Pub Date : 2024-10-21DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2351208
Juan Pablo Bermúdez
For agents like us, the feeling of effort is a very useful thing. It helps us sense how hard an action is, control its level of intensity, and decide whether to continue or stop performing it. Whil...
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Pub Date : 2024-10-14DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2379264
Lucy McDonald
In this paper I identify a distinctive kind of gaslighting: communicative gaslighting. Communicative gaslighters intentionally misrepresent the communicative properties of an utterance—their own or...
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Pub Date : 2024-10-14DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2379265
Una Stojnić, Ernie Lepore
We often use language creatively, introducing new expressions on the fly. That we can successfully communicate with novel expressions without antecedent semantic knowledge has led many to a dynamic...
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Pub Date : 2024-10-13DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2388615
E. Sonny Elizondo
I offer a qualified defence of Kant’s natural teleological argument, that is, his inference from the (un)naturalness of an act to its (im)morality. Though I reject many of Kant’s conclusions, I thi...
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Pub Date : 2024-10-10DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2310197
J. Dmitri Gallow
In this journal, Jack Spencer argues that we should reject a decision rule called MaxRat because it is incompatible with this principle: if you know that you will choose x, and you know that x is b...
在这篇日志中，杰克-斯宾塞（Jack Spencer）认为，我们应该摒弃一种名为 MaxRat 的决策规则，因为它不符合这一原则：如果你知道你会选择 x，而且你知道 x 是 b...
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Pub Date : 2024-10-10DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2403762
Jeff Engelhardt, Molly Moran
Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever (C&D) have recently argued that the ideal/non-ideal distinction is ‘useless’ in philosophy of language. This paper responds to C&D’s argument, develops an account of ...
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Pub Date : 2024-09-18DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2388613
James Hart
Limited aggregationists argue that when deciding between competing claims to aid we are sometimes required and sometimes forbidden from aggregating weaker claims to outweigh stronger claims. Joe Ho...
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Pub Date : 2024-09-15DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2390186
Christopher Frugé
According to traditional universalism, properties are instantiated by objects, where instantiation is a ‘tie’ that binds objects and properties into facts. I offer two arguments against this view. ...
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Pub Date : 2024-09-11DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2389291
Alexander Motchoulski
Fair-play theories of political obligation hold that persons have a duty to obey the law based on the fact that they benefit from the law and have a duty of reciprocity to comply in return. These a...
{"title":"Reciprocity and the Rule of Law","authors":"Alexander Motchoulski","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2389291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2389291","url":null,"abstract":"Fair-play theories of political obligation hold that persons have a duty to obey the law based on the fact that they benefit from the law and have a duty of reciprocity to comply in return. These a...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142313738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-09DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2389554
Julian Fink
This paper presents a new argument against the view that structural (or attitude-based) irrationality consists in failing to respond correctly to normative reasons. According to this view, a patter...
{"title":"Structural Irrationality Does Not Consist in Having Attitudes You Ought Not to Have: A New Dilemma for Reasons-Violating Structural Irrationality","authors":"Julian Fink","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2024.2389554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2389554","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a new argument against the view that structural (or attitude-based) irrationality consists in failing to respond correctly to normative reasons. According to this view, a patter...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142306264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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