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Conspiracy Theories and Democratic Legitimacy 阴谋论与民主合法性
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-20 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2172700
W. Mittendorf
ABSTRACT Conspiracy theories are frequently described as a threat to democracy and conspiracy theorists portrayed as epistemically or morally unreasonable. If these characterizations are correct, then it may be the case that reasons stemming from conspiracy theorizing threaten the legitimizing function of democratic deliberation. In this paper, I will argue the opposite. Despite the extraordinary epistemic and morally unreasonable claims made by some conspiracy theorists, belief in conspiracy theories is guided by internal epistemic norms inherent in believing. By utilizing the insights of the Peircean epistemic defense formulated by Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse, I take it that these epistemic norms implicitly commit the theorist to an open democratic society.
阴谋论经常被描述为对民主的威胁,阴谋论者被描述为在认识上或道德上不合理。如果这些描述是正确的,那么源自阴谋论的原因可能会威胁到民主审议的合法化功能。在本文中,我将提出相反的观点。尽管一些阴谋论者提出了非同寻常的认识论和道德上不合理的主张,但对阴谋论的信仰是由信仰中固有的内在认识规范引导的。通过利用Cheryl Misak和Robert Talisse提出的皮尔斯认识论辩护的见解,我认为这些认识论规范隐含地将理论家承诺于一个开放的民主社会。
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引用次数: 5
Who is a Conspiracy Theorist? 谁是阴谋论理论家?
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-20 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2172695
M. Tsapos
ABSTRACT The simplest and most natural definition of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ leads us to the conclusion that we are all conspiracy theorists. Yet, I claim that most of us would not self-identify as such. In this paper I call this the problem of self-identification. Since virtually everyone emerges as a conspiracy theorist, the term is essentially theoretically fruitless. It would be like defining intelligence in a way that makes everyone intelligent. This raises the problem for theoretical fruitfulness, i.e. the problem of how to define the concept in a theoretically fruitful way. I suggest that these problems are currently causing confusion in the literature and present us with a dilemma, the conspiracy definition dilemma. I will present an analysis of the literature and what are on my reconstruction the solutions on offer, and argue that none is satisfactory. Either a) the solution will solve the problem of self-identification or b) it will potentially provide a theoretical fruitful definition, but no account does both. Video abstract
“阴谋论”一词最简单、最自然的定义让我们得出结论,我们都是阴谋论者。然而,我声称,我们大多数人不会自我认同。在本文中,我称之为自我认同问题。由于几乎每个人都是阴谋论者,这个术语在理论上基本上是徒劳的。这就像是用一种让每个人都聪明的方式来定义智力。这就提出了理论成果的问题,即如何以理论成果的方式定义概念的问题。我认为,这些问题目前在文献中引起了混乱,并给我们带来了一个困境,即阴谋定义困境。我将对文献进行分析,并对我的重建提供的解决方案进行分析,认为没有一个是令人满意的。要么a)该解决方案将解决自我认同的问题,要么b)它将潜在地提供一个理论上富有成果的定义,但没有一个账户同时做到这两个。视频摘要
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引用次数: 7
Towards a Conceptual Framework for Conspiracy Theory Theories 阴谋论理论的概念框架
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-20 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2172698
N. Pfeifer
ABSTRACT I present a conceptual framework for classifying generalist and particularist approaches to conspiracy theories (CTs). Specifically, I exploit a probabilistic version of the hexagon of opposition which allows for systematically visualising the logical relations among basic philosophical positions concerning CTs. The probabilistic interpretation can also account for positions, which make weaker claims about CTs: e.g. instead of claiming ‘every CT is suspicious’ some theorists might prefer to claim ‘most CTs are suspicious’ and then ask about logical consequences of such claims. Finally, I illustrate the proposed conceptual framework by selected claims about CTs drawn from the CT research literature.
摘要:我提出了一个概念框架,用于对阴谋论的广义方法和特殊方法进行分类。具体来说,我利用了对立六边形的概率版本,它允许系统地可视化关于CT的基本哲学立场之间的逻辑关系。概率解释也可以解释对CT提出较弱主张的立场:例如,一些理论家可能更倾向于声称“大多数CT都是可疑的”,然后询问这些主张的逻辑后果,而不是声称“每个CT都可疑”。最后,我通过从CT研究文献中选取的关于CT的声明来说明所提出的概念框架。
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引用次数: 4
What Does It Mean for a Conspiracy Theory to Be a ‘Theory’? 阴谋论成为“理论”意味着什么?
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-19 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2172697
J. Duetz
ABSTRACT The pejorative connotation often associated with the ordinary language meaning of “conspiracy theory” does not only stem from a conspiracy theory’s being about a conspiracy, but also from a conspiracy theory’s being regarded as a particular kind of theory. I propose to understand conspiracy theory-induced polarization in terms of disagreement about the correct epistemic evaluation of ‘theory’ in ‘conspiracy theory’. By framing the positions typical in conspiracy theory-induced polarization in this way, I aim to show that pejorative conceptions of ‘conspiracy theory’ are problematic for research open to the possibility of finding depolarization strategies. That is, because they preclude constructive engagement with the epistemic norms governing (the rationales foundational of) belief in conspiracy theories.
摘要“阴谋论”的贬义往往与普通语言含义联系在一起,这不仅源于阴谋论是关于阴谋的,也源于阴谋理论被视为一种特定的理论。我建议从对“阴谋论”中“理论”的正确认识评价的分歧来理解阴谋论引发的两极分化。通过以这种方式界定阴谋论引发两极分化的典型立场,我的目的是表明,“阴谋论”的贬义概念对于寻找去极端化策略的可能性的研究是有问题的。也就是说,因为它们排除了对阴谋论信仰的认识规范的建设性参与。
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引用次数: 11
Some Conspiracy Theories 一些阴谋论
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-19 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2173539
M. Dentith
ABSTRACT A remarkable feature of the philosophical work on conspiracy theory theory has been that most philosophers agree there is nothing inherently problematic about conspiracy theories (AKA the thesis of particularism). Recent work, however, has challenged this consensus view, arguing that there really is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorising (AKA generalism). Are particularism and generalism incompatible? By looking at just how much particularists and generalists might have to give away to make their theoretical viewpoints compatible, I will argue that particularists can accept many of the concerns that motivate generalism because generalism can never be about ‘all’ conspiracy theories without being either ahistorical or apolitical. In the end generalist critiques are best seen as useful guidelines or considerations for the appraising of particular conspiracy theories.
关于阴谋论的哲学研究的一个显著特征是,大多数哲学家都认为阴谋论(也就是特殊论的论点)本质上没有问题。然而,最近的研究对这种共识观点提出了挑战,认为阴谋论(又名泛论)在认识论上确实存在一些错误。特殊主义和普遍主义是不相容的吗?通过观察特殊论者和通才们为了使他们的理论观点兼容而不得不付出的代价,我将论证特殊论者可以接受许多激发通才论的担忧,因为通才论永远不可能是关于“所有”阴谋论的,而不是非历史的或非政治的。最后,通才式的评论最好被看作是评估特定阴谋论的有用指南或考虑因素。
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引用次数: 6
Conceptual Engineering, Conceptual Domination, and the Case of Conspiracy Theories 概念工程、概念支配与阴谋论案例
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-15 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2172696
M. Shields
ABSTRACT Using the example of recent attempts to engineer the concept of conspiracy theory, I argue that philosophers should be far more circumspect in their approach to conceptual engineering than we have been – in particular, that we should pay much closer attention to the history behind and context that surrounds our target concept in order to determine whether it is a site of what I have elsewhere called ‘conceptual domination’. If it is, we may well have good reason to avoid engineering. In their recent ‘What is a Conspiracy Theory?’, M. Giulia Napolitano and Kevin Reuter argue that the disagreement between generalists and particularists in the literature on conspiracy theories is best characterized as a set of dueling conceptual engineering projects. While I agree with their turn to this metaphilosophical literature, I give a very different account of its applicability. Particularists, on my account, are better read as aiming to diagnose the ways in which many discussions of the concept of conspiracy theories are a form of conceptual domination, where this broader context should then prompt us to abandon or block any concept of conspiracy theory that treats its referents as inherently defective. Broader metaphilosophical lessons are drawn.
摘要以最近试图设计阴谋论概念的例子为例,我认为哲学家在进行概念工程时应该比我们更加谨慎——尤其是,我们应该更密切地关注目标概念背后的历史和背景,以确定它是否是我在其他地方所说的“概念统治”的场所。如果是这样的话,我们很可能有充分的理由避免工程。在他们最近的“什么是阴谋论?”,M.Giulia Napolitano和Kevin Reuter认为,在阴谋论文献中,通才主义者和特殊主义者之间的分歧最好被描述为一系列决斗的概念工程项目。虽然我同意他们转向这种形而上学的文学,但我对其适用性给出了截然不同的解释。就我而言,特殊主义者最好被解读为旨在诊断阴谋论概念的许多讨论是概念支配的一种形式,在这种情况下,这种更广泛的背景应该促使我们放弃或阻止任何将其指称物视为固有缺陷的阴谋论概念。得出了更广泛的形而上学教训。
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引用次数: 10
The Future of the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory: An Introduction to the Special Issue on Conspiracy Theory Theory 阴谋论哲学的未来:《阴谋论理论》特刊导论
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-15 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2173538
M. Dentith
ABSTRACT Looking at the early work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, I put in context the papers in this special issue on new work on conspiracy theory theory (itself the product of the 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory held in February 2022), showing how this new generation of work not only grew out of, but is itself a novel extension of the first generation of philosophical interest in these things called ‘conspiracy theories’.
摘要纵观阴谋论哲学的早期工作,我将本期关于阴谋论新工作的论文(其本身是2022年2月举行的第一届阴谋论哲学国际会议的产物)放在上下文中,展示了这一新一代工作如何不仅从,但它本身就是第一代对这些所谓“阴谋论”的哲学兴趣的新颖延伸。
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引用次数: 4
”That’s Just a Conspiracy Theory!”: Relevant Alternatives, Dismissive Conversational Exercitives, and the Problem of Premature Conclusions “那只是一个阴谋论!”:相关的选择、不屑一顾的会话练习和过早结论的问题
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-12 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2172699
Rico Hauswald
ABSTRACT Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework and Mary Kate McGowan’s work on conversational scorekeeping, I argue that usage of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in ordinary language and public discourse typically entails the performance of what I call a dismissive conversational exercitive, a kind of speech act that functions to exclude certain propositions from (or prevent their inclusion in) the set of alternatives considered relevant in a given conversational context. While it can be legitimate to perform dismissive conversational exercitives, excluding alternatives that deserve to be taken seriously can be highly problematic for a variety of reasons. For one, it can give rise to what I call the problem of premature conclusions when subjects illegitimately dismiss certain propositions as irrelevant and, as a result, prematurely take certain conclusions or claims to be warranted. Depending on the kind of conclusion or claim, the problem can come in different variants, three of which I shall examine in more detail: the problem of premature knowledge claims, the problem of premature causal claims, and the problem of premature generic generalizations.
借鉴相关替代框架和Mary Kate McGowan在会话计分方面的工作,我认为,在日常语言和公共话语中使用“阴谋论”一词通常需要我称之为不屑一顾的会话练习的表现,这是一种语言行为,其功能是将某些命题排除在(或阻止它们包含在)在给定会话上下文中被认为相关的替代集合中。虽然进行轻蔑的对话练习是合理的,但排除值得认真对待的替代方案可能会因为各种原因而产生很大的问题。首先,它会导致我所说的过早结论的问题,当主体不合理地将某些命题视为无关的,并因此过早地认为某些结论或主张是有根据的。根据结论或主张的类型,这个问题可以有不同的变体,我将更详细地研究其中的三种:过早的知识主张问题,过早的因果主张问题,以及过早的一般概括问题。
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引用次数: 4
The Values of Intellectual Transparency 知识透明的价值
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-12 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2171747
Ryan Byerly
ABSTRACT In a recent book and journal article, I have developed an account of intellectual transparency as an other-regarding intellectual virtue, and have explored its conceptual relationship to the virtue of honesty. This paper aims to further advance understanding of intellectual transparency by examining some of the ways in which the trait is instrumentally valuable. Specifically, I argue that intellectual transparency tends to enhance its possessor’s close personal relationships, work performance, and civic engagement. On account of their intellectual transparency, the intellectually transparent person is likely to enjoy better quality, more satisfied personal relationships such as romantic relationships and friendships. They are likely to contribute to better work outcomes, especially when working in a team context. And, they are likely to be more civically active and to promote epistemic values of democratic deliberation.
在最近的一本书和一篇期刊文章中,我将智力透明描述为一种与他者相关的智力美德,并探讨了其与诚实美德的概念关系。本文旨在通过研究智力透明度具有工具价值的一些方式,进一步推进对智力透明度的理解。具体来说,我认为知识透明倾向于增强其拥有者的亲密个人关系、工作表现和公民参与。由于他们的智力透明,智力透明的人可能会享受更好的质量,更满意的个人关系,如浪漫关系和友谊。他们可能会为更好的工作成果做出贡献,尤其是在团队环境中工作时。而且,他们可能更积极地参与公民活动,并促进民主审议的认知价值。
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引用次数: 0
Promoting Interdisciplinary Research Collaboration: A Systematic Review, a Critical Literature Review, and a Pathway Forward 促进跨学科研究合作:系统综述、批判性文献综述和前进之路
IF 1.7 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pub Date : 2023-02-12 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2172694
J. Newman
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引用次数: 2
期刊
Social Epistemology
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