Pub Date : 2023-02-27DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2172594
Paul Silva
Self-fulfilling beliefs are, in at least some cases, a kind of belief that is rational to form and hold in the absence of evidence. The rationality of such beliefs have significant implications for a range of debates in epistemology. Most startlingly, it undermines the idea that having strong evidence for the truth of p is necessary for it to be rational to believe p . The rationality of self-fulfilling beliefs is here defended against the idea that their rationality is incompatible with a compelling closure principle.
{"title":"Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defence","authors":"Paul Silva","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2172594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2172594","url":null,"abstract":"Self-fulfilling beliefs are, in at least some cases, a kind of belief that is rational to form and hold in the absence of evidence. The rationality of such beliefs have significant implications for a range of debates in epistemology. Most startlingly, it undermines the idea that having strong evidence for the truth of p is necessary for it to be rational to believe p . The rationality of self-fulfilling beliefs is here defended against the idea that their rationality is incompatible with a compelling closure principle.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41445879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2172592
Szymon Bogacz
{"title":"Buddhist Epistemology and the Liar Paradox","authors":"Szymon Bogacz","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2172592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2172592","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48193066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-01DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2022.2149826
F. Kroon
{"title":"Robert Nola (25 June 1940 – 23 October 2022)","authors":"F. Kroon","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2022.2149826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2149826","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45242362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-29DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2172595
Robert B. Louden
{"title":"Experience Embodied: Early Modern Accounts of the Human Place in Nature","authors":"Robert B. Louden","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2172595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2172595","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"101 1","pages":"765 - 767"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41918526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-24DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2169947
R. L. Sparling
ution’ Charles envisages for our mind-body problem, and then also the contribution the study of Aristotle makes to our problem as currently conceived. Charles is surely right to imply that no mind-body problem worth the name can be mounted without relying on some manner of categorial distinction between the mental and the physical. Here, then, ‘impurity’ brings clarity rather than murkiness: if indeed the current orthodoxy relies on there being definitional purity where none is to be had, then inextricability undercuts the presuppositions needed to articulate any mind-body problem worthy of the name. Not solved, then, but rather dissolved. Pulling back further still, one can say of this book: it is demanding and challenging in equal measure, in the very best senses of these terms; it repays the careful study its nuanced investigations require; and it demonstrates in the plainest way possible how the study of philosophy’s past can yet illuminate its present. It is that rare book which will be read and then reread, put aside, and then reread yet again, each time with increasing profit. So filled is it with careful, intelligent, and fruitful speculation that this review has, of necessity, prescinded from discussing the many measured investigations of Aristotelian texts it offers. These investigations are none the less surely worth studying, in one way by any scholar interested in Aristotle’s psychology and in another way by any metaphysically informed philosopher of mind. Charles, as these pages make clear, is both.
{"title":"Plato’s Epistemology: Being and Seeming","authors":"R. L. Sparling","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2169947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2169947","url":null,"abstract":"ution’ Charles envisages for our mind-body problem, and then also the contribution the study of Aristotle makes to our problem as currently conceived. Charles is surely right to imply that no mind-body problem worth the name can be mounted without relying on some manner of categorial distinction between the mental and the physical. Here, then, ‘impurity’ brings clarity rather than murkiness: if indeed the current orthodoxy relies on there being definitional purity where none is to be had, then inextricability undercuts the presuppositions needed to articulate any mind-body problem worthy of the name. Not solved, then, but rather dissolved. Pulling back further still, one can say of this book: it is demanding and challenging in equal measure, in the very best senses of these terms; it repays the careful study its nuanced investigations require; and it demonstrates in the plainest way possible how the study of philosophy’s past can yet illuminate its present. It is that rare book which will be read and then reread, put aside, and then reread yet again, each time with increasing profit. So filled is it with careful, intelligent, and fruitful speculation that this review has, of necessity, prescinded from discussing the many measured investigations of Aristotelian texts it offers. These investigations are none the less surely worth studying, in one way by any scholar interested in Aristotle’s psychology and in another way by any metaphysically informed philosopher of mind. Charles, as these pages make clear, is both.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"101 1","pages":"511 - 514"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41834989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-23DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2022.2157032
A. Flowerree
: The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we are in a position to know that they are in bad faith.
{"title":"When to Psychologize","authors":"A. Flowerree","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2022.2157032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2157032","url":null,"abstract":": The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we are in a position to know that they are in bad faith.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46894768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-22DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2022.2154814
Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, Olle Risberg
{"title":"Benefits are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit","authors":"Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, Olle Risberg","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2022.2154814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2154814","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41684117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-18DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2022.2158891
Sergio Tenenbaum
{"title":"Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will","authors":"Sergio Tenenbaum","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2022.2158891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2158891","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47281787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-18DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2022.2118338
Yacin Hamami, R. Morris
ABSTRACT Mathematical proofs are not sequences of arbitrary deductive steps—each deductive step is, to some extent, rational. This paper aims to identify and characterize the particular form of rationality at play in mathematical proofs. The approach adopted consists in viewing mathematical proofs as reports of proof activities—that is, sequences of deductive inferences—and in characterizing the rationality of the former in terms of that of the latter. It is argued that proof activities are governed by specific norms of rational planning agency, and that a deductive step in a mathematical proof qualifies as rational whenever the corresponding deductive inference in the associated proof activity figures in a plan that has been constructed rationally. It is then shown that mathematical proofs whose associated proof activities violate these norms are likely to be judged as defective by mathematical agents, thereby providing evidence that these norms are indeed present in mathematical practice. We conclude that, if mathematical proofs are not mere sequences of deductive steps, if they possess a rational structure, it is because they are the product of rational planning agents.
{"title":"Rationality in Mathematical Proofs","authors":"Yacin Hamami, R. Morris","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2022.2118338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2118338","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Mathematical proofs are not sequences of arbitrary deductive steps—each deductive step is, to some extent, rational. This paper aims to identify and characterize the particular form of rationality at play in mathematical proofs. The approach adopted consists in viewing mathematical proofs as reports of proof activities—that is, sequences of deductive inferences—and in characterizing the rationality of the former in terms of that of the latter. It is argued that proof activities are governed by specific norms of rational planning agency, and that a deductive step in a mathematical proof qualifies as rational whenever the corresponding deductive inference in the associated proof activity figures in a plan that has been constructed rationally. It is then shown that mathematical proofs whose associated proof activities violate these norms are likely to be judged as defective by mathematical agents, thereby providing evidence that these norms are indeed present in mathematical practice. We conclude that, if mathematical proofs are not mere sequences of deductive steps, if they possess a rational structure, it is because they are the product of rational planning agents.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48429373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-17DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2022.2123009
I. Carter, Olof Page
ABSTRACT In this paper we steer a course between two views of the value of equality that are usually understood as diametrically opposed to one another: on the one hand, the view that equality has intrinsic value; on the other, the view that equality is a normatively redundant notion. We proceed by analysing the different ways in which the equal possession of certain relevant properties justifies distributive equality. We then present an account of ‘basic equality’ that serves to single out where this equal possession is really doing normative work. Our account departs from some common assumptions about basic equality but is nevertheless plausible in as much as it assigns to that concept a precise and normatively significant role in grounding the non-instrumental value of distributive equality. By showing when, exactly, equality is basic, we are able to explain both what is right and what is wrong in each of the two opposed views of the value of equality. The argument proceeds at a fairly high level of abstraction and is therefore applicable to a number of rival egalitarian theories.
{"title":"When is Equality Basic?","authors":"I. Carter, Olof Page","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2022.2123009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2123009","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper we steer a course between two views of the value of equality that are usually understood as diametrically opposed to one another: on the one hand, the view that equality has intrinsic value; on the other, the view that equality is a normatively redundant notion. We proceed by analysing the different ways in which the equal possession of certain relevant properties justifies distributive equality. We then present an account of ‘basic equality’ that serves to single out where this equal possession is really doing normative work. Our account departs from some common assumptions about basic equality but is nevertheless plausible in as much as it assigns to that concept a precise and normatively significant role in grounding the non-instrumental value of distributive equality. By showing when, exactly, equality is basic, we are able to explain both what is right and what is wrong in each of the two opposed views of the value of equality. The argument proceeds at a fairly high level of abstraction and is therefore applicable to a number of rival egalitarian theories.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49061337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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