Journal of Financial Intermediation最新文献

The size and the leverage of financial market investors and the elasticity of demand of unlevered investors define MinMaSS, the smallest market size that can support a given degree of leverage. The financial system’s potential for financial crises can be measured by the stability ratio, the ratio of total market size to MinMaSS. We use that financial stability metric to gauge the buildup of vulnerability in the run-up to the 1998 Long-Term Capital Management crisis and argue that policymakers could have detected the potential for the crisis.

Liquidity shocks transmitted through interbank connections contributed to bank distress during the Great Depression. New data on interbank connections reveal that banks were vulnerable to closures of their correspondents and their respondents. Further, banks were less responsive to network liquidity risk in their management of cash and capital buffers after the Federal Reserve was established, suggesting that banks expected the Fed to reduce that risk. The Fed's presence weakened incentives for the most systemically important banks to maintain capital and cash buffers against liquidity risk, and thereby likely contributed to the banking system's vulnerability to contagion during the Depression.

Exploiting debit card and credit card transactions of a large, representative sample of consumers from a leading bank in Singapore, we examine the consumption response to an anticipated, transitory price shock generated by the nation-wide annual sale event. Consumers significantly increase their spending during the sale event. More importantly, we find inter-temporal substitution where consumers spend less immediately before the event, and cross-categorical substitution behavior where consumers decrease spending in items unaffected by the sale event. However, consumers exhibit little substitution behavior when they use credit cards or when they are liquidity constrained, highlighting the importance of heterogeneity in assessing the aggregate impact of such stimulus programs.

An expansion in mortgage credit to subprime borrowers is widely believed to have been a principal driver of the 2002-2006 U.S. house price boom. By contrast, this paper documents a robust, negative correlation between the growth in the share of purchase mortgages to subprime borrowers and house price appreciation at the county-level during this time. Using two different instrumental variables approaches, we also establish causal evidence that house price appreciation lowered the share of purchase loans to subprime borrowers. Further analysis using micro-level credit bureau data shows that higher house price appreciation reduced the transition rate into first-time homeownership for subprime individuals. Finally, the paper documents that subprime borrowers did not play a significant role in the increased speculative activity and underwriting fraud that the literature has linked directly to the housing boom. Taken together, these results are more consistent with subprime borrowers being priced out of housing boom markets rather than inflating prices in those markets.

We study the transmission of negative interest rates to bank lending around an unexpected policy rate cut into deep negative territory by the Swiss National Bank (−0.75%). We exploit a rich data set on transaction-level corporate loans matched with bank balance sheet data. We find that banks more affected by negative interest rates offer looser lending terms and lend more than other banks. This result is consistent with the risk-taking channel, where a lower policy rate spurs bank risk-taking to maintain profits. The result implies that, even in such deep negative territory, the reversal rate has not yet been hit.

We investigate the effects of countercyclical prudential buffers on bank risk-taking. We exploit the introduction of dynamic loan loss provisioning in Spain, mandating that banks use historical average loss rates in their estimation of loan loss provisions. We find that dynamic loan loss provisioning is associated with reductions in timely loan loss provisioning. Banks that previously recognized loan losses in a timely fashion exhibit the greatest reductions in timeliness and consequently extend loans to riskier borrowers with lower accounting quality. Our results have policy implications for the debate on the use of financial reporting requirements in mitigating capital pro-cyclicality.

How should sovereign bailouts take account of the effects bailouts have on policy reforms? Conflicted recipient governments complicate bailout choices because some reforms that spur growth reduce rents that benefit government decision makers. Our model takes account of whether bailout generosity and policy reforms are strategic substitutes, strategic complements or both, and each case implies a different optimal bailout contract, which generally cannot achieve First Best. Conditional forgiveness of some loan payments when economic outcomes are sufficiently favorable can achieve outcomes closer to First Best, and this is so for a small ex ante amount of the bailout subsidy.

Studies find that during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, loan spreads rose and corporate lending tightened, especially for foreign borrowers (a flight-home effect). We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance (DI) made smaller reductions in total lending and foreign lending, experienced smaller increases in loan spreads, and had quicker post-crisis recoveries. These effects are more pronounced for banks heavily relying on deposit funding. Evidence also reveals that more generous or credible DI design is associated with a stronger stabilization effect on bank lending during the crisis, confirmed by the difference-in-differences analysis based on expansion of DI coverage during the crisis. The stabilization effect is robust to the use of country-specific crisis measures and control of temporary government guarantees.

Funds with performance fees have annual net risk-adjusted returns of 0.50% below other funds, a result mostly due to funds without a stochastic benchmark against which performance is measured and funds with a benchmark that is easy to beat. For other funds, there is no evidence of underperformance. Performance fee funds charge total expenses, including the performance fee, that are substantially higher than those of other funds. Investors are more likely to punish poor performance in funds with performance fees than in other funds. Our results indicate that even when fees are less regulated, investors can generally be relied upon to make the right choices, but that there are a subset of funds where performance fees are employed to extract additional fees from investors.

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk.