Pub Date : 2024-09-11DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2389291
Alexander Motchoulski
Fair-play theories of political obligation hold that persons have a duty to obey the law based on the fact that they benefit from the law and have a duty of reciprocity to comply in return. These a...
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Pub Date : 2024-09-09DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2389554
Julian Fink
This paper presents a new argument against the view that structural (or attitude-based) irrationality consists in failing to respond correctly to normative reasons. According to this view, a patter...
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Pub Date : 2024-09-02DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2390175
Laura Caponetto, Neri Marsili
Moorean constructions are famously odd: it is infelicitous to deny that you believe what you claim to be true. But what about claiming that p, only to immediately put into question your evidence in...
摩尔结构是著名的古怪结构：否认你相信你所声称的事实是不恰当的。但是，当你声称自己相信 p 时，却立即对自己的证据提出质疑，这又是怎么回事呢？
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Pub Date : 2024-08-19DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2379259
Jason Brennan, Jessica Flanigan, Christopher Freiman
This paper describes public reason communitarianism, a theory which is isomorphic to public reason liberalism. It contains the same internal diversity and debates, and the same fundamental structur...
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Pub Date : 2024-08-14DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2381677
Stephan Torre
This paper embraces the view that we have substantial knowledge of the future and investigates how such knowledge fundamentally differs from knowledge of the past and present. I argue for a new sou...
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Pub Date : 2024-08-12DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2384912
D. Gene Witmer
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
发表于《澳大拉西亚哲学杂志》（2024 年提前出版）
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Pub Date : 2024-08-09DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2381692
Bernhard Salow
The strongest version of the dogmatism puzzle argues that, when we know something, we should resolve to ignore or avoid evidence against it. The best existing responses are fallibilist, and hold th...
{"title":"Fallibility and Dogmatism","authors":"Bernhard Salow","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2381692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2381692","url":null,"abstract":"The strongest version of the dogmatism puzzle argues that, when we know something, we should resolve to ignore or avoid evidence against it. The best existing responses are fallibilist, and hold th...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141909313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-04DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2381120
Vera Hoffmann-Kolss
The goal of this paper is to argue that there is indeterminacy in causation. I present three types of cases in which it is indeterminate whether an event c caused another event e: (1) cases of abse...
本文旨在论证因果关系的不确定性。我提出了三类情况，在这些情况中，一个事件 c 是否引起了另一个事件 e 是不确定的：(1) Abse...
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Pub Date : 2024-08-04DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2381678
Alexis Morin-Martel
In this paper, I raise a challenge to Gideon Rosen’s defence of moral contingentism against Jamie Dreier’s moral luck argument. Dreier argues that if moral contingentism is true, acting in a morall...
{"title":"Dreier Is a Great Dad in All Possible Worlds: A Challenge to Moral Contingentism","authors":"Alexis Morin-Martel","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2381678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2381678","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I raise a challenge to Gideon Rosen’s defence of moral contingentism against Jamie Dreier’s moral luck argument. Dreier argues that if moral contingentism is true, acting in a morall...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141899699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-30DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2379254
Iddo Landau
This paper explores the notions of competitive and noncompetitive value and examines how they both affect meaning in life. The paper distinguishes, among other things, between engaging with competi...
{"title":"Competitive Value, Noncompetitive Value, and Life's Meaning","authors":"Iddo Landau","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2379254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2379254","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the notions of competitive and noncompetitive value and examines how they both affect meaning in life. The paper distinguishes, among other things, between engaging with competi...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141880128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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