I argue that we grasp distinctive, self-involving truths, or de se truths, through immersive experience. Drawing on examples involving gameplay and virtual reality, I defend the value of immersive exploration and virtual first personal perspectives, and explore the relation between a virtual first personal perspective and a real world first personal perspective. I then develop the connection between immersive modes of presentation, the de se, and transformative experience, and show how our grasp of qualitative truths in experience relates to our grasp of de se truths (and tensed truths) in experience. Tying the value of immersive gameplay and augmented reality to the value of gaining an immersive understanding of our future and possible selves, I argue that imaginative immersion in one’s future experience is a distinctive, experience-based way to discover de se truths. I close my discussion by exploring a case where an epistemic transformation scales up into a personal transformation. In such cases, the discovery of new phenomenal truths can lead to the discovery of new de se truths. When you face a life-defining change, you can ask yourself: Who will I become? This can be understood as a question about who you are and who you will become, asked from your first personal, subjective perspective. As such, it is also a question about the nature and character of your future lived experience, because the nature and character of your conscious, lived experience is a defining constituent of who you are. Framed this way, knowing your future lived experience is a way of knowing your future self. In this paper, I will explore this way of understanding one’s self, with a focus on understanding life-defining changes. “Who will I become?” when asked in high-stakes, life-defining contexts, connects the metaphysics of the self to the role of imagination, empathy, testimony, and the de se in self1 Thanks to Nilanjan Das, Josh Dever, Martin Glazier, Adam Lerner, Dilip Ninan, Simon Prosser, the St. Andrews metaphysics reading group, and the UNC transformative experience working group for discussion. 2 Life-defining choices, as self-involving choices, need not be self-interested in a selfish sense. Life-defining choices don’t even need to be self-involving choices. We often think about the futures of others who will be affected by our choices, and about how they will be formed. I will focus on self-involving choices for simplicity, but what I will say in much of this paper applies to the way we think of these choices for others as well as ourselves. 3 In this way, what I am saying has ideas in common with Chang (2015), Korsgaard (2009), and Bratman (1999): you make yourself into who you are partly because of your commitments and your choices. This partly defines who you are. But my focus is on the role of decision theory, new experience, the first person, and cognitive modeling in all of this, not on practical reasoning per se.
{"title":"DE SE PREFERENCES AND EMPATHY FOR FUTURE SELVES1","authors":"L. Paul","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12090","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that we grasp distinctive, self-involving truths, or de se truths, through immersive experience. Drawing on examples involving gameplay and virtual reality, I defend the value of immersive exploration and virtual first personal perspectives, and explore the relation between a virtual first personal perspective and a real world first personal perspective. I then develop the connection between immersive modes of presentation, the de se, and transformative experience, and show how our grasp of qualitative truths in experience relates to our grasp of de se truths (and tensed truths) in experience. Tying the value of immersive gameplay and augmented reality to the value of gaining an immersive understanding of our future and possible selves, I argue that imaginative immersion in one’s future experience is a distinctive, experience-based way to discover de se truths. I close my discussion by exploring a case where an epistemic transformation scales up into a personal transformation. In such cases, the discovery of new phenomenal truths can lead to the discovery of new de se truths. When you face a life-defining change, you can ask yourself: Who will I become? This can be understood as a question about who you are and who you will become, asked from your first personal, subjective perspective. As such, it is also a question about the nature and character of your future lived experience, because the nature and character of your conscious, lived experience is a defining constituent of who you are. Framed this way, knowing your future lived experience is a way of knowing your future self. In this paper, I will explore this way of understanding one’s self, with a focus on understanding life-defining changes. “Who will I become?” when asked in high-stakes, life-defining contexts, connects the metaphysics of the self to the role of imagination, empathy, testimony, and the de se in self1 Thanks to Nilanjan Das, Josh Dever, Martin Glazier, Adam Lerner, Dilip Ninan, Simon Prosser, the St. Andrews metaphysics reading group, and the UNC transformative experience working group for discussion. 2 Life-defining choices, as self-involving choices, need not be self-interested in a selfish sense. Life-defining choices don’t even need to be self-involving choices. We often think about the futures of others who will be affected by our choices, and about how they will be formed. I will focus on self-involving choices for simplicity, but what I will say in much of this paper applies to the way we think of these choices for others as well as ourselves. 3 In this way, what I am saying has ideas in common with Chang (2015), Korsgaard (2009), and Bratman (1999): you make yourself into who you are partly because of your commitments and your choices. This partly defines who you are. But my focus is on the role of decision theory, new experience, the first person, and cognitive modeling in all of this, not on practical reasoning per se.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"31 1","pages":"7-39"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12090","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43052092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A problem of the many Fs arises in cases where intuitively there is precisely one F, but when you look closely you find many candidates for being that F, each one apparently as well-qualified as the next. The problem arises for mundane things like rocks, houses, and coins. It also arises for entities that present special philosophical challenges, like persons and experiencers. In this essay, I present a new argument that the problem of the many experiencers is an especially hard problem of the many, and that property dualism — the view that properties that there is something it is like to instantiate are irreducible — may be the best way to solve it. The argument given here turns primar-ily on normative (i.e., moral) considerations, and is independent of existing arguments for property dualism such as the conceivability and knowledge arguments. It is also independent of existing arguments deriving metaphysical conclusions from the problem of the many experiencers (or related problems of the many), such as those in Unger (2004) and Zimmerman (2010).
{"title":"THE HARD PROBLEM OF THE MANY","authors":"J. Simon","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12100","url":null,"abstract":"A problem of the many Fs arises in cases where intuitively there is precisely one F, but when you look closely you find many candidates for being that F, each one apparently as well-qualified as the next. The problem arises for mundane things like rocks, houses, and coins. It also arises for entities that present special philosophical challenges, like persons and experiencers. In this essay, I present a new argument that the problem of the many experiencers is an especially hard problem of the many, and that property dualism — the view that properties that there is something it is like to instantiate are irreducible — may be the best way to solve it. The argument given here turns primar-ily on normative (i.e., moral) considerations, and is independent of existing arguments for property dualism such as the conceivability and knowledge arguments. It is also independent of existing arguments deriving metaphysical conclusions from the problem of the many experiencers (or related problems of the many), such as those in Unger (2004) and Zimmerman (2010).","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"31 1","pages":"449-468"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12100","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44999246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"GENERATIVE EXPLANATION IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS","authors":"Lisa J. Miracchi","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12095","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"31 1","pages":"267-291"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12095","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48620789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent philosophical attention to fiction has focused largely on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance: the fact that readers are sometimes unable or unwilling to play along with an author's instructions to imagine certain, especially moral, contents or responses. The fact that readers resist in these cases appears puzzling, given that they are typically willing to imagine all sorts of highly implausible, even impossible things, including alterations to the laws of physics. Theorists have explained imaginative resistance in various ways. Richard Moran (1994) argues that resistance arises because evaluative and emotional engagement with fiction requires more than merely imaging certain contents: it requires having actual, robust responses of the relevant kind, and this is not the sort of thing readers can simply choose to do in response to an author's demands. Kendall Walton (1994), Steve Yablo (2002) and Brian Weatherson (2004) argue that resistance arises because what readers are able to imagine true in the fiction is fixed by invariant conceptual or metaphysical principles. And Tamar Szabó Gendler (2000) argues that resistance is driven by readers' unwillingness to 'export' certain moral principles or perspectives from fictions to reality. Because they focus on imaginative resistance, all of these theorists emphasize the limits of imagination, and specifically the ways in which engagement with fiction is constrained by one's sense of reality. Against this, I will argue that it is at least as notable how often readers' evaluative and emotional responses toward fictions differ from those they would have toward the same situation in reality. Thus, I find it funny rather than cruel that the Three Stooges bop each other over the head with heavy implements. I find the events in a Stephen King novel thrilling rather than disgusting. And I root for Conversations with Richard Wollheim were instrumental in developing the notion of perspectives. My debt to the work of Richard Moran and Tamar Gendler will also be apparent throughout.
最近哲学对小说的关注主要集中在想象抗拒现象上:读者有时不能或不愿意按照作者的指示去想象某些内容或反应，尤其是道德内容或反应。考虑到读者通常愿意想象各种极不可信、甚至是不可能的事情，包括物理定律的改变，在这种情况下，读者抵制的事实令人费解。理论家们从不同的角度解释了想象抵抗。理查德·莫兰(Richard Moran, 1994)认为，阻力之所以产生，是因为对小说的评价和情感投入不仅仅需要想象某些内容:它需要对相关内容有实际的、强有力的反应，而这不是读者可以简单地选择回应作者要求的那种事情。肯德尔·沃尔顿(1994)、史蒂夫·亚布罗(2002)和布莱恩·威瑟森(2004)认为，之所以会产生抗拒，是因为读者在小说中能够想象到的真实情况是由不变的概念或形而上学原则固定的。Tamar Szabó Gendler(2000)认为，抵制是由于读者不愿意将小说中的某些道德原则或观点“输出”到现实中。因为他们关注想象力的抵抗，所有这些理论家都强调想象力的局限性，特别是与小说的接触受到现实意识的限制。与此相反，我认为，至少值得注意的是，读者对小说的评价和情感反应与他们对现实中同样情况的反应是不同的。因此，我觉得“活宝三人组”用沉重的工具互相打对方的头，与其说是残忍，不如说是有趣。我觉得斯蒂芬·金小说里的情节不是恶心，而是令人兴奋。我认为《与理查德·沃尔海姆对话》对发展观点的概念很有帮助。我对理查德·莫兰和塔玛·詹德勒的工作的感激也将贯穿始终。
{"title":"PERSPECTIVES IN IMAGINATIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH FICTION","authors":"Elisabeth Camp","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12102","url":null,"abstract":"Recent philosophical attention to fiction has focused largely on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance: the fact that readers are sometimes unable or unwilling to play along with an author's instructions to imagine certain, especially moral, contents or responses. The fact that readers resist in these cases appears puzzling, given that they are typically willing to imagine all sorts of highly implausible, even impossible things, including alterations to the laws of physics. Theorists have explained imaginative resistance in various ways. Richard Moran (1994) argues that resistance arises because evaluative and emotional engagement with fiction requires more than merely imaging certain contents: it requires having actual, robust responses of the relevant kind, and this is not the sort of thing readers can simply choose to do in response to an author's demands. Kendall Walton (1994), Steve Yablo (2002) and Brian Weatherson (2004) argue that resistance arises because what readers are able to imagine true in the fiction is fixed by invariant conceptual or metaphysical principles. And Tamar Szabó Gendler (2000) argues that resistance is driven by readers' unwillingness to 'export' certain moral principles or perspectives from fictions to reality. Because they focus on imaginative resistance, all of these theorists emphasize the limits of imagination, and specifically the ways in which engagement with fiction is constrained by one's sense of reality. Against this, I will argue that it is at least as notable how often readers' evaluative and emotional responses toward fictions differ from those they would have toward the same situation in reality. Thus, I find it funny rather than cruel that the Three Stooges bop each other over the head with heavy implements. I find the events in a Stephen King novel thrilling rather than disgusting. And I root for Conversations with Richard Wollheim were instrumental in developing the notion of perspectives. My debt to the work of Richard Moran and Tamar Gendler will also be apparent throughout.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"31 1","pages":"73-102"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12102","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46612240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS","authors":"Brian Cutter","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12092","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"31 1","pages":"103-130"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12092","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48525915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
{"title":"Visual expectations and visual imagination","authors":"Dominic Gregory","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12094","url":null,"abstract":"eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"31 1","pages":"187-206"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12094","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42149664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CONVENTION BEFORE COMMUNICATION","authors":"E. Lepore, Matthew Stone","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12103","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"31 1","pages":"245-265"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12103","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41944085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：