The resource limitations of legal nonprofit organizations force staff attorneys to make difficult choices about whom to serve. Nowhere are the consequences of lawyers’ case selection decisions starker than in the immigration context, where individuals face deportation if unable to successfully advocate for themselves before legal authorities. Based on three years of qualitative research within legal services organizations in Los Angeles, this Note describes and contextualizes immigration lawyers’ case-selection approach, with a focus on attorneys’ role as policy actors within the immigrant justice movement.
{"title":"Universalizing the U Visa: Challenges of Immigration Case Selection in Legal Nonprofits","authors":"S. Lakhani","doi":"10.15779/Z38G15TB7H","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38G15TB7H","url":null,"abstract":"The resource limitations of legal nonprofit organizations force staff attorneys to make difficult choices about whom to serve. Nowhere are the consequences of lawyers’ case selection decisions starker than in the immigration context, where individuals face deportation if unable to successfully advocate for themselves before legal authorities. Based on three years of qualitative research within legal services organizations in Los Angeles, this Note describes and contextualizes immigration lawyers’ case-selection approach, with a focus on attorneys’ role as policy actors within the immigrant justice movement.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1661"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67471609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Housing Choice Voucher (“HCV”) program is a government program that subsidizes the rent of low-income individuals or families, allowing them to afford housing in the private market. Families pay 30 percent of their income towards rent, and the voucher covers the remainder. Congress created the program with the goal of enabling low-income families to live in high-opportunity neighborhoods, thereby improving family outcomes and eliminating the concentrations of poverty often seen with other low-income housing programs. This goal has failed, however, largely due to landlord discrimination against voucher holders. Many families are unable to find housing that will accept their voucher. For families that do find housing, they are unable to access the low-poverty neighborhoods the HCV program promised. For families of color, discrimination has an especially significant effect. To improve the success of the HCV program, this Note argues that policymakers must limit the ability of landlords to refuse to accept HCVs and that the most effective method for doing so is through Source of Income (“SOI”) discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination against voucher holders.
{"title":"Improving the Housing Choice Voucher Program through Source of Income Discrimination Laws","authors":"M. Rofael","doi":"10.15779/Z38QF8JK1D","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38QF8JK1D","url":null,"abstract":"The Housing Choice Voucher (“HCV”) program is a government program that subsidizes the rent of low-income individuals or families, allowing them to afford housing in the private market. Families pay 30 percent of their income towards rent, and the voucher covers the remainder. Congress created the program with the goal of enabling low-income families to live in high-opportunity neighborhoods, thereby improving family outcomes and eliminating the concentrations of poverty often seen with other low-income housing programs. This goal has failed, however, largely due to landlord discrimination against voucher holders. Many families are unable to find housing that will accept their voucher. For families that do find housing, they are unable to access the low-poverty neighborhoods the HCV program promised. For families of color, discrimination has an especially significant effect. To improve the success of the HCV program, this Note argues that policymakers must limit the ability of landlords to refuse to accept HCVs and that the most effective method for doing so is through Source of Income (“SOI”) discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination against voucher holders.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"830 1","pages":"1635"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67533370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Confronting Mass Incarceration: Lecture from the 2018-2019 Jorde Symposium","authors":"James L. Forman","doi":"10.15779/Z38XK84Q9P","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38XK84Q9P","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1955"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67586066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. The Revolutionary War and the Far-reaching Power to Use Military Courts ........................................................................................ 1024 II. A Tale of Continuity: The Sweeping War Power under the Constitution ............................................................................... 1030 A. Congress’s Power to Prevail in Wars ................................. 1030 B. Congress’s Power to Authorize Military Trials ................. 1033 III. Early Exercises of the Sweeping War Power .................................. 1038 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 1040
{"title":"Speaking with a Different Voice: Why the Military Trial of Civilians and the Enemy is Constitutional","authors":"S. Prakash","doi":"10.15779/Z38PK0724J","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38PK0724J","url":null,"abstract":"I. The Revolutionary War and the Far-reaching Power to Use Military Courts ........................................................................................ 1024 II. A Tale of Continuity: The Sweeping War Power under the Constitution ............................................................................... 1030 A. Congress’s Power to Prevail in Wars ................................. 1030 B. Congress’s Power to Authorize Military Trials ................. 1033 III. Early Exercises of the Sweeping War Power .................................. 1038 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 1040","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1021"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67524688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The libertarian regulatory environment of online political advertising has come under scrutiny again, as news reports continue to come out describing the extent of Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election. For years, Silicon Valley has resisted Washington, D.C.’s efforts to regulate online political advertising. Tech companies feared regulation would threaten not only their business models, but also the Internet’s status as the “most accessible marketplace of ideas in history.”1 But can America’s democracy continue to tolerate lax regulation of online political advertising? Overwhelming evidence of Russian operatives spreading divisive messages across online platforms during the 2016 presidential election demands a government response. In fact, Congress is now debating the Honest Ads Act, and the Federal Election Commission is considering implementing regulations to increase the transparency of online political advertisements. With the specter of regulation, Facebook, Google, and Twitter have updated their policies governing online political advertising.
{"title":"Regulating the Most Accessible Marketplace of Ideas in History: Disclosure Requirements in Online Political Advertisements After the 2016 Election","authors":"Brian Beyersdorf","doi":"10.15779/Z38C53F20R","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38C53F20R","url":null,"abstract":"The libertarian regulatory environment of online political advertising has come under scrutiny again, as news reports continue to come out describing the extent of Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election. For years, Silicon Valley has resisted Washington, D.C.’s efforts to regulate online political advertising. Tech companies feared regulation would threaten not only their business models, but also the Internet’s status as the “most accessible marketplace of ideas in history.”1 But can America’s democracy continue to tolerate lax regulation of online political advertising? Overwhelming evidence of Russian operatives spreading divisive messages across online platforms during the 2016 presidential election demands a government response. In fact, Congress is now debating the Honest Ads Act, and the Federal Election Commission is considering implementing regulations to increase the transparency of online political advertisements. With the specter of regulation, Facebook, Google, and Twitter have updated their policies governing online political advertising.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1061"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67446531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Supreme Court displays increasing hostility to constitutional tort claims. Although the Justices sometimes cast their stance as deferential to Congress, recent cases exhibit aggressive judicial lawmaking with respect to official immunity. Among the causes of turbulence in constitutional tort doctrine and the surrounding literature is a failure—not only among the Justices, but also among leading scholarly critics—to see interconnected problems in a sufficiently broad frame.
{"title":"Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts","authors":"R. Fallon","doi":"10.15779/Z38NK3654F","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38NK3654F","url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court displays increasing hostility to constitutional tort claims. Although the Justices sometimes cast their stance as deferential to Congress, recent cases exhibit aggressive judicial lawmaking with respect to official immunity. Among the causes of turbulence in constitutional tort doctrine and the surrounding literature is a failure—not only among the Justices, but also among leading scholarly critics—to see interconnected problems in a sufficiently broad frame.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"933"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67514754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For decades, courts and commentators have vigorously debated how the relationship between common-law and statutory writs of habeas corpus in pre-revolutionary England should inform our understanding of the U.S. Constitution's Suspension Clause, which, as the Supreme Court has held, enshrines access to the writ "at least as it existed in 1789." One of the many lessons to emerge from this discourse is how the elimination of access to the common-law writ in state court, through a combination of legislation and judicial decisions, raised the constitutional stakes when Congress later sought to restrict federal statutory habeas, as manifested in the Supreme Court's landmark (if controversial) 2008 ruling in Boumediene v. Bush. In this essay, prepared in conjunction with the California Law Review's symposium on Professor Amanda Tyler's new book, "Habeas Corpus in Wartime," I seek to take some of the lessons from the habeas debates and apply them to a different species of constitutional remedy—damages suits against federal officers for constitutional violations, today known as "Bivens" claims after the 1971 decision that first recognized such judge-made remedies under federal law. As in the habeas context, a combination of statutory intervention and judicial constriction has all-but eliminated what used to be a rich and robust array of judge-made constitutional remedies against federal officers in state courts and under state law. As late as 1963, the Supreme Court thought it uncontroversial that, "[w]hen it comes to suits for damages for abuse of power, federal officials are usually governed by local law." Thanks to a series of intervening developments, victims of constitutional violations by federal officers today, in contrast, are often left to judge-made federal damages remedies or nothing—and, especially in light of the Supreme Court's 2017 ruling in Ziglar v. Abbasi, increasingly, nothing. More often than not, modern judicial hostility to judge-made damages remedies against federal officers is pitched, as in Abbasi, in terms of the separation of powers—and the extent to which unelected federal judges should stay their hand before providing damages remedies that Congress has not seen fit to expressly authorize. But as this essay argues, this reasoning reflects historical amnesia as to the role of state law and state courts in holding federal officers to account, leaving observers with the misimpression that serious separation-of-powers concerns arise from federal judicial recognition of implied causes of action when the true question these cases present—or, at least, should present—actually sounds in federalism. Although that conclusion may itself suggest that the relevant decisionmakers should be more amenable to allowing federal constitutional claims to be resolved by state courts and/or under state law in the first instance, at the very least, it suggests that federal judges should not take quite as dim a view as has become commonplace rega
几十年来，法院和评论家们一直在激烈地争论，革命前英国的普通法和成文法人身保护令之间的关系应该如何影响我们对美国宪法暂停条款的理解。正如最高法院所认为的那样，该条款规定了“至少像1789年那样”享有人身保护令的权利。从这一论述中得出的许多教训之一是，当国会后来试图限制联邦法定人身保护令时，通过立法和司法决定的结合，取消了在州法院使用普通法令状的权利，这提高了宪法的风险，正如最高法院2008年具有里程碑意义(如果有争议的话)的裁决Boumediene诉布什案所体现的那样。这篇文章是与《加州法律评论》关于阿曼达·泰勒(Amanda Tyler)教授的新书《战时人身保护令》(Habeas Corpus In Wartime)的研讨会一起准备的。在这篇文章中，我试图从人身保护令辩论中吸取一些教训，并将它们应用于另一种不同的宪法救济——针对违反宪法的联邦官员提起的损害赔偿诉讼，在1971年的决定之后，今天被称为“比文斯”(Bivens)索赔，该决定首次承认了这种由法官根据联邦法律作出的救济。在人身保护令的背景下，法律干预和司法约束的结合几乎消除了过去在州法院和州法律下针对联邦官员的丰富而有力的法官制定的宪法救济措施。直到1963年，最高法院还认为，“当涉及到滥用权力的损害赔偿诉讼时，联邦官员通常受地方法律管辖。”相比之下，由于一系列干预的发展，今天联邦官员违反宪法的受害者往往只能得到法官制定的联邦损害赔偿，或者什么也得不到——尤其是考虑到最高法院2017年对Ziglar v. Abbasi一案的裁决，他们越来越得不到任何赔偿。就像在Abbasi案中一样，现代司法对法官做出的针对联邦官员的损害赔偿的敌意往往是基于三权分立，以及非选举产生的联邦法官在提供国会认为不适合明确授权的损害赔偿之前应该保持多少干预。但正如本文所论证的那样，这种推理反映了对州法律和州法院在追究联邦官员责任方面的作用的历史健忘症，给观察者留下了一种错误的印象，即严重的三权分立问题源于联邦司法对行为隐含原因的承认，而这些案件——或者至少应该——的真正问题实际上听起来像是联邦制。尽管这一结论本身可能表明，相关的决策者应该更容易接受允许联邦宪法索赔由州法院和/或根据州法律在第一次审理中解决，但至少，它表明，联邦法官不应该对他们填补现有空白的权力持如此普遍的模糊看法。
{"title":"Constitutional Remedies in Federalism's Forgotten Shadow","authors":"Stephen I. Vladeck","doi":"10.15779/Z38TB0XV9X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38TB0XV9X","url":null,"abstract":"For decades, courts and commentators have vigorously debated how the relationship between common-law and statutory writs of habeas corpus in pre-revolutionary England should inform our understanding of the U.S. Constitution's Suspension Clause, which, as the Supreme Court has held, enshrines access to the writ \"at least as it existed in 1789.\" One of the many lessons to emerge from this discourse is how the elimination of access to the common-law writ in state court, through a combination of legislation and judicial decisions, raised the constitutional stakes when Congress later sought to restrict federal statutory habeas, as manifested in the Supreme Court's landmark (if controversial) 2008 ruling in Boumediene v. Bush. \u0000 \u0000In this essay, prepared in conjunction with the California Law Review's symposium on Professor Amanda Tyler's new book, \"Habeas Corpus in Wartime,\" I seek to take some of the lessons from the habeas debates and apply them to a different species of constitutional remedy—damages suits against federal officers for constitutional violations, today known as \"Bivens\" claims after the 1971 decision that first recognized such judge-made remedies under federal law. As in the habeas context, a combination of statutory intervention and judicial constriction has all-but eliminated what used to be a rich and robust array of judge-made constitutional remedies against federal officers in state courts and under state law. As late as 1963, the Supreme Court thought it uncontroversial that, \"[w]hen it comes to suits for damages for abuse of power, federal officials are usually governed by local law.\" Thanks to a series of intervening developments, victims of constitutional violations by federal officers today, in contrast, are often left to judge-made federal damages remedies or nothing—and, especially in light of the Supreme Court's 2017 ruling in Ziglar v. Abbasi, increasingly, nothing. \u0000 \u0000More often than not, modern judicial hostility to judge-made damages remedies against federal officers is pitched, as in Abbasi, in terms of the separation of powers—and the extent to which unelected federal judges should stay their hand before providing damages remedies that Congress has not seen fit to expressly authorize. But as this essay argues, this reasoning reflects historical amnesia as to the role of state law and state courts in holding federal officers to account, leaving observers with the misimpression that serious separation-of-powers concerns arise from federal judicial recognition of implied causes of action when the true question these cases present—or, at least, should present—actually sounds in federalism. Although that conclusion may itself suggest that the relevant decisionmakers should be more amenable to allowing federal constitutional claims to be resolved by state courts and/or under state law in the first instance, at the very least, it suggests that federal judges should not take quite as dim a view as has become commonplace rega","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1043"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48731699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When Congress enacts command-and-control regulation, it chooses between implementation through litigation and courts, through bureaucracy, or through a hybrid regime. Since the late 1960s, the frequency with which Congress has relied on civil litigation for frontline enforcement of statutes grew dramatically, and with it grew rates of federal statutory litigation and the role of courts in federal regulatory policy. By the late 1970s, and with increasing intensity over the decades, a critique of these developments emerged that included two core themes. Relative to administrative implementation, direct enforcement through civil litigation (1) weakens democratic control over public policy because litigants and federal judges are harder for the elected branches to control than bureaucracy, and (2) degrades the quality of public policy because the judiciary is a less capable policy-making infrastructure than bureaucracy. This Article argues that Congress’s reliance on frontline enforcement through civil litigation is associated with how specifically it articulates substantive policy in the statute, versus how much policy-making discretion it delegates to implementing agents. When legislative coalitions rely heavily on civil litigation for implementation, they have incentives to focus more attention and effort on developing and articulating policy substance in the statute, and to leverage more mandatory and specific administrative rulemaking power. The institutional attributes of litigation and courts that make them more challenging to supervise and influence during postenactment implementation, and that render them a less capable policy-making apparatus, create these incentives. This theoretical account contradicts existing arguments offered by the relatively few scholars to consider the relationship between the legislative choice of enforcement through civil litigation, and how much policy substance Congress lays down in the statute. This Article deploys original data to investigate this theory and its rivals. The data contain granular information about the policy content of significant federal regulatory legislation passed between 1947 and 2008, and about the level of attention and effort legislators and witnesses in committee hearings focused on it. Empirical analysis demonstrates that Congress focused more than twice as much attention in legislative hearings on parts of regulatory statutes relying heavily on civil litigation for implementation, and elaborated policy in those parts of statutes in about twice as much detail. When relying substantially on civil actions, Congress was also much more likely to delegate administrative rulemaking authority, thereby leveraging more administrative expertise and enlarging congressional capacity to influence substantive elaboration of the statute via agency oversight powers. Ultimately, this Article argues that meaningful assessment of the democratic and public policy consequences of legislative reliance o
{"title":"Legislating for Litigation: Delegation, Public Policy, and Democracy","authors":"Sean Farhang","doi":"10.15779/Z38Z892F6Q","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38Z892F6Q","url":null,"abstract":"When Congress enacts command-and-control regulation, it chooses between implementation through litigation and courts, through bureaucracy, or through a hybrid regime. Since the late 1960s, the frequency with which Congress has relied on civil litigation for frontline enforcement of statutes grew dramatically, and with it grew rates of federal statutory litigation and the role of courts in federal regulatory policy. By the late 1970s, and with increasing intensity over the decades, a critique of these developments emerged that included two core themes. Relative to administrative implementation, direct enforcement through civil litigation (1) weakens democratic control over public policy because litigants and federal judges are harder for the elected branches to control than bureaucracy, and (2) degrades the quality of public policy because the judiciary is a less capable policy-making infrastructure than bureaucracy. \u0000This Article argues that Congress’s reliance on frontline enforcement through civil litigation is associated with how specifically it articulates substantive policy in the statute, versus how much policy-making discretion it delegates to implementing agents. When legislative coalitions rely heavily on civil litigation for implementation, they have incentives to focus more attention and effort on developing and articulating policy substance in the statute, and to leverage more mandatory and specific administrative rulemaking power. The institutional attributes of litigation and courts that make them more challenging to supervise and influence during postenactment implementation, and that render them a less capable policy-making apparatus, create these incentives. This theoretical account contradicts existing arguments offered by the relatively few scholars to consider the relationship between the legislative choice of enforcement through civil litigation, and how much policy substance Congress lays down in the statute. \u0000This Article deploys original data to investigate this theory and its rivals. The data contain granular information about the policy content of significant federal regulatory legislation passed between 1947 and 2008, and about the level of attention and effort legislators and witnesses in committee hearings focused on it. Empirical analysis demonstrates that Congress focused more than twice as much attention in legislative hearings on parts of regulatory statutes relying heavily on civil litigation for implementation, and elaborated policy in those parts of statutes in about twice as much detail. When relying substantially on civil actions, Congress was also much more likely to delegate administrative rulemaking authority, thereby leveraging more administrative expertise and enlarging congressional capacity to influence substantive elaboration of the statute via agency oversight powers. \u0000Ultimately, this Article argues that meaningful assessment of the democratic and public policy consequences of legislative reliance o","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"106 1","pages":"1529"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44051954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Harmful lies are nothing new. But the ability to distort reality has taken an exponential leap forward with “deep fake” technology. This capability makes it possible to create audio and video of real people saying and doing things they never said or did. Machine learning techniques are escalating the technology’s sophistication, making deep fakes ever more realistic and increasingly resistant to detection. Deep-fake technology has characteristics that enable rapid and widespread diffusion, putting it into the hands of both sophisticated and unsophisticated actors. While deep-fake technology will bring with it certain benefits, it also will introduce many harms. The marketplace of ideas already suffers from truth decay as our networked information environment interacts in toxic ways with our cognitive biases. Deep fakes will exacerbate this problem significantly. Individuals and businesses will face novel forms of exploitation, intimidation, and personal sabotage. The risks to our democracy and to national security are profound as well. Our aim is to provide the first in-depth assessment of the causes and consequences of this disruptive technological change, and to explore the existing and potential tools for responding to it. We survey a broad array of responses, including: the role of technological solutions; criminal penalties, civil liability, and regulatory action; military and covert-action responses; economic sanctions; and market developments. We cover the waterfront from immunities to immutable authentication trails, offering recommendations to improve law and policy and anticipating the pitfalls embedded in various solutions.
{"title":"Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security","authors":"Robert M. Chesney, D. Citron","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3213954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3213954","url":null,"abstract":"Harmful lies are nothing new. But the ability to distort reality has taken an exponential leap forward with “deep fake” technology. This capability makes it possible to create audio and video of real people saying and doing things they never said or did. Machine learning techniques are escalating the technology’s sophistication, making deep fakes ever more realistic and increasingly resistant to detection. Deep-fake technology has characteristics that enable rapid and widespread diffusion, putting it into the hands of both sophisticated and unsophisticated actors. While deep-fake technology will bring with it certain benefits, it also will introduce many harms. The marketplace of ideas already suffers from truth decay as our networked information environment interacts in toxic ways with our cognitive biases. Deep fakes will exacerbate this problem significantly. Individuals and businesses will face novel forms of exploitation, intimidation, and personal sabotage. The risks to our democracy and to national security are profound as well. Our aim is to provide the first in-depth assessment of the causes and consequences of this disruptive technological change, and to explore the existing and potential tools for responding to it. We survey a broad array of responses, including: the role of technological solutions; criminal penalties, civil liability, and regulatory action; military and covert-action responses; economic sanctions; and market developments. We cover the waterfront from immunities to immutable authentication trails, offering recommendations to improve law and policy and anticipating the pitfalls embedded in various solutions.","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"107 1","pages":"1753"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.3213954","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46119886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Love and Lawyering: A Celebration of the East Bay Community Law Center","authors":"S. Patel","doi":"10.15779/Z38NZ80Q36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38NZ80Q36","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51452,"journal":{"name":"California Law Review","volume":"106 1","pages":"541"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42431168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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