Fiscal Studies最新文献

In this paper, we present findings from the first ever study, to our knowledge, to focus in detail on public attitudes to an annual wealth tax. We start with a brief review of relevant recent studies before outlining the mixed methods used, which involved a nationally representative survey of 2,243 members of the general public and four focus groups conducted during the summer of 2020. The study aimed to measure, explore and explain the overall levels of support for a wealth tax compared with other taxes, the arguments for and against a wealth tax, and opinions on the particular design of such a tax. Key findings include high levels of public support for a wealth tax compared with other taxes, and support for the base of the tax to include financial investments and property wealth (after excluding the main home). The most popular rate/threshold combination is for the tax to be levied at a rate of at least 1 per cent over £500,000. Support for the tax appears to be driven by a combination of rational self-interest and beliefs about fairness but, in particular, the public are keen for the tax to be focused on those with capacity to contribute the most.

Wealth taxes are increasingly being considered as an option in policy and academic circles to collect additional revenue and address inequality. One objection that is often raised, however, is that they seem to have failed in countries that tried them, with most OECD countries abandoning their wealth taxes in recent decades. This paper gives an overview of OECD countries’ experiences with wealth taxes and explores the different factors that have led to their repeal in most countries. The paper also discusses whether the situation might be different today and what the implications for tax policy might be.

This paper asks when a wealth tax would, in principle, be a desirable part of the tax system, setting aside the practicalities and politics that would be crucial in reality. The case for a one-off wealth tax is simple. If it were unexpected and credibly one-off – a major challenge in practice – this would be an efficient way to raise revenue and could be used to address existing wealth inequality. Whether such a tax is desirable hinges on whether it is considered fair, about which reasonable people will differ. Making the case for an annual wealth tax, which would affect future wealth accumulation as well as existing wealth, is less straightforward. It requires explaining why it is better to tax the same wealth every year – penalising those who save – rather than raising the same revenue by taxing all sources of wealth once when they are received (and/or when they are spent). Such a case can be made based on subtle arguments for why taxing wealth might help to ease the trade-off between redistribution and work incentives; and a wealth tax might also be justified if holding on to wealth, rather than spending it, benefits the holder or harms others. These theoretical arguments probably justify some taxation of wealth in principle, though we have little basis for judging the appropriate level, so only part of the theoretical benefit could be attained. It is questionable whether the achievable benefits outweigh the costs of an imperfect wealth tax in practice.

There are strong reasons to radically reform how we currently tax the sources/uses of wealth; this includes reforming capital income taxes in order to properly tax high returns. An annual wealth tax would be a poor substitute for doing that. But to the extent that taxes remain imperfect and that responses to a wealth tax would not affect revenue from other taxes (such as on income, expenditure and bequests), there may be a benefit to adding a wealth tax in order to diversify sources of revenue and prevent any one tax getting too high – though that must be weighed against the extra administrative burdens of having another tax.

I assess the costs of administering a wealth tax for taxpayers and the tax authority in the UK context, based on evidence from existing UK taxes on wealth and comprehensive wealth taxes that have been imposed in other countries. My central estimate is that a well-designed wealth tax generates costs to taxpayers of 0.1 per cent of taxable wealth and costs to the tax authority of 0.05 per cent of taxable wealth. I discuss how these costs depend on design choices. My findings can inform revenue modelling and help to evaluate the desirability of wealth taxes.

Liquidity concerns are oft raised when considering wealth taxes, yet the issue has received scant attention in the extant literature. In this paper we provide the first comprehensive review of the liquidity problem. Our aims are to estimate the scale of the problem, to explore the extent to which archetypal examples are at risk of experiencing low liquidity, and to review the policy options to reduce the scale and impact of liquidity challenges. Using data from Round 6 of the Wealth and Assets Survey, we demonstrate that the scale of the problem depends largely on conceptual and design issues. We find that farmers and business owners are commonly over-represented in the low-liquidity group, but there is little evidence to support the typical narrative surrounding single pensioners. Finally, we conclude our review with a number of preferred solutions to address liquidity issues, including recognising that a net wealth tax can be paid out of income or by sale of assets, by withholding tax (e.g. by pension providers), by borrowing/financing, deferred payment arrangements and, possibly in limited circumstances, payment in specie.

We show that wealth inequality in the UK is high and has increased slightly over the past decade as financial asset prices have increased in the wake of the financial crisis. But data deficiencies are a major barrier in understanding the true distribution, composition and size of household wealth. The most comprehensive survey of household wealth in the UK does a good job of capturing the vast majority of the wealth distribution, but nearly £800 billion of wealth held by the very wealthiest UK households is missing. We also find tentative evidence that survey measures of high-wealth families undervalue their assets – our central estimate of the true value of wealth held by households in the UK is 5 per cent higher than the survey data suggest.

This paper considers the scale and prevalence of valuation issues under a wealth tax. Valuation issues are frequently cited in the literature as the most difficult aspect of wealth taxes. We examine some of the most problematic asset types from a valuation perspective. We also consider a range of solutions to manage these concerns, drawing on international experience and the approaches already taken for other taxes within the UK system. We conclude that satisfactory options for arriving at a value for wealth tax purposes are available even for the most problematic assets. We also estimate that the absolute number of taxpayers likely to pay substantial valuation fees is small, and that, in aggregate, valuation costs could be contained to around 0.1 per cent or less of total chargeable assets, even if they are substantial for some individual taxpayers.

Any wealth tax design needs to resolve the question of who should pay it it How wide should the net be cast? Setting high or low exempt thresholds affects avoidance behaviour and may influence whether one should tax by reference to the household (and if so how that should be defined) or simply on each individual who owns wealth over a certain threshold. Typically, wealth taxes in other countries have not been imposed on non-residents except in relation to real property but questions remain over whether any exempt period should be given to new arrivals, not least for administrative convenience. A one-off wealth tax would require a different design in a number of respects from an annual wealth tax. For example, a one off tax t would need to be designed to catch those who have recently left the UK and contain modifications for recent arrivals. Trusts, foundations and similar vehicles pose particular problems in the design of a wealth tax and the author suggests some possible solutions and connecting factors that could be considered.