Journal of Financial Intermediation最新文献

Private equity (PE) managers are required to invest their own money in the funds they manage. We examine the incentive effects of this ownership on the delegated acquisition decision. A simple model shows that PE managers select less risky firms and use more debt, the higher their ownership. We test these predictions for a sample of Norwegian PE funds, using managers’ wealth to capture their relative risk aversion. As predicted, the target company’s cash-flow risk decreases and leverage increases with the manager’s ownership scaled by wealth. Moreover, the overall portfolio risk decreases with ownership, mitigating widespread concerns about excessive risk-taking.

Can fintech close the gender gap in access to financial services? Using novel survey data for 28 countries, this paper finds a large and ubiquitous ‘fintech gender gap’: while 29% of men use fintech products, only 21% of women do. This difference exceeds the gender gap in bank account ownership at traditional financial institutions. While country characteristics and individual-level controls explain about a third of the fintech gender gap, the residual gap declines by 60% when accounting for gender differences in the willingness to use new financial technology, the suitability of fintech products, and the willingness to use fintech entrants if they offer cheaper products. The paper concludes by discussing drivers of differences in attitudes and implications for policy to foster financial inclusion with new technology.

We review the literature on financial intermediation in the process by which new medical therapeutics are financed, developed, and delivered. We discuss the contributing factors that lead to a key finding in the literature—underinvestment in biomedical R&D—and focus on the role that banks and other intermediaries can play in financing biomedical R&D and potentially closing this funding gap. We conclude with a discussion of the role of financial intermediation in the delivery of healthcare to patients.

This paper documents the agency costs resulting from the deeper tranching of subprime residential mortgage pools. Mortgage servicers are less likely to renegotiate delinquent loans collateralizing a greater number and variety of tranches. We find that an interquartile increase in tranching reduces mortgage servicers’ probability of loan renegotiation by 14% relative to the mean. This effect is concentrated in mortgages with greater ambiguity surrounding the loan value maximizing action. Overall, our results support the notion that tranching worsens agency frictions by increasing coordination costs among investors and impeding their monitoring of the agent.

Firms insure themselves from liquidity shocks by contracting on credit lines from banks. I document novel empirical evidence on how the risk of contract nonperformance by banks is priced. Firms pay a higher price for loan commitments from safer banks. A one standard deviation increase in the cross-sectional mean of bank capital increases the commitment fees by 5%. To investigate a potential causal effect of lender stability on commitment fees, I exploit exogenous variation in the market value of banks’ assets from natural disasters. The sensitivity of the fees is higher for firms with higher short-term liabilities and higher income uncertainty.

We present a model in which intermediaries create liquidity by issuing safe debt. Two types of intermediaries emerge: Traditional banks that create liquidity by issuing equity and holding assets to maturity, and market-based intermediaries that create liquidity by selling assets in fire sales in downturns. We show that the reliance on market-based intermediation is necessarily too high, but liquidity creation is not. It can also be too low as the endogenous fire-sale risk can push liquidity creation below its optimum. We argue that standard capital or liquidity regulation are ineffective, and optimal macroprudential regulation should instead target market-based intermediation.

We assemble a unique dataset containing population-level information on loan applications in a region hosting two cultural groups to study the role of culture in firm borrowing decisions. We find that firms are more likely to apply for loans from culturally close banks. This effect is stronger for opaque firms, but not for less performing firms, indicating that firms do not expect preferential treatment from same-culture banks. Loan applications to culturally distant banks increase sharply with firms’ size and age, suggesting a role of information asymmetry in firm-bank matching. In contrast, we find no effect of cultural proximity on loan supply. Overall, our results show that demand-side factors play a key role in the formation of same-culture lending relationships.

Increasing the cost associated with gathering information can hamper the monitoring activity of the market even when information remains public. Using the 2015 US money market funds (MMFs) reform as a quasi-natural experiment, I find a positive effect of removing information requirements over credit ratings on the allocation by MMFs toward securities rated as second tier. The effect is driven by monitored MMFs catering to retail investors and by monitored MMFs that do not voluntarily report credit ratings after the reform. The verfied increase in the relative demand by MMFs for second tier securities is associated with a decrease in the spread paid at issuance by second tier commercial paper.

Banks engage in maturity transformation and the term premium compensates them for bearing the associated interest rate risk. Consistent with this view, I show that banks’ net interest margins and term premia have comoved in the United States over the last decades. On monetary policy announcement days, bank equity falls more sharply than nonbank equity following an increase in expected future short-term rates, but also responds more positively if term premia increase. These effects are reflected in bank cash-flows and amplified for banks with a larger maturity mismatch. The results reveal that banks are not immune to interest rate risk.

I study a registry-based dataset of Swedish mutual fund managers’ personal portfolios. The majority of managers do not invest personal wealth into the very same funds they professionally manage. The managers who do invest personal money into their funds subsequently outperform the managers who do not. The results suggest that fund managers, in contrast to regular investors, are certain about their ability to generate an abnormal return, or lack thereof, and invest their personal wealth accordingly.