Journal of Risk and Insurance最新文献

I examine the design of optimal insurance contracts considering the possibility of government disaster relief payments. This work focuses on the impact of (risky and ambiguous) government disaster relief on the shape of optimal private insurance contracts. I demonstrate that the optimal insurance contract is a straight deductible contract in the case of a fixed probability of government relief. This result is robust to ambiguity in the probability of relief payments, even for ambiguity-averse decision makers. If government disaster relief becomes more likely for larger losses, then the optimal insurance contract features coinsurance above a deductible. I also extend this analysis to more general stochastic dominance relationships between disaster relief and loss magnitude.

This paper investigates retirees' optimal purchases of fixed and variable longevity income annuities using their defined contribution (DC) plan assets and given their expected social security benefits. As an alternative, we also evaluate using plan assets to boost social security benefits through delayed claiming. Using a calibrated life-cycle model, we determine that including deferred income annuities in DC accounts is welfare-enhancing for all sex/education groups examined. We also show that providing access to well-designed variable deferred annuities with some equity exposure further enhances retiree well-being, compared to having access only to fixed annuities. Nevertheless, for those facing the highest mortality rates, delaying claiming social security is mostly preferred, whereas those anticipating living longer than average will benefit more from using accumulated DC plan assets to purchase deferred annuities.

This paper investigates the relationship between female CEOs and insolvency risk of US property-casualty insurance companies. We show that female CEOs are associated with lower insurer insolvency propensity, higher z-score, and lower standard deviation of return on assets. These findings are robust to alternative econometric specifications to address potential endogeneity concerns and self-selection issues, including propensity score matching, the instrumental variable approach, and the difference-in-difference approach. Furthermore, we find that the impact of female CEOs on insurer insolvency risk is moderated by firm capitalization, the presence of female directors, and political conservatism of insurers' home states.

Using an exogenous drop in analyst coverage introduced by broker closures and mergers, we test for the causal impact of analyst coverage on corporate risk-taking, in an opaque industry. We document an increase in risk using several book-based and market-based risk measures, including tail and default risk measures. Results are driven by firms with stronger managerial risk-taking compensation incentives. The increase in risk is stronger in more opaque firms, and firms with weaker policyholder monitoring. Firm risk increases through at least one risk-taking action, such as investing firm assets in higher-risk bonds. Our study highlights the importance of stock analysts in affecting corporate risk-taking, especially in the presence of stronger managerial, compensation risk-taking incentives.

In the underwriting and pricing of nonlife insurance products, it is essential for the insurer to utilize both policyholder information and claim history to ensure profitability and proper risk management. In this paper, we apply a flexible regression model with random effects, called the Mixed Logit-weighted Reduced Mixture-of-Experts, which leverages both policyholder information and their claim history, to categorize policyholders into groups with similar risk profiles, and to determine a premium that accurately captures the unobserved risks. Estimates of model parameters and the posterior distribution of random effects can be obtained by a stochastic variational algorithm, which is numerically efficient and scalable to large insurance portfolios. Our proposed framework is shown to outperform the classical benchmark models (Logistic and Lognormal GL(M)M) in terms of goodness-of-fit to data, while offering intuitive and interpretable characterization of policyholders' risk profiles to adequately reflect their claim history.

About a quarter of long-term care insurance (LTCI) policy holders aged 65 let their policies lapse before death, forfeiting all benefits. We find that lapse rates are substantially higher among the cognitively impaired in the Health and Retirement Study. This generates a pernicious form of dynamic advantageous selection, as the cognitively impaired are more likely to use care. Simulations show that an inappropriately optimistic asset drawdown path further increases the individual welfare cost of unanticipated lapses. Meanwhile, we find evidence of a significant but very small role for either strategic or financial motives for lapsing.

On-demand insurance is an innovative business model from the InsurTech space, which provides coverage for episodic risks. It makes use of a simple fact in a practical way: People differ in their frequency of exposure as well as the probability of loss. The extra dimension of heterogeneity can be used to screen the insured and shifts the utility-possibility frontier outward. We provide a sufficient condition under which type-specific full insurance at the actuarially fair price is incentive compatible. We also show that our results hold for various real-world implementations of on-demand insurance.

Ignoring the effects of inflation in retirement planning can have severe consequences for an individual's future financial well-being. Yet, many pension funds do not communicate inflation-related information, presumably for the fear of reduced contributions once the members understand how low the “real” return on saving for retirement is. As an alternative prediction, the provision of inflation information could increase pension contributions, because it reveals possible pension shortfalls. In cooperation with a major German pension fund, we conduct a field experiment, in which we vary the inflation information provided to the fund members, to explore this important issue. Among all participants, we find mostly positive but insignificant effects of the inflation information on pension contributions. Among those participants who voluntarily changed their pension contributions after the experimental intervention, the provision of inflation information significantly raises the likelihood of increasing pension contributions.