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“Do Your Own Research” “做你自己的研究”
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-12-20 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2146469
N. Ballantyne, Jared B. Celniker, David Dunning
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引用次数: 6
Self-Trust and Critical Thinking Online: A Relational Account 自我信任与在线批判性思维:一个关系账户
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-12-15 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2151330
Lavinia Marin, S. Copeland
An increasingly popular solution to the anti-scientific climate rising on social media platforms has been the appeal to more critical thinking from the user’s side. In this paper, we zoom in on the ideal of critical thinking and unpack it in order to see, specifically, whether it can provide enough epistemic agency so that users endowed with it can break free from enclosed communities on social media (so-called epistemic bubbles). We criticise some assumptions embedded in the ideal of critical thinking online and, instead, we propose that a better way to understand the virtuous behaviour at hand is as critical engagement, namely a mutual cultivation of critical skills among the members of an epistemic bubble. This mutual cultivation allows members within an epistemic bubble (in contrast, as we will show, with the authority-based models of epistemic echo chambers) to become more autonomous critical thinkers by cultivating self-trust. We use the model of relational autonomy as well as resources from work on epistemic self-trust and epistemic interdependence to develop an explanatory framework, which in turn may ground rules for identifying and creating virtuous epistemic bubbles within the environments of social media platforms.
针对社交媒体平台上日益高涨的反科学气候,一个越来越受欢迎的解决方案是吸引用户更多的批判性思维。在这篇论文中,我们放大了批判性思维的理想,并对其进行了解读,以具体地观察它是否能够提供足够的认知代理,从而使拥有它的用户能够从社交媒体上的封闭社区(所谓的认知泡沫)中挣脱出来。我们批评了网络批判性思维理想中的一些假设,相反,我们提出,理解手头的良性行为的更好方法是批判性参与,即认识泡沫成员之间相互培养批判性技能。这种相互培养使认识泡沫中的成员(相反,正如我们将要展示的那样,与基于权威的认识回音室模型形成对比)能够通过培养互信而成为更自主的批判性思想家。我们使用关系自主的模型以及来自认识自我信任和认识相互依存工作的资源来开发一个解释框架,这反过来可能为在社交媒体平台的环境中识别和创造良性认识泡沫奠定规则。
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引用次数: 1
Costly Displays in a Digital World: Signalling Trustworthiness on Social Media 数字世界中的昂贵展示:在社交媒体上表明可信度
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-12-12 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2150990
Ritsaart Reimann
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引用次数: 0
Why Post-Truth Cannot Be Our Epistemological Compass 为什么后真相不能成为我们的认识论指南针
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-12-11 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2145858
Massimo Dell’Utri
ABSTRACT This paper tackles some of the arguments Steve Fuller – arguably the best advocate of post-truth currently on the scene – put forward to show that, correctly understood, post-truth is the best conceptual tool to get a clear picture not only of what is happening in our societies today, but also of what has happened throughout the secular history of Western culture. The implicit assumption is that post-truth represents a reliable ‘epistemological compass’ – that is, a notion (or a set of notions) for proper orientation in both cultural and physical environments. The aim of the paper is to show that Fuller’s arguments do not work, because an epistemological compass can only be centered on a plausible notion of objectivity, and – it will be contended – this is exactly what Fuller lacks. Accordingly, it will be stressed how the upshot of his theses is the opposite of what he presumes it to be and, moreover, that his theses prove lethal to his own position.
摘要本文论述了史蒂夫·富勒(Steve Fuller)提出的一些论点,他可以说是目前世界上后真相的最佳倡导者,以表明,如果正确理解,后真相是最好的概念工具,不仅可以清楚地了解我们当今社会正在发生的事情,还可以清楚地理解西方文化世俗史上发生的事情。隐含的假设是,后真理代表了一个可靠的“认识论指南针”——也就是说,一个概念(或一组概念),用于在文化和物理环境中正确定位。这篇论文的目的是表明富勒的论点是行不通的,因为认识论的指南针只能以一个看似合理的客观性概念为中心,而这正是富勒所缺乏的。因此,我们将强调,他的论文的结果与他所认为的相反,而且,他的论文对他自己的立场是致命的。
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引用次数: 1
The Epistemological Compass and the (Post)Truth about Objectivity 认识论指南针与客观性的(后)真理
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-12-08 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2150988
S. Fuller
ABSTRACT Massimo Dell’Utri proposes the idea of an ‘epistemological compass’, which he alleges provides a common intuitive sense of objectivity, the existence of which defenders of ‘post-truth’ positions would perversely try to deny. I argue that Dell’Utri’s choice of a compass – metaphorical or otherwise – is unfortunate because it is a device that presupposes that what appears plain to the senses is directed by hidden forces emanating from distant sources, such as the stars. More generally, the post-truth condition is not about the denial of facts as ordinarily understood. Rather, it is about the denial of a privileged context in terms of which the significance of the facts should be understood. In Dell’Utri’s terms, it implies a plurality of epistemological compasses, which in turn undermines the effectiveness of the metaphor. I have described this situation as a struggle over ‘the name of the game’. In terms of philosophical logic, it is about which metalanguage provides the semantics for expressions in the object language the people try to deploy to their advantage.
摘要Massimo Dell'Utri提出了“认识论指南针”的概念,他声称这提供了一种普遍的客观直觉,“后真相”立场的捍卫者会反常地试图否认这种客观性的存在。我认为,Dell'Utri选择指南针——无论是隐喻的还是其他的——都是不幸的,因为它是一种预设,即感官上显而易见的东西是由遥远来源(如恒星)发出的隐藏力量引导的。更普遍地说,后真相条件并不是像通常理解的那样否认事实。相反,它是关于否认一种特权背景,在这种背景下,应该理解事实的重要性。用Dell'Utri的话来说,它暗示了多种认识论的圆规,这反过来又破坏了隐喻的有效性。我把这种情况描述为一场关于“游戏名称”的斗争。从哲学逻辑的角度来看,是关于哪种元语言为人们试图利用的对象语言中的表达提供了语义。
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引用次数: 2
The Rationality Principle: An Attempt at Synthesis 理性原则:综合的尝试
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-11-29 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2145856
Alfonso Palacio-Vera
ABSTRACT The status and role of Popper’s ‘Rationality Principle’ (RP) is still the subject of disputes. The ‘prevailing view’ among Popper’s commentators seems to be that RP is better interpreted as a methodological principle. Yet, this view is challenged in a recent study where RP is interpreted as an‘idealization’. We critically review these two accounts of RP and propose a novel one according to which RP is, first and foremost, the scientific version of a heuristic that ordinary people unconsciously use when they seek to explain and predict other people’s behavior. However, we recognize that, to the extent RP is part of a methodological strategy whereby, in the wake of adverse empirical results, social scientists place the ‘onus of proof’ on their situational model it is legitimate to claim that RP is adopted, at least partly, for methodological reasons. Further, to the extent that the adoption of RP implies suppressing those mental processes that may affect actors’ reasoning and willpower it is also legitimate to claim that RP is, at least partly, an ‘idealization’. We conclude that the status and role of RP is multi-faceted and that the three accounts of RP complement each other.
波普尔“理性原则”的地位和作用至今仍存在争议。波普尔的评论家们的“主流观点”似乎是,RP被更好地解释为一种方法论原则。然而,这一观点在最近的一项研究中受到了质疑,该研究将RP解释为“去极端化”。我们批判性地回顾了RP的这两种说法,并提出了一种新颖的说法,根据这种说法,RP首先是普通人在试图解释和预测他人行为时无意识使用的启发式方法的科学版本。然而,我们认识到,在某种程度上,RP是一种方法论策略的一部分,根据该策略,在出现不利的实证结果后,社会科学家将“举证责任”放在他们的情境模型上,声称RP的采用是合理的,至少部分是出于方法论的原因。此外,如果RP的采用意味着抑制那些可能影响演员推理和意志力的心理过程,那么声称RP至少在一定程度上是一种“理想化”也是合理的。我们得出结论,RP的地位和作用是多方面的,并且RP的三个方面是相辅相成的。
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引用次数: 0
Are Honest Brokers Good for Democracy? 诚实的经纪人对民主有益吗?
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-11-16 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2139166
Darrin Durant
ABSTRACT In Roger Pielke Jr.’s The Honest Broker (2007) he discusses different roles a scientist can adopt when giving advice to policymakers. The honest broker role focuses on clarifying and expanding the scope of choice for others. This role has the virtues of being sensitive to known problems with experts being partisan by stealth, dominating policy decisions by controlling knowledge input, and reducing the scope of considerations deemed relevant to decision-making. Yet I argue that to the extent the honest broker role involves expanding the scope of choice, an array of problems arises. These include ambiguity about which and whose consensus ought to guide scientists in their decisions about what role to adopt, an implicit tendency to insulate politics from science, and a possible replication of the anti-pluralism of political populism. Drawing upon Phillip Pettit’s critique of Isaiah Berlin’s account of freedom as non-interference, I argue that the honest broker role for scientists inherits the problems afflicting accounts of freedom as the non-restriction of options: namely, the problems of adaptive preference formation and ingratiation. On this basis I suggest not advising scientists to be honest brokers, because doing so might fail to help them be reflexive scientists.
在小罗杰·皮尔克(Roger Pielke Jr.)的《诚实的经纪人》(The Honest Broker, 2007)一书中,他讨论了科学家在向决策者提供建议时可以扮演的不同角色。诚实的经纪人角色侧重于澄清和扩大他人的选择范围。这个角色的优点是对已知的问题很敏感,而专家们则是秘密地偏袒,通过控制知识输入来主导政策决策,并减少与决策相关的考虑范围。然而,我认为,只要诚实经纪人的角色涉及扩大选择范围,就会产生一系列问题。这些问题包括:在科学家决定扮演何种角色时,哪些共识以及谁的共识应该指导科学家,这是一个模棱两可的问题;将政治与科学隔离开来的隐性倾向;以及政治民粹主义反多元主义的可能复制。根据菲利普·佩蒂特对以赛亚·伯林(Isaiah Berlin)将自由描述为不干涉的批评,我认为,科学家的诚实经纪人角色继承了困扰自由描述为选择权不受限制的问题:即适应性偏好形成和迎合的问题。在此基础上,我建议不要建议科学家成为诚实的经纪人,因为这样做可能无法帮助他们成为反思的科学家。
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引用次数: 1
Hermeneutical Injustice and Child Victims of Abuse 解释学不公正与虐待儿童受害者
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-10-31 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2136506
Arlene Lo
ABSTRACT This article analyses how child victims of abuse may be subjected to hermeneutical injustice. I start by explaining how child victims are hermeneutically marginalised by adults’ social and epistemic authority, and the stigma around child abuse. In understanding their abuse, I highlight two epistemic obstacles child victims may face: (i) lack of access to concepts of child abuse, thereby causing victims not to know what abuse is; and (ii) myths of child abuse causing misunderstandings of abuse. When these epistemic obstacles cause the child victims to fail to see themselves as being abused and/or to get adults to recognise that they are being abused, I argue that this constitutes hermeneutical injustice. While some may justify obstructing epistemic access to concepts of abuse on the grounds of parental rights and protection of children’s innocence, I reply that both grounds are unjust in light of children’s basic rights and the fact that children can easily be taught such concepts in a child-appropriate manner. The case of child abuse prompts important reflections on existing epistemic injustice literature, particularly on the ways in which hermeneutical injustice materialises, the epistemic responsibilities of institutional bodies and individuals, and the interrelationship between testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.
摘要本文分析了虐待儿童受害者如何受到解释学的不公正对待。我首先解释了儿童受害者是如何被成年人的社会和认识权威以及虐待儿童的污名所边缘化的。在理解他们的虐待行为时,我强调了儿童受害者可能面临的两个认识障碍:(一)缺乏对虐待儿童概念的了解,从而导致受害者不知道什么是虐待;以及(ii)虐待儿童的神话导致对虐待的误解。当这些认识障碍导致儿童受害者没有看到自己被虐待和/或让成年人认识到自己被虐待时,我认为这构成了解释学的不公正。虽然有些人可能会以父母权利和保护儿童无辜为由,为阻碍人们从认知角度了解虐待概念辩护,但我回答说,鉴于儿童的基本权利,以及儿童可以很容易地以适合儿童的方式学习这些概念,这两种理由都是不公正的。虐待儿童的案件促使人们对现有的认识不公正文献进行重要反思,特别是对解释学不公正的实现方式、机构和个人的认识责任以及证明和解释学不公正之间的相互关系进行反思。
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引用次数: 0
Post-Enquiry and Disagreement. A Socio-Epistemological Model of the Normative Significance of Disagreement Between Scientists and Denialists 张贴询问和意见分歧。科学家与否定主义者分歧规范意义的社会认识论模型
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-10-25 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2129505
Filippo Ferrari, S. Moruzzi
ABSTRACT In this paper we investigate whether and to what extent scientists (e.g. inquirers such as epidemiologists or virologists) can have rational and fruitful disagreement with what we call post-enquirers (e.g. conspiratorial anti-vaxxers) on topics of scientific relevance such as the safety and efficacy of vaccines. In order to accomplish this aim, we will rely and expand on the epistemological framework developed in detail in Ferrari & Moruzzi (2021) to study the underlying normative profile of enquiry and post-enquiry. We take it that our analysis provides an effective explanation of why standard argumentative strategies such as fact-checking and debunking cannot work in the context of disagreement between scientists and denialists unless they are coupled with a discussion of the values that are endorsed by the scientific community.
在本文中,我们调查科学家(如流行病学家或病毒学家等询问者)是否以及在多大程度上可以与我们所谓的后询问者(如阴谋反疫苗者)就科学相关的主题(如疫苗的安全性和有效性)产生理性和富有成效的分歧。为了实现这一目标,我们将依赖并扩展Ferrari & Moruzzi(2021)中详细开发的认识论框架,以研究探究和探究后的潜在规范特征。我们认为,我们的分析提供了一个有效的解释,为什么标准的论证策略,如事实核查和揭穿,在科学家和否认者之间的分歧的背景下不起作用,除非它们与科学界认可的价值观的讨论相结合。
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引用次数: 0
Three Decades of Social Construction of Technology: Dynamic Yet Fuzzy? The Methodological Conundrum 三十年的技术社会建构:动态还是模糊?方法论难题
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2022-10-24 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2120783
Sumitran Basu
ABSTRACT Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) formed a key component of the ‘new sociology of technology’, which emerged in mid-1980s and heralded the entry of social constructivist theory into the domain of technology from science. A large number of empirical case studies were generated using SCOT methodology in the following three decades, encompassing a wide range of technological artefacts or systems. This essay reviews the trajectory of SCOT as a distinct intellectual tradition in technology studies. First, an attempt is made to appraise and classify the main strands of criticisms against SCOT that have come up over the years. Second, this essay discusses several new conceptual heuristics, which were successively incorporated by the original authors of SCOT, along with the concomitant broadening of analytical units and research questions. We conclude that, while SCOT demonstrated its resilience as a dynamic scholarly tradition and constantly adapted itself to address criticisms through the incorporation of new conceptual tools, the consequent methodological transition had profound implications for SCOT as a theory, somewhat undermining its original agenda and methodological distinctiveness in social studies of technology.
摘要技术社会建构是20世纪80年代中期出现的“新技术社会学”的重要组成部分,预示着社会建构主义理论从科学进入技术领域。在接下来的三十年里,使用SCOT方法生成了大量实证案例研究,涵盖了广泛的技术人工制品或系统。本文回顾了SCOT作为技术研究中一种独特的知识传统的发展轨迹。首先,试图对多年来出现的针对SCOT的主要批评进行评估和分类。其次,本文讨论了SCOT的原始作者相继引入的几种新的概念启发式方法,以及随之而来的分析单元和研究问题的拓宽。我们得出的结论是,尽管SCOT作为一种充满活力的学术传统表现出了其韧性,并通过引入新的概念工具不断调整自己以应对批评,但随之而来的方法论转变对SCOT这一理论产生了深远的影响,在一定程度上破坏了其在技术社会研究中的原始议程和方法论独特性。
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引用次数: 1
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Social Epistemology
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