Pub Date : 2023-06-15DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000196
Lukas Beck
{"title":"The Tragic Science: How Economists Cause Harm (even as They Aspire to Do Good). George F. DeMartino. University of Chicago Press. xi + 265 pages","authors":"Lukas Beck","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000196","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49395490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000159
Han van Wietmarschen
This article explains how social norms can help to distinguish and understand a range of different kinds of social inequality and social hierarchy. My aim is to show how the literature on social norms can provide crucial resources to relational egalitarianism, which has made social equality and inequality into a central topic of contemporary normative political theorizing. The hope is that a more discriminating and detailed picture of different kinds of social inequality will help relational egalitarians move beyond a discussion of the justice or injustice of social equality as a single general category.
{"title":"Stratified social norms","authors":"Han van Wietmarschen","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000159","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explains how social norms can help to distinguish and understand a range of different kinds of social inequality and social hierarchy. My aim is to show how the literature on social norms can provide crucial resources to relational egalitarianism, which has made social equality and inequality into a central topic of contemporary normative political theorizing. The hope is that a more discriminating and detailed picture of different kinds of social inequality will help relational egalitarians move beyond a discussion of the justice or injustice of social equality as a single general category.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42819392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vanessa Morton, Meghan Hamel, Vicky Ng, Susan Gilmour, Fernando Alvarez, Marina I Salvadori
An increase in severe acute hepatitis of unknown etiology was first reported in the United Kingdom in April 2022. Following this report, the Public Health Agency of Canada connected with three paediatric liver transplant centres across Canada to determine if an increase in liver transplants was noted. Data demonstrated no observable increase in the number of transplants conducted in 2022. These data in conjunction with a federal, provincial, territorial investigation provided insight into the situation in Canada.
{"title":"Investigation of acute severe hepatitis in children: A review of liver transplant data, Canada, 2021-2022.","authors":"Vanessa Morton, Meghan Hamel, Vicky Ng, Susan Gilmour, Fernando Alvarez, Marina I Salvadori","doi":"10.14745/ccdr.v49i06a01","DOIUrl":"10.14745/ccdr.v49i06a01","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>An increase in severe acute hepatitis of unknown etiology was first reported in the United Kingdom in April 2022. Following this report, the Public Health Agency of Canada connected with three paediatric liver transplant centres across Canada to determine if an increase in liver transplants was noted. Data demonstrated no observable increase in the number of transplants conducted in 2022. These data in conjunction with a federal, provincial, territorial investigation provided insight into the situation in Canada.</p>","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":"253-255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10907058/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78913068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000172
Douglas MacKay, Alexandria Huber-Disla
Soda taxes are controversial. While proponents point to their potential health benefits and the public projects that could be funded with their revenue, critics argue that they are paternalistic and regressive. In this paper, we explore the prospects for designing a just soda tax, one that appropriately balances the often-competing ethical considerations of promoting social welfare, respecting people’s autonomy and ensuring distributive fairness. We argue that policymakers have several paths forward for designing a just soda tax, but that the considerations relevant to ethical policy design are more complicated than is sometimes acknowledged.
{"title":"Designing a just soda tax","authors":"Douglas MacKay, Alexandria Huber-Disla","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000172","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Soda taxes are controversial. While proponents point to their potential health benefits and the public projects that could be funded with their revenue, critics argue that they are paternalistic and regressive. In this paper, we explore the prospects for designing a just soda tax, one that appropriately balances the often-competing ethical considerations of promoting social welfare, respecting people’s autonomy and ensuring distributive fairness. We argue that policymakers have several paths forward for designing a just soda tax, but that the considerations relevant to ethical policy design are more complicated than is sometimes acknowledged.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48768231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-19DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000020
F. Dietrich, A. Staras, R. Sugden
We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values and intentions. We define three ‘logical’ conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions such as preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome’s programme ‘rationality through reasoning’, we formally characterize how you can (not) become more logical by reasoning. Our analysis connects rationality with logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology.
{"title":"Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes","authors":"F. Dietrich, A. Staras, R. Sugden","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values and intentions. We define three ‘logical’ conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions such as preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome’s programme ‘rationality through reasoning’, we formally characterize how you can (not) become more logical by reasoning. Our analysis connects rationality with logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43857310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000147
J. Thoma
{"title":"Reply to Hausman","authors":"J. Thoma","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000147","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43985801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1017/s0266267122000311
D. Hausman
In Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, I argued, among other things, that preferences in economics are and ought to be total subjective comparative evaluations, that the theory of rational choice is a reformulation of everyday folk-psychological explanations and predictions of behaviour, and that revealed preference theory is completely untenable. All three of these theses have been challenged in essays by Erik Angner (2018), Francesco Guala (2019) and Johanna Thoma (2021a, 2021b). This essay responds to these criticisms and defends these three theses.
在《偏好、价值、选择和福利》一书中，我认为，经济学中的偏好是而且应该是完全主观的比较评估，理性选择理论是对日常的民间心理学解释和行为预测的重新表述，而揭示的偏好理论是完全站不住脚的。Erik Angner (2018)， Francesco Guala(2019)和Johanna Thoma (2021a, 2021b)的文章对这三个论点都提出了挑战。本文回应了这些批评，并为这三个论点进行了辩护。
{"title":"Subjective total comparative evaluations","authors":"D. Hausman","doi":"10.1017/s0266267122000311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267122000311","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, I argued, among other things, that preferences in economics are and ought to be total subjective comparative evaluations, that the theory of rational choice is a reformulation of everyday folk-psychological explanations and predictions of behaviour, and that revealed preference theory is completely untenable. All three of these theses have been challenged in essays by Erik Angner (2018), Francesco Guala (2019) and Johanna Thoma (2021a, 2021b). This essay responds to these criticisms and defends these three theses.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46054347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000123
Ivan Mitrouchev, V. Buonomo
Multiple selves is a conventional assumption in behavioural welfare economics for modelling intrapersonal well-being. Yet an important question is which self has normative authority over others. In this paper, we advance an argument for what we call the ‘ontological approach’ to personal identity in behavioural welfare economics. According to this approach, ethical questions – such as which preference should be granted normative authority over another – can be informed by the ontological criterion of personal persistence, which aims at determining what it takes for an individual to persist from one time to another.
{"title":"Identity, ethics and behavioural welfare economics","authors":"Ivan Mitrouchev, V. Buonomo","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000123","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Multiple selves is a conventional assumption in behavioural welfare economics for modelling intrapersonal well-being. Yet an important question is which self has normative authority over others. In this paper, we advance an argument for what we call the ‘ontological approach’ to personal identity in behavioural welfare economics. According to this approach, ethical questions – such as which preference should be granted normative authority over another – can be informed by the ontological criterion of personal persistence, which aims at determining what it takes for an individual to persist from one time to another.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43726363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-14DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000093
Ivan Moscati
Abstract I examine some behavioural and heuristic models of individual decision-making and argue that the diverse psychological mechanisms these models posit are too demanding to be implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, by actual decision makers. Accordingly, and contrary to what their advocates typically claim, behavioural and heuristic models are best understood as ‘as-if’ models. I then sketch a version of scientific antirealism that justifies the practice of as-if modelling in decision theory but goes beyond traditional instrumentalism. Finally, I relate my account of decision models to the recent controversy about mentalism versus behaviourism, reject both positions, and offer an alternative view.
{"title":"Behavioural and heuristic models are as-if models too – and that’s ok","authors":"Ivan Moscati","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000093","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I examine some behavioural and heuristic models of individual decision-making and argue that the diverse psychological mechanisms these models posit are too demanding to be implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, by actual decision makers. Accordingly, and contrary to what their advocates typically claim, behavioural and heuristic models are best understood as ‘as-if’ models. I then sketch a version of scientific antirealism that justifies the practice of as-if modelling in decision theory but goes beyond traditional instrumentalism. Finally, I relate my account of decision models to the recent controversy about mentalism versus behaviourism, reject both positions, and offer an alternative view.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134998891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-30DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000044
Joaquín Paseyro Mayol, Edoardo Peruzzi
{"title":"The Profit Paradox: How Thriving Firms Threaten the Future of Work, Jan Eeckhout. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021, viii + 327 pages.","authors":"Joaquín Paseyro Mayol, Edoardo Peruzzi","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000044","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"39 1","pages":"338 - 343"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41850116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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