首页 > 最新文献

Philosophical Perspectives最新文献

英文 中文
Plenitude, Coincidence, and Humility 充足、巧合和谦卑
IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-12-08 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12161
Maegan Fairchild
It is a persistent trope in period dramas that the most garishly extravagant character — the matriarch with all the feathers — is most concerned to trumpet their conservative virtues. And so too in metaphysics! Fairchild (2019) advertised the humility of material plenitude, arguing that despite the profligate ontology of coincident objects it entails, the best version of plenitude is one that takes no stand on a range of nearby questions about modality and coincidence. Roughly, the thought is that plenitude says only that there are coincident objects corresponding to every consistent pattern of essential and accidental properties. Plenitude says — or should say — nothing about which patterns those might be, and so should be compatible with any reasonable hypothesis about which combinations of properties it is possible for something to have. I argued in the earlier paper that a particular formulation of the target view (Global Plenitude) has exactly that virtue. But like the many-feathered matriarch, Global Plenitude turns out not to be very humble at all. Most vividly, Global Plenitude is incompatible with an exceptionally compelling hypothesis about coincidence: that there are some things which coincide, but might not have. Scandal ensues. Thankfully (as we know from the dramas) untangling a scandal can reveal a lot about the underlying character of the thing. Getting a handle on the shape of the problem for Global Plenitude paves the way for an attractive fix, but also puts significant pressure on our aspriations to ‘humility’. In what follows, I recap and diagnose the problem for the old formulation (Section 2) and propose an improvement (Section 3). Along the way, I discuss a number of connected questions. Section 2.3 explores whether a plenitudinous picture of the world really does require that coincidence be contingent, and Section 5 asks whether plenitude allows for “nontrivial essences.” (Roughly, nontrivial properties that are had essentially if at all.) I argue that both are genuine choice-points, yielding quite different pictures which are nonetheless compatible with what I take to be the characteristic ambitions of plenitude. Both Global Plenitude and the new formulation I propose in Section 3 are what I’ll call ‘essentialist’ varieties of plenitude. Briefly, and with a promise to return to the details: plenitude is
在古装剧中,最华丽的奢侈角色——带着所有羽毛的女族长——最关心的是宣扬她们保守的美德,这是一个持久的比喻。在形而上学中也是如此!费尔柴尔德(2019)宣传了物质丰富性的谦卑性,他认为,尽管它带来了重合物体的挥霍本体论,但丰富性的最佳版本是不涉及一系列有关形态和巧合的问题。粗略地说,这个思想是,充分性只说,有一致的对象对应于每一个基本和偶然性质的一致模式。充分性没有说——或者应该说——这些可能是哪种模式,因此应该与任何关于某物可能具有哪些属性组合的合理假设相兼容。我在之前的文章中指出,目标视图(Global abundance)的一个特定表述恰好具有这种优点。但就像长着许多羽毛的母象一样,Global plentiity一点也不谦逊。最生动的是,“全球丰盛”与一个非常令人信服的关于巧合的假设是不相容的:有些事情是重合的,但可能不是。丑闻。值得庆幸的是(正如我们从电视剧中所知道的),解开丑闻可以揭示很多事情的潜在特征。为“全球饱足”找到问题的根源,为有吸引力的解决方案铺平了道路,但也给我们“谦卑”的愿望带来了巨大的压力。在接下来的内容中,我将回顾和诊断旧公式的问题(第2节),并提出改进建议(第3节)。在此过程中,我讨论了一些相关的问题。第2.3节探讨了一个丰裕的世界图景是否真的需要偶然的巧合,第5节探讨了丰裕是否允许“非平凡的本质”。(粗略地说,这些是非平凡的属性基本上是存在的。)我认为,两者都是真正的选择点,产生了截然不同的图景,尽管如此,它们与我所认为的丰裕的典型抱负是相容的。全球充实和我在第3节中提出的新表述都是充实的“本质主义”变种。简单地说,并承诺回到细节:充足是
{"title":"Plenitude, Coincidence, and Humility","authors":"Maegan Fairchild","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12161","url":null,"abstract":"It is a persistent trope in period dramas that the most garishly extravagant character — the matriarch with all the feathers — is most concerned to trumpet their conservative virtues. And so too in metaphysics! Fairchild (2019) advertised the humility of material plenitude, arguing that despite the profligate ontology of coincident objects it entails, the best version of plenitude is one that takes no stand on a range of nearby questions about modality and coincidence. Roughly, the thought is that plenitude says only that there are coincident objects corresponding to every consistent pattern of essential and accidental properties. Plenitude says — or should say — nothing about which patterns those might be, and so should be compatible with any reasonable hypothesis about which combinations of properties it is possible for something to have. I argued in the earlier paper that a particular formulation of the target view (Global Plenitude) has exactly that virtue. But like the many-feathered matriarch, Global Plenitude turns out not to be very humble at all. Most vividly, Global Plenitude is incompatible with an exceptionally compelling hypothesis about coincidence: that there are some things which coincide, but might not have. Scandal ensues. Thankfully (as we know from the dramas) untangling a scandal can reveal a lot about the underlying character of the thing. Getting a handle on the shape of the problem for Global Plenitude paves the way for an attractive fix, but also puts significant pressure on our aspriations to ‘humility’. In what follows, I recap and diagnose the problem for the old formulation (Section 2) and propose an improvement (Section 3). Along the way, I discuss a number of connected questions. Section 2.3 explores whether a plenitudinous picture of the world really does require that coincidence be contingent, and Section 5 asks whether plenitude allows for “nontrivial essences.” (Roughly, nontrivial properties that are had essentially if at all.) I argue that both are genuine choice-points, yielding quite different pictures which are nonetheless compatible with what I take to be the characteristic ambitions of plenitude. Both Global Plenitude and the new formulation I propose in Section 3 are what I’ll call ‘essentialist’ varieties of plenitude. Briefly, and with a promise to return to the details: plenitude is","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47570312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Power to Govern 治理的权力
IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-11-28 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12168
Erica Shumener
{"title":"The Power to Govern","authors":"Erica Shumener","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12168","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47377256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
No “Easy” Answers to Ontological Category Questions 本体论范畴问题没有“简单”的答案
IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-11-28 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12162
Vera Flocke, K. Ritchie
Easy Ontologists, most notably Thomasson (2015), argue that ontological questions are shallow. They think that these questions can either be answered by using our ordinary conceptual competence—of course tables exist!—or are meaningless, or else should be answered through conceptual re-engineering. Ontology thus is “easy”, requiring no distinctively metaphysical investigation. This paper raises a two-stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first argue that questions concerning which entities exist are inextricably bound up with “ontological category questions”, which are questions concerning the identity of and differences between kinds of entities. We then argue that ontological category questions do not have trivial answers, are meaningful, and cannot be answered through conceptual re-engineering. Easy Ontology hence does not constitute a comprehensive ontological methodology. While some of ontology might be easy, category questions form a central part of ontology and are not answered easily. Easy Ontologists, most notably Amie Thomasson (2015, 2020a, 2021), argue that ontological questions are shallow. They think that these questions can either be answered by using our ordinary conceptual competence—of course tables exist!—or are meaningless, or else should be answered through conceptual re-engineering. They conclude that ontologists should focus on conceptual questions, regarding which concepts we in fact use and which concepts we should use. This paper raises a two-stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first argue that questions concerning which entities exist are inextricably bound up with ontological category questions—questions concerning the identity of and differences between kinds of entities. 1 For example, consider two philosophers who both think that there
{"title":"No “Easy” Answers to Ontological Category Questions","authors":"Vera Flocke, K. Ritchie","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12162","url":null,"abstract":"Easy Ontologists, most notably Thomasson (2015), argue that ontological questions are shallow. They think that these questions can either be answered by using our ordinary conceptual competence—of course tables exist!—or are meaningless, or else should be answered through conceptual re-engineering. Ontology thus is “easy”, requiring no distinctively metaphysical investigation. This paper raises a two-stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first argue that questions concerning which entities exist are inextricably bound up with “ontological category questions”, which are questions concerning the identity of and differences between kinds of entities. We then argue that ontological category questions do not have trivial answers, are meaningful, and cannot be answered through conceptual re-engineering. Easy Ontology hence does not constitute a comprehensive ontological methodology. While some of ontology might be easy, category questions form a central part of ontology and are not answered easily. Easy Ontologists, most notably Amie Thomasson (2015, 2020a, 2021), argue that ontological questions are shallow. They think that these questions can either be answered by using our ordinary conceptual competence—of course tables exist!—or are meaningless, or else should be answered through conceptual re-engineering. They conclude that ontologists should focus on conceptual questions, regarding which concepts we in fact use and which concepts we should use. This paper raises a two-stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first argue that questions concerning which entities exist are inextricably bound up with ontological category questions—questions concerning the identity of and differences between kinds of entities. 1 For example, consider two philosophers who both think that there","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48352322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Tensed Facts and the Fittingness of our Attitudes 1 紧张的事实与我们态度的适宜性
IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-11-28 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12166
Kristie Miller
{"title":"Tensed Facts and the Fittingness of our Attitudes\u0000 1","authors":"Kristie Miller","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12166","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43216253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Relativity in a Fundamentally Absolute World 一个基本绝对世界中的相对论
IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-11-28 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12164
Jack Spencer
{"title":"Relativity in a Fundamentally Absolute World","authors":"Jack Spencer","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12164","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43724015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The complete chloroplast genome of Atriplex gmelinii C. A. Mey. ex Bong. (Amaranthaceae). Atriplex gmelinii C. A. Mey.A. Mey.(苋科)。
IF 0.5 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-03-25 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1080/23802359.2022.2055501
Jongsun Park, Yongsung Kim, Juhyeon Min, Sang-Tae Kim

Atriplex gmelinii C. A. Mey. Ex Bong._1838 is an annual halophytic herb found in East Asia and North America. The chloroplast genome of A. gmelinii was successfully sequenced. The assembled genome (151,852 bp; GC ratio, 37.3%) is composed of four subregions, with the large single copy (LSC; 83,872 bp; 35.4%) and small single copy (SSC; 17,812 bp; 30.9%) regions separated by two regions of inverted repeat regions (25,084 bp; 42.8%). A total of 130 genes were predicted with 85 protein-coding genes, 8 rRNAs, and 37 tRNAs. The phylogenetic analyses inferred from whole chloroplast genomes of 35 species, including 34 species in Amaranthaceae and one outgroup species, suggest a close relationship between A. gmelinii and A. centralasiatica.

Atriplex gmelinii C. A. Mey.A. Mey.Ex Bong._1838)是一种生长在东亚和北美的一年生卤代草本植物。gmelinii 的叶绿体基因组已成功测序。组装的基因组(151,852 bp;GC 比率,37.3%)由四个亚区组成,其中大单拷贝区(LSC;83,872 bp;35.4%)和小单拷贝区(SSC;17,812 bp;30.9%)被两个反向重复区(25,084 bp;42.8%)隔开。共预测出 130 个基因,其中包括 85 个蛋白质编码基因、8 个 rRNA 和 37 个 tRNA。从 35 个物种(包括 34 个苋科物种和 1 个外群物种)的全叶绿体基因组推断的系统发生分析表明,A. gmelinii 与 A. centralasiatica 关系密切。
{"title":"The complete chloroplast genome of <i>Atriplex gmelinii</i> C. A. Mey. ex Bong. (Amaranthaceae).","authors":"Jongsun Park, Yongsung Kim, Juhyeon Min, Sang-Tae Kim","doi":"10.1080/23802359.2022.2055501","DOIUrl":"10.1080/23802359.2022.2055501","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p><i>Atriplex gmelinii</i> C. A. Mey. Ex Bong._1838 is an annual halophytic herb found in East Asia and North America. The chloroplast genome of <i>A. gmelinii</i> was successfully sequenced. The assembled genome (151,852 bp; GC ratio, 37.3%) is composed of four subregions, with the large single copy (LSC; 83,872 bp; 35.4%) and small single copy (SSC; 17,812 bp; 30.9%) regions separated by two regions of inverted repeat regions (25,084 bp; 42.8%). A total of 130 genes were predicted with 85 protein-coding genes, 8 rRNAs, and 37 tRNAs. The phylogenetic analyses inferred from whole chloroplast genomes of 35 species, including 34 species in Amaranthaceae and one outgroup species, suggest a close relationship between <i>A. gmelinii</i> and <i>A. centralasiatica</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"27 1","pages":"541-543"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8959532/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85648103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information 问题信息
IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12134
{"title":"Issue Information","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12134","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47659779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidence, ignorance, and symmetry 证据,无知和对称
IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-10-31 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12151
Tamar Lando
{"title":"Evidence, ignorance, and symmetry","authors":"Tamar Lando","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12151","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45850575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Consequences of comparability 可比性的后果
IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-10-31 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12157
C. Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel, Jake Zuehl
We defend three claims about preference, credence, and choice. First, all agents (not just rational ones) have complete preferences. Second, all agents (again, not just rational ones) have real-valued credences in every proposition in which they are confident to any degree. Third, there is almost always some unique thing we ought to do, want, or believe. These claims may seem absurd. But as we will show, they follow from certain hard-to-resist premises by a principle of the logic of comparatives that we call Comparability. This principle requires, to a first approximation, that if two things are not equally F, then one must be more F than the other. Although many philosophers have rejected Comparability, it is widely assumed in the semantics literature on gradable adjectives and other comparative expressions. In a companion paper (Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl 2021) we defend its validity. In the present paper, we take Comparability for granted and use it to argue for further controversial conclusions. Of course, those who reject these conclusions may prefer to read the present paper as providing a further battery ofmodus tollens arguments to back up the putative counterexamples that have already convinced so many philosophers to reject Comparability. But we argue, in each case, that the consequences of Comparability are less implausible than they might initially seem. We provide the necessary background in section 1. The rest of the paper draws out our central claims for preference, credence, and choice.
我们捍卫三个主张:偏好、信任和选择。首先,所有的主体(不仅仅是理性主体)都有完全的偏好。其次,所有的主体(再次强调,不仅仅是理性主体)在任何程度上对每个命题都有实值信任。第三,几乎总是有一些独特的事情我们应该去做,想要,或相信。这些说法可能看起来很荒谬。但正如我们将要展示的,它们遵循着某些难以抗拒的前提,遵循着比较逻辑的原则,我们称之为可比性。这个原理要求,近似地说,如果两个东西不等于F,那么其中一个一定比另一个大。虽然许多哲学家反对可比性,但在语义学文献中,可分级形容词和其他比较表达被广泛认为是可比性。在一篇同伴论文(Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl 2021)中,我们捍卫了它的有效性。在本文中,我们认为可比性是理所当然的,并用它来论证进一步有争议的结论。当然,那些拒绝这些结论的人可能更愿意阅读本文,认为它提供了一系列进一步的模态论证,以支持那些已经说服许多哲学家拒绝可比性的假定反例。但我们认为,在每种情况下,可比性的结果并不像最初看起来那样令人难以置信。我们将在第1节中提供必要的背景知识。本文的其余部分阐述了我们对偏好、信任和选择的核心主张。
{"title":"Consequences of comparability","authors":"C. Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel, Jake Zuehl","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12157","url":null,"abstract":"We defend three claims about preference, credence, and choice. First, all agents (not just rational ones) have complete preferences. Second, all agents (again, not just rational ones) have real-valued credences in every proposition in which they are confident to any degree. Third, there is almost always some unique thing we ought to do, want, or believe. These claims may seem absurd. But as we will show, they follow from certain hard-to-resist premises by a principle of the logic of comparatives that we call Comparability. This principle requires, to a first approximation, that if two things are not equally F, then one must be more F than the other. Although many philosophers have rejected Comparability, it is widely assumed in the semantics literature on gradable adjectives and other comparative expressions. In a companion paper (Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl 2021) we defend its validity. In the present paper, we take Comparability for granted and use it to argue for further controversial conclusions. Of course, those who reject these conclusions may prefer to read the present paper as providing a further battery ofmodus tollens arguments to back up the putative counterexamples that have already convinced so many philosophers to reject Comparability. But we argue, in each case, that the consequences of Comparability are less implausible than they might initially seem. We provide the necessary background in section 1. The rest of the paper draws out our central claims for preference, credence, and choice.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48666615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Moral and epistemic evaluations: A unified treatment 道德和认知评价:统一的处理
IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12159
Bob Beddor
A rich tradition in metaethics seeks to explain the meaning of moral language in terms of desire-like attitudes. This approach can be implemented in di erent ways. On a contextualist implementation, moral discourse describes the desire-like attitudes of some agent(s), for example, the speaker or the speaker’s community. On an expressivist implementation, moral discourse does not describe desire-like attitudes; it expresses them. On a relativist implementation, the truth-value of a moral assertion at a context of assessment depends on the desire-like attitudes of the assessor—that is, someone assessing the utterance for truth or falsity. Despite these di erences, all such “attitudinal metaethics” are bound by a common thread: they analyze moral discourse in terms of conative states. Attitudinal metaethicists sometimes propose extending their approach to other varieties of normative discourse, including epistemic discourse.1 A generalized attitudinal semantics along these lines carries obvious attractions. But it also faces important challenges. An initial challenge concerns how to even spell out a generalized attitudinal semantics. While much ink has been spilled in pursuit of a precise attitudinal semantics for moral discourse, the extension to other fragments of normative language has not received a comparable degree of attention. Second, and more worrisome, some philosophers have argued that there are principled obstacles to the very idea of a generalized attitudinal semantics. For example, Boult and Köhler 2020 argue that a generalized attitudinal semantics is under-motivated, since the primary arguments for an attitudinal metaethics do not carry over to the epistemic domain. And Wodak 2017 argues that a generalized attitudinal semantics over-predicts disagreements across normative domains. These obstacles can be used to frame a dilemma for any attempt to generalize an attitudinal semantics. On the one hand, generalizers need to show that there are su cient commonalities between di erent normative domains to warrant a uni ed treatment. On the other hand, generalizers had better not erase the obvious di erences between di erent avors of normative judgment.
元伦理学中有一个丰富的传统,试图从欲望态度的角度来解释道德语言的意义。这种方法可以通过不同的方式实现。在语境主义的实施中,道德话语描述了一些行为主体(例如,说话者或说话者的群体)的欲望式态度。在表现主义的实施中,道德话语不描述欲望般的态度;它表达了它们。在相对主义的实施中,在评估的语境中,道德主张的真值取决于评估者的欲望态度,也就是说,某人评估话语的真实性或虚假性。尽管存在这些差异,但所有这些“态度元伦理学”都被一条共同的线索所束缚:他们从自然状态的角度分析道德话语。态度元伦理学家有时建议将他们的方法扩展到其他种类的规范性话语,包括认识论话语沿着这些路线的广义态度语义具有明显的吸引力。但它也面临着重要的挑战。一个最初的挑战是如何拼出一个广义的态度语义。虽然在追求道德话语的精确态度语义学方面已经花费了大量的精力,但将其扩展到规范语言的其他片段却没有得到相当程度的关注。其次,更令人担忧的是,一些哲学家认为,广义态度语义学的概念本身存在原则性障碍。例如,Boult和Köhler 2020认为,广义的态度语义是动机不足的,因为态度元伦理学的主要论点没有延续到认知领域。Wodak 2017认为,广义态度语义过度预测了规范领域之间的分歧。这些障碍可以用来为任何试图概括态度语义的尝试构建一个困境。一方面,泛化者需要证明在不同的规范领域之间有足够的共性来保证统一的处理。另一方面,泛化者最好不要抹去不同规范性判断偏好之间的明显差异。
{"title":"Moral and epistemic evaluations: A unified treatment","authors":"Bob Beddor","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12159","url":null,"abstract":"A rich tradition in metaethics seeks to explain the meaning of moral language in terms of desire-like attitudes. This approach can be implemented in di erent ways. On a contextualist implementation, moral discourse describes the desire-like attitudes of some agent(s), for example, the speaker or the speaker’s community. On an expressivist implementation, moral discourse does not describe desire-like attitudes; it expresses them. On a relativist implementation, the truth-value of a moral assertion at a context of assessment depends on the desire-like attitudes of the assessor—that is, someone assessing the utterance for truth or falsity. Despite these di erences, all such “attitudinal metaethics” are bound by a common thread: they analyze moral discourse in terms of conative states. Attitudinal metaethicists sometimes propose extending their approach to other varieties of normative discourse, including epistemic discourse.1 A generalized attitudinal semantics along these lines carries obvious attractions. But it also faces important challenges. An initial challenge concerns how to even spell out a generalized attitudinal semantics. While much ink has been spilled in pursuit of a precise attitudinal semantics for moral discourse, the extension to other fragments of normative language has not received a comparable degree of attention. Second, and more worrisome, some philosophers have argued that there are principled obstacles to the very idea of a generalized attitudinal semantics. For example, Boult and Köhler 2020 argue that a generalized attitudinal semantics is under-motivated, since the primary arguments for an attitudinal metaethics do not carry over to the epistemic domain. And Wodak 2017 argues that a generalized attitudinal semantics over-predicts disagreements across normative domains. These obstacles can be used to frame a dilemma for any attempt to generalize an attitudinal semantics. On the one hand, generalizers need to show that there are su cient commonalities between di erent normative domains to warrant a uni ed treatment. On the other hand, generalizers had better not erase the obvious di erences between di erent avors of normative judgment.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44750202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
期刊
Philosophical Perspectives
全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1