Pub Date : 2021-07-30DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000079
A. Schaefer, Jineun Sohn
Abstract According to Hobbes, individuals care about their relative standing in a way that shapes their social interactions. To model this aspect of Hobbesian psychology, this paper supposes that agents have social preferences, that is, preferences about their comparative resource holdings. Introducing uncertainty regarding the social preferences of others unleashes a process of trust-unravelling, ultimately leading to Hobbes’s ‘state of war’. This Trust-unravelling Model incorporates important features of Hobbes’s argument that past models ignore.
{"title":"Unravelling into war: trust and social preferences in Hobbes’s state of nature","authors":"A. Schaefer, Jineun Sohn","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000079","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Hobbes, individuals care about their relative standing in a way that shapes their social interactions. To model this aspect of Hobbesian psychology, this paper supposes that agents have social preferences, that is, preferences about their comparative resource holdings. Introducing uncertainty regarding the social preferences of others unleashes a process of trust-unravelling, ultimately leading to Hobbes’s ‘state of war’. This Trust-unravelling Model incorporates important features of Hobbes’s argument that past models ignore.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"171 - 205"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000079","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46122978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-13DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000183
James Christensen, Tom Parr, David V. Axelsen
Abstract In recent years, much public attention has been devoted to the existence of pay discrepancies between men and women at the upper end of the income scale. For example, there has been considerable discussion of the ‘Hollywood gender pay gap’. We can refer to such discrepancies as cases of millionaire inequality. These cases generate conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, the unequal remuneration involved looks like a troubling case of gender injustice. On the other, it’s natural to feel uneasy when confronted with the suggestion that multi-millionaires are somehow being paid inadequately. In this paper, we consider two arguments for rectifying millionaire inequality, clarifying their appeal but also identifying the obstacles that each will have to surmount in order to succeed.
{"title":"Justice for Millionaires?","authors":"James Christensen, Tom Parr, David V. Axelsen","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000183","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years, much public attention has been devoted to the existence of pay discrepancies between men and women at the upper end of the income scale. For example, there has been considerable discussion of the ‘Hollywood gender pay gap’. We can refer to such discrepancies as cases of millionaire inequality. These cases generate conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, the unequal remuneration involved looks like a troubling case of gender injustice. On the other, it’s natural to feel uneasy when confronted with the suggestion that multi-millionaires are somehow being paid inadequately. In this paper, we consider two arguments for rectifying millionaire inequality, clarifying their appeal but also identifying the obstacles that each will have to surmount in order to succeed.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"333 - 353"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000183","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48834084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-07DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000146
H. Stefánsson
Abstract Suppose that a decision-maker’s aim, under certainty, is to maximize some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-maker rationally satisfy what has been called ‘continuity for easy cases’ while at the same time satisfying what seems to be a widespread intuition against the full-blown continuity axiom of expected utility theory? In this note I argue that the answer is ‘no’: given transitivity and a weak trade-off principle, continuity for easy cases violates the anti-continuity intuition. I end the note by exploring an even weaker continuity condition that is consistent with the aforementioned intuition.
{"title":"Continuity and catastrophic risk","authors":"H. Stefánsson","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000146","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Suppose that a decision-maker’s aim, under certainty, is to maximize some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-maker rationally satisfy what has been called ‘continuity for easy cases’ while at the same time satisfying what seems to be a widespread intuition against the full-blown continuity axiom of expected utility theory? In this note I argue that the answer is ‘no’: given transitivity and a weak trade-off principle, continuity for easy cases violates the anti-continuity intuition. I end the note by exploring an even weaker continuity condition that is consistent with the aforementioned intuition.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"266 - 274"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000146","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48145882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1017/s0266267121000158
{"title":"EAP volume 37 issue 2 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0266267121000158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267121000158","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"f1 - f2"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s0266267121000158","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48023197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1017/s026626712100016x
{"title":"EAP volume 37 issue 2 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s026626712100016x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s026626712100016x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"b1 - b5"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s026626712100016x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48997004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-29DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000171
C. Knight
Abstract The standard version of sufficientarianism maintains that providing people with enough, or as close to enough as is possible, is lexically prior to other distributive goals. This article argues that this is excessive – more than distributive justice allows – in four distinct ways. These concern the magnitude of advantage, the number of beneficiaries, responsibility and desert, and above-threshold distribution. Sufficientarians can respond by accepting that providing enough unconditionally is more than distributive justice allows, instead balancing sufficiency against other considerations.
{"title":"Enough is too much: the excessiveness objection to sufficientarianism","authors":"C. Knight","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000171","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The standard version of sufficientarianism maintains that providing people with enough, or as close to enough as is possible, is lexically prior to other distributive goals. This article argues that this is excessive – more than distributive justice allows – in four distinct ways. These concern the magnitude of advantage, the number of beneficiaries, responsibility and desert, and above-threshold distribution. Sufficientarians can respond by accepting that providing enough unconditionally is more than distributive justice allows, instead balancing sufficiency against other considerations.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"275 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000171","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46268618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-28DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000134
Erik Malmqvist
Global Health Impact is based on Hassoun’s broad and extensive scholarship on topics such as global justice, human rights, empirical philosophy and corporate responsibility, and her work as director of the Global Health Impact project (https://www.global-health-impact.org/new), a collaboration between academics and civil society organizations aimed at increasing access to essential medicines. [...]while Hassoun does not reject the global patent system as such, she contends that drug companies exploit this system in ways that violate people’s right to access to essential medicines, e.g. by aggressively extending and multiplying patent protections that keep drugs unaffordable in poor countries and by lobbying against compulsory licensing. [...]she argues that since drug companies contribute to, benefit from and are especially well-placed to address the access to medicines problem, they have a special obligation to address it, an obligation they currently fail to fulfil. [...]the chapter discusses how to collect evidence for other initiatives to improve access to medicines and advance global justice, and why empirical research needs philosophy (and not just the other way around).
{"title":"Global Health Impact: Extending Access to Essential Medicines, Nicole Hassoun . Oxford University Press, 2020, xv + 301 pages.","authors":"Erik Malmqvist","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000134","url":null,"abstract":"Global Health Impact is based on Hassoun’s broad and extensive scholarship on topics such as global justice, human rights, empirical philosophy and corporate responsibility, and her work as director of the Global Health Impact project (https://www.global-health-impact.org/new), a collaboration between academics and civil society organizations aimed at increasing access to essential medicines. [...]while Hassoun does not reject the global patent system as such, she contends that drug companies exploit this system in ways that violate people’s right to access to essential medicines, e.g. by aggressively extending and multiplying patent protections that keep drugs unaffordable in poor countries and by lobbying against compulsory licensing. [...]she argues that since drug companies contribute to, benefit from and are especially well-placed to address the access to medicines problem, they have a special obligation to address it, an obligation they currently fail to fulfil. [...]the chapter discusses how to collect evidence for other initiatives to improve access to medicines and advance global justice, and why empirical research needs philosophy (and not just the other way around).","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"158 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000134","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48553912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-23DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000122
M. Pivato
We have all experienced ‘moral uncertainty’, in the sense of being unsure of the correct morality. Despite such uncertainty, we must make morally loaded decisions. Here is one obvious response: first, identify the moral theory you find the most plausible; then, make decisions as prescribed by this theory. But the monograph under review represents a recent literature that explores a different approach, based on maximizing expected choiceworthiness. For example, suppose I am invited to dinner, and I can order Meat or Tofu. If I order Tofu, it will hurt my host’s feelings. However, I am torn between two moral theories. I assign 95% credence to Theory X, which says it is okay to eat meat. But I assign 5% credence to Theory Y, which says meat is an atrocity. My moral decision problem can be described by the following table.
{"title":"Moral Uncertainty, by William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist and Toby Ord. Oxford University Press, 2020, viii + 226 pages","authors":"M. Pivato","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000122","url":null,"abstract":"We have all experienced ‘moral uncertainty’, in the sense of being unsure of the correct morality. Despite such uncertainty, we must make morally loaded decisions. Here is one obvious response: first, identify the moral theory you find the most plausible; then, make decisions as prescribed by this theory. But the monograph under review represents a recent literature that explores a different approach, based on maximizing expected choiceworthiness. For example, suppose I am invited to dinner, and I can order Meat or Tofu. If I order Tofu, it will hurt my host’s feelings. However, I am torn between two moral theories. I assign 95% credence to Theory X, which says it is okay to eat meat. But I assign 5% credence to Theory Y, which says meat is an atrocity. My moral decision problem can be described by the following table.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"152 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000122","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42289739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000109
S. Segall
Abstract According to the Competing Claims View (CCV) we decide between alternatives by looking at the competing claims held by affected individuals. The strength of these claims is a function of two features: how much they stand to benefit (or lose) by each alternative, and how badly off they would be in its absence. The view can be, and is, endorsed by both egalitarians and prioritarians. For the former the second condition will concern looking at how badly off the person is relative to others, whereas for the latter it will be how badly off she is in absolute terms. In this paper I want to argue that neither should be endorsed. The egalitarian version of CCV breaks down when attempting to assess the competing claims of possible persons who may never exist. Also, the view, on at least one plausible interpretation, leads to intransitive judgements. The prioritarian version of CCV, in turn, is vulnerable to its own unique objection, namely delivering an anti-prioritarian and rather implausible verdict in certain Single Person Cases.
{"title":"Equality or priority about competing claims?","authors":"S. Segall","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000109","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the Competing Claims View (CCV) we decide between alternatives by looking at the competing claims held by affected individuals. The strength of these claims is a function of two features: how much they stand to benefit (or lose) by each alternative, and how badly off they would be in its absence. The view can be, and is, endorsed by both egalitarians and prioritarians. For the former the second condition will concern looking at how badly off the person is relative to others, whereas for the latter it will be how badly off she is in absolute terms. In this paper I want to argue that neither should be endorsed. The egalitarian version of CCV breaks down when attempting to assess the competing claims of possible persons who may never exist. Also, the view, on at least one plausible interpretation, leads to intransitive judgements. The prioritarian version of CCV, in turn, is vulnerable to its own unique objection, namely delivering an anti-prioritarian and rather implausible verdict in certain Single Person Cases.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"242 - 265"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000109","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45949997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000092
Richard Endörfer
Abstract Many proponents of the Harm Principle seem to implicitly assume that the principle is compatible with permitting the free exchange of goods and services, even if such exchanges generate so-called market harms. I argue that, as a result, proponents of the Harm Principle face a dilemma: either the Harm Principle’s domain cannot include a large number of non-market harm cases or market harms must be treated on par with non-market harms. I then go on to discuss three alternative arguments defending the status of market harms as exceptions to the Harm Principle and discuss why these arguments also fail.
{"title":"Should market harms be an exception to the Harm Principle?","authors":"Richard Endörfer","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000092","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many proponents of the Harm Principle seem to implicitly assume that the principle is compatible with permitting the free exchange of goods and services, even if such exchanges generate so-called market harms. I argue that, as a result, proponents of the Harm Principle face a dilemma: either the Harm Principle’s domain cannot include a large number of non-market harm cases or market harms must be treated on par with non-market harms. I then go on to discuss three alternative arguments defending the status of market harms as exceptions to the Harm Principle and discuss why these arguments also fail.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"221 - 241"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000092","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42088618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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