Pub Date : 2024-04-18DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2335325
Bram Vaassen
The standard objection to dualist theories of mind is that they seemingly cannot account for the obvious fact that mental phenomena cause our behaviour. On the plausible assumption that all our beh...
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Pub Date : 2024-03-24DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2326432
David Kelley
In this paper, I introduce the notion of ‘philosophy moves’: prominent tropes featured in contemporary academic philosophy. Moves are more than patterns—they are tools for advancing and enriching p...
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Pub Date : 2024-03-24DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2328629
Thomas Blanchard
This paper argues that the knowledge asymmetry (the fact that we know more about the past than the future) can be explained as a consequence of the causal Markov condition. The causal Markov condit...
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Pub Date : 2024-03-21DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2326430
Chien-hsing Ho
Theorists who advocate worldly (metaphysical or ontological) indeterminacy—the idea that the world itself is indeterminate in one or more respects—should address how we understand the signifying na...
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Pub Date : 2024-03-07DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2319781
Elizabeth Schechter
This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that ¬p and yet is sincere in asserting that p. I argue that...
本文为自我欺骗的誓言观点辩护，根据该观点，自我欺骗者被证据引导相信¬p，但却真诚地断言p。
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Pub Date : 2024-03-03DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841
Adam Bradley
Are we acquainted with the self in experience? It may seem so. After all, we tend to be confident in our own existence. A natural explanation for this confidence is that the self somehow shows up i...
{"title":"Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance","authors":"Adam Bradley","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2320841","url":null,"abstract":"Are we acquainted with the self in experience? It may seem so. After all, we tend to be confident in our own existence. A natural explanation for this confidence is that the self somehow shows up i...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140026683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-03DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190
Christopher James Masterman
Serious actualism is the view that it is metaphysically impossible for an entity to have a property, or stand in a relation, and not exist. Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that t...
{"title":"Serious Actualism and Nonexistence","authors":"Christopher James Masterman","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2310190","url":null,"abstract":"Serious actualism is the view that it is metaphysically impossible for an entity to have a property, or stand in a relation, and not exist. Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that t...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"139 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140043541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-03DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778
Alec Hinshelwood
We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establ...
我们以一种独特的第一人称方式认识自己的有意行为。许多关于 "有意做某事 "A 的知识的论述都假定，这种知识的依据必须建立在......
{"title":"Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal","authors":"Alec Hinshelwood","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778","url":null,"abstract":"We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establ...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"139 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140043555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-21DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2312166
Michael Zhao
Call ‘radical moral theorizing’ the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency,...
{"title":"Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?","authors":"Michael Zhao","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2312166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2312166","url":null,"abstract":"Call ‘radical moral theorizing’ the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency,...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139917202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-20DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2248476
Joe Stratmann
For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces t...
{"title":"The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason","authors":"Joe Stratmann","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2248476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2248476","url":null,"abstract":"For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces t...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139909099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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