Pub Date : 2021-12-27DOI: 10.1017/S026626712100033X
G. Keeling
Abstract This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally inadequate. The upshot of the dilemma is that one of the most influential accounts of how reasons accrue to determine what we ought to do is flawed.
{"title":"A dilemma for reasons additivity","authors":"G. Keeling","doi":"10.1017/S026626712100033X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S026626712100033X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally inadequate. The upshot of the dilemma is that one of the most influential accounts of how reasons accrue to determine what we ought to do is flawed.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"39 1","pages":"20 - 42"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41356333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-22DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000262
Nils Springhorn
Abstract Need-based justice is an important ingredient for a pluralistic theory of justice. But how can need-based justice be measured? I will argue that need-based justice cannot be measured by measuring need-satisfaction. This is because need-based justice does not only depend on need-satisfaction, but also on opportunities to avoid or at least mitigate undersupply. Depending on these opportunities, one and the same degree of undersupply can be unjust to different degrees. In this article, I establish a number of desiderata that a measure of need-based justice has to comply with. Resulting measures treat avoidable undersupply as the main source of injustice.
{"title":"On the measurement of need-based justice","authors":"Nils Springhorn","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000262","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Need-based justice is an important ingredient for a pluralistic theory of justice. But how can need-based justice be measured? I will argue that need-based justice cannot be measured by measuring need-satisfaction. This is because need-based justice does not only depend on need-satisfaction, but also on opportunities to avoid or at least mitigate undersupply. Depending on these opportunities, one and the same degree of undersupply can be unjust to different degrees. In this article, I establish a number of desiderata that a measure of need-based justice has to comply with. Resulting measures treat avoidable undersupply as the main source of injustice.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"466 - 500"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45076092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-22DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000249
Ittay Nissan-Rozen
In recent years a growing number of philosophers have started working on normative questions related to what may be called ‘pure’ attitudes risk. Pure attitudes to risk are attitudes to risk that cannot be reduced to attitudes to certain states of affairs, but rather are directed to the risk itself. Although such attitudes have gained much attention by economists, psychologists and philosophers in the past, most (but certainly not all) of this attention was directed at descriptive questions. The current trend in the literature deals explicitly with normative questions. Paul Weirich’s new book constitutes a deep and comprehensive major contribution to this new line of literature. It also constitutes a very unique such contribution. I will point to two different – but related – senses in which this is the case, but before doing so it will be instructive to first cover some necessary background. Although this goes against the spirit of his book (as will soon become clear), in order to understand the differences between Weirich’s account and other contemporary accounts, it will be useful to adopt, at the outset, a characterization of attitudes to risk in terms of preferences over risky options. Consider an agent who faces a decision between two gambles whose possible outcomes are different quantities of some divisible good, G. The two gambles have the same expectation in terms of G, but different variances.1 We can say that the agent is risk-averse with respect to G if she prefers the gamble with the lower variance, risk-seeking if she prefers the gamble with the higher variance and risk-neutral if she is indifferent between the gambles. For example, consider an agent who faces a choice between a certain 100 units of G (gamble A) and a gamble that gives 200 units of G with probability 0.5 and nothing with probability 0.5 (gamble B). A risk-averse agent (with respect to G) prefers A to B, a risk-seeking agent prefers B to A and a risk-neutral agent is indifferent between the two gambles. We can distinguish between three types of explanations for risk-aversion and risk-seeking with respect to G (for convenience let us concentrate on riskaversion, though).2 First, the agent might be risk-averse with respect to G (in the sense explicated above) because she values every additional unit of G in a marginally decreasing (increasing in the case of risk-seeking) way. If the agent
{"title":"Rational Responses to Risk, Paul Weirich. Oxford University Press, 2020, xi + 269 pages.","authors":"Ittay Nissan-Rozen","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000249","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years a growing number of philosophers have started working on normative questions related to what may be called ‘pure’ attitudes risk. Pure attitudes to risk are attitudes to risk that cannot be reduced to attitudes to certain states of affairs, but rather are directed to the risk itself. Although such attitudes have gained much attention by economists, psychologists and philosophers in the past, most (but certainly not all) of this attention was directed at descriptive questions. The current trend in the literature deals explicitly with normative questions. Paul Weirich’s new book constitutes a deep and comprehensive major contribution to this new line of literature. It also constitutes a very unique such contribution. I will point to two different – but related – senses in which this is the case, but before doing so it will be instructive to first cover some necessary background. Although this goes against the spirit of his book (as will soon become clear), in order to understand the differences between Weirich’s account and other contemporary accounts, it will be useful to adopt, at the outset, a characterization of attitudes to risk in terms of preferences over risky options. Consider an agent who faces a decision between two gambles whose possible outcomes are different quantities of some divisible good, G. The two gambles have the same expectation in terms of G, but different variances.1 We can say that the agent is risk-averse with respect to G if she prefers the gamble with the lower variance, risk-seeking if she prefers the gamble with the higher variance and risk-neutral if she is indifferent between the gambles. For example, consider an agent who faces a choice between a certain 100 units of G (gamble A) and a gamble that gives 200 units of G with probability 0.5 and nothing with probability 0.5 (gamble B). A risk-averse agent (with respect to G) prefers A to B, a risk-seeking agent prefers B to A and a risk-neutral agent is indifferent between the two gambles. We can distinguish between three types of explanations for risk-aversion and risk-seeking with respect to G (for convenience let us concentrate on riskaversion, though).2 First, the agent might be risk-averse with respect to G (in the sense explicated above) because she values every additional unit of G in a marginally decreasing (increasing in the case of risk-seeking) way. If the agent","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"309 - 314"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41825429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-21DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000316
Fay Niker
current research focuses on the intersection of philosophy of economics, political philosophy, and social epistemology, with a particular focus on the way in which economic expertise informs public policy.
{"title":"Frame It Again: New Tools for Rational Decision-Making, José Luis Bermúdez. Cambridge University Press, 2020, x + 330 pages.","authors":"Fay Niker","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000316","url":null,"abstract":"current research focuses on the intersection of philosophy of economics, political philosophy, and social epistemology, with a particular focus on the way in which economic expertise informs public policy.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"320 - 326"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45974128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-21DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000304
G. Contessa
The book is well-written, well-structured (if a bit repetitive), and, surprisingly, even entertaining. [...]taken with a pinch of salt, it might even disabuse its less knowledgeable readers of some basic misunderstandings about public finance. [...]Kelton approvingly quotes former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan, who during a 2005 congressional hearing on the financial sustainability of the US Social Security system, responded to Former House Representative Paul Ryan’s worry about the Social Security system becoming insolvent by saying that ‘there’s nothing to prevent the federal government from creating as much money as it wants and paying it to somebody’ (182). According to MMT, those limits are primarily a function of the economy’s capacity to put the newly issued money to productive use. According to MMT, the point of taxing or borrowing is not to collect revenues to finance government spending (after all the government could ‘print’ all the money it needs).
{"title":"The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People’s Economy, Stephanie Kelton. Public Affairs, 2020, 325 pages.","authors":"G. Contessa","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000304","url":null,"abstract":"The book is well-written, well-structured (if a bit repetitive), and, surprisingly, even entertaining. [...]taken with a pinch of salt, it might even disabuse its less knowledgeable readers of some basic misunderstandings about public finance. [...]Kelton approvingly quotes former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan, who during a 2005 congressional hearing on the financial sustainability of the US Social Security system, responded to Former House Representative Paul Ryan’s worry about the Social Security system becoming insolvent by saying that ‘there’s nothing to prevent the federal government from creating as much money as it wants and paying it to somebody’ (182). According to MMT, those limits are primarily a function of the economy’s capacity to put the newly issued money to productive use. According to MMT, the point of taxing or borrowing is not to collect revenues to finance government spending (after all the government could ‘print’ all the money it needs).","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"315 - 320"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41953427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s0266267121000274
Cambridge Core For further information about this journal please go to the journal website at: cambridge.org/eap Articles Elizabeth Brake Price gouging and the duty of easy rescue 329 Gabriele Contessa Inductive risk in macroeconomics: Natural Rate Theory, monetary policy, and the Great Canadian Slump 353 Vaughn Bryan Baltzly Concerning publicized goods (or, the promiscuity of the public goods argument) 376 Bas van der Vossen Property, the environment, and the Lockean Proviso 395 H ein Duijf Cooperation, fairness and team reasoning 413 Keith A. Markus Causal effects and counterfactual conditionals: contrasting Rubin, Lewis and Pearl 441 Kian Mintz-Woo and Justin Leroux What do climate change winners owe, and to whom? 462
剑桥核心欲了解更多关于该杂志的信息，请访问该杂志网站：Cambridge.org/eap Articles Elizabeth Brake价格欺诈和轻松救援的责任329 Gabriele Contessa宏观经济学中的归纳风险：自然利率理论、货币政策，和加拿大大贫民窟353 Vaughn Bryan Baltzly关于公共产品（或公共产品论点的混乱）376 Bas van der Vossen财产、环境和Lockean Proviso 395在Duijf合作、公平和团队推理413 Keith A.Markus因果效应和反事实条件：对比Rubin，Lewis和Pearl 441 Kian Mintz Woo和Justin Leroux气候变化获奖者欠谁什么？462
{"title":"EAP volume 37 issue 3 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0266267121000274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267121000274","url":null,"abstract":"Cambridge Core For further information about this journal please go to the journal website at: cambridge.org/eap Articles Elizabeth Brake Price gouging and the duty of easy rescue 329 Gabriele Contessa Inductive risk in macroeconomics: Natural Rate Theory, monetary policy, and the Great Canadian Slump 353 Vaughn Bryan Baltzly Concerning publicized goods (or, the promiscuity of the public goods argument) 376 Bas van der Vossen Property, the environment, and the Lockean Proviso 395 H ein Duijf Cooperation, fairness and team reasoning 413 Keith A. Markus Causal effects and counterfactual conditionals: contrasting Rubin, Lewis and Pearl 441 Kian Mintz-Woo and Justin Leroux What do climate change winners owe, and to whom? 462","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":"f1 - f2"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42049700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s0266267121000286
{"title":"EAP volume 37 issue 3 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0266267121000286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267121000286","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"b1 - b6"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47495908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-06DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000213
E. Thornley
Abstract Lexical views in population axiology can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without violating Transitivity or Separability. However, they imply a dilemma: either some good life is better than any number of slightly worse lives, or else the ‘at least as good as’ relation on populations is radically incomplete. In this paper, I argue that Archimedean views face an analogous dilemma. I thus conclude that the lexical dilemma gives us little reason to prefer Archimedean views. Even if we give up on lexicality, problems of the same kind remain.
{"title":"A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiology","authors":"E. Thornley","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000213","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Lexical views in population axiology can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without violating Transitivity or Separability. However, they imply a dilemma: either some good life is better than any number of slightly worse lives, or else the ‘at least as good as’ relation on populations is radically incomplete. In this paper, I argue that Archimedean views face an analogous dilemma. I thus conclude that the lexical dilemma gives us little reason to prefer Archimedean views. Even if we give up on lexicality, problems of the same kind remain.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"395 - 415"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42450049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-31DOI: 10.1017/S0266267121000195
F. Hindriks
Abstract Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate institutions with behavioural regularities. In contrast, rule theories explicate them in terms of a standard that people are supposed to meet. I propose that, when an institution is weak, a discrepancy exists between the regularity and the standard or rule. To capture this discrepancy, I present a hybrid theory, the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. According to this theory, institutions are rule-governed behavioural regularities. The Rules-and-Equilibria Theory provides the basis for two measures of institutional strength. First, institutions that pertain to coordination games solve problems of information. Their strength is primarily a matter of the expected degree of compliance. Second, institutions that concern mixed-motive games solve problems of motivation. Their strength can be measured in terms of the weight people attribute to its rule.
{"title":"Institutions and their strength","authors":"F. Hindriks","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000195","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate institutions with behavioural regularities. In contrast, rule theories explicate them in terms of a standard that people are supposed to meet. I propose that, when an institution is weak, a discrepancy exists between the regularity and the standard or rule. To capture this discrepancy, I present a hybrid theory, the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. According to this theory, institutions are rule-governed behavioural regularities. The Rules-and-Equilibria Theory provides the basis for two measures of institutional strength. First, institutions that pertain to coordination games solve problems of information. Their strength is primarily a matter of the expected degree of compliance. Second, institutions that concern mixed-motive games solve problems of motivation. Their strength can be measured in terms of the weight people attribute to its rule.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"354 - 371"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45115227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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