Pub Date : 2019-11-15DOI: 10.1007/s10693-019-00325-5
G. B. Navaretti, G. Calzolari, A. Pozzolo, Maria Teresa Trentinaglia de Daverio
{"title":"Few Large with Many Small: Banks Size Distribution and Cross-Border Financial Linkages","authors":"G. B. Navaretti, G. Calzolari, A. Pozzolo, Maria Teresa Trentinaglia de Daverio","doi":"10.1007/s10693-019-00325-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-019-00325-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10693-019-00325-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42960487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-29DOI: 10.1007/s10693-019-00324-6
Mei Li, F. Milne, Junfeng Qiu
{"title":"The LOLR Policy and its Signaling Effect in a Time of Crisis","authors":"Mei Li, F. Milne, Junfeng Qiu","doi":"10.1007/s10693-019-00324-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-019-00324-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10693-019-00324-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52238325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-25DOI: 10.1007/s10693-021-00365-w
Zuzana Fungáčová, Eeva Kerola, L. Weill
{"title":"Does Experience of Banking Crises Affect Trust in Banks?","authors":"Zuzana Fungáčová, Eeva Kerola, L. Weill","doi":"10.1007/s10693-021-00365-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-021-00365-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49134551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-18DOI: 10.1007/s10693-019-00326-4
Dimitris K. Chronopoulos, George Dotsis, Nikolaos T. Milonas
{"title":"International Evidence on the Determinants of Domestic Sovereign Debt Bank Holdings","authors":"Dimitris K. Chronopoulos, George Dotsis, Nikolaos T. Milonas","doi":"10.1007/s10693-019-00326-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-019-00326-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10693-019-00326-4","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45745738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a sample of 1,507 US all-public acquisitions from 1985–2014, 5% of acquirers use the same advisor that underwrote the target’s initial public offering. Acquirers who use these informed advisors have acquisition announcement three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) that are 2.048 percentage points higher, all else equal. Same-advisor acquisition announcements have higher combined CARs but not lower target CARs, suggesting higher synergies instead of lower deal premia. Same-advisor acquisition announcement outperformance decays as the target ages and grows. These findings show the value and timeliness of investment bank information production, retention, and transfer.
{"title":"How Much Does Your Banker’s Target-Specific Experience Matter? Evidence from Target IPO Underwriters that Advise Acquirers","authors":"Richard Herron","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2889506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2889506","url":null,"abstract":"In a sample of 1,507 US all-public acquisitions from 1985–2014, 5% of acquirers use the same advisor that underwrote the target’s initial public offering. Acquirers who use these informed advisors have acquisition announcement three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) that are 2.048 percentage points higher, all else equal. Same-advisor acquisition announcements have higher combined CARs but not lower target CARs, suggesting higher synergies instead of lower deal premia. Same-advisor acquisition announcement outperformance decays as the target ages and grows. These findings show the value and timeliness of investment bank information production, retention, and transfer.","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48558897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-08DOI: 10.1007/s10693-019-00323-7
Jinyong Kim, Mingook Kim, Yongsik Kim
{"title":"Bank Transparency and the Market’s Perception of Bank Risk","authors":"Jinyong Kim, Mingook Kim, Yongsik Kim","doi":"10.1007/s10693-019-00323-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-019-00323-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10693-019-00323-7","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52238311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that IRS monitoring exerts a significantly negative effect on the cost of syndicated loans. A one standard deviation increase in the probability of an IRS audit decreases loan spreads by around nine basis points. We also find that this effect is stronger for borrowers with better lending relationships and credible access to public markets. These results indicate that IRS monitoring could increase the bargaining power of borrowers and restrain banks from extracting informational rents from their lending relationships. Thus, they provide a novel insight into how IRS monitoring could lower the cost of financing from the banking system.
{"title":"Does IRS Monitoring Matter for the Cost of Bank Loans?","authors":"Theodora Bermpei, A. Kalyvas, S. Wolfe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3419334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3419334","url":null,"abstract":"We show that IRS monitoring exerts a significantly negative effect on the cost of syndicated loans. A one standard deviation increase in the probability of an IRS audit decreases loan spreads by around nine basis points. We also find that this effect is stronger for borrowers with better lending relationships and credible access to public markets. These results indicate that IRS monitoring could increase the bargaining power of borrowers and restrain banks from extracting informational rents from their lending relationships. Thus, they provide a novel insight into how IRS monitoring could lower the cost of financing from the banking system.","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68591943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fund families are centrally managed, and can directly control resource allocations between funds. We quantify multiple manageable fund family attributes, and examine their combined effects upon returns and investor flows. We focus upon five attributes that are exclusively manageable by fund families: marginal fee economies of scale, star fund offerings, mixed high and low risk product offerings, within-family manager scope, and manager outsourcing. We find sensitivity differences during the financial crisis and non-crisis time periods. Management of these exclusive attributes significantly improve a fund family’s returns and investor flows, benefiting fund families and their investors during both normal and financial crisis periods. We find that investors reward fund families with greater performance sensitive inflows and weaker performance sensitive outflows, indicating that investors identify greater utility in centrally managed fund families.
{"title":"The Exclusive Role of Centralized Fund Family Management","authors":"D. Hunter, Zhen Sun, K. Benson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3363199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3363199","url":null,"abstract":"Fund families are centrally managed, and can directly control resource allocations between funds. We quantify multiple manageable fund family attributes, and examine their combined effects upon returns and investor flows. We focus upon five attributes that are exclusively manageable by fund families: marginal fee economies of scale, star fund offerings, mixed high and low risk product offerings, within-family manager scope, and manager outsourcing. We find sensitivity differences during the financial crisis and non-crisis time periods. Management of these exclusive attributes significantly improve a fund family’s returns and investor flows, benefiting fund families and their investors during both normal and financial crisis periods. We find that investors reward fund families with greater performance sensitive inflows and weaker performance sensitive outflows, indicating that investors identify greater utility in centrally managed fund families.","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46200113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-06DOI: 10.1007/s10693-019-00321-9
G. Löffler
{"title":"The Systemic Risk Implications of Using Credit Ratings Versus Quantitative Measures to Limit Bond Portfolio Risk","authors":"G. Löffler","doi":"10.1007/s10693-019-00321-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-019-00321-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10693-019-00321-9","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46303258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-13DOI: 10.1007/s10693-019-00313-9
John Pereira, Irma Malafronte, G. Sorwar, Mohamed Nurullah
{"title":"Enforcement Actions, Market Movement and Depositors’ Reaction: Evidence from the US Banking System","authors":"John Pereira, Irma Malafronte, G. Sorwar, Mohamed Nurullah","doi":"10.1007/s10693-019-00313-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-019-00313-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51503,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Services Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s10693-019-00313-9","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52238278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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