{"title":"Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 12/2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12498","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"805-808"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12498","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142685346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Membership Benefits","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12499","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"1089"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12499","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142685347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The role of government versus private sector provision of insurance","authors":"Arthur Charpentier","doi":"10.1111/jori.12497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12497","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"983-989"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142692060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The economics of emerging insurance technologies: Theory and early evidence","authors":"Daniel Bauer, Joan Schmit, Justin Sydnor","doi":"10.1111/jori.12495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12495","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"809-812"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142691208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Subsidized insurance against extreme weather events improves affordability among households in at-risk areas but it can weaken the risk signal via property prices. Leveraging a granular data set of all property transactions and flood events in England, we study the effects of a reinsurance scheme that lowers insurance premiums for at-risk properties. We document that the introduction of this scheme increases prices and transaction volumes of flood-prone properties. This fully offsets the negative direct effects of flooding on property prices, with high-income areas and high-value properties benefiting relatively more. Our findings speak to the debate on climate adaptation policies and their consequences for wealth distribution.
{"title":"The effect of subsidized flood insurance on real estate markets","authors":"Nicola Garbarino, Benjamin Guin, Jonathan Lee","doi":"10.1111/jori.12491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12491","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Subsidized insurance against extreme weather events improves affordability among households in at-risk areas but it can weaken the risk signal via property prices. Leveraging a granular data set of all property transactions and flood events in England, we study the effects of a reinsurance scheme that lowers insurance premiums for at-risk properties. We document that the introduction of this scheme increases prices and transaction volumes of flood-prone properties. This fully offsets the negative direct effects of flooding on property prices, with high-income areas and high-value properties benefiting relatively more. Our findings speak to the debate on climate adaptation policies and their consequences for wealth distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"991-1024"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12491","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142685329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Extant research holds that digital sales channels advance competition and service or goods availability but rarely details the attendant information asymmetry. Leveraging a large unique dataset, this study examines a specific case in which consumers have a choice between offline and digital channels for insurance purchases. We find that digital channels screen in consumers with lower unobserved risk. For term life, endowment and disease insurance products, the average risks of the policies purchased through digital channels were significantly lower than those purchased offline after controlling for all observed risk characteristics. This risk screening effect mainly comes from the inclusion of new low-risk enrollees. As a consequence, digital channels exhibit lower information asymmetry and greater profitability compared to offline channels.
{"title":"The risk screening effect of digital insurance distribution","authors":"Finbarr Murphy, Wei Xu, Xian Xu","doi":"10.1111/jori.12496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12496","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Extant research holds that digital sales channels advance competition and service or goods availability but rarely details the attendant information asymmetry. Leveraging a large unique dataset, this study examines a specific case in which consumers have a choice between offline and digital channels for insurance purchases. We find that digital channels screen in consumers with lower unobserved risk. For term life, endowment and disease insurance products, the average risks of the policies purchased through digital channels were significantly lower than those purchased offline after controlling for all observed risk characteristics. This risk screening effect mainly comes from the inclusion of new low-risk enrollees. As a consequence, digital channels exhibit lower information asymmetry and greater profitability compared to offline channels.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"841-866"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142685304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Miremad Soleymanian, Charles B. Weinberg, Ting Zhu
In this paper, we examine the role of usage‐based auto insurance on customers' decisions to change their insurance coverage at the renewal. Using a sample of 135,540 customers, we study whether usage‐based insurance (UBI) can facilitate the upselling and cross‐selling efforts of the firm, possibly leading to higher coverage choices and additional insurance product purchases. Our results suggest that UBI customers are more likely to change their coverage choice than non‐UBI customers at first (but not second) renewal. Both price discounts and the information provided by UBI affect the customers' coverage changes. Among UBI customers, those who get higher UBI discounts are more likely to both increase their insurance coverage (upselling) and add the comprehensive coverage option (cross‐selling), which is not directly related to driving behavior at the time of first (annual) renewal. Moreover, customers who have received more negative feedback (daily hard brakes) are more likely to increase their insurance coverage.
在本文中，我们研究了基于使用情况的汽车保险对客户在续保时决定变更保险范围的作用。我们以 135 540 位客户为样本，研究了基于使用情况的保险（UBI）是否能促进公司的追加销售和交叉销售，从而可能导致更多的保险选择和额外的保险产品购买。我们的研究结果表明，与非 UBI 客户相比，UBI 客户在首次续保（而非第二次续保）时更有可能改变其保险选择。价格折扣和 UBI 提供的信息都会影响客户的投保变化。在 UBI 客户中，获得较高 UBI 折扣的客户更有可能增加保险范围（向上销售）和增加综合保险选项（交叉销售），这与首次（年度）续保时的驾驶行为没有直接关系。此外，收到较多负面反馈（日常急刹车）的客户更有可能增加保险额度。
{"title":"Insurtech, sensor data, and changes in customers' coverage choices: Evidence from usage‐based automobile insurance","authors":"Miremad Soleymanian, Charles B. Weinberg, Ting Zhu","doi":"10.1111/jori.12490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12490","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we examine the role of usage‐based auto insurance on customers' decisions to change their insurance coverage at the renewal. Using a sample of 135,540 customers, we study whether usage‐based insurance (UBI) can facilitate the upselling and cross‐selling efforts of the firm, possibly leading to higher coverage choices and additional insurance product purchases. Our results suggest that UBI customers are more likely to change their coverage choice than non‐UBI customers at first (but not second) renewal. Both price discounts and the information provided by UBI affect the customers' coverage changes. Among UBI customers, those who get higher UBI discounts are more likely to both increase their insurance coverage (upselling) and add the comprehensive coverage option (cross‐selling), which is not directly related to driving behavior at the time of first (annual) renewal. Moreover, customers who have received more negative feedback (daily hard brakes) are more likely to increase their insurance coverage.","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 3/2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12486","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"495-497"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12486","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142013519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Membership Benefits","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12488","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"803-804"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12488","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142013518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a dynamic investment model with loan guarantees wherein insurers face information disadvantages and learn about borrower quality. Borrowers signal their qualities through investment timing, which is characterized by the investment threshold and elapsed time. We derive the conditions for separating or pooling equilibria. We show that the separating investment threshold is constant and determined mainly by the maximum threshold preventing mimicry. If project risk is higher (lower) than the market growth rate, the pooling investment threshold declines (increases) with elapsed time, and learning enhances (reduces) the willingness of high-quality borrowers to wait. Learning alleviates adverse selection and reduces guarantee costs. These effects are more pronounced with a greater uncertainty of the insurer on borrower quality. We reveal dual effects of waiting. The worse the market prospect, the higher the value of waiting in pooling outcomes. Fee-for-guarantee swaps are superior to equity-for-guarantee swaps in environments with marked information asymmetry.
{"title":"Loan guarantees and SMEs' investments under asymmetric information and Bayesian learning","authors":"Pengfei Luo, Huamao Wang, Zhaojun Yang","doi":"10.1111/jori.12485","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12485","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a dynamic investment model with loan guarantees wherein insurers face information disadvantages and learn about borrower quality. Borrowers signal their qualities through investment timing, which is characterized by the investment threshold and elapsed time. We derive the conditions for separating or pooling equilibria. We show that the separating investment threshold is constant and determined mainly by the maximum threshold preventing mimicry. If project risk is higher (lower) than the market growth rate, the pooling investment threshold declines (increases) with elapsed time, and learning enhances (reduces) the willingness of high-quality borrowers to wait. Learning alleviates adverse selection and reduces guarantee costs. These effects are more pronounced with a greater uncertainty of the insurer on borrower quality. We reveal dual effects of waiting. The worse the market prospect, the higher the value of waiting in pooling outcomes. Fee-for-guarantee swaps are superior to equity-for-guarantee swaps in environments with marked information asymmetry.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"567-598"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141612880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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