Social Epistemology最新文献

英文中文

Three Decades of Social Construction of Technology: Dynamic Yet Fuzzy? The Methodological Conundrum 三十年的技术社会建构:动态还是模糊?方法论难题

IF 1.7 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-10-24 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2120783

Sumitran Basu

ABSTRACT Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) formed a key component of the ‘new sociology of technology’, which emerged in mid-1980s and heralded the entry of social constructivist theory into the domain of technology from science. A large number of empirical case studies were generated using SCOT methodology in the following three decades, encompassing a wide range of technological artefacts or systems. This essay reviews the trajectory of SCOT as a distinct intellectual tradition in technology studies. First, an attempt is made to appraise and classify the main strands of criticisms against SCOT that have come up over the years. Second, this essay discusses several new conceptual heuristics, which were successively incorporated by the original authors of SCOT, along with the concomitant broadening of analytical units and research questions. We conclude that, while SCOT demonstrated its resilience as a dynamic scholarly tradition and constantly adapted itself to address criticisms through the incorporation of new conceptual tools, the consequent methodological transition had profound implications for SCOT as a theory, somewhat undermining its original agenda and methodological distinctiveness in social studies of technology.

摘要技术社会建构是20世纪80年代中期出现的“新技术社会学”的重要组成部分，预示着社会建构主义理论从科学进入技术领域。在接下来的三十年里，使用SCOT方法生成了大量实证案例研究，涵盖了广泛的技术人工制品或系统。本文回顾了SCOT作为技术研究中一种独特的知识传统的发展轨迹。首先，试图对多年来出现的针对SCOT的主要批评进行评估和分类。其次，本文讨论了SCOT的原始作者相继引入的几种新的概念启发式方法，以及随之而来的分析单元和研究问题的拓宽。我们得出的结论是，尽管SCOT作为一种充满活力的学术传统表现出了其韧性，并通过引入新的概念工具不断调整自己以应对批评，但随之而来的方法论转变对SCOT这一理论产生了深远的影响，在一定程度上破坏了其在技术社会研究中的原始议程和方法论独特性。

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引用次数: 1

Stability in Liberal Epistocracies 自由派的稳定

IF 1.7 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-10-24 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2131482

C. Fumagalli

ABSTRACT In this article, I argue that stability is one of the enabling conditions for epistocratic arrangements to function well and justify their claim right to rule. Against this backdrop, I demonstrate that advocates of strategies to allocate exclusive decision-making power to knowledgeable citizens fail to demonstrate that in a context marked by the fact of pluralism, liberal epistocracies will be stable. They could argue that liberal epistocracies will be stable because epistocratic arrangements are better equipped than democratic decision-making bodies to produce outcomes that approximate the common good. They could argue that liberal epistocracies will be stable because there is a shared meritocratic set of values and ideas. Furthermore, they could opt for two standard liberal strategies, such as overlapping consensus and modus vivendi. Yet, in all cases, the argument for the stability of liberal epistocracies is not persuasive.

摘要在本文中，我认为稳定性是上位制度安排发挥良好作用并证明其主张统治权的有利条件之一。在这种背景下，我证明，将排他性决策权分配给知识渊博的公民的策略的倡导者未能证明，在以多元化为标志的背景下，自由主义的上位论将是稳定的。他们可能会争辩说，自由主义的上位制度将是稳定的，因为上位制度安排比民主决策机构更有能力产生接近共同利益的结果。他们可能会争辩说，自由主义的书信主义将是稳定的，因为有一套共同的精英价值观和思想。此外，他们可以选择两种标准的自由主义策略，如重叠的共识和权宜之计。然而，在所有情况下，自由主义书信体稳定性的论点都没有说服力。

引用次数: 0

Knowledge, Expertise and Science Advice During COVID-19: In Search of Epistemic Justice for the 'Wicked' Problems of Post-Normal Times. COVID-19 期间的知识、专长和科学建议：为后正常时代的 "邪恶 "问题寻求认识论正义。

IF 1.4 2区哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-10-10 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2103750

Maru Mormina

A consistent claim from governments around the world during the Coronavirus pandemic has been that they were following the science. This raises the question, central to this paper, of what and whose knowledge is or should be sought, which is being side-lined through the choice of particular framings and discourses, and with what consequences for the creation and implementation of evidence-based policy to tackle wicked problems. Through the lens of Fricker's epistemic injustice, I problematise the expertise that has guided the COVID-19 response as epistemically narrow and argue that counteracting a monolithic culture of expertise requires tackling the structural inequalities in the systems of knowledge production to diversify the social and epistemological foundations of science. Drawing on Post-normal Science (PNS) theory, I suggest that the expertise needed to respond to the challenges of a post-COVID world is one that embraces greater pluralism, avoids groupthink, challenges the accepted orthodoxy and helps us revert old models and rigid path dependencies that so often neglect the lived realities and demands of those left behind. This can only be realised by overcoming epistemic injustice and embracing epistemic democracy in the practice of evidence-based policy.

在冠状病毒大流行期间，世界各国政府一直声称他们遵循的是科学。这就提出了一个问题，也是本文的核心问题，即什么知识和谁的知识是或应该被寻求的，哪些知识通过选择特定的框架和话语而被忽视，以及对制定和实施以证据为基础的政策来解决邪恶问题会产生什么后果。通过弗里克（Fricker）认识论不公正的视角，我提出了指导 COVID-19 应对措施的专业知识在认识论上的狭隘性问题，并认为要抵制单一的专业知识文化，就必须解决知识生产系统中的结构性不平等问题，以实现科学的社会和认识论基础的多元化。借鉴 "后常态科学"（PNS）理论，我认为，应对后 COVID 世界挑战所需的专业知识应更加多元化，避免群体思维，挑战公认的正统观念，并帮助我们扭转旧模式和僵化的路径依赖，因为这些模式和路径依赖往往忽视了那些被抛在后面的人们的生活现实和需求。要实现这一点，就必须在循证政策的实践中克服认识论上的不公正，拥抱认识论上的民主。

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引用次数: 0

Epistemic Bunkers 认知掩体

IF 1.7 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-09-26 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2122756

Katherine Furman

ABSTRACT One reason that fake news and other objectionable views gain traction is that they often come to us in the form of testimony from those in our immediate social circles – from those we trust. A language around this phenomenon has developed which describes social epistemic structures in terms of ‘epistemic bubbles’ and ‘epistemic echo chambers’. These concepts involve the exclusion of external evidence in various ways. While these concepts help us see the ways that evidence is socially filtered, it doesn’t help us understand the social functions that these structures play, which limits our ability to intervene on them. In this paper, I introduce a new concept – that of the epistemic bunker. This concept helps us better account for a central feature of the phenomenon, which is that exclusionary social epistemic structures are often constructed to offer their members safety, either actual or perceived. Recognising this allows us to develop better strategies to mitigate their negative effects.

摘要：假新闻和其他令人反感的观点之所以受到关注，一个原因是它们经常以我们直接社交圈中的人——我们信任的人——的证词的形式出现在我们面前。围绕这一现象发展出了一种语言，用“认识泡沫”和“认识回音室”来描述社会认识结构。这些概念涉及以各种方式排除外部证据。虽然这些概念有助于我们了解证据被社会过滤的方式，但它并不能帮助我们理解这些结构所发挥的社会功能，这限制了我们干预它们的能力。在这篇论文中，我引入了一个新的概念——认识地堡。这一概念有助于我们更好地解释这一现象的一个核心特征，即排斥性的社会认识结构往往是为了为其成员提供实际或感知的安全而构建的。认识到这一点，我们可以制定更好的战略来减轻其负面影响。

引用次数: 2

Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge 非总结性社会知识的认识结构

IF 1.7 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-09-21 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2121621

Avram Hiller, R. Randall

ABSTRACT How a group G can know that p has been the subject of much investigation in social epistemology in recent years. This paper clarifies and defends a form of non-supervenient, non-summative group knowledge: G can know that p even if none of the members of G knows that p, and whether or not G knows that p does not locally supervene on the mental states of the members of G. Instead, we argue that what is central to G knowing that p is whether G has an epistemic structure that is functioning appropriately in accord with the action-related purposes of the group, and this structure may include non-agential elements such as devices that retain or process information. We argue that recent objections to non-summative group knowledge given by Jennifer Lackey do not in fact succeed in undermining the view, but do help to clarify the nature of non-summative group knowledge. The main upshot of our response to Lackey’s objections is that groups put their knowledge into action in ways that often differ from how individuals do, and social epistemologists should be careful to notice these differences, especially insofar as groups often structure themselves by employing various epistemically-relevant devices.

群体G如何知道p是近年来社会认识论研究的热点问题。本文阐明并捍卫了一种非监督性、非总结性的群体知识:G可以知道p即使没有G知道p的成员,以及G是否知道p不当地取代的精神状态的成员G .相反,我们认为什么是G知道p是G的中心有一个认知结构适当运作符合集团action-related目的,这个结构可能包括non-agential元素,如设备保留或处理信息。我们认为，最近由Jennifer Lackey提出的对非总结性群体知识的反对实际上并没有成功地破坏这一观点，但确实有助于澄清非总结性群体知识的本质。我们对Lackey的反对意见的回应的主要结论是，群体以不同于个人的方式将他们的知识付诸行动，社会认识论学者应该小心注意这些差异，特别是在群体经常通过使用各种与认识论相关的手段来构建自己的情况下。

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引用次数: 0

The Gap Between Science and Society and the Intrinsically Capitalistic Character of Science Communication 科学与社会的差距与科学传播的本质资本主义特征

IF 1.7 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-09-21 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2111670

Luis Arboledas-Lérida

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Science Communication inheres to the capitalist relations of production. By making use of Marxist dialectics, the enquiry will elucidate the enquiry will elucidate that capital creates the gap between science and society that Science Communication is deemed to bridge, for capitalism deprives workers of the ‘intellectual potencies of the material process of production’ and makes both impossible and meaningless for them to appropriate scientific knowledge in a direct, unmediated manner. Along these lines, the paper will revisit the long-standing ‘deskilling-upskilling debate’ in order to shed light on what specific workers’ productive attributes form the material basis on which Science Communication grounded. I conclude that the existence of Science Communication responds to the fact that workers are devoid of any control over the social qualitative content of their work – the purpose and the mode of the labouring activity. In other words, Science Communication is premised on the limited form taken by the productive consciousness capital equips workers with in order just to reproduce itself.

摘要本文旨在论证科学传播是资本主义生产关系的本质。通过运用马克思主义辩证法，探究将阐明资本制造了科学与社会之间的鸿沟，科学传播被认为是弥合这一鸿沟的桥梁，因为资本主义剥夺了工人“物质生产过程的智力潜能”，使他们不可能也没有意义地直接、无中介地运用科学知识。沿着这些思路，这篇论文将重新审视长期以来的“去办公技能提升辩论”，以阐明具体工人的生产属性是什么构成了科学传播的物质基础。我的结论是，科学传播的存在回应了这样一个事实，即工人对他们工作的社会质量内容——劳动活动的目的和模式——缺乏任何控制。换言之，科学传播是以资本为劳动者提供的生产意识所采取的有限形式为前提的。

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引用次数: 0

Beyond Deep Disagreement: A Path Towards Achieving Understanding Across a Cultural Divide 超越深刻分歧:跨越文化鸿沟实现理解之路

IF 1.7 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-09-20 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2123261

Jay Evans, J. Kingsbury

ABSTRACT Achieving genuine engagement and understanding between communities with radically divergent worldviews is challenging. If there is no common ground on which to stand and have a discussion, the likely outcomes of an apparent intercultural disagreement are a stalemate, the (sometimes colonialist) imposition of a single worldview, or a kind of relativistic tolerance that falls short of genuine engagement. In this paper, we suggest a way forward that takes as its starting point the philosophical discussion of deep disagreement, using the example of taniwha – in te ao Māori (the Māori world/worldview), powerful water beings that must be treated with respect – to outline a strategy for building intercultural understanding and enabling constructive intercultural dialogue.

摘要在世界观大相径庭的社区之间实现真正的参与和理解是一项挑战。如果没有共同的立场和讨论，那么明显的跨文化分歧可能会导致僵局，（有时是殖民主义的）强加单一的世界观，或者是一种缺乏真正参与的相对论宽容。在这篇论文中，我们提出了一条前进的道路，以深刻分歧的哲学讨论为起点，以taniwha为例——在毛利语（毛利世界/世界观）中，强大的水生物必须受到尊重——概述了建立跨文化理解和促进建设性跨文化对话的战略。

引用次数: 1

Bots: Some Less-Considered Epistemic Problems 机器人:一些较少考虑的认知问题

IF 1.7 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-09-19 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2122898

Benjamin Winokur

ABSTRACT Posts on social media platforms like Twitter are sometimes the products of deceptively designed bots. These bots can cause obvious epistemic problems, such as tricking human users into believing the contents of misleading posts. However, less-considered epistemic problems involve false bot judgements where a human user mistakes another human user’s post for a bot-post, or where a human user mistakenly believes that bots are the primary vehicles for tokening certain content on social media. This paper takes up three questions concerning false bot judgements: what exactly are their associated epistemic harms, just how harmful are they, and what should we do about them?

推特等社交媒体平台上的帖子有时是欺骗性设计的机器人的产物。这些机器人可能会导致明显的认知问题，比如欺骗人类用户相信误导性帖子的内容。然而，较少考虑的认知问题涉及错误的机器人判断，即人类用户将另一个人类用户的帖子误认为是机器人帖子，或者人类用户错误地认为机器人是在社交媒体上标记某些内容的主要工具。本文讨论了关于错误的机器人判断的三个问题:与错误判断相关的认知危害究竟是什么，它们有多有害，以及我们应该如何应对它们?

引用次数: 0

The Influence of Disciplinary Origins on Peer Review Normativities in a New Discipline 学科渊源对新学科同行评审规范性的影响

IF 1.7 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2111669

K. Beddoes, Yu Xia, Stephanie Cutler

ABSTRACT STS scholarship has produced important insights about relationships between the roles of peer review and the social construction of knowledge. Yet, barriers related to access have been a continual challenge for such work. This article overcomes some past access challenges and explores peer review normativities operating in the new discipline of Engineering Education. In doing so, it contributes new insights about disciplinary development, interdisciplinarity, and peer review as a site of knowledge construction. In particular, it draws attention to an aspect of peer review not previously discussed – how peer review normativities are shaped by disciplinary origins. A content analysis of peer review documentation revealed that a hyperfocus on methods, which can be traced back to disciplinary origins, continues to be a guiding normativity. However, interviews with editors revealed that they do not acknowledge that normativity. Implications of those findings and their misalignment are discussed, as are contrasts with the history of other disciplines.

STS学术对同行评审的作用与知识的社会建构之间的关系产生了重要的见解。然而，与准入有关的障碍一直是这类工作面临的挑战。本文克服了过去的一些访问挑战，并探讨了工程教育新学科中的同行评审规范。通过这样做，它为学科发展、跨学科性和作为知识构建场所的同行评审提供了新的见解。特别是，它提请人们注意以前没有讨论过的同行评审的一个方面——同行评审规范是如何由学科起源形成的。对同行评审文件的内容分析表明，对方法的过度关注（可以追溯到学科起源）仍然是一种指导规范。然而，对编辑的采访显示，他们并不承认这种规范性。讨论了这些发现的含义及其错位，以及与其他学科历史的对比。

引用次数: 3

The Social Indicators of the Reputation of an Expert 专家声誉的社会指标

IF 1.7 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Social Epistemology

Pub Date : 2022-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2116962

G. Origgi

ABSTRACT A notion that comes from the toolbox of social sciences, trust has become a mainstream epistemological concept in the last 15 years. The notion of epistemic trust has been distinguished from the notion of moral and social trust, the former involves kinds of inferences about the others that are rationally justifiable. If I trust a scientist about the efficacy of a vaccine against COVID-19, I must have an epistemic justification. I am therefore rationally justified in trusting her because I have an epistemic reason to justify my belief. I will challenge the distinction between epistemic and moral and social trust by pointing to several social indicators that contribute to our trustful attitudes in a reasonable way. Social indicators of reputation, values and moral commitments to values are indispensable strategies to come to trust in a rational way, an attitude that is different from merely believing the truth. I also point out the fragility of trusting experts’ reputations and stress the importance of avoiding biases in trusting other people’s reputations to make our deference to experts more robust.

信任是一个来自社会科学工具箱的概念，在过去的15年里，它已经成为一个主流的认识论概念。认识信任的概念与道德和社会信任的概念不同，前者涉及对他人的各种合理推理。如果我相信一位科学家对新冠肺炎疫苗的有效性，我必须有认识上的理由。因此，我有理由相信她，因为我有一个认识论的理由来证明我的信仰是正确的。我将通过指出几个社会指标来挑战认识信任与道德和社会信任之间的区别，这些指标以合理的方式有助于我们的信任态度。声誉、价值观和对价值观的道德承诺的社会指标是以理性的方式获得信任的不可或缺的策略，这种态度不同于仅仅相信真相。我还指出了信任专家声誉的脆弱性，并强调了在信任他人声誉时避免偏见的重要性，以使我们对专家的尊重更加坚定。

引用次数: 1

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全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

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Social Epistemology

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