Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2020.1943200
Zoe Williams, R. Aron, L. Strauss
{"title":"Index to Vol. 32 (2020)","authors":"Zoe Williams, R. Aron, L. Strauss","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2020.1943200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1943200","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"593 - 594"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2020.1943200","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41845457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2020.1891761
A. Craiutu
ABSTRACT Jeremy Waldron has argued that Berlin ignored the importance of institutions and constitutions and worked with an impoverished conception of social and political design. Political structures, legal and political institutions, constitutional design, mechanisms of representation and the rule of law: all this remained untouched by Berlin, who seemed, in Waldron’s opinion, largely uninterested in the actual political institutions of liberal society. In this essay, I argue that what may be missing in Berlin—close and sustained attention to, and interest in, institutions and social context—can be found in the works of his prominent contemporary, Raymond Aron (1905-1983), who also wrote about liberty during the Cold War. As such, Aron’s An Essay on Liberty can and should be read as a complement to Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty.”
{"title":"In Search of the Decent Society: Isaiah Berlin and Raymond Aron on Liberty","authors":"A. Craiutu","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2020.1891761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1891761","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Jeremy Waldron has argued that Berlin ignored the importance of institutions and constitutions and worked with an impoverished conception of social and political design. Political structures, legal and political institutions, constitutional design, mechanisms of representation and the rule of law: all this remained untouched by Berlin, who seemed, in Waldron’s opinion, largely uninterested in the actual political institutions of liberal society. In this essay, I argue that what may be missing in Berlin—close and sustained attention to, and interest in, institutions and social context—can be found in the works of his prominent contemporary, Raymond Aron (1905-1983), who also wrote about liberty during the Cold War. As such, Aron’s An Essay on Liberty can and should be read as a complement to Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty.”","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"407 - 433"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2020.1891761","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42110105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2021.1898129
G. Thomas
ABSTRACT Returning to Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” offers a defense of liberal democracy that can help us come to terms with its limits, as well as the implicit tradeoffs that are an inescapable feature of politics in a liberal democracy. While critics of Berlin are right to note his neglect of Enlightenment constitutionalism, his skeptical liberalism is illuminated by comparative constitutional law, where we see how different constitutional regimes balance different values—such as democracy, liberty, and equality—in different ways that are attuned to the particulars of place and history that both Berlin and critics of liberalism insist are so important.
{"title":"Two Cheers for “Two Concepts”: Isaiah Berlin’s Skeptical, Tragic Liberalism","authors":"G. Thomas","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2021.1898129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2021.1898129","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Returning to Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” offers a defense of liberal democracy that can help us come to terms with its limits, as well as the implicit tradeoffs that are an inescapable feature of politics in a liberal democracy. While critics of Berlin are right to note his neglect of Enlightenment constitutionalism, his skeptical liberalism is illuminated by comparative constitutional law, where we see how different constitutional regimes balance different values—such as democracy, liberty, and equality—in different ways that are attuned to the particulars of place and history that both Berlin and critics of liberalism insist are so important.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"574 - 592"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2021.1898129","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42572237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2020.1942424
Shterna Friedman
ABSTRACT Isaiah Berlin viewed value conflict as tragic, as it requires the sacrifice of some values for others. It is a mark of maturity, he thought, to accept this tragic truth. This view raises certain conceptual problems that can be attributed to Berlin’s subtle departures from the German authors (Kant, Schelling, and Hegel) who originated the doctrine of tragic maturity—figures who had, in turn, transformed the earlier idea that enlightenment is a natural and morally neutral process of maturation. Kant moralized the notion of enlightened maturation by portraying it as contingent on our courage to bring it about, such that we are responsible if we remain immature. This theory of maturity rested on the idea, which would have been uncongenial to Berlin, that we are intelligible creatures inhabiting the noumenal realm, duty bound to exercise moral freedom, even though this duty surpasses our ability to carry it out, as we also inhabit the phenomenal realm, where our natural inclinations tend to make us resist laboring to fulfill our duties. However, according to Kant, the metaphysical limitations we face as individuals can be transcended to an extent, allowing us to make moral progress as a species—so long as we do not lazily persist in our immaturity. Schelling built upon Kant’s notion of freedom to bring out the tragic and heroic dimension of individual moral life, where the tragedy is our doomed but noble struggle to exert moral freedom in a world of natural necessity. Hegel turned these metaphysical notions in a more recognizably Berlinian direction by extending Schelling’s account of tragic conflict to conflicts of values. But he identified the ultimate tragic hero as an ethical totality that enacts eternal justice by reconciling such conflicts, while Berlin attempted to repudiate both the notion of a historical totality and the possibility of reconciliation on empirical grounds, even though these are metaphysical claims. Thus, Berlin asserted the absolute, trans-historical necessity of tragic value conflict, while the evidence for this assertion was merely his personal conviction that in his particular time and place, specific values were, as a matter of empirical fact, tragically irreconcilable. In this manner he illicitly portrayed Cold War value pluralists (such as himself) as courageously accepting the tragic inevitability of value conflict, while Marxists, the legatees of Hegel and thus German Idealism, immaturely shrank from this reality by embracing the fantasy of total reconciliation.
{"title":"German Idealism and Tragic Maturity","authors":"Shterna Friedman","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2020.1942424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1942424","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Isaiah Berlin viewed value conflict as tragic, as it requires the sacrifice of some values for others. It is a mark of maturity, he thought, to accept this tragic truth. This view raises certain conceptual problems that can be attributed to Berlin’s subtle departures from the German authors (Kant, Schelling, and Hegel) who originated the doctrine of tragic maturity—figures who had, in turn, transformed the earlier idea that enlightenment is a natural and morally neutral process of maturation. Kant moralized the notion of enlightened maturation by portraying it as contingent on our courage to bring it about, such that we are responsible if we remain immature. This theory of maturity rested on the idea, which would have been uncongenial to Berlin, that we are intelligible creatures inhabiting the noumenal realm, duty bound to exercise moral freedom, even though this duty surpasses our ability to carry it out, as we also inhabit the phenomenal realm, where our natural inclinations tend to make us resist laboring to fulfill our duties. However, according to Kant, the metaphysical limitations we face as individuals can be transcended to an extent, allowing us to make moral progress as a species—so long as we do not lazily persist in our immaturity. Schelling built upon Kant’s notion of freedom to bring out the tragic and heroic dimension of individual moral life, where the tragedy is our doomed but noble struggle to exert moral freedom in a world of natural necessity. Hegel turned these metaphysical notions in a more recognizably Berlinian direction by extending Schelling’s account of tragic conflict to conflicts of values. But he identified the ultimate tragic hero as an ethical totality that enacts eternal justice by reconciling such conflicts, while Berlin attempted to repudiate both the notion of a historical totality and the possibility of reconciliation on empirical grounds, even though these are metaphysical claims. Thus, Berlin asserted the absolute, trans-historical necessity of tragic value conflict, while the evidence for this assertion was merely his personal conviction that in his particular time and place, specific values were, as a matter of empirical fact, tragically irreconcilable. In this manner he illicitly portrayed Cold War value pluralists (such as himself) as courageously accepting the tragic inevitability of value conflict, while Marxists, the legatees of Hegel and thus German Idealism, immaturely shrank from this reality by embracing the fantasy of total reconciliation.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"458 - 492"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2020.1942424","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44282183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2020.1894013
George Crowder
ABSTRACT Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” is clearly set within a Cold War context. However, its framework of ideas is also applicable to a range of twenty-first century social and political issues. First, Berlin’s “inversion thesis” concerning liberty captures a salient pattern of thought in radical Islamism. Second, his understanding of the power of belonging and recognition bears significantly on the rise of authoritarian nationalism and populism. Third, his value pluralism implies a critique of global neoliberalism and support for egalitarian liberalism or social democracy. Thus, Berlin’s framework provides us with a set of useful tools for understanding and responding to some of the most urgent political problems that trouble us now. But this framework has limitations and needs to be supplemented by thinking that goes beyond Berlin.
{"title":"Beyond the Cold War: Isaiah Berlin for the Twenty-First Century","authors":"George Crowder","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2020.1894013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1894013","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” is clearly set within a Cold War context. However, its framework of ideas is also applicable to a range of twenty-first century social and political issues. First, Berlin’s “inversion thesis” concerning liberty captures a salient pattern of thought in radical Islamism. Second, his understanding of the power of belonging and recognition bears significantly on the rise of authoritarian nationalism and populism. Third, his value pluralism implies a critique of global neoliberalism and support for egalitarian liberalism or social democracy. Thus, Berlin’s framework provides us with a set of useful tools for understanding and responding to some of the most urgent political problems that trouble us now. But this framework has limitations and needs to be supplemented by thinking that goes beyond Berlin.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"434 - 457"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2020.1894013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49534546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2021.1938403
Seth Lobis
ABSTRACT Isaiah Berlin makes two brief references to John Milton in the essay he strategically titled “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life.” The references establish a contrast between Milton and Mill by associating Milton with moral monism and Mill with its opposite, value pluralism. Yet a careful reading of Milton’s Areopagitica, cited dismissively in the essay, reveals the inadequacy of Berlin’s intellectual-historical account of the two concepts, which he presents as fully distinct and diametrically opposed. Although still heuristically valuable, Berlin’s account warrants historiographic revision and refinement, as his treatments of both Milton and Mill make apparent.
{"title":"Milton, Mill, and Berlin’s History of Monism and Pluralism","authors":"Seth Lobis","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2021.1938403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2021.1938403","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Isaiah Berlin makes two brief references to John Milton in the essay he strategically titled “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life.” The references establish a contrast between Milton and Mill by associating Milton with moral monism and Mill with its opposite, value pluralism. Yet a careful reading of Milton’s Areopagitica, cited dismissively in the essay, reveals the inadequacy of Berlin’s intellectual-historical account of the two concepts, which he presents as fully distinct and diametrically opposed. Although still heuristically valuable, Berlin’s account warrants historiographic revision and refinement, as his treatments of both Milton and Mill make apparent.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"493 - 516"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2021.1938403","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47356570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2020.1891705
Steven R. B. Smith
ABSTRACT Berlin and Strauss shared surprisingly compatible views about four matters of great importance. The first is the need for political philosophy, which Berlin traced to value pluralism and Strauss to the inherent incompleteness and contestability of our knowledge of politics, due to its comprehensive nature. Second, Berlin and Strauss each opposed social-scientific positivism: Berlin, because it contradicts human freedom and responsibility; Strauss, because it depends on an untenable and nihilistic distinction between facts and values. Third, both philosophers wished to place, in the ground currently occupied by positivist political science, the study of statecraft, embodied in such figures as Churchill and FDR. Finally, Berlin and Strauss agreed on what characterizes such statesmen: an intuitive, pretheoretical practical judgment of political particulars.
{"title":"Isaiah Berlin and Leo Strauss: Notes Toward a Dialogue","authors":"Steven R. B. Smith","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2020.1891705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1891705","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Berlin and Strauss shared surprisingly compatible views about four matters of great importance. The first is the need for political philosophy, which Berlin traced to value pluralism and Strauss to the inherent incompleteness and contestability of our knowledge of politics, due to its comprehensive nature. Second, Berlin and Strauss each opposed social-scientific positivism: Berlin, because it contradicts human freedom and responsibility; Strauss, because it depends on an untenable and nihilistic distinction between facts and values. Third, both philosophers wished to place, in the ground currently occupied by positivist political science, the study of statecraft, embodied in such figures as Churchill and FDR. Finally, Berlin and Strauss agreed on what characterizes such statesmen: an intuitive, pretheoretical practical judgment of political particulars.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"539 - 555"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2020.1891705","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41925679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2020.1893498
Sonu Bedi
ABSTRACT Because of the irresolvable disagreement between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, the U.S. Constitution both embodies value pluralism and has encouraged it ever since its adoption. Rather than ignoring the nation-centered, dynamic ideas of the Federalists or the state-centered, static ideas of the Anti-Federalists, the Constitution incorporated both views, giving rise to plentiful opportunities for interpretive disagreements that have not, however, stood in the way of the interpreters’ shared commitment to the document itself. In this respect, the Constitution and constitutional law model the politics of pluralism.
{"title":"The Pluralist Constitution","authors":"Sonu Bedi","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2020.1893498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1893498","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Because of the irresolvable disagreement between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, the U.S. Constitution both embodies value pluralism and has encouraged it ever since its adoption. Rather than ignoring the nation-centered, dynamic ideas of the Federalists or the state-centered, static ideas of the Anti-Federalists, the Constitution incorporated both views, giving rise to plentiful opportunities for interpretive disagreements that have not, however, stood in the way of the interpreters’ shared commitment to the document itself. In this respect, the Constitution and constitutional law model the politics of pluralism.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"369 - 380"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2020.1893498","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46895267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2020.1851480
Kevin J. Elliott
ABSTRACT Jeffrey Friedman’s Power Without Knowledge provides not only a critique of technocracy but a compelling story about the intimate relationship between three of today’s most important political phenomena: populism, technocracy, and democracy. In contrast to many recent accounts that treat populism as a backlash against technocracy, Friedman’s theory suggests that populism is a lineal descendent of technocracy, with which it shares substantial intellectual DNA. Friedman’s implicit theory of populism helps to explain many of its core features, including its political stances, emotionality, and hostility to mediating institutions, in interpretively charitable ways. Central to Friedman’s analysis is the importance of political epistemology, which supplies key connective tissue between the three phenomena. The relations between technocracy, democracy, and populism revealed by Friedman’s theory generate both enlightening and disturbing implications for democratic theory.
{"title":"A Family Affair: Populism, Technocracy, and Political Epistemology","authors":"Kevin J. Elliott","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2020.1851480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1851480","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Jeffrey Friedman’s Power Without Knowledge provides not only a critique of technocracy but a compelling story about the intimate relationship between three of today’s most important political phenomena: populism, technocracy, and democracy. In contrast to many recent accounts that treat populism as a backlash against technocracy, Friedman’s theory suggests that populism is a lineal descendent of technocracy, with which it shares substantial intellectual DNA. Friedman’s implicit theory of populism helps to explain many of its core features, including its political stances, emotionality, and hostility to mediating institutions, in interpretively charitable ways. Central to Friedman’s analysis is the importance of political epistemology, which supplies key connective tissue between the three phenomena. The relations between technocracy, democracy, and populism revealed by Friedman’s theory generate both enlightening and disturbing implications for democratic theory.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"85 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2020.1851480","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41467566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2020.1857610
Alfred Moore
ABSTRACT Technocracy is a contested concept, but it is typically associated with the exercise of political power justified by claims to expertise, and is often contrasted with populist forms of politics. In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman reframes the concept of technocracy as a form of politics oriented to solving social and economic problems, and thereby extends it to cover not only epistemic elites but ordinary people. This move usefully challenges the simplistic framing of populism and technocracy as opposites, but at the expense of effacing other dimensions of democratic politics. Friedman also suggests that maximizing individuals’ exit opportunities will allow them to take advantage of their relatively reliable personal knowledge. The architecture of “exitocracy” would itself, however, be designed by experts who, as such, might be tempted to insulate the institutional architecture they design against democratic interference.
{"title":"Architects and Engineers: Two Types of Technocrat and Their Relation to Democracy","authors":"Alfred Moore","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2020.1857610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2020.1857610","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Technocracy is a contested concept, but it is typically associated with the exercise of political power justified by claims to expertise, and is often contrasted with populist forms of politics. In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman reframes the concept of technocracy as a form of politics oriented to solving social and economic problems, and thereby extends it to cover not only epistemic elites but ordinary people. This move usefully challenges the simplistic framing of populism and technocracy as opposites, but at the expense of effacing other dimensions of democratic politics. Friedman also suggests that maximizing individuals’ exit opportunities will allow them to take advantage of their relatively reliable personal knowledge. The architecture of “exitocracy” would itself, however, be designed by experts who, as such, might be tempted to insulate the institutional architecture they design against democratic interference.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"164 - 181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2020.1857610","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42338521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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