The federal courts have long struggled to articulate a set of coherent standards for who may assert rights under a federal statute. Apart from the constitutional limitations of the judicial power under Article III, courts have until recently addressed this question under a series of freestanding “prudential” rules governing standing to sue. The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lexmark International v. Static Control Components marked a sea change, holding that the federal courts may not decline to assert jurisdiction for prudential reasons and that standing to sue under a federal statute depends on whom Congress intended to authorize to sue. But Lexmark raised as many questions as it answered. In the same breath that it declared statutory standing a matter of congressional intent, the Court held that proximate cause— a creature of the common law of tort—generally defines the limits of federal statutory claims. Subsequent decisions applying this rule have extrapolated the Court’s decisional law from narrow and specific settings to provide a new, trans-substantive limitation on standing to assert federal statutory rights.
{"title":"Proximate Cause in Statutory Standing and the Genesis of Federal Common Law","authors":"D. Yablon","doi":"10.15779/Z380000111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z380000111","url":null,"abstract":"The federal courts have long struggled to articulate a set of coherent standards for who may assert rights under a federal statute. Apart from the constitutional limitations of the judicial power under Article III, courts have until recently addressed this question under a series of freestanding “prudential” rules governing standing to sue. The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lexmark International v. Static Control Components marked a sea change, holding that the federal courts may not decline to assert jurisdiction for prudential reasons and that standing to sue under a federal statute depends on whom Congress intended to authorize to sue. But Lexmark raised as many questions as it answered. In the same breath that it declared statutory standing a matter of congressional intent, the Court held that proximate cause— a creature of the common law of tort—generally defines the limits of federal statutory claims. Subsequent decisions applying this rule have extrapolated the Court’s decisional law from narrow and specific settings to provide a new, trans-substantive limitation on standing to assert federal statutory rights.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1609"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67366926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. S. Richardson, Cristina Mora, Sabrina McGraw, Caroline Mae McKay, Paul von Autenried, Lexi Heller, Patrick Rubalcava, Devon W. Carbado
I. The Solidarity Presumption ............................................................ 1994 II. The Fallacy ................................................................................... 1996 A. Racial Anxiety Experienced by Blacks ............................ 1996 1. Conformity Pressure.................................................. 1997 2. Value Threat ............................................................. 2000 3. Lower Performance Ratings for Diversity-Valuing Behavior ................................................................... 2003 B. Racial Anxiety Experienced by Whites............................ 2004 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 2007
当时为止The Solidarity Presumption ............................................................在1994二世。《Fallacy ...................................................................................在1996甲。Racial Anxiety Experienced by Blacks ............................在1996 1。Conformity Pressure ..................................................在1997两个。Value Threat .............................................................2000三。美国小妞那家Performance Ratings Diversity-Valuing Behavior ...................................................................2003 b Racial Anxiety Experienced by Whites ............................在2004 Conclusion ........................................................................................2007
{"title":"The Fallacy of the (Racial) Solidarity Presumption","authors":"L. S. Richardson, Cristina Mora, Sabrina McGraw, Caroline Mae McKay, Paul von Autenried, Lexi Heller, Patrick Rubalcava, Devon W. Carbado","doi":"10.15779/Z38707WP36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38707WP36","url":null,"abstract":"I. The Solidarity Presumption ............................................................ 1994 II. The Fallacy ................................................................................... 1996 A. Racial Anxiety Experienced by Blacks ............................ 1996 1. Conformity Pressure.................................................. 1997 2. Value Threat ............................................................. 2000 3. Lower Performance Ratings for Diversity-Valuing Behavior ................................................................... 2003 B. Racial Anxiety Experienced by Whites............................ 2004 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 2007","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1993"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67415588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In its two most recent decisions regarding the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)—Jesner v. Arab Bank and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum— the US Supreme Court failed to answer the specific question upon which it granted certiorari: whether the ATS permits suit against corporate defendants. These two cases reveal only that the ATS does not permit suits against foreign corporate defendants or suits for claims arising from conduct that takes place outside of the US. To frustrate the ATS saga further, the fractured Court in Jesner expressly declined to resolve the question whether international or domestic law should govern corporate liability. And only the plurality even entertained the issue that was central to the lower court’s reasoning: whether the ATS required a customary international law norm of corporate liability or, instead, allowed plaintiffs to bring tort claims ipso facto under federal common law. The inarticulation leaves a gap in international law that the Supreme Court would do well to fill. The question has begun to percolate among the lower federal courts, and it has emerged in a case before the Canadian Supreme Court as well. (Nevsun Res. v. Araya, 2018 CarswellBC 1552 (Can.) (WL) (granting petition for review)).
{"title":"Hidden Renvoi: The Search for Corporate Liability in Alien Tort Statute Litigation","authors":"Isaac Ramsey","doi":"10.15779/Z38WM13T9T","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38WM13T9T","url":null,"abstract":"In its two most recent decisions regarding the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)—Jesner v. Arab Bank and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum— the US Supreme Court failed to answer the specific question upon which it granted certiorari: whether the ATS permits suit against corporate defendants. These two cases reveal only that the ATS does not permit suits against foreign corporate defendants or suits for claims arising from conduct that takes place outside of the US. To frustrate the ATS saga further, the fractured Court in Jesner expressly declined to resolve the question whether international or domestic law should govern corporate liability. And only the plurality even entertained the issue that was central to the lower court’s reasoning: whether the ATS required a customary international law norm of corporate liability or, instead, allowed plaintiffs to bring tort claims ipso facto under federal common law. The inarticulation leaves a gap in international law that the Supreme Court would do well to fill. The question has begun to percolate among the lower federal courts, and it has emerged in a case before the Canadian Supreme Court as well. (Nevsun Res. v. Araya, 2018 CarswellBC 1552 (Can.) (WL) (granting petition for review)).","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"2071"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67575584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Introduction ............................................................................................ 868 I. Situating the Debate ............................................................................ 871 II. Pre-Constitutional History ................................................................. 877 A. The English Experience ....................................................... 879 1. The English Privilege .................................................... 880 2. English Suspension ........................................................ 882 B. The American Experience ................................................... 884 C. The Coverage Rule .............................................................. 888 1. The major premise ......................................................... 890 2. The minor premise ......................................................... 892 3. The conclusion, and the history of which privilege? ..... 893 III. Verdicts on History ........................................................................... 895 A. President Lincoln and the Civil War .................................... 896 B. President Roosevelt and World War II ................................ 898 C. President George W. Bush and the War on Terror .............. 901 IV. The Thickness Plank ......................................................................... 903 A. The Extent of Citizen Detention .......................................... 904 1. Hamdi and Padilla .......................................................... 904 2. John Doe ........................................................................ 906 B. Wartime Flexibility and Incapacitation Strategies ............... 908 C. Suspension-as-Authorization ............................................... 914 V. The Coverage Plank ........................................................................... 918
{"title":"Citizenship, National Security Detention, and the Habeas Remedy","authors":"Lee B. Kovarsky","doi":"10.15779/Z387D2Q76Q","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z387D2Q76Q","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction ............................................................................................ 868 I. Situating the Debate ............................................................................ 871 II. Pre-Constitutional History ................................................................. 877 A. The English Experience ....................................................... 879 1. The English Privilege .................................................... 880 2. English Suspension ........................................................ 882 B. The American Experience ................................................... 884 C. The Coverage Rule .............................................................. 888 1. The major premise ......................................................... 890 2. The minor premise ......................................................... 892 3. The conclusion, and the history of which privilege? ..... 893 III. Verdicts on History ........................................................................... 895 A. President Lincoln and the Civil War .................................... 896 B. President Roosevelt and World War II ................................ 898 C. President George W. Bush and the War on Terror .............. 901 IV. The Thickness Plank ......................................................................... 903 A. The Extent of Citizen Detention .......................................... 904 1. Hamdi and Padilla .......................................................... 904 2. John Doe ........................................................................ 906 B. Wartime Flexibility and Incapacitation Strategies ............... 908 C. Suspension-as-Authorization ............................................... 914 V. The Coverage Plank ........................................................................... 918","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"867"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67419118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Big Data and the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines","authors":"Charles A. Miller","doi":"10.15779/Z38TT4FT2H","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38TT4FT2H","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"309"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67561439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The story that James Forman Jr. tells in his superb book, Locking Up Our Own,1 is local and nuanced. Forman explains that mass incarceration resulted from many small decisions made in many different places.2 Although all of those decisions were shaped by the legacies of racism and racial oppression, Forman shows that mass incarceration was not only a product of racism and racial oppression, or at least that the lines of causation are long and complicated. The story that Forman tells may therefore seem disconnected from the election of Donald Trump and from the nationwide resurgence of racism, nativism, and anti-Semitism since 2016. The fear and hate that Trump has whipped up have been anything but nuanced, and this is a national story, not a local one. It may therefore seem misguided to ask what Forman’s book can tell us about the distinctive challenges of the Trump era, other than to remind us of the continued, critical importance of local politics in criminal justice. Ultimately, though, Locking Up Our Own is about policing, prosecution, and punishment in a democracy. The direction that our national politics has taken in the past few years gives us reason to rethink democracy; not whether it is a good thing, but what it should mean, and what it requires to flourish. And Forman’s book does have some lessons about that, beyond “think local.” It can help us think more sensibly about the connections between criminal justice and democracy at the national as well as the local level. The most important lesson the book offers in this regard is that we should worry more about making criminal justice safe for democracy than about making democracy safe for criminal justice.
小詹姆斯·福尔曼(James Forman Jr.)在他的著作《锁住我们自己的人》(locked Up Our Own)中讲述的故事是地方性的，细致入微的。福尔曼解释说，大规模监禁是由许多不同地方的许多小决定造成的虽然所有这些决定都受到种族主义和种族压迫的影响，但福尔曼表明，大规模监禁不仅仅是种族主义和种族压迫的产物，或者至少因果关系是漫长而复杂的。因此，福尔曼讲述的故事似乎与唐纳德·特朗普的当选以及2016年以来全国范围内种族主义、本土主义和反犹太主义的复苏无关。特朗普挑起的恐惧和仇恨一点也不微妙，这是一个全国性的故事，而不是一个地方性的故事。因此，问福尔曼的书能告诉我们特朗普时代的独特挑战是什么，而不是提醒我们地方政治在刑事司法中持续的、至关重要的重要性，似乎是错误的。然而，归根结底，《关起我们自己的人》是关于民主国家的治安、起诉和惩罚。我们国家政治在过去几年中所采取的方向使我们有理由重新思考民主;不是它是不是一件好事，而是它应该意味着什么，以及它需要什么才能蓬勃发展。福尔曼的书确实有一些关于这方面的教训，除了“本地化思考”。它可以帮助我们更理智地思考国家和地方一级刑事司法与民主之间的联系。在这方面，这本书提供的最重要的教训是，我们应该更多地担心刑事司法对民主的安全，而不是民主对刑事司法的安全。
{"title":"Populism, Pluralism, and Criminal Justice","authors":"D. Sklansky","doi":"10.15779/Z38ZK55M88","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38ZK55M88","url":null,"abstract":"The story that James Forman Jr. tells in his superb book, Locking Up Our Own,1 is local and nuanced. Forman explains that mass incarceration resulted from many small decisions made in many different places.2 Although all of those decisions were shaped by the legacies of racism and racial oppression, Forman shows that mass incarceration was not only a product of racism and racial oppression, or at least that the lines of causation are long and complicated. The story that Forman tells may therefore seem disconnected from the election of Donald Trump and from the nationwide resurgence of racism, nativism, and anti-Semitism since 2016. The fear and hate that Trump has whipped up have been anything but nuanced, and this is a national story, not a local one. It may therefore seem misguided to ask what Forman’s book can tell us about the distinctive challenges of the Trump era, other than to remind us of the continued, critical importance of local politics in criminal justice. Ultimately, though, Locking Up Our Own is about policing, prosecution, and punishment in a democracy. The direction that our national politics has taken in the past few years gives us reason to rethink democracy; not whether it is a good thing, but what it should mean, and what it requires to flourish. And Forman’s book does have some lessons about that, beyond “think local.” It can help us think more sensibly about the connections between criminal justice and democracy at the national as well as the local level. The most important lesson the book offers in this regard is that we should worry more about making criminal justice safe for democracy than about making democracy safe for criminal justice.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"2009"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67593111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article challenges existing narratives about the future of American Indian land tenure. The current highly-federalized system for reservation property is deeply problematic. In particular, the trust status of many reservation lands is expensive, bureaucratic, oppressive, and linked to persistent poverty in many reservation communities. Yet, for complex reasons, trust property has proven largely immune from fundamental reform. Today, there seem to be two primary approaches floated for the future of reservation property. The first is a “do the best with what we have” strategy that largely accepts core problems with trust, perhaps with some minor efficiency-oriented tinkering, for the sake of the benefits and security it does provide. The second is a return to old, already-failed reform strategies focused on “liberating” American Indian people with a forced transition to statebased fee simple property. Both strategies respond, sometimes implicitly, to deep impulses about how property should work, especially in a market economy. But both of these approaches also neglect sufficient respect for the true potential of more autonomous Indigenous property regimes.
{"title":"Transforming Property: Reclaiming Indigenous Land Tenures","authors":"Jessica A. Shoemaker","doi":"10.15779/Z383R0PT7K","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z383R0PT7K","url":null,"abstract":"This Article challenges existing narratives about the future of American Indian land tenure. The current highly-federalized system for reservation property is deeply problematic. In particular, the trust status of many reservation lands is expensive, bureaucratic, oppressive, and linked to persistent poverty in many reservation communities. Yet, for complex reasons, trust property has proven largely immune from fundamental reform. Today, there seem to be two primary approaches floated for the future of reservation property. The first is a “do the best with what we have” strategy that largely accepts core problems with trust, perhaps with some minor efficiency-oriented tinkering, for the sake of the benefits and security it does provide. The second is a return to old, already-failed reform strategies focused on “liberating” American Indian people with a forced transition to statebased fee simple property. Both strategies respond, sometimes implicitly, to deep impulses about how property should work, especially in a market economy. But both of these approaches also neglect sufficient respect for the true potential of more autonomous Indigenous property regimes.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1531"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67394023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. The Architecture and Accountability of Crime Policy ..................... 1968 A. The “Cultural Change” Frame ......................................... 1969 B. The “Institutional Change” Frame ................................... 1973 II. Moving Beyond the Most Sympathetic Cases................................ 1975 III. Getting to All of the Above ......................................................... 1979 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 1982
{"title":"Three Lessons for Criminal Law Reformers from Locking Up Our Own","authors":"R. Barkow","doi":"10.15779/Z383775W0D","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z383775W0D","url":null,"abstract":"I. The Architecture and Accountability of Crime Policy ..................... 1968 A. The “Cultural Change” Frame ......................................... 1969 B. The “Institutional Change” Frame ................................... 1973 II. Moving Beyond the Most Sympathetic Cases................................ 1975 III. Getting to All of the Above ......................................................... 1979 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 1982","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1967"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67390082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the ongoing litigation of Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard College, Harvard faces allegations that its once-heralded admissions process discriminates against Asian Americans. Public discourse has revealed a dominant narrative: affirmative action is viewed as the presumptive cause of Harvard’s alleged “Asian penalty.” Yet this narrative misrepresents the plaintiff’s own theory of discrimination. Rather than implicating affirmative action, the underlying allegations portray the phenomenon of “negative action” — that is, an admissions regime in which White applicants take the seats of their more qualified Asian-American counterparts. Nonetheless, we are witnessing a broad failure to see this case for what it is. This misperception invites an unnecessary and misplaced referendum on race-conscious admissions at Harvard and beyond.
在正在进行的“学生公平录取”(Students for Fair Admissions)诉哈佛学院(Harvard College)的诉讼中，哈佛大学面临的指控是，其一度备受推崇的录取程序歧视亚裔美国人。公共话语揭示了一种占主导地位的说法:平权法案被视为哈佛所谓的“亚裔惩罚”的推定原因。然而，这种叙述歪曲了原告自己的歧视理论。这些指控并没有涉及平权行动，而是描绘了一种“消极行动”现象——也就是说，在一种招生制度中，白人申请人占据了更合格的亚裔美国人的席位。尽管如此，我们看到的是，人们普遍未能看清这一问题的本质。这种误解引发了一场不必要的、错误的全民公决，反对哈佛大学及其他学校的种族意识录取。
{"title":"SFFA v. Harvard: How Affirmative Action Myths Mask White Bonus","authors":"J. Feingold","doi":"10.15779/Z38Z02Z882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38Z02Z882","url":null,"abstract":"In the ongoing litigation of Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard College, Harvard faces allegations that its once-heralded admissions process discriminates against Asian Americans. Public discourse has revealed a dominant narrative: affirmative action is viewed as the presumptive cause of Harvard’s alleged “Asian penalty.” Yet this narrative misrepresents the plaintiff’s own theory of discrimination. Rather than implicating affirmative action, the underlying allegations portray the phenomenon of “negative action” — that is, an admissions regime in which White applicants take the seats of their more qualified Asian-American counterparts. Nonetheless, we are witnessing a broad failure to see this case for what it is. This misperception invites an unnecessary and misplaced referendum on race-conscious admissions at Harvard and beyond.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"707"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67589645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Locking Up My Own: Reflections of a Black (Recovering) Prosecutor","authors":"P. Butler","doi":"10.15779/Z38ST7DX6G","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38ST7DX6G","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1983"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67552452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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