Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1708563
Peregrine Schwartz-Shea
ABSTRACT Interpretive social science consists of researchers’ interpretations of actors’ interpretations. Bevir and Blakely’s anti-naturalist approach truncates this double hermeneutic, neglecting how researcher identity affects knowledge-making. Moreover, by disappearing methodology and treating methods as neutral tools, the authors miss the significance of methodological practice. In their treatment, an anti-naturalist philosophy is sufficient to produce high-quality interpretive research, even when the methods used are those of large-N statistics or other variables-based approaches. Unfortunately, then, the book is unlikely to create more space for research alternatives to the naturalism that the authors seek to unseat.
{"title":"Scholarly Reflexivity, Methodological Practice, and Bevir and Blakely's Anti-Naturalism","authors":"Peregrine Schwartz-Shea","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1708563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1708563","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Interpretive social science consists of researchers’ interpretations of actors’ interpretations. Bevir and Blakely’s anti-naturalist approach truncates this double hermeneutic, neglecting how researcher identity affects knowledge-making. Moreover, by disappearing methodology and treating methods as neutral tools, the authors miss the significance of methodological practice. In their treatment, an anti-naturalist philosophy is sufficient to produce high-quality interpretive research, even when the methods used are those of large-N statistics or other variables-based approaches. Unfortunately, then, the book is unlikely to create more space for research alternatives to the naturalism that the authors seek to unseat.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"462 - 480"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1708563","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47181292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-02DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1671681
Ronald S. Beiner
ABSTRACT Donald Trump’s thinking is too erratic and scattershot to count as a real system of ideas. Steve Bannon’s version of populism seems significantly more focused, more self-conscious, and hence more open to theory-based critical analysis, which this paper attempts to provide. That is not at all to say, however, that Bannon’s ideas achieve intellectual coherence or consistency. Close examination of the defining components of his worldview suggest the opposite. Still, engagement with contemporary right-populism cannot, or should not, avoid Bannon and his attempts to cook up a new ideology.
{"title":"The Plague of Bannonism","authors":"Ronald S. Beiner","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1671681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1671681","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Donald Trump’s thinking is too erratic and scattershot to count as a real system of ideas. Steve Bannon’s version of populism seems significantly more focused, more self-conscious, and hence more open to theory-based critical analysis, which this paper attempts to provide. That is not at all to say, however, that Bannon’s ideas achieve intellectual coherence or consistency. Close examination of the defining components of his worldview suggest the opposite. Still, engagement with contemporary right-populism cannot, or should not, avoid Bannon and his attempts to cook up a new ideology.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"300 - 314"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1671681","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47758087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-25DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1647679
S. Goodman
ABSTRACT The politics of populism is the politics of belonging. It reflects a deep challenge to the liberal democratic state, which attempts to maintain social boundaries (as an imperative of state capacity) but also allow immigration. Boundaries—established through citizenship and norms of belonging—must be both coherent and malleable. Changes to boundaries become sites of contestation for exclusionary populists in the putative interest of “legitimate” citizens. Populism is an inevitable response to liberal democratic adjustment; any liberal democracy that redefines citizenship opens itself to populist challenge.
{"title":"Liberal Democracy, National Identity Boundaries, and Populist Entry Points","authors":"S. Goodman","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1647679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1647679","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The politics of populism is the politics of belonging. It reflects a deep challenge to the liberal democratic state, which attempts to maintain social boundaries (as an imperative of state capacity) but also allow immigration. Boundaries—established through citizenship and norms of belonging—must be both coherent and malleable. Changes to boundaries become sites of contestation for exclusionary populists in the putative interest of “legitimate” citizens. Populism is an inevitable response to liberal democratic adjustment; any liberal democracy that redefines citizenship opens itself to populist challenge.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"377 - 388"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1647679","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46804837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-24DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1649880
J. Bailey
ABSTRACT Populism raises questions about the extent to which public opinion should be a legitimate foundation for executive power. In the United States, it is often thought, such a foundation was established at the beginning of the twentieth century through the creation of a newly “representative” modern presidency (one that enabled the president to represent the popular will). This new presidency, it is held, acts as an agent of populist majorities to undermine constitutional and legal norms. In fact, however, the argument for presidential representation is a long-standing element of politics in the United States. It is appealed to, recurrently, by what might be called the party of opinion against its natural opponent, the party of law.
{"title":"Populism and Presidential Representation","authors":"J. Bailey","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1649880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1649880","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Populism raises questions about the extent to which public opinion should be a legitimate foundation for executive power. In the United States, it is often thought, such a foundation was established at the beginning of the twentieth century through the creation of a newly “representative” modern presidency (one that enabled the president to represent the popular will). This new presidency, it is held, acts as an agent of populist majorities to undermine constitutional and legal norms. In fact, however, the argument for presidential representation is a long-standing element of politics in the United States. It is appealed to, recurrently, by what might be called the party of opinion against its natural opponent, the party of law.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"267 - 277"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1649880","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47765490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-27DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1647956
H. Appel
ABSTRACT The EU’s activation of Article 7 procedures against Hungary and Poland signals that it is beginning to take seriously the illiberal turn in Central Europe. However, the likelihood that the EU can restrain populist and illiberal tendencies in Hungary and Poland in the near future is slim. Despite the efficacy of the EU and other international organizations in promoting liberalism in these countries in the past, similar efforts are hobbled by a lack of political will and by significant bureaucratic hurdles. The impetus to protect the liberal institutions and practices developed after the collapse of communism must come from the combined efforts of additional external actors and, most of all, by strong pressure from below.
{"title":"Can the EU Stop Eastern Europe's Illiberal Turn?","authors":"H. Appel","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1647956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1647956","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The EU’s activation of Article 7 procedures against Hungary and Poland signals that it is beginning to take seriously the illiberal turn in Central Europe. However, the likelihood that the EU can restrain populist and illiberal tendencies in Hungary and Poland in the near future is slim. Despite the efficacy of the EU and other international organizations in promoting liberalism in these countries in the past, similar efforts are hobbled by a lack of political will and by significant bureaucratic hurdles. The impetus to protect the liberal institutions and practices developed after the collapse of communism must come from the combined efforts of additional external actors and, most of all, by strong pressure from below.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"255 - 266"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1647956","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48225330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1688520
Donal Khosrowi, J. Reiss
ABSTRACT Acceding to the demand that public policy should be based on “the best available evidence” can come at significant moral cost. Important policy questions cannot be addressed using “the best available evidence” as defined by the evidence-based policy paradigm; the paradigm can change the meaning of questions so that they can be addressed using the preferred kind of evidence; and important evidence that does not meet the standard defined by the paradigm can get ignored. We illustrate these problems in three contexts of evidence-based policy.
{"title":"Evidence-Based Policy: The Tension Between the Epistemic and the Normative","authors":"Donal Khosrowi, J. Reiss","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1688520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1688520","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Acceding to the demand that public policy should be based on “the best available evidence” can come at significant moral cost. Important policy questions cannot be addressed using “the best available evidence” as defined by the evidence-based policy paradigm; the paradigm can change the meaning of questions so that they can be addressed using the preferred kind of evidence; and important evidence that does not meet the standard defined by the paradigm can get ignored. We illustrate these problems in three contexts of evidence-based policy.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"179 - 197"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1688520","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48104778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1677300
A. Pluta
ABSTRACT Charles U. Zug, following Jeffrey Tulis’s The Rhetorical Presidency (1987), argues that the original design of the Constitution constrained presidents from cultivating a relationship with the American public. In reality, though, presidents are opportunistic politicians who always look for new ways to reach the public in order to gain political advantage and nurture their relationship with the people. In this effort they have often made use of new communication technologies, such that what may look like radical twentieth-century departures from previous understandings of the constitutional place of the president are actually continuous with attempts by presidents from Washington forward to engage in what was—in line with contemporaneous understandings of political issues—persuasive communication designed to influence public policy.
{"title":"The Timelessly Rhetorical Presidency: Reply to Zug","authors":"A. Pluta","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1677300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1677300","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Charles U. Zug, following Jeffrey Tulis’s The Rhetorical Presidency (1987), argues that the original design of the Constitution constrained presidents from cultivating a relationship with the American public. In reality, though, presidents are opportunistic politicians who always look for new ways to reach the public in order to gain political advantage and nurture their relationship with the people. In this effort they have often made use of new communication technologies, such that what may look like radical twentieth-century departures from previous understandings of the constitutional place of the president are actually continuous with attempts by presidents from Washington forward to engage in what was—in line with contemporaneous understandings of political issues—persuasive communication designed to influence public policy.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"230 - 241"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1677300","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44042475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1700036
Guive Assadi
ABSTRACT R. G. Collingwood is mostly remembered for his theory that historical understanding consists in re-enacting the thoughts of the historical figure whom one is studying. His first recognizable expression of this view followed from an argument about the emptiness of psychological interpretations of religion, and throughout his career Collingwood offered history as re-enactment as an alternative to psychology. Over time, his argument that the psychology of religion could not be relevant to the veracity of religious beliefs was supplanted by the argument that psychology is self-undermining because the psychologist’s procedure of attributing beliefs to blind psychic needs could apply just as easily to the psychologist him- or herself. As an alternative to what he took to be the self-defeating psychological position, Collingwood put forward the study of the development of beliefs as the motivations for actions, which led him to his views that “all history is the history of thought” and that, in order to understand an historical event, we must mentally re-enact the thoughts that stood behind it.
{"title":"History Against Psychology in the Thought of R. G. Collingwood","authors":"Guive Assadi","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1700036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1700036","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT R. G. Collingwood is mostly remembered for his theory that historical understanding consists in re-enacting the thoughts of the historical figure whom one is studying. His first recognizable expression of this view followed from an argument about the emptiness of psychological interpretations of religion, and throughout his career Collingwood offered history as re-enactment as an alternative to psychology. Over time, his argument that the psychology of religion could not be relevant to the veracity of religious beliefs was supplanted by the argument that psychology is self-undermining because the psychologist’s procedure of attributing beliefs to blind psychic needs could apply just as easily to the psychologist him- or herself. As an alternative to what he took to be the self-defeating psychological position, Collingwood put forward the study of the development of beliefs as the motivations for actions, which led him to his views that “all history is the history of thought” and that, in order to understand an historical event, we must mentally re-enact the thoughts that stood behind it.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"135 - 159"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1700036","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47610816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1690223
M. Wattenberg
ABSTRACT The proportion of the American electorate that is “constrained” by ideology has risen dramatically since Philip E. Converse suggested, in the early 1960s, that ideology is the province of only a small fraction of the mass public. In part, the rise of ideological voters has been obscured by the tendency of scholars after Converse to equate them with those who use terms referring to ideological concepts, such as liberal and conservative, in open-ended interviews. These “concept ideologues,” however, are not the only members of the public whose political opinions show evidence of ideological constraint. There is also a growing segment of the public, the “policy ideologues,” who take positions on three or more policy issues but do not happen to mention ideological concepts. Policy ideologues prove to be as politically knowledgeable as concept ideologues; their attitudes are nearly as constrained across issues and over time; and their policy stances usually “make sense” as liberal or conservative—not surprisingly, as they are almost as willing as concept ideologues to label themselves ideologically, when asked. By 2012, the portion of the public consisting of concept and policy ideologues had reached 42 percent. It declined to 38 percent in 2016, but was still a far cry from the 12 percent of the electorate whom Converse identified as ideologues or near ideologues as of 1956.
{"title":"The Changing Nature of Mass Belief Systems: The Rise of Concept and Policy Ideologues","authors":"M. Wattenberg","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1690223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1690223","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The proportion of the American electorate that is “constrained” by ideology has risen dramatically since Philip E. Converse suggested, in the early 1960s, that ideology is the province of only a small fraction of the mass public. In part, the rise of ideological voters has been obscured by the tendency of scholars after Converse to equate them with those who use terms referring to ideological concepts, such as liberal and conservative, in open-ended interviews. These “concept ideologues,” however, are not the only members of the public whose political opinions show evidence of ideological constraint. There is also a growing segment of the public, the “policy ideologues,” who take positions on three or more policy issues but do not happen to mention ideological concepts. Policy ideologues prove to be as politically knowledgeable as concept ideologues; their attitudes are nearly as constrained across issues and over time; and their policy stances usually “make sense” as liberal or conservative—not surprisingly, as they are almost as willing as concept ideologues to label themselves ideologically, when asked. By 2012, the portion of the public consisting of concept and policy ideologues had reached 42 percent. It declined to 38 percent in 2016, but was still a far cry from the 12 percent of the electorate whom Converse identified as ideologues or near ideologues as of 1956.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"198 - 229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1690223","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46021635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-03DOI: 10.1080/08913811.2019.1690220
Charles U. Zug
ABSTRACT Anne C. Pluta’s reply to my critique perpetuates the errors that undermined the article I criticized. Pluta dismisses out of hand my suggestion that her mistakes are the result of the particular lens through which she and much of the political science community view the American presidency. Yet this suggestion has the merit of explaining why she contends that piling up nineteenth-century instances of presidential public “speech” undermines Jeffrey Tulis’s contention that the nature of presidential speech changed decisively at the beginning of the twentieth century, such that rhetorical, often-demagogic appeals over the heads of Congress displaced public speech that affirmed the values of republican, constitutional government.
{"title":"Diagnosing the Blinding Effects of Trumpism: Rejoinder to Pluta","authors":"Charles U. Zug","doi":"10.1080/08913811.2019.1690220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1690220","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Anne C. Pluta’s reply to my critique perpetuates the errors that undermined the article I criticized. Pluta dismisses out of hand my suggestion that her mistakes are the result of the particular lens through which she and much of the political science community view the American presidency. Yet this suggestion has the merit of explaining why she contends that piling up nineteenth-century instances of presidential public “speech” undermines Jeffrey Tulis’s contention that the nature of presidential speech changed decisively at the beginning of the twentieth century, such that rhetorical, often-demagogic appeals over the heads of Congress displaced public speech that affirmed the values of republican, constitutional government.","PeriodicalId":51723,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review","volume":"31 1","pages":"242 - 254"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08913811.2019.1690220","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47886279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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