Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2261871
Šimon Trlifaj
ABSTRACTThis paper examines the conceptualization of innovation as a public good using an empirical analysis of patent transfers. It proposes that patents make inventions both excludable and alienable, in contrast to secrecy which only makes them excludable. A survival analysis finds that 10% higher complexity of patent descriptions is associated with 9% higher patent transfer hazard. This suggests that inventors more often patent complex inventions for the alienability motive – as opposed to the excludability motive. Small inventors transfer their patents less likely, but they do so sooner than other inventors. This suggests that patents enable an exchange of inventions that would otherwise be kept secret, but small inventors may not benefit from this function disproportionately more than others. These findings have implications for the conceptualization of innovation.KEYWORDS: Innovationpatentssecrecyalienabilityexcludabilitypublic goods Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Appropriability defined as the ability to protect the firm's competitive advantage from its inventions in the prior three years (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh Citation2000, p. 5).2 Arrow (Citation1962) generalizes the observation to information, while this paper focuses on innovation.3 Akcigit, Alp Celik, and Greenwood (Citation2016) model an extreme scenario where patented are not transferable. Although this is sub-optimal for patents, it is the case of some intellectual property rights. Copyright may not be re-sold in some countries (WIPO Citation2016). Regional agricultural indicators, such as those on the Parmigiano Reggiano cheese, may not be licensed or sold to producers outside a specific region (WTO Citation1994).4 Private email communication with the USPTO, available from the author upon request.5 For consistency, micro-entities, introduced in 2013, are treated as small entities (see USPTO Citation2020, for details).
摘要本文通过对专利转让的实证分析，探讨了创新作为一种公共产品的概念。它提出，专利使发明具有排他性和可让渡性，而保密只使发明具有排他性。生存分析发现，专利描述复杂性增加10%，专利转移风险增加9%。这表明，发明人更多地是出于可让与性动机而非可排他性动机为复杂发明申请专利。小型发明人转让专利的可能性较小，但他们比其他发明人做得更快。这表明，专利使原本保密的发明得以交换，但小发明家可能不会比其他人更不成比例地从这一功能中受益。这些发现对创新的概念化具有启示意义。关键词:创新专利、机密性、可让与性、排他性、公共产品披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。注1可挪用性被定义为保护公司在前三年的发明中获得竞争优势的能力(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh Citation2000, p. 5)Arrow (Citation1962)将观察概括为信息，而本文则侧重于创新Akcigit、Alp Celik和Greenwood (Citation2016)模拟了一种极端情况，即专利不可转让。尽管这对于专利来说不是最优的，但对于某些知识产权来说却是如此。在某些国家，版权不得转售(WIPO Citation2016)。区域农业指标，如帕尔马干酪上的指标，不得许可或出售给特定区域以外的生产者(WTO引文1994)与USPTO的私人电子邮件通信，可应作者要求提供为了一致性，2013年引入的微实体被视为小实体(详见USPTO Citation2020)。
{"title":"The alienability of innovation: evidence from patent transfers","authors":"Šimon Trlifaj","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2261871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2261871","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper examines the conceptualization of innovation as a public good using an empirical analysis of patent transfers. It proposes that patents make inventions both excludable and alienable, in contrast to secrecy which only makes them excludable. A survival analysis finds that 10% higher complexity of patent descriptions is associated with 9% higher patent transfer hazard. This suggests that inventors more often patent complex inventions for the alienability motive – as opposed to the excludability motive. Small inventors transfer their patents less likely, but they do so sooner than other inventors. This suggests that patents enable an exchange of inventions that would otherwise be kept secret, but small inventors may not benefit from this function disproportionately more than others. These findings have implications for the conceptualization of innovation.KEYWORDS: Innovationpatentssecrecyalienabilityexcludabilitypublic goods Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Appropriability defined as the ability to protect the firm's competitive advantage from its inventions in the prior three years (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh Citation2000, p. 5).2 Arrow (Citation1962) generalizes the observation to information, while this paper focuses on innovation.3 Akcigit, Alp Celik, and Greenwood (Citation2016) model an extreme scenario where patented are not transferable. Although this is sub-optimal for patents, it is the case of some intellectual property rights. Copyright may not be re-sold in some countries (WIPO Citation2016). Regional agricultural indicators, such as those on the Parmigiano Reggiano cheese, may not be licensed or sold to producers outside a specific region (WTO Citation1994).4 Private email communication with the USPTO, available from the author upon request.5 For consistency, micro-entities, introduced in 2013, are treated as small entities (see USPTO Citation2020, for details).","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135199343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2258355
Di Wu, Qifeng Zhao
ABSTRACTThe functions of the stock market such as investment exit mechanism (IPO), interest incentive and capital allocation are beneficial for corporate to engage in innovation activities with higher risk and longer cycle, but IPO underpricing will hinder the realization of such functions. This paper uses the fixed effect model for empirical analysis and finds that the long-term innovation performance of corporate s with IPO underpricing is poor. Mechanism analysis shows that IPO underpricing corporates will have management myopia, lack of R&D enthusiasm that inhibit corporate innovation. Further analysis shows that the improvement of corporate information transparency and institutional investor field research can alleviate this negative impact can alleviate this negative impact. The conclusion of this paper aims to improve efficiency of the capital market, promote the effective pricing of the capital market, and provide certain reference significance for the relevant policies of the capital market to support the high-quality development of the real economy.KEYWORDS: Corporate innovationIPO underpricingmanagement myopiaR&D enthusiasmcorporate information transparencyJEL CLASSIFICATION: G32O31 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingQifeng Zhao acknowledges support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [grant number 72302229]; Di Wu acknowledges support from the Social Science Planning Fund Program, Shandong Province [grant number 22DGLJ13].
{"title":"IPO underpricing and corporate innovation: evidence from China","authors":"Di Wu, Qifeng Zhao","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2258355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2258355","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe functions of the stock market such as investment exit mechanism (IPO), interest incentive and capital allocation are beneficial for corporate to engage in innovation activities with higher risk and longer cycle, but IPO underpricing will hinder the realization of such functions. This paper uses the fixed effect model for empirical analysis and finds that the long-term innovation performance of corporate s with IPO underpricing is poor. Mechanism analysis shows that IPO underpricing corporates will have management myopia, lack of R&D enthusiasm that inhibit corporate innovation. Further analysis shows that the improvement of corporate information transparency and institutional investor field research can alleviate this negative impact can alleviate this negative impact. The conclusion of this paper aims to improve efficiency of the capital market, promote the effective pricing of the capital market, and provide certain reference significance for the relevant policies of the capital market to support the high-quality development of the real economy.KEYWORDS: Corporate innovationIPO underpricingmanagement myopiaR&D enthusiasmcorporate information transparencyJEL CLASSIFICATION: G32O31 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingQifeng Zhao acknowledges support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [grant number 72302229]; Di Wu acknowledges support from the Social Science Planning Fund Program, Shandong Province [grant number 22DGLJ13].","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135014882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-15DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2258065
Albert N. Link, Christopher A. Swann
ABSTRACTAn unanticipated consequence from the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is the propensity of U.S. firms to sell their SBIR-funded and developed technology rights to foreign entities. While such sales are factually documented in reports from both the U.S. National Academies and from the Department of Defense, the U.S. Congress has only recently shown concern about such activity. Using project-level data, we document the extent of foreign sales of technology rights. We also highlight the role of foreign development funding during the commercialization phase. Our statistical analysis finds a positive association between the probability of selling technology rights to foreign firms or investors and the receipt of foreign development funding. This finding might be a bellwether to the U.S. Congress and to other countries that have adopted programs that mirror the U.S. program.KEYWORDS: SBIR programsale of technology rightsforeign development fundingR&DJEL CODES: H11H32H44 Authorship Contribution StatementBoth authors contributed equally at all stages of this study.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions.2 This act is one of a number of Congressional responses to the productivity slowdown in the economy that began in the early – to mid-1970 and raised its head again in the early 1980s.3 See also Bastiat (original Citation1848, Citation1995, 1) who wrote: ‘There is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account both the effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen. Yet this difference is tremendous; for it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is favorable, the later consequences are disastrous, and vice versa. Whence it follows that the bad economist pursues a small present good that will be followed by a great evil to come, while the good economist pursues a great good to come, at the risk of a small present evil.'4 Unanticipated consequences associated with a legislated subsidy, such as the SBIR program, are not necessarily at odds with the concept of government failure for which the rules set by government are too broad (Dolfsma Citation2011).5 These countries, and the date of the enabling legislation, are: Republic of Turkey (1995), Australia (1996), Brazil (1997), South Korea (1998), Japan (1999), Taiwan (1999), United Kingdom (2001), The Netherlands (2004), and New Zealand (2012). A detailed summary of the programs in each of these countries is forthcoming in a special issue of Annals of Science and Technology Policy.6 For example, Cunningham and Link (Citation2021, 40) wrote that a comparable program in the United Kingdom is the Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI), and it was initiated in 2001 to mirror the U.S. SBIR program. The aut
{"title":"Unanticipated consequences: concerns about the sale of taxpayer-funded technologies to foreign entities","authors":"Albert N. Link, Christopher A. Swann","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2258065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2258065","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAn unanticipated consequence from the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is the propensity of U.S. firms to sell their SBIR-funded and developed technology rights to foreign entities. While such sales are factually documented in reports from both the U.S. National Academies and from the Department of Defense, the U.S. Congress has only recently shown concern about such activity. Using project-level data, we document the extent of foreign sales of technology rights. We also highlight the role of foreign development funding during the commercialization phase. Our statistical analysis finds a positive association between the probability of selling technology rights to foreign firms or investors and the receipt of foreign development funding. This finding might be a bellwether to the U.S. Congress and to other countries that have adopted programs that mirror the U.S. program.KEYWORDS: SBIR programsale of technology rightsforeign development fundingR&DJEL CODES: H11H32H44 Authorship Contribution StatementBoth authors contributed equally at all stages of this study.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions.2 This act is one of a number of Congressional responses to the productivity slowdown in the economy that began in the early – to mid-1970 and raised its head again in the early 1980s.3 See also Bastiat (original Citation1848, Citation1995, 1) who wrote: ‘There is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account both the effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen. Yet this difference is tremendous; for it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is favorable, the later consequences are disastrous, and vice versa. Whence it follows that the bad economist pursues a small present good that will be followed by a great evil to come, while the good economist pursues a great good to come, at the risk of a small present evil.'4 Unanticipated consequences associated with a legislated subsidy, such as the SBIR program, are not necessarily at odds with the concept of government failure for which the rules set by government are too broad (Dolfsma Citation2011).5 These countries, and the date of the enabling legislation, are: Republic of Turkey (1995), Australia (1996), Brazil (1997), South Korea (1998), Japan (1999), Taiwan (1999), United Kingdom (2001), The Netherlands (2004), and New Zealand (2012). A detailed summary of the programs in each of these countries is forthcoming in a special issue of Annals of Science and Technology Policy.6 For example, Cunningham and Link (Citation2021, 40) wrote that a comparable program in the United Kingdom is the Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI), and it was initiated in 2001 to mirror the U.S. SBIR program. The aut","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135396759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-13DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2255975
Hao Cheng, Xiaoyuan Ding, Chenhang Zeng
This paper revisits how private cross-ownership affects cost-reducing R&D, production quantities, consumer surplus, firms’ profits and social welfare in a mixed oligopoly with a convex cost function. We show that increasing cross-ownership reduces private firms’ R&D but increases the semi-public firm’s R&D. Further, both consumer surplus and social welfare could be enhanced through cross-ownership when the convexity of cost function is small. However, increasing cross-ownership could hurt consumers and social welfare when the convexity of cost function is large. Our finding highlights that the convexity of cost function is very important to the welfare implications of cross-ownership. Hence, antitrust authorities should be more careful when assessing the welfare effects of partial ownership in different industries.
{"title":"Cross-ownership on R&D and welfare in a mixed oligopoly: revisiting with convex cost","authors":"Hao Cheng, Xiaoyuan Ding, Chenhang Zeng","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2255975","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2255975","url":null,"abstract":"This paper revisits how private cross-ownership affects cost-reducing R&D, production quantities, consumer surplus, firms’ profits and social welfare in a mixed oligopoly with a convex cost function. We show that increasing cross-ownership reduces private firms’ R&D but increases the semi-public firm’s R&D. Further, both consumer surplus and social welfare could be enhanced through cross-ownership when the convexity of cost function is small. However, increasing cross-ownership could hurt consumers and social welfare when the convexity of cost function is large. Our finding highlights that the convexity of cost function is very important to the welfare implications of cross-ownership. Hence, antitrust authorities should be more careful when assessing the welfare effects of partial ownership in different industries.","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135740561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-07DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2255978
Li-ming Li, Yu-Hang Liu, Ya-feng Zhang
{"title":"The U-shaped relationship between patent age and patent value: evidence from assigned patents in China","authors":"Li-ming Li, Yu-Hang Liu, Ya-feng Zhang","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2255978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2255978","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41857857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-05DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2254241
Godfrey Kamutando, Fiona Tregenna
{"title":"Complementarity between product and process innovation in small and micro-enterprises in Johannesburg, South Africa","authors":"Godfrey Kamutando, Fiona Tregenna","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2254241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2254241","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48841329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-24DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2251004
Jingxian Gan
{"title":"Impact of the combination intensity and balance of patent policy on firm patent quality","authors":"Jingxian Gan","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2251004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2251004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41872325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-23DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2250263
D. Buccella, L. Fanti, L. Gori
{"title":"Network externalities, product compatibility and process innovation: corrigendum","authors":"D. Buccella, L. Fanti, L. Gori","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2250263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2250263","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48696276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2246021
Marco Amendola
{"title":"Input additionality of R&D tax reliefs: results from a panel LP-IV approach","authors":"Marco Amendola","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2246021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2246021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48603079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-25DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2237895
Juan Fernández-Sastre, Fernando Bruna
{"title":"The geographical component in firms’ perception of innovation barriers: the case of Ecuador","authors":"Juan Fernández-Sastre, Fernando Bruna","doi":"10.1080/10438599.2023.2237895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2023.2237895","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51485,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Innovation and New Technology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43393684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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