British Journal of Politics & International Relations最新文献

• The role of the European Union (EU) in services liberalisation—and the impact thereof on the provision of services of general interest—has been highly contentious both globally and in the EU. Besides other policy issues, services liberalisation contributes to make the EU a ‘conflicted trade power’ (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006).
• The study of conflicting discourses and, in particular, the EU's responsiveness to criticism towards the conduct of its trade policy can help to understand the legitimacy issues the EU has to face better than approaches focused on negotiating positions shaped.
• The study finds that the EU's trade policy is characterised by continuity in spite of the a) potentially various ideological profiles of EU Trade Commissioners b) in the face of contention by civil society, c) external events such as the global financial crisis and the EU debt crisis.
• However, specific institutional settings can prompt political responsiveness from the Commission in a greater extent. In the European arena, unlike in the more loosely structured global arena, the existence of a parliamentary debate and formal as well as informal contacts with organised civil society (NGOs, interest groups and unions) constrain the EU Commission to more discursive responsiveness and provides for better accountability.

This article examines interactions between two conflicting discourses over the EU, public services and negotiations during the WTO Doha Round (2001–2012): on the one hand, the discourse of the anti-GATS transnational advocacy network, and on the other, that of the two EU Trade Commissioners. Conducting a frame analysis in a discursive institutionalist perspective, the eventfulness of political interactions is found to be more important than Commissioners’ personal views, but differentiated institutional settings are even more crucial: the presence of a parliamentary arena in the EU arena, in particular, constrains Commissioners to engage with the discourse put forward by its critics; whereas in the global arena they tend to stick to their own framing of services liberalisation as a win-win process. The stalling of the Doha Round and the rise of the debt crisis have brought about new ways of framing threats related to the EU's trade policy.

• A sympathetic critique of the literature on ‘Normative Power Europe’ that incorporates economic liberalism into the repertoire of the EU's constitutive principles.
• The derivation of three ideal type liberal modes of justification for external action and a discussion of their potential complementarities and contradictions.
• An application of the three modes to the case of EU external action.

This article—a sympathetic critique of the literature on ‘Normative Power Europe'—observes that the rationales for EU external action, while understandable in terms of the concept of ‘normative power’, emerge from a variety of overlapping and potentially contradictory liberal arguments. For the purposes of the argument, these liberalisms are organised into three ideal types: market liberalism, the pursuit of peace through liberal means and the ethic of cosmopolitan duty. The article suggests that while it is possible to associate different domains of EU external action with different varieties of liberal discourse, it is often more appropriate to see these policy domains as sites of struggle, negotiation and (perhaps) reconciliation between competing liberal projects.

This article

• provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of UK debt.
• makes a contribution to the debate on the Anglo-liberal growth model and its consequences for the recovery of the UK economy.

The UK has the highest private debt among the G7 states plus Spain. Both financial services and household debt are high. Financial services debt is much the more consequential of the two sectors. It was a central component of the growth model of the UK prior to 2008 and its legacy is making the UK's recovery from recession extremely difficult. Financial sector debt also had an impact on the UK's rising borrowing requirement from 2007. However, it was not the direct cause of the rise in the UK's budget deficit, which was in large part a product of the Brown government's approach to its political difficulties as growth came to an end. Despite the UK's high budget deficit in comparative terms, the UK has enjoyed considerable fiscal autonomy the past few years. However, this autonomy could yet be threatened by the ongoing consequences of financial sector debt.

Research Highlights

• Comparative assessment of three indexes of voting cohesion
• Demonstrates the strong shared orientation towards global affairs among states in the Pacific Asian region, especially ASEAN and China, which is greater than that of the EU
• Shows the widespread reluctance of most Pacific Asian states publicly to criticize human rights abuses
• Shows the estrangement of the US from the foreign policy orientations of Pacific Asian states, even Japan and South Korea

This article aims to do three things: (i) compare three different indexes for assessing the voting cohesion of regional groups of states in the UN General Assembly; (ii) use these indexes to assess the foreign policy convergence of states in Pacific Asia on global issues between 1974 and 2008; (iii) compare the extent of that convergence with the European Union (EU). All three indexes show a high degree of convergence in the voting records of states in Pacific Asia, but particularly in ASEAN, which is higher than in the EU. The most frequent cause of divergence since the end of the Cold War has been the reluctance of most states in the region, apart from Japan and South Korea, publicly to criticize the human rights records of other states. Although there are variations, the results also reveal the divergence in voting between states throughout the region and the US.

This article:

• Places New Labour's political economy in historical context using macro-economic data;
• Demonstrates that the arguments on policy convergence have led to a simplification of the nuances of Labour's political economy and underestimated its partisan nature;
• Highlights how globalisation rather than restraining Labour allowed an unprecedented increase in borrowing and spending making Labour very different to Conservative administrations and more ‘old’ Labour than previous Labour administrations.

There has been considerable debate about the way in which globalisation and neo-liberalism have produced convergence in macro-economic policy. In the British case this convergence is seen in the adoption by the Labour Government (1997–2010) of the core elements of Thatcherite economic policy. However, this article argues that that an examination of macro-economic data demonstrates that is difficult to characterise New Labour as neo-liberal and indeed there is some evidence that it shared a number of commonalities with ‘Old’ Labour. Indeed, in many ways the changing structure of the financial markets removed, to some degree, the shackles from Labour and allowed greater borrowing and spending than previous left of centre administrations. Consequently, as Geoffrey Garrett suggests, partisanship remains an important determinant of economic policy in the UK case.

• demonstrates that the tools of Historical Institutionalism are valuable for interest group scholars in assessing change
• offers a way to conceptualize and empirically differentiate between radical and routine change within interest group organisations
• shows that a group's founding mission is both a constraint and a resource for radical group change.

While group scholars have long noted instances of change in overall organisational form—say from amateur scientific group to environmental campaign group—the literature is short on persuasive accounts of the mechanism(s) that drive or constrain such radical types of change. How can we explain groups getting from form A to form B? In this article we explore how tools from the historical institutionalism literature might aid in the analytical process. Specifically we focus on the combination of focussing events, internal challengers to the status quo, and the capability of challengers to demonstrate to key audiences that the ‘radical’ change is in some way consistent with the founding identity of the group. We demonstrate the application of this approach by examining a case of radical change—a shift in overall form—in a well-known UK interest group, the Soil Association.

• The article discusses how states are increasingly using sports mega-events as part of their ‘soft power’ strategies
• The limited literature on ‘soft power’ and sports mega-events fails to either explain the concept and how it pertains to sport or provide examples that operationalize the concept empirically.
• Further research can build on the idea of sports mega-events being used for public diplomacy; the case of Germany, it could be argued, has led many ‘emerging’ states to seek to bid for and host such events.
• We show how the UK—with a very different international image to Germany prior to 2006—engage in a different manner in its ‘soft power’ strategy.
• Finally, the macro-level concept of ‘soft power’ offers at least a partial answer to the unanswered question (in the sports studies literature) of why states host sports ‘megas’.

The potential positive impact on a nation's image has moved from being a welcome consequence to a significant justification for investing in hosting sports mega-events. Mobilising Joseph Nye's concept of ‘soft power’ we empirically investigate Germany's strategic use of a sports ‘mega’ (the 2006 FIFA World Cup) to successfully alter their image among ‘foreign publics’. We then analyse the example of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games for Britain's international prestige. For both cases we draw on and analyse official government documents and newspaper sources written before and after the Games. The findings reveal the stark contrast between Germany's and Britain's sport and ‘soft power’ strategies: the former undertook a long-term, well-planned and resourced approach to altering its poor international image; the latter appeared far less concerned about capitalising on the Olympics to enhance Britain's (seemingly robust) international image.

• Viewed from the theory of two-level games, the European Union (EU) Act (2011) is a rare example of a government tying its hands in international diplomacy.
• The UK government could find its hands more tightly bound than anticipated under the EU Act, inter alia, due to the enhanced role of the courts in EU treaty ratification.
• The EU Act could convey bargaining advantages to the UK, but it could also encourage other EU member states to walk away from the negotiating table.
• The risks posed by tighter ratification rules are borne out by Ireland's experience of EU treaty ratification since the Supreme Court ruling Crotty v. An Taoiseach (1987).
• David Cameron's ‘veto’ of plans for a new EU treaty in December 2011 illustrates the difficulties of knowing ex ante when a referendum is required under the EU Act.

The European Union (EU) Act (2011) provides for greater parliamentary oversight and the possibility of a referendum before EU treaties can be ratified. This article explores the EU Act from a two-level game perspective, seeing it as a rare example of a government tying its hands in international diplomacy. That the UK government could find its hands more tightly bound than anticipated is suggested by Ireland's turbulent experience of treaty ratification in the light of Crotty v. An Taoiseach (1987), a landmark ruling by the Irish Supreme Court and an inspiration for the EU Act. This situation could, the theory of two-level games predicts, bolster the UK's bargaining position in Brussels, but it could also damage the country's credibility and encourage other member states to walk away from the negotiating table. This last point helps to shed some light on the UK's ‘veto’ of the Fiscal Compact in December 2011.

• Governments offer scholarships to foreign nationals expected to become influential in their home countries and shape public opinion to the benefit of their sponsor. This is known as the ‘opinion leader’ model.
• The histories of three British scholarship programs whose directors now subscribe to the ‘opinion leader’ model suggest they were actually set up for other reasons.
• Beliefs about what the programs are for have shifted toward the ‘opinion leader’ model even as they have continued to do the same things.
• The pattern of changing objectives seems to fit a Kingdonian model of the policy process.

Many governments offer scholarships specifically to foreign citizens. In recent years both policymakers and academics have associated these scholarships with political influence, arguing that they generate sympathetic and influential alumni who support positive relationships between their home country and their sponsor. Digging deeper into the histories of several scholarship programs which are now being portrayed in this way shows they were actually set up for very different reasons. Explanations for why scholarships are being given to foreign citizens have changed over time, consistent with a Kingdonian model of the policy process. We need to be cautious about taking these claims at face value, an important reminder for foreign policy analysts more generally.

This article

• Critically reviews e-democracy policy thinking in the UK.
• Surveys and evaluates e-democracy activity in key areas, including online forums, open government and data, e-petitioning, and more recent ‘crowdsourcing’ initiatives.
• Defends the on-going importance of a more deliberative approach to e-democracy policy and practice.

This paper evaluates the UK Government's e-democracy policy and considers what lesson should be learned for future policy and practice. Despite some isolated examples of success, we argue that policy experimentation in the area has been disappointing overall, especially when compared with the ambitious rhetoric that has surrounded it, and has failed to culminate in a coherent strategy for using the Internet to support democratic citizenship. Our analysis emphasizes the on-going importance of online deliberation in achieving inclusive, informed, and negotiated policy formation and political decision-making. In the absence of inclusive sites and practices of public deliberation, the democratic value of non-deliberative experiments with petitioning and crowdsourcing and recent government efforts to open up public information and data for citizen auditing and evaluation is likely to remain limited.