Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1017/s0266267122000232
D. Spears
{"title":"Reply to Aaron: How people respond to the Asymmetry is an empirical question","authors":"D. Spears","doi":"10.1017/s0266267122000232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267122000232","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49238072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1017/s0266267122000177
Jonas H. Aaron
Is the procreation asymmetry intuitively supported? According to a recent article in this journal, an experimental study suggests the opposite. Dean Spears (2020) claims that nearly three-quarters of participants report that there is a reason to create a person just because that person’s life would be happy. In reply, I argue that various confounding factors render the study internally invalid. More generally, I show how one might come to adopt the procreation asymmetry for the wrong reasons by misinterpreting one’s intuitions.
{"title":"Reply to Spears’s ‘The Asymmetry of Population Ethics’","authors":"Jonas H. Aaron","doi":"10.1017/s0266267122000177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267122000177","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Is the procreation asymmetry intuitively supported? According to a recent article in this journal, an experimental study suggests the opposite. Dean Spears (2020) claims that nearly three-quarters of participants report that there is a reason to create a person just because that person’s life would be happy. In reply, I argue that various confounding factors render the study internally invalid. More generally, I show how one might come to adopt the procreation asymmetry for the wrong reasons by misinterpreting one’s intuitions.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46024677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-12DOI: 10.1017/S0266267122000104
Anahí Wiedenbrüg
Stressing both commonalities and changes of the uses to which sovereign debt was put over time, the authors explain how sovereign debt developed into a safe asset and how it contributed to the development of financial markets, and the economy more generally, serving as an important tool for counter-cyclical spending which limited the incidence of economic depressions. Writing about the most recent spike in indebtedness, they acknowledge that running the sort of large, persistent primary surpluses required to bring down the level of indebtedness generated by Covid are rare, that attempting to raise taxes is challenging when the wealthy and their financial assets can move, and that a burst of inflation that liquidates debt burdens seems unlikely in the current context. Despite the difficulties created by unleashing ‘a tsunami of debt’ (199), the authors are adamant that a failure to act in the face of a national emergency – such as a war, a systemic financial crisis or a pandemic –would rob a government of its legitimacy. Collective Action Clauses (CACs) – provisions specifying that a supermajority of bondholders can change the terms of a bond – are also discussed by the authors.
{"title":"In Defense of Public Debt, Barry Eichengreen, Asmaa El-Ganainy, Rui Esteves and Kris James Mitchener. Oxford University Press, 2021, vii + 305 pages.","authors":"Anahí Wiedenbrüg","doi":"10.1017/S0266267122000104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267122000104","url":null,"abstract":"Stressing both commonalities and changes of the uses to which sovereign debt was put over time, the authors explain how sovereign debt developed into a safe asset and how it contributed to the development of financial markets, and the economy more generally, serving as an important tool for counter-cyclical spending which limited the incidence of economic depressions. Writing about the most recent spike in indebtedness, they acknowledge that running the sort of large, persistent primary surpluses required to bring down the level of indebtedness generated by Covid are rare, that attempting to raise taxes is challenging when the wealthy and their financial assets can move, and that a burst of inflation that liquidates debt burdens seems unlikely in the current context. Despite the difficulties created by unleashing ‘a tsunami of debt’ (199), the authors are adamant that a failure to act in the face of a national emergency – such as a war, a systemic financial crisis or a pandemic –would rob a government of its legitimacy. Collective Action Clauses (CACs) – provisions specifying that a supermajority of bondholders can change the terms of a bond – are also discussed by the authors.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"507 - 513"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42261414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-07DOI: 10.1017/S0266267122000207
Laurens van Apeldoorn
ECLAC 2021. Financing for development in the era of COVID-19 and beyond. . Gavras P. 2012. Ratings game. Finance & Development 49, 34–37. Guzmán M., J.A. Ocampo and J.E. Stiglitz, eds. 2016. Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Wertheimer A. 1988. The equalization of legal resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17, 303–322.
{"title":"Taxing Profit in a Global Economy, M. Devereux , A. Auerbach , M. Keen , P. Oosterhuis , W. Schön and J. Vella . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.","authors":"Laurens van Apeldoorn","doi":"10.1017/S0266267122000207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267122000207","url":null,"abstract":"ECLAC 2021. Financing for development in the era of COVID-19 and beyond. <https://repositorio.cepal. org/bitstream/handle/11362/46711/1/S2100063_en.pdf>. Gavras P. 2012. Ratings game. Finance & Development 49, 34–37. Guzmán M., J.A. Ocampo and J.E. Stiglitz, eds. 2016. Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Wertheimer A. 1988. The equalization of legal resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17, 303–322.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"513 - 519"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44706163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-05DOI: 10.1017/s0266267122000116
F. Corvino
In this article I argue that the non-reciprocity problem does not apply to intergenerational justice. Future generations impact, here and now, on the well-being of people now living. I firstly illustrate the economic-synchronic model of direct intergenerational reciprocity (DIR): future generations allow people now living to maintain the economic system future-oriented and capital-preserving. The rational choice for people now living is to guarantee transgenerational sufficiency to future generations. I then analyse the axiological-synchronic model of DIR: future generations give meaning and value to many of the activities that people now living carry out, and this is a compelling reason for the latter to worry about the former. I argue that only the economic-synchronic model of DIR can consistently explain why we need future generations. I conclude by discussing the limits of indirect intergenerational reciprocity.
{"title":"Why we need future generations: a defence of direct intergenerational reciprocity","authors":"F. Corvino","doi":"10.1017/s0266267122000116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267122000116","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article I argue that the non-reciprocity problem does not apply to intergenerational justice. Future generations impact, here and now, on the well-being of people now living. I firstly illustrate the economic-synchronic model of direct intergenerational reciprocity (DIR): future generations allow people now living to maintain the economic system future-oriented and capital-preserving. The rational choice for people now living is to guarantee transgenerational sufficiency to future generations. I then analyse the axiological-synchronic model of DIR: future generations give meaning and value to many of the activities that people now living carry out, and this is a compelling reason for the latter to worry about the former. I argue that only the economic-synchronic model of DIR can consistently explain why we need future generations. I conclude by discussing the limits of indirect intergenerational reciprocity.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42592460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-05DOI: 10.1017/s0266267122000141
Lukas Beck
Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate how structural rationality, in contrast to procedural rationality, allows us to offer an account of the guiding idea behind preference purification that avoids inner rational agents. Afterward, I address two pressing challenges against preference purification that emerge under the structural rationality account.
{"title":"The Econ within or the Econ above? On the plausibility of preference purification","authors":"Lukas Beck","doi":"10.1017/s0266267122000141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267122000141","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate how structural rationality, in contrast to procedural rationality, allows us to offer an account of the guiding idea behind preference purification that avoids inner rational agents. Afterward, I address two pressing challenges against preference purification that emerge under the structural rationality account.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48317539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-05DOI: 10.1017/s026626712200013x
D. Timmer
Carl Knight argues that lexical sufficientarianism, which holds that sufficientarian concerns should have lexical priority over other distributive goals, is ‘excessive’ in many distinct ways and that sufficientarians should either defend weighted sufficientarianism or become prioritarians. In this article, I distinguish three types of weighted sufficientarianism and propose a weighted sufficientarian view that meets the excessiveness objection and is preferable to both Knight’s proposal and prioritarianism. More specifically, I defend a multi-threshold view which gives weighted priority to benefits directly above and below its thresholds, but gives benefits below the lowest threshold lexical priority over benefits above the highest threshold.
{"title":"Weighted sufficientarianisms: Carl Knight on the excessiveness objection","authors":"D. Timmer","doi":"10.1017/s026626712200013x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s026626712200013x","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Carl Knight argues that lexical sufficientarianism, which holds that sufficientarian concerns should have lexical priority over other distributive goals, is ‘excessive’ in many distinct ways and that sufficientarians should either defend weighted sufficientarianism or become prioritarians. In this article, I distinguish three types of weighted sufficientarianism and propose a weighted sufficientarian view that meets the excessiveness objection and is preferable to both Knight’s proposal and prioritarianism. More specifically, I defend a multi-threshold view which gives weighted priority to benefits directly above and below its thresholds, but gives benefits below the lowest threshold lexical priority over benefits above the highest threshold.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47245912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-31DOI: 10.1017/S0266267122000128
Donald Franklin
Abstract Even where willingness-to-pay as a measure of welfare impact is adjusted for diminishing marginal utility, welfare economics is shown to favour policies that add to the life expectancy or that enhance the quality of life of persons who are already better-off. I propose an alternative, Equal Respect methodology, under an axiomatic claim that at the point of decision the prospective life years of all individuals are of equal intrinsic social value. This justifies equal valuation of risk mitigation across all persons; similarly, all appraised impacts should be scaled to accord equal respect to difficult but no-less-valuable lives.
{"title":"Respecting equality in economic option appraisal: valuing the time of your life","authors":"Donald Franklin","doi":"10.1017/S0266267122000128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267122000128","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Even where willingness-to-pay as a measure of welfare impact is adjusted for diminishing marginal utility, welfare economics is shown to favour policies that add to the life expectancy or that enhance the quality of life of persons who are already better-off. I propose an alternative, Equal Respect methodology, under an axiomatic claim that at the point of decision the prospective life years of all individuals are of equal intrinsic social value. This justifies equal valuation of risk mitigation across all persons; similarly, all appraised impacts should be scaled to accord equal respect to difficult but no-less-valuable lives.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"416 - 449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46756322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-24DOI: 10.1017/S0266267122000219
Joseph Mazor
Abstract This article introduces an intuitive conservation dilemma called the Canyon Dilemma: Is it possible to condemn the mining of the Grand Canyon, even by a poor generation, while also permitting this generation’s mining of an unremarkable small canyon? It then argues that not one of several prominent theories of environmental justice, including various forms of egalitarianism, welfarism, deep-ecological theories, communitarianism and free-market environmentalism, can navigate this dilemma. The article concludes by highlighting the dilemma-navigating potential of the equal-claims idea – the idea that the natural world is something to which every human being, present and future, has an equal, substantive claim.
{"title":"On environmental justice, Part I: an intuitive conservation dilemma","authors":"Joseph Mazor","doi":"10.1017/S0266267122000219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267122000219","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article introduces an intuitive conservation dilemma called the Canyon Dilemma: Is it possible to condemn the mining of the Grand Canyon, even by a poor generation, while also permitting this generation’s mining of an unremarkable small canyon? It then argues that not one of several prominent theories of environmental justice, including various forms of egalitarianism, welfarism, deep-ecological theories, communitarianism and free-market environmentalism, can navigate this dilemma. The article concludes by highlighting the dilemma-navigating potential of the equal-claims idea – the idea that the natural world is something to which every human being, present and future, has an equal, substantive claim.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"39 1","pages":"230 - 255"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46475921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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