Arctic states, regional and local authorities, NGOs, and Indigenous communities have debated how Arctic seals should be governed for more than a century. This governance discourse covers a wide array of issues, from seal hunting and the sale of animal products to the impacts of pollution and climate change. This article examines the frames used by political entities to discuss the regional governance of Arctic seals in the North American Arctic from 1900–2020, a period defined by landmark agreements on seals. Informed by framing and agenda-setting theory, the article employs textual analysis of policy documents and newspaper articles. These serve as a source of information and space for policy advocacy and debate to study political entities’ discourse regarding the issues and policies that shape Arctic seal governance. The analysis focuses on English-language texts from regional and local newspapers and international newspapers of record. The article identifies four dominant frames, namely perceived threats to (a) economic revenue, (b) animal welfare, (c) Indigenous ways of life, and (d) threats emanating from the involvement of NGOs in Arctic regional governance. Each of these frames is associated with one or multiple political entities involved in the regional governance of seals. The article demonstrates how the dominance of these entities and the frames they employ varies over time and corresponds to several anthropogenic threats to seals, including commercial hunting, pollution, and climate change. The article concludes that tensions between local and regional entities and international and non-Arctic entities are reflective of broader Arctic regional governance dynamics.
{"title":"Governing Arctic Seals: A Longitudinal Analysis of News and Policy Discourse","authors":"Charlotte Gehrke","doi":"10.17645/pag.7304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7304","url":null,"abstract":"Arctic states, regional and local authorities, NGOs, and Indigenous communities have debated how Arctic seals should be governed for more than a century. This governance discourse covers a wide array of issues, from seal hunting and the sale of animal products to the impacts of pollution and climate change. This article examines the frames used by political entities to discuss the regional governance of Arctic seals in the North American Arctic from 1900–2020, a period defined by landmark agreements on seals. Informed by framing and agenda-setting theory, the article employs textual analysis of policy documents and newspaper articles. These serve as a source of information and space for policy advocacy and debate to study political entities’ discourse regarding the issues and policies that shape Arctic seal governance. The analysis focuses on English-language texts from regional and local newspapers and international newspapers of record. The article identifies four dominant frames, namely perceived threats to (a) economic revenue, (b) animal welfare, (c) Indigenous ways of life, and (d) threats emanating from the involvement of NGOs in Arctic regional governance. Each of these frames is associated with one or multiple political entities involved in the regional governance of seals. The article demonstrates how the dominance of these entities and the frames they employ varies over time and corresponds to several anthropogenic threats to seals, including commercial hunting, pollution, and climate change. The article concludes that tensions between local and regional entities and international and non-Arctic entities are reflective of broader Arctic regional governance dynamics.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"52 S259","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135341652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores the level of digital competence of young people in Poland, with the indirect aim being to show the differences in the level of digital competence for adolescents living in rural and urban areas. The research covered a sample of 985 respondents, from 11–18 years old, from Poland. The research was carried out within the EU Kids Online network. The survey tool related to the assessment of digital competences covered issues of installation of software on mobile devices, configuration of internet access as pertains to confidential information, information security awareness, management of information downloaded from the internet, configuration of social networks, e-shopping, verification of costs related to the use of additional software, advanced information search, checking the reliability of information, and editing online content. Descriptive statistics, k-means cluster analysis, one-way analysis of variance (non-parametric test), and correlations were used to show the differences between rural and urban adolescents in the indicated areas. The collected data offer several postulates for education and education policy, being not only diagnostic but also implementational. Based on the analysis of the data, it was noted that: (a) Eleven areas related to basic digital competence strongly differentiate between urban and rural young people; (b) rural young people rate their own digital competence lower than urban young people do; (c) a small percentage of young people from both rural and urban areas have low digital competence; (d) one well-developed area of key competence does not always co-occur with another well-developed area; and (e) the style of using new media among rural and urban young people is similar.
{"title":"Digital Transformation and Digital Competences of Urban and Rural Polish Youths","authors":"Łukasz Tomczyk","doi":"10.17645/pag.7381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7381","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the level of digital competence of young people in Poland, with the indirect aim being to show the differences in the level of digital competence for adolescents living in rural and urban areas. The research covered a sample of 985 respondents, from 11–18 years old, from Poland. The research was carried out within the EU Kids Online network. The survey tool related to the assessment of digital competences covered issues of installation of software on mobile devices, configuration of internet access as pertains to confidential information, information security awareness, management of information downloaded from the internet, configuration of social networks, e-shopping, verification of costs related to the use of additional software, advanced information search, checking the reliability of information, and editing online content. Descriptive statistics, k-means cluster analysis, one-way analysis of variance (non-parametric test), and correlations were used to show the differences between rural and urban adolescents in the indicated areas. The collected data offer several postulates for education and education policy, being not only diagnostic but also implementational. Based on the analysis of the data, it was noted that: (a) Eleven areas related to basic digital competence strongly differentiate between urban and rural young people; (b) rural young people rate their own digital competence lower than urban young people do; (c) a small percentage of young people from both rural and urban areas have low digital competence; (d) one well-developed area of key competence does not always co-occur with another well-developed area; and (e) the style of using new media among rural and urban young people is similar.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"63 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135341900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses chips and critical ICT infrastructure policy in the US and the EU. It examines the increasing importance of Waltian geopolitical security threats on both sides of the Atlantic as a driver of industrial policy, export controls, self-sufficiency, and friendshoring as a replacement for dependence on global supply chains. It shows that threat perceptions are strong and bipartisan in the US, allowing comprehensive, strategic and well-funded industrial policy. Threat perceptions driving chip and 5G industrial policy are also present in the EU’s Economic Security Strategy and related policies. However, differing national preferences dilute a Waltian turn with continued attachment to liberal (global supply chain) approaches to chips and 5G infrastructure and a Waltzian realist stance (capacity-building to build, protect, and promote regardless of security threat) that occupies the middle ground.
{"title":"Semiconductor and ICT Industrial Policy in the US and EU: Geopolitical Threat Responses","authors":"Shawn Donnelly","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7031","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article analyses chips and critical ICT infrastructure policy in the US and the EU. It examines the increasing importance of Waltian geopolitical security threats on both sides of the Atlantic as a driver of industrial policy, export controls, self-sufficiency, and friendshoring as a replacement for dependence on global supply chains. It shows that threat perceptions are strong and bipartisan in the US, allowing comprehensive, strategic and well-funded industrial policy. Threat perceptions driving chip and 5G industrial policy are also present in the EU’s Economic Security Strategy and related policies. However, differing national preferences dilute a Waltian turn with continued attachment to liberal (global supply chain) approaches to chips and 5G infrastructure and a Waltzian realist stance (capacity-building to build, protect, and promote regardless of security threat) that occupies the middle ground.</p>","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"78 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135342542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There has been a conspicuous shift in the European Union’s perception of economic interdependence and open markets, manifested in a mushrooming number of screening policies aimed at verifying foreign direct investments raising national security concerns. The introduction of these policies can be viewed as a market constraint that might negatively affect business operations, so it is puzzling that some European business actors did not actively resist their adoption, despite having wide lobbying opportunities in Europe. I explore this puzzle using the case of Denmark by drawing on theories of securitisation and preference formation under uncertainty. I argue that business actors established their policy preferences in the context of uncertainty and the gradual increase in security framing by the European and local political elites. Exposed to these increasing security discourses across different levels and networks, businesses adjusted their policy preferences, balancing between different identities. The flexibility inherent in a multilevel and evolving securitisation process led to the legitimisation of investment screening policies among interest groups and mitigated their resistance to the imposition of market constraints on security grounds.
{"title":"Legitimisation of Foreign Direct Investment Screening Among Business Actors: The Danish Case","authors":"Anna Vlasiuk Nibe","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7258","url":null,"abstract":"There has been a conspicuous shift in the European Union’s perception of economic interdependence and open markets, manifested in a mushrooming number of screening policies aimed at verifying foreign direct investments raising national security concerns. The introduction of these policies can be viewed as a market constraint that might negatively affect business operations, so it is puzzling that some European business actors did not actively resist their adoption, despite having wide lobbying opportunities in Europe. I explore this puzzle using the case of Denmark by drawing on theories of securitisation and preference formation under uncertainty. I argue that business actors established their policy preferences in the context of uncertainty and the gradual increase in security framing by the European and local political elites. Exposed to these increasing security discourses across different levels and networks, businesses adjusted their policy preferences, balancing between different identities. The flexibility inherent in a multilevel and evolving securitisation process led to the legitimisation of investment screening policies among interest groups and mitigated their resistance to the imposition of market constraints on security grounds.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"4 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135390600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The transnational political participation of migrants has been extensively analyzed in the literature. Previous explanations focus on individual determinants ranging from political interest or efficacy to social ties or socio-demographic characteristics. So far, little attention has been paid to the contrast between factors related to their lives in two different countries. The present article adds to this burgeoning literature by identifying and comparing the effects of several attitudes and behaviors of migrants in the host and home country on their voter turnout in home country elections. We use individual-level data from a survey conducted in 2022 on 1,058 Romanian migrants living around the world. The results indicate that migrants who remain anchored in the politics of their home country—without necessarily striving to return—and those who are engaged in their host communities are more likely to vote. Migrant voter turnout is not determined by poor integration in the host society.
{"title":"Migrants' Voter Turnout in the Home Country Elections: Non‐Integration or Political Anchor?","authors":"Sergiu Gherghina, Adrian Basarabă","doi":"10.17645/pag.7396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7396","url":null,"abstract":"The transnational political participation of migrants has been extensively analyzed in the literature. Previous explanations focus on individual determinants ranging from political interest or efficacy to social ties or socio-demographic characteristics. So far, little attention has been paid to the contrast between factors related to their lives in two different countries. The present article adds to this burgeoning literature by identifying and comparing the effects of several attitudes and behaviors of migrants in the host and home country on their voter turnout in home country elections. We use individual-level data from a survey conducted in 2022 on 1,058 Romanian migrants living around the world. The results indicate that migrants who remain anchored in the politics of their home country—without necessarily striving to return—and those who are engaged in their host communities are more likely to vote. Migrant voter turnout is not determined by poor integration in the host society.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"10 28","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135390421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the extensive spread of external voting across the world, exceptions remain as some countries have not passed such regulations (e.g., Uruguay) or have passed them but lag implementation (e.g., Nicaragua). Others still took a long time to join the trend, possibly presenting a pushback to the commonly accepted notion of norm diffusion to explain migrant enfranchisement. We examine a latecomer by asking why Chile took so long to enfranchise emigrants. Classified as a liberal democracy with a century of legal history of foreign-resident voting, it repeatedly rejected proposed bills on external voting since 1971. Chile enacted external voting only in 2014, regulated it in 2016, and applied it in 2017. Through legal historical content analysis, we identify which political actors proposed the bills, when, and why each failed. Left and right-leaning actors gave normative, legal, and procedural reasons that resulted in rejection and stagnation at various institutional stages. This latecomer’s constitutional tradition, strongly focused on territory and territorial links, potentially sheds light on dozens of other country cases of late adoption of the external franchise.
{"title":"Reject, Reject, Reject...Passed! Explaining a Latecomer of Emigrant Enfranchisement","authors":"Victoria Finn, Juan Pablo Ramaciotti","doi":"10.17645/pag.7331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7331","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the extensive spread of external voting across the world, exceptions remain as some countries have not passed such regulations (e.g., Uruguay) or have passed them but lag implementation (e.g., Nicaragua). Others still took a long time to join the trend, possibly presenting a pushback to the commonly accepted notion of norm diffusion to explain migrant enfranchisement. We examine a latecomer by asking why Chile took so long to enfranchise emigrants. Classified as a liberal democracy with a century of legal history of foreign-resident voting, it repeatedly rejected proposed bills on external voting since 1971. Chile enacted external voting only in 2014, regulated it in 2016, and applied it in 2017. Through legal historical content analysis, we identify which political actors proposed the bills, when, and why each failed. Left and right-leaning actors gave normative, legal, and procedural reasons that resulted in rejection and stagnation at various institutional stages. This latecomer’s constitutional tradition, strongly focused on territory and territorial links, potentially sheds light on dozens of other country cases of late adoption of the external franchise.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"11 18","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135390571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tomasz P. Woźniakowski, Tiziano Zgaga, Sergio Fabbrini
This thematic issue examines two main research questions: What are the features, the determinants, and the implications of fiscal integration in a system of multilevel governance like the EU? And, what can the post-pandemic EU learn from established federations when it comes to fiscal integration? We attempt to conceptualize the patterns of EU fiscal integration. In so doing, we identify eight instruments of fiscal integration in a federal or multilevel polity, equally divided between fiscal capacity and fiscal regulation, depending on the side of the budget and the mode of integration (autonomous or dependent). For instance, as part of the fiscal capacity instrument of integration, we propose to distinguish between revenue and expenditure capacity. Revenue capacity is then further divided into tax capacity, based on EU/federal taxes, and budgetary capacity, based on non-independent sources, for instance, contributions from the member states. Expenditure capacity is divided into autonomous spending capacity, meaning direct spending by the EU, and a dependent transfer capacity, where the EU merely distributes resources (both grants and loans) to the member states.
{"title":"Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power","authors":"Tomasz P. Woźniakowski, Tiziano Zgaga, Sergio Fabbrini","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7653","url":null,"abstract":"This thematic issue examines two main research questions: What are the features, the determinants, and the implications of fiscal integration in a system of multilevel governance like the EU? And, what can the post-pandemic EU learn from established federations when it comes to fiscal integration? We attempt to conceptualize the patterns of EU fiscal integration. In so doing, we identify eight instruments of fiscal integration in a federal or multilevel polity, equally divided between fiscal capacity and fiscal regulation, depending on the side of the budget and the mode of integration (autonomous or dependent). For instance, as part of the fiscal capacity instrument of integration, we propose to distinguish between revenue and expenditure capacity. Revenue capacity is then further divided into tax capacity, based on EU/federal taxes, and budgetary capacity, based on non-independent sources, for instance, contributions from the member states. Expenditure capacity is divided into autonomous spending capacity, meaning direct spending by the EU, and a dependent transfer capacity, where the EU merely distributes resources (both grants and loans) to the member states.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136233432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses the revenue capacity at the “centre” of the EU. It first outlines major elements (“segments”) of EU “federal” fiscal capacity, both on the revenue and expenditure side, as well as on- and off-budget. It provides a new typology of taxes in a multi-level setting, based on tax ownership and decision-making on tax bases and/or rates. It then enters the so-called EU budgetary galaxy and (a) analyses how the centre utilises different types of revenue capacity and (b) discusses if the so-called “own resources” have tax features. The article finds that these own resources, to a large extent, de facto constitute taxing power, that the EU significantly uses off-budget borrowing capacity (through the European Investment Bank and the European Commission) and that the EU has a variety of schemes that offer revenue capacity to the centre, through the pooling of resources (transfers, guarantees) by its member states and by third countries. The way in which a large portion of the Next Generation EU resources have been channelled into the EU budget (by means of externally assigned revenue) completes the image of a centre with fiscal capacity, rather than an entity that spends but has no true fiscal powers.
{"title":"Revenue Capacity of the EU: Taxes, Tax Sharing, and Resource Pooling","authors":"Nico Groenendijk","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7240","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the revenue capacity at the “centre” of the EU. It first outlines major elements (“segments”) of EU “federal” fiscal capacity, both on the revenue and expenditure side, as well as on- and off-budget. It provides a new typology of taxes in a multi-level setting, based on tax ownership and decision-making on tax bases and/or rates. It then enters the so-called EU budgetary galaxy and (a) analyses how the centre utilises different types of revenue capacity and (b) discusses if the so-called “own resources” have tax features. The article finds that these own resources, to a large extent, de facto constitute taxing power, that the EU significantly uses off-budget borrowing capacity (through the European Investment Bank and the European Commission) and that the EU has a variety of schemes that offer revenue capacity to the centre, through the pooling of resources (transfers, guarantees) by its member states and by third countries. The way in which a large portion of the Next Generation EU resources have been channelled into the EU budget (by means of externally assigned revenue) completes the image of a centre with fiscal capacity, rather than an entity that spends but has no true fiscal powers.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136233428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The last few years have resulted in substantial changes for the EU’s fiscal powers, primarily through the introduction of the Next Generation EU funds. This article argues that the assessment of these developments as federalisation processes is based upon a central misunderstanding of the EU budget as a public goods budget in a federal state. The EU is a compound polity comprising of mature states, and its budget may be termed a “transfer budget,” which allows member states to predict budgetary costs and benefits. To understand the transfer-oriented nature of the budget, this article adopts a historical institutionalist lens. Revisiting the fiscal centralisation in the European Coal and Steel Community allows us to understand how the six delegations agreed to combine economic and social aims in this budget, which was intended to serve the European Coal and Steel Community with similar elements to a public goods budget. Revenue consisted of debts and a levy on coal and steel produce, whereas expenditure ranged from investments to payments to individual workers. The Treaty of Rome, with its anti-supranational basis, triggered a critical juncture in Europe’s budgetary history: Since 1957, a transfer budget evolved. Revisiting the European Coal and Steel Community budget system allows us to understand the fiscal federal appearance of the Next Generation EU funds: While the EU makes new attempts to use its budget for the provision of common goods, its functions are limited by the institutional structure of the transfer budget.
过去几年，欧盟的财政权力发生了重大变化，主要是通过引入下一代欧盟基金。本文认为，将这些发展作为联邦化进程的评估是基于对欧盟预算作为联邦制国家的公共产品预算的核心误解。欧盟是一个由成熟国家组成的复合政体，其预算可以被称为“转移预算”，允许成员国预测预算成本和收益。为了理解预算的转移导向性质，本文采用了历史制度主义的视角。重新审视欧洲煤炭和钢铁共同体的财政集中化，可以让我们了解六个代表团如何同意将经济和社会目标结合在这个预算中，这个预算旨在为欧洲煤炭和钢铁共同体提供类似于公共产品预算的元素。收入包括债务和对煤炭和钢铁产品的征税，而支出则从投资到支付给个人工人。以反超国家为基础的《罗马条约》(Treaty of Rome)引发了欧洲预算史上的一个关键时刻:自1957年以来，转移预算开始演变。重新审视欧洲煤钢共同体预算体系可以让我们理解下一代欧盟基金的财政联邦外观:虽然欧盟试图利用其预算来提供共同商品，但其功能受到转移预算的制度结构的限制。
{"title":"Revisiting Early Fiscal Centralisation in the European Coal and Steel Community in Light of the EU’s Transfer Budget","authors":"Johanna Lorraine Breuer","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7252","url":null,"abstract":"The last few years have resulted in substantial changes for the EU’s fiscal powers, primarily through the introduction of the Next Generation EU funds. This article argues that the assessment of these developments as federalisation processes is based upon a central misunderstanding of the EU budget as a public goods budget in a federal state. The EU is a compound polity comprising of mature states, and its budget may be termed a “transfer budget,” which allows member states to predict budgetary costs and benefits. To understand the transfer-oriented nature of the budget, this article adopts a historical institutionalist lens. Revisiting the fiscal centralisation in the European Coal and Steel Community allows us to understand how the six delegations agreed to combine economic and social aims in this budget, which was intended to serve the European Coal and Steel Community with similar elements to a public goods budget. Revenue consisted of debts and a levy on coal and steel produce, whereas expenditure ranged from investments to payments to individual workers. The Treaty of Rome, with its anti-supranational basis, triggered a critical juncture in Europe’s budgetary history: Since 1957, a transfer budget evolved. Revisiting the European Coal and Steel Community budget system allows us to understand the fiscal federal appearance of the Next Generation EU funds: While the EU makes new attempts to use its budget for the provision of common goods, its functions are limited by the institutional structure of the transfer budget.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"20 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136233684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve-outs (exemptions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national-level programmes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These tactics are most successful at “getting to yes” for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.
{"title":"Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers","authors":"Shawn Donnelly","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve-outs (exemptions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national-level programmes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These tactics are most successful at “getting to yes” for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"4 3-4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136233431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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