Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been perceived as a fundamental shift at the international level, triggering reorientation in foreign and security policy, in particular among liberal democracies. At the same time, beyond such external shocks, states may incrementally adapt their positioning towards international affairs. To shed light on these dynamics, this article aims to quantitatively explore longer-term patterns of foreign and security policy in liberal democracies. In doing so, we make two contributions to the literature: First, we propose a quantitative operationalization of foreign and security policy change, combining military and non-military aspects, to explore the patterns of continuity and change over time (1988–2021), considering 20 liberal democracies. Second, we leverage insights from public policy analysis, in particular the punctuated equilibrium theory, to make sense of the identified patterns. Accordingly, we find support for the proposition that foreign and security policies typically change incrementally and that major change is rare. Moreover, while incremental shifts can be explained by domestic politics and institutional settings, major changes disrupt this pattern. In conclusion, the article discusses the plausibility of the quantitative analysis given the current policy shifts among democracies following Russia’s war in Ukraine.
{"title":"Grasping Foreign and Security Policy Change: Patterns and Conditions of Change Among Liberal Democracies","authors":"Florian Böller, Georg Wenzelburger","doi":"10.17645/pag.7172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7172","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been perceived as a fundamental shift at the international level, triggering reorientation in foreign and security policy, in particular among liberal democracies. At the same time, beyond such external shocks, states may incrementally adapt their positioning towards international affairs. To shed light on these dynamics, this article aims to quantitatively explore longer-term patterns of foreign and security policy in liberal democracies. In doing so, we make two contributions to the literature: First, we propose a quantitative operationalization of foreign and security policy change, combining military and non-military aspects, to explore the patterns of continuity and change over time (1988–2021), considering 20 liberal democracies. Second, we leverage insights from public policy analysis, in particular the punctuated equilibrium theory, to make sense of the identified patterns. Accordingly, we find support for the proposition that foreign and security policies typically change incrementally and that major change is rare. Moreover, while incremental shifts can be explained by domestic politics and institutional settings, major changes disrupt this pattern. In conclusion, the article discusses the plausibility of the quantitative analysis given the current policy shifts among democracies following Russia’s war in Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"27 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139255075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russia’s war against Ukraine has severely damaged the European security architecture. This article examines the consequences of this rupture for German foreign and security policy. Just a few months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany saw the transition to an unprecedented three-party coalition government of Social Democrats, Greens, and Liberals. In a special address to the Bundestag three days after the invasion, Chancellor Olaf Scholz described Russia’s war initiation as a historical Zeitenwende (“watershed”) that called into question long-held beliefs about European security. In the wake of this, Scholz proclaimed far-reaching changes, including the announcement that military expenditure would be drastically increased, additional military capabilities would be procured, and new deployments would be committed to NATO’s eastern flank. This article argues that the Zeitenwende amounts to an international orientation change in German foreign and security policy. Apart from identifying areas of significant change, the article also documents political contestation over the Zeitenwende’s nature and extent as well as gaps between proclaimed changes and actual implementation.
{"title":"Zeitenwende: German Foreign Policy Change in the Wake of Russia's War Against Ukraine","authors":"Patrick A. Mello","doi":"10.17645/pag.7346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7346","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s war against Ukraine has severely damaged the European security architecture. This article examines the consequences of this rupture for German foreign and security policy. Just a few months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany saw the transition to an unprecedented three-party coalition government of Social Democrats, Greens, and Liberals. In a special address to the Bundestag three days after the invasion, Chancellor Olaf Scholz described Russia’s war initiation as a historical Zeitenwende (“watershed”) that called into question long-held beliefs about European security. In the wake of this, Scholz proclaimed far-reaching changes, including the announcement that military expenditure would be drastically increased, additional military capabilities would be procured, and new deployments would be committed to NATO’s eastern flank. This article argues that the Zeitenwende amounts to an international orientation change in German foreign and security policy. Apart from identifying areas of significant change, the article also documents political contestation over the Zeitenwende’s nature and extent as well as gaps between proclaimed changes and actual implementation.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"69 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139257523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jan Hupkens, Christine Neuhold, Sophie Vanhoonacker
Against the background of more than a decade of crises in the EU and an increasing inflationary use of the term, this article contributes to the crisis literature in two ways. First, by presenting the state of the art in broader academic research on crises and crisis management, it explores how the more recent EU literature can benefit from this earlier work. At the same time, it also pays attention to the EU specificities and the implications in terms of research, especially with regard to studying actors and perceived threats. Here the unpacking of the well-established crisis definition of Boin et al. (2013), which builds on the work of Rosenthal et al. (1989), serves as a helpful starting point. Second, the contribution argues that one crisis is not like another and that crises can take different gradations. By distinguishing between mild, severe, and existential crises, it makes a first attempt to propose the key analytical dimensions that impact the gradation of a crisis. Building on the findings in EU crisis research, it distils the dimensions of severity, symmetry, and speed as defining characteristics. Depending on the crisis, the gradation of each of these dimensions ranges along a spectrum. In other words, there are different shades of crises. By being more explicit about the gradation, scholars can identify what type of crisis is at stake (i.e., whether the crisis under study is mild, severe, or existential in nature). This in turn has implications for questions such as by whom, how, and when a crisis needs to be addressed. As a final step, the article also identifies a series of avenues for further research.
{"title":"One Crisis is not Like Another: Exploring Different Shades of Crisis in the EU","authors":"Jan Hupkens, Christine Neuhold, Sophie Vanhoonacker","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7349","url":null,"abstract":"Against the background of more than a decade of crises in the EU and an increasing inflationary use of the term, this article contributes to the crisis literature in two ways. First, by presenting the state of the art in broader academic research on crises and crisis management, it explores how the more recent EU literature can benefit from this earlier work. At the same time, it also pays attention to the EU specificities and the implications in terms of research, especially with regard to studying actors and perceived threats. Here the unpacking of the well-established crisis definition of Boin et al. (2013), which builds on the work of Rosenthal et al. (1989), serves as a helpful starting point. Second, the contribution argues that one crisis is not like another and that crises can take different gradations. By distinguishing between mild, severe, and existential crises, it makes a first attempt to propose the key analytical dimensions that impact the gradation of a crisis. Building on the findings in EU crisis research, it distils the dimensions of severity, symmetry, and speed as defining characteristics. Depending on the crisis, the gradation of each of these dimensions ranges along a spectrum. In other words, there are different shades of crises. By being more explicit about the gradation, scholars can identify what type of crisis is at stake (i.e., whether the crisis under study is mild, severe, or existential in nature). This in turn has implications for questions such as by whom, how, and when a crisis needs to be addressed. As a final step, the article also identifies a series of avenues for further research.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"15 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139258312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ana Sofia Ribeiro, Vladislava Lendzhova, Sonata Vyšniauskienė, Tatiana Ferreira, João Carlos Sousa, Isabel Roque, Kerli Kõiv, Katrin Saks, Omeed Agahi, Òscar Prieto-Flores, Niall O'Higgins
The Covid-19 pandemic provoked critical changes to welfare in Europe, requiring the dematerialisation of programmes and services while relying mainly on remote support. This study aims to present insights into how European public employment services have coped and adapted to the pandemic challenges, particularly regarding the digitalisation and delivery of services to young people in rural areas. It focuses on three case studies from distinct European regions: Portugal, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. It is based on an exploratory survey of public employment services national offices and qualitative data collected from public employment services offices in rural settings. It highlights the advantages and dangers of the adoption of digitalisation processes, namely considering literacy and accessibility in diverse contexts. It concludes that despite cultural and regional differences, all three countries evidenced an acceleration in service provision due to digitalisation and were capable of adjusting their practices to remote delivery. However, rural areas faced delays due to poor infrastructure, and after the pandemic, public employment privileged on-site delivery, since it is considered more effective in the training and counselling of young people.
{"title":"Public Employment Services' Responses to the Pandemic: Examples from Portugal, Bulgaria, and Lithuania","authors":"Ana Sofia Ribeiro, Vladislava Lendzhova, Sonata Vyšniauskienė, Tatiana Ferreira, João Carlos Sousa, Isabel Roque, Kerli Kõiv, Katrin Saks, Omeed Agahi, Òscar Prieto-Flores, Niall O'Higgins","doi":"10.17645/pag.7437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7437","url":null,"abstract":"The Covid-19 pandemic provoked critical changes to welfare in Europe, requiring the dematerialisation of programmes and services while relying mainly on remote support. This study aims to present insights into how European public employment services have coped and adapted to the pandemic challenges, particularly regarding the digitalisation and delivery of services to young people in rural areas. It focuses on three case studies from distinct European regions: Portugal, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. It is based on an exploratory survey of public employment services national offices and qualitative data collected from public employment services offices in rural settings. It highlights the advantages and dangers of the adoption of digitalisation processes, namely considering literacy and accessibility in diverse contexts. It concludes that despite cultural and regional differences, all three countries evidenced an acceleration in service provision due to digitalisation and were capable of adjusting their practices to remote delivery. However, rural areas faced delays due to poor infrastructure, and after the pandemic, public employment privileged on-site delivery, since it is considered more effective in the training and counselling of young people.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"301 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139255878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article highlights recent successes and failures in efforts to manage Arctic marine living resources to improve our understanding of institutional resilience—that is, the ability of cooperative institutions to maintain their performance despite severe disruptions to their operating environments. Rising ocean temperatures and other impacts of climate change may alter the spatial distribution of fish stocks, including their relative attachment to exclusive economic zones and their availability on the high seas. As evident in the examined Arctic cases, which involve the world’s largest stocks of cod, herring and mackerel, such changes may complicate core resource management tasks, including the regulatory task of reaching an agreement among user states on quotas and other restraints that align with scientific advice. The cross-case variance in regulatory resilience to climate-related and other changes in cooperative circumstances sheds light on general propositions regarding the drivers and inhibitors of institutional resilience, including institutional characteristics and the severity of the political challenges posed by changing circumstances.
{"title":"Climate Change and Institutional Resilience in Arctic Environmental Governance","authors":"O. Stokke","doi":"10.17645/pag.7369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7369","url":null,"abstract":"This article highlights recent successes and failures in efforts to manage Arctic marine living resources to improve our understanding of institutional resilience—that is, the ability of cooperative institutions to maintain their performance despite severe disruptions to their operating environments. Rising ocean temperatures and other impacts of climate change may alter the spatial distribution of fish stocks, including their relative attachment to exclusive economic zones and their availability on the high seas. As evident in the examined Arctic cases, which involve the world’s largest stocks of cod, herring and mackerel, such changes may complicate core resource management tasks, including the regulatory task of reaching an agreement among user states on quotas and other restraints that align with scientific advice. The cross-case variance in regulatory resilience to climate-related and other changes in cooperative circumstances sheds light on general propositions regarding the drivers and inhibitors of institutional resilience, including institutional characteristics and the severity of the political challenges posed by changing circumstances.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"21 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139256750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a changing territorial and geopolitical moment of the Arctic region, are the Indigenous Peoples Organizations heard at the regional level and are the Arctic states working to keep them safe and secure? To safeguard the human security of Arctic Indigenous peoples, Arctic states (and their governments) have to understand the needs and changes that are affecting their way of life as well as to be able to cooperate between them. In a comparative study of Canada’s and Finland’s Arctic policies—Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019) and Finland’s Strategy for Arctic Policy (2021)—it is possible to identify the applicability of the human security approach, which is influenced by the truth and reconciliation process between Canada and Inuit and Finland and Sámi. This process is a main factor in having their human rights respected and their human security safeguarded, considering that the relation between the countries of the North and the South of the Arctic countries is a discovery of their diversity (linguistical and cultural) in the 21st century. In my perspective, and for a participative democracy to be applied as mentioned by the green political theory (following the views of scholars like Barry, Eckersley, and Goodin), states and governments need to be open and recognise the gaps identified by those communities and transnational organisations.
{"title":"Human Security of Inuit and Sámi in the 21st Century: The Canadian and Finnish Cases","authors":"Céline Rodrigues","doi":"10.17645/pag.7254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7254","url":null,"abstract":"In a changing territorial and geopolitical moment of the Arctic region, are the Indigenous Peoples Organizations heard at the regional level and are the Arctic states working to keep them safe and secure? To safeguard the human security of Arctic Indigenous peoples, Arctic states (and their governments) have to understand the needs and changes that are affecting their way of life as well as to be able to cooperate between them. In a comparative study of Canada’s and Finland’s Arctic policies—Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019) and Finland’s Strategy for Arctic Policy (2021)—it is possible to identify the applicability of the human security approach, which is influenced by the truth and reconciliation process between Canada and Inuit and Finland and Sámi. This process is a main factor in having their human rights respected and their human security safeguarded, considering that the relation between the countries of the North and the South of the Arctic countries is a discovery of their diversity (linguistical and cultural) in the 21st century. In my perspective, and for a participative democracy to be applied as mentioned by the green political theory (following the views of scholars like Barry, Eckersley, and Goodin), states and governments need to be open and recognise the gaps identified by those communities and transnational organisations.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"50 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139255275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In December 2021, the EU member states agreed on the Global Gateway strategy to mobilize public and private funds of up to €300 billion between 2021 and 2027, to invest in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education, and research fields. With a geographical focus on Africa, Global Gateway links infrastructure investment projects with condition principles—including democratic values, good governance, and transparency—and catalyzes private investment into EU development financing. Against this backdrop, this study explores why EU member states agreed on this new geopolitical instrument. This piece posits that the confluence of three factors enabled the creation of Global Gateway. First, the EU established this new instrument to counter China’s role as a global infrastructure lender in Africa. Second, Global Gateway was possible through the shift to private investment in multilateral development financing. Equally important for the establishment of Global Gateway was the European Commission’s transformational leadership as an entrepreneurial agent in designing this geopolitical strategy of the EU’s power projection. The conclusion outlines future research avenues and enables readers to consider the wider prospects and caveats of the Global Gateway strategy.
{"title":"Europe’s Global Gateway: A New Instrument of Geopolitics","authors":"Eugénia C. Heldt","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7098","url":null,"abstract":"In December 2021, the EU member states agreed on the Global Gateway strategy to mobilize public and private funds of up to €300 billion between 2021 and 2027, to invest in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education, and research fields. With a geographical focus on Africa, Global Gateway links infrastructure investment projects with condition principles—including democratic values, good governance, and transparency—and catalyzes private investment into EU development financing. Against this backdrop, this study explores why EU member states agreed on this new geopolitical instrument. This piece posits that the confluence of three factors enabled the creation of Global Gateway. First, the EU established this new instrument to counter China’s role as a global infrastructure lender in Africa. Second, Global Gateway was possible through the shift to private investment in multilateral development financing. Equally important for the establishment of Global Gateway was the European Commission’s transformational leadership as an entrepreneurial agent in designing this geopolitical strategy of the EU’s power projection. The conclusion outlines future research avenues and enables readers to consider the wider prospects and caveats of the Global Gateway strategy.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139257590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does the EU adapt its policies in response to current global changes? Extant scholarship has shed light on the EU’s geopolitical turn by analysing it as either a shift away from neoliberalism or a reshuffling of EU–US relations. This article makes the case for studying how these two dynamics interact. To do so, I draw on the economic patriotism framework, which focuses on the links between types and spaces of economic interventionism. Economic patriotism instruments can take various forms depending on their type (liberal/protectionist instruments) and space of reference (national/EU/transatlantic/international). From this perspective, the EU has responded to global changes by shifting from liberal to protectionist instruments of economic patriotism. However, the design of these policy instruments reflects compromises between the preferences of policymakers who adopt liberal/protectionist and Europeanist/Atlanticist positions. As policy instruments can create room for compromise because they allow various positions to converge, EU protectionist economic instruments cater to Atlanticist and liberal preferences too. This article illustrates this argument by means of EU armament policy. Using official documents and interviews, I analyse changes in EU economic patriotism by looking at the two major policy instruments: the 2009 Defence Procurement Directive and the 2021 European Defence Fund. Whereas the 2009 Directive reflected liberal economic patriotism anchored in the transatlantic space, the European Defence Fund illustrates tensions between types and spaces of economic interventionism in the EU’s geopolitical turn: Some clauses protect the EU from foreign interference, but its political-economic space of reference remains strongly transatlantic.
{"title":"Arming Fortress Europe? Spaces and Instruments of Economic Patriotism in EU Armament Policy","authors":"Catherine Hoeffler","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7231","url":null,"abstract":"How does the EU adapt its policies in response to current global changes? Extant scholarship has shed light on the EU’s geopolitical turn by analysing it as either a shift away from neoliberalism or a reshuffling of EU–US relations. This article makes the case for studying how these two dynamics interact. To do so, I draw on the economic patriotism framework, which focuses on the links between types and spaces of economic interventionism. Economic patriotism instruments can take various forms depending on their type (liberal/protectionist instruments) and space of reference (national/EU/transatlantic/international). From this perspective, the EU has responded to global changes by shifting from liberal to protectionist instruments of economic patriotism. However, the design of these policy instruments reflects compromises between the preferences of policymakers who adopt liberal/protectionist and Europeanist/Atlanticist positions. As policy instruments can create room for compromise because they allow various positions to converge, EU protectionist economic instruments cater to Atlanticist and liberal preferences too. This article illustrates this argument by means of EU armament policy. Using official documents and interviews, I analyse changes in EU economic patriotism by looking at the two major policy instruments: the 2009 Defence Procurement Directive and the 2021 European Defence Fund. Whereas the 2009 Directive reflected liberal economic patriotism anchored in the transatlantic space, the European Defence Fund illustrates tensions between types and spaces of economic interventionism in the EU’s geopolitical turn: Some clauses protect the EU from foreign interference, but its political-economic space of reference remains strongly transatlantic.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135341651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When faced with highly heterogeneous national conditions and preferences, the EU has often resorted to differentiation to ensure political support for advancing common policies. Despite growing scholarly interest in differentiation in the EU, conceptual clarity and empirical evidence of different forms of differentiation are still in a nascent stage. Particularly the use of differentiation in times of crisis needs to be better understood. To address this research gap, we investigate differentiation in the EU renewable energy policy in response to the crisis stirred by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We find that the EU successfully used the Ukraine crisis to increase the ambition of renewable energy policy, but this was accompanied by various and often novel forms of differentiation. Rather than formally exempting countries from common EU provisions (differentiated integration), EU decision-makers strategically incorporated flexibility in implementation, often tailored to a few outlier countries. Strategic flexibility was instrumental in overcoming political disagreements among national governments and adopting a more ambitious and comprehensive renewable energy policy. Our findings contribute conceptually and empirically to understanding various forms of differentiation in EU policymaking and how they are employed to facilitate the building of political majorities during crises.
{"title":"EU Renewable Energy Governance and the Ukraine War: Moving Ahead Through Strategic Flexibility?","authors":"Aron Buzogány, Stefan Ćetković, Tomas Maltby","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7361","url":null,"abstract":"When faced with highly heterogeneous national conditions and preferences, the EU has often resorted to differentiation to ensure political support for advancing common policies. Despite growing scholarly interest in differentiation in the EU, conceptual clarity and empirical evidence of different forms of differentiation are still in a nascent stage. Particularly the use of differentiation in times of crisis needs to be better understood. To address this research gap, we investigate differentiation in the EU renewable energy policy in response to the crisis stirred by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We find that the EU successfully used the Ukraine crisis to increase the ambition of renewable energy policy, but this was accompanied by various and often novel forms of differentiation. Rather than formally exempting countries from common EU provisions (differentiated integration), EU decision-makers strategically incorporated flexibility in implementation, often tailored to a few outlier countries. Strategic flexibility was instrumental in overcoming political disagreements among national governments and adopting a more ambitious and comprehensive renewable energy policy. Our findings contribute conceptually and empirically to understanding various forms of differentiation in EU policymaking and how they are employed to facilitate the building of political majorities during crises.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"11 19","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135390570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses how the European Council and the institutional infrastructure that supports it have been managing the early stages of the energy crisis. This was the time when the European Council, as the “control room” of EU crisis management, was unable to come up with any solutions to high energy prices. It makes a methodological and empirical contribution to the debate on how the European Council system manages (poly)crises. Methodologically, we introduce the method of embedded process tracing to study EU crisis management from within. Embedded process tracing combines mainstream causal process tracing techniques with elements from interpretivist approaches, to deal with context dependency, case heterogeneity, and empirical density. Empirically, we offer a process-management analysis of the first nine months of the energy crisis. We delineate the roles of various actors and institutions: the president of the European Council, the Council Secretariat, the Commission president, and the Commission Services. We unpack the crucial ingredients of polycrisis management: how to get and keep an issue on the agenda, how to shape and steer European-Council-level debates and conclusions, and how to ensure a proper follow-up by the Commission and the Council. Finally, we re-assess the image of the malfunctioning control room and show the causal relevance of the European Council’s early performance.
{"title":"The Institutional Ingredients of Polycrisis Management: Unpacking European Council’s Handling of the Energy Crisis","authors":"Sandrino Smeets, Derek Beach","doi":"10.17645/pag.v11i4.7345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7345","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses how the European Council and the institutional infrastructure that supports it have been managing the early stages of the energy crisis. This was the time when the European Council, as the “control room” of EU crisis management, was unable to come up with any solutions to high energy prices. It makes a methodological and empirical contribution to the debate on how the European Council system manages (poly)crises. Methodologically, we introduce the method of embedded process tracing to study EU crisis management from within. Embedded process tracing combines mainstream causal process tracing techniques with elements from interpretivist approaches, to deal with context dependency, case heterogeneity, and empirical density. Empirically, we offer a process-management analysis of the first nine months of the energy crisis. We delineate the roles of various actors and institutions: the president of the European Council, the Council Secretariat, the Commission president, and the Commission Services. We unpack the crucial ingredients of polycrisis management: how to get and keep an issue on the agenda, how to shape and steer European-Council-level debates and conclusions, and how to ensure a proper follow-up by the Commission and the Council. Finally, we re-assess the image of the malfunctioning control room and show the causal relevance of the European Council’s early performance.","PeriodicalId":51598,"journal":{"name":"Politics and Governance","volume":"29 29","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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