Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2272052
Taliah L. Powers
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
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{"title":"Return of the Grasshopper: Games, Leisure, and the Good Life in the Third Millennium <b>Return of the Grasshopper: Games, Leisure, and the Good Life in the Third Millennium</b> , by Bernard Suits (edited by Christopher C. Yorke and Francisco Javier López Frías), illustrated by Paul Hammond, (Ethics and Sport Series), London and New York, Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group), 2022, 190 pp., (paperback, 22 B/W Illustrations), $48.95 (paperback), $170.00 (hardback), $48.95 (ebook), ISBN 978-1-…","authors":"Taliah L. Powers","doi":"10.1080/17511321.2023.2272052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2023.2272052","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":51786,"journal":{"name":"Sport Ethics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135778506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2265070
Aurélien Daudi
Epitomized in the bodily exhibitions of ‘fitspiration’, photo-based social media is biased toward self-beautification and glorification of reality. Meanwhile, evidence is growing of psychological side effects connected to this ‘pictorial turn’ in our communication. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche poses the question how ugliness and discord can produce aesthetic pleasure. This paper proceeds from an inverse relationship and examines why glorification of appearances and conspicuous beauty fails to do the same, and even compounds suffering. Drawing on the Apollo-Dionysus dualism undergirding Nietzsche’s aesthetic philosophy, I posit a deeper relation between the saturation of visual self-exhibitionism typified in fitspiration and its empirical effects. Concentrating on the medium and self-representational photograph, I argue that Instagram is primarily an instrument of Apolline artifice and that the pictorial turn which defines the present centers Apolline mediation to the detrimental exclusion of meaningful communion with its Dionysiac antithesis. For users immersed in this Apolline sphere of visual self-representation, a fractured existence beholden to conditions of the image ensues—comprising surface-level appearances, deification of the moment, and loss of existential sustenance through myth. By positioning fitspiration not as an aberration but as the logical conclusion of the medium’s intrinsic Apolline property, it becomes a litmus test of the entire visual landscape and illustrative of the implications that uncritical participation in it may bring.
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Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2266581
Matthew C. Altman
ABSTRACTTwo of the major arguments against performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs), appealing to fairness and the protection of athletes’ health, have serious flaws. First, there is no relevant moral distinction between the use of PEDs and the use of other performance enhancers that introduce unfairness and that we accept nonetheless. Second, prohibiting PEDs for athletes’ own good ignores the fact that adult athletes are constantly making tradeoffs to improve performance and pursue excellence, including sacrificing their health. We should not paternalistically impose our values on them. On the other side, arguments to allow ‘safe’ PEDs provide no normative criterion to determine the acceptable level of risk, thus begging the question. The reasonable athlete argument solves both sets of problems: it justifies a ban on some performance-enhancing drugs based on health and fairness, while avoiding paternalism, and it also establishes a non-arbitrary standard to determine which drugs ought to be allowed. First, if unsafe PEDs were allowed, some athletes would refuse to take them out of concern for their health. This is a reasonable decision even though it would put them at a competitive disadvantage against athletes who choose to use unsafe PEDs. It would be unfair for clean athletes to suffer a competitive disadvantage for acting reasonably. Therefore, PEDs that pose significant health risks should be prohibited for all athletes. Second, it would be unreasonable for athletes to refuse, on principle, relatively safe and effective PEDs, so a blanket prohibition is also unjustified. Which drugs and which doses to allow should be determined not by athletes’ actual choices but by the hypothetical choices of the reasonable athlete. The resulting sport-specific drug policy would carve a justifiable middle path between complete prohibition and complete permission.KEYWORDS: Performance-enhancing drugsdopingfairnesscoercionsteroids AcknowledgmentsI am grateful to Cynthia Coe and Lou Matz for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The two reviewers for Sport, Ethics and Philosophy also provided valuable suggestions as I revised the article for publication.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Some philosophers have questioned whether elite athletes are in fact fully free. For example, Murray (Citation1983), Fraleigh (Citation1985), and Holowchak (Citation2000) claim that they are coerced—forced to choose either to harm themselves, lower expectations, or quit the sport; and pressured by team owners and fans—and are thus not in control of their choices regarding PEDs. Brown (Citation1985a) and Veber (Citation2014) challenge that idea, claiming that the athlete’s situation is not coercive, or coercive enough, for them to be in need of protection against their own decisions. Saying that someone must do something dangerous to compete at the highest levels, such as the McTwist maneuver in skateboarding, is not coercive,
{"title":"Reframing the Debate over Performance-Enhancing Drugs: The Reasonable Athlete Argument","authors":"Matthew C. Altman","doi":"10.1080/17511321.2023.2266581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2023.2266581","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTTwo of the major arguments against performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs), appealing to fairness and the protection of athletes’ health, have serious flaws. First, there is no relevant moral distinction between the use of PEDs and the use of other performance enhancers that introduce unfairness and that we accept nonetheless. Second, prohibiting PEDs for athletes’ own good ignores the fact that adult athletes are constantly making tradeoffs to improve performance and pursue excellence, including sacrificing their health. We should not paternalistically impose our values on them. On the other side, arguments to allow ‘safe’ PEDs provide no normative criterion to determine the acceptable level of risk, thus begging the question. The reasonable athlete argument solves both sets of problems: it justifies a ban on some performance-enhancing drugs based on health and fairness, while avoiding paternalism, and it also establishes a non-arbitrary standard to determine which drugs ought to be allowed. First, if unsafe PEDs were allowed, some athletes would refuse to take them out of concern for their health. This is a reasonable decision even though it would put them at a competitive disadvantage against athletes who choose to use unsafe PEDs. It would be unfair for clean athletes to suffer a competitive disadvantage for acting reasonably. Therefore, PEDs that pose significant health risks should be prohibited for all athletes. Second, it would be unreasonable for athletes to refuse, on principle, relatively safe and effective PEDs, so a blanket prohibition is also unjustified. Which drugs and which doses to allow should be determined not by athletes’ actual choices but by the hypothetical choices of the reasonable athlete. The resulting sport-specific drug policy would carve a justifiable middle path between complete prohibition and complete permission.KEYWORDS: Performance-enhancing drugsdopingfairnesscoercionsteroids AcknowledgmentsI am grateful to Cynthia Coe and Lou Matz for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The two reviewers for Sport, Ethics and Philosophy also provided valuable suggestions as I revised the article for publication.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Some philosophers have questioned whether elite athletes are in fact fully free. For example, Murray (Citation1983), Fraleigh (Citation1985), and Holowchak (Citation2000) claim that they are coerced—forced to choose either to harm themselves, lower expectations, or quit the sport; and pressured by team owners and fans—and are thus not in control of their choices regarding PEDs. Brown (Citation1985a) and Veber (Citation2014) challenge that idea, claiming that the athlete’s situation is not coercive, or coercive enough, for them to be in need of protection against their own decisions. Saying that someone must do something dangerous to compete at the highest levels, such as the McTwist maneuver in skateboarding, is not coercive, ","PeriodicalId":51786,"journal":{"name":"Sport Ethics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135094569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-30DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2260116
Michael Hemmingsen
ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that philosophers of sport should avoid value-laden definitions of sport; that is, they should avoid building into the definition of sport that they are inherently worthwhile activities. Sports may very well often be worthwhile as a contingent matter, but this should not be taken to be a core feature included in the definition of sport. I start by outlining what I call the ‘legitimacy-conferring’ element of the category ‘sport’. I then argue that we ought not to include such a dimension in our definition of sport, on the grounds that it confuses issues of description with issues of definition: the issue of what sport does with what sport is. Following this, I consider a Wittgensteinian family resemblance approach to defining sport; Kevin Schieman’s argument that sports are necessarily good games; and the oft-cited wide-following and institutional criteria, as arguments for including an evaluative dimension in the definition of sport. I conclude that none succeed, for similar reasons: they either fail to track our common sense intuitions about what does or does not count as a sport; and/or they make it impossible for us to ever describe something a ‘bad’ sport (or instance of sport). Just as a good definition of, say, art, shouldn’t make it impossible for us to describe something as ‘bad art’, I argue that our definition of sport shouldn’t build in a necessarily positive evaluation. I conclude by discussing some of the practical reasons why supporters of activities about which there is currently debate as to their status as sports might want to see those activities included under the sports umbrella, but suggest that this on its own isn’t a good reason for modifying a philosophical definition of sport to include them.KEYWORDS: value-neutraldefining sportlegitimacy AcknowledgmentsI would like to thank Don Oxtoby for his comments on a draft of this paper, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Realising that you made a definitional mistake like this is not the same as extending a chain of family resemblances. Whereas extending a chain of family resemblances continues to take the original feature as definitionally central to some instances of sport—s1, say, even if we now realise that it doesn’t apply to s2, s3, etc., – realising that you’ve made a definitional mistake is a matter of appreciating that you should never have taken that element to be definitionally important in the first place.2. Again putting aside the question of physicality, which is important to Schieman’s definition, but somewhat tangential to our discussion here.
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Pub Date : 2023-09-22DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2260112
Francisco Javier Lopez Frias, Cesar R. Torres
ABSTRACTIn a previous paper entitled ‘Beyond Physiology: Embodied Experience, Embodied Advantage, and the Inclusion of Transgender Athletes in Competitive Sport,’ we claim that analyses of the inclusion or exclusion of transgender athletes in competitive sport must go beyond physiological criteria and incorporate the notions of embodied experience and embodied advantage. Our stance has recently been challenged as impractical and excessively exclusionary. In this paper, we address these challenges and build upon them to expand on the policy implications of our original framework, highlighting that embodied experience and embodied advantage heavily influence athletic performance. We differentiate competitive fairness from justice to, with an emphasis on the inclusion of transgender women in competitive sport, formulate a justice-based argument for maximizing inclusion. Afterward, we identify ideal and nonideal policy recommendations connected to our analysis of embodied experience and embodied advantage. We ultimately advocate for a qualified inclusion that assesses potential residual (physiological and embodied) advantages while striving for justice and competitive fairness.KEYWORDS: transgender athletesembodied experienceinclusion, justicecompetitive fairness Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Birrell and Cole (Citation1990) and, among others, Herman (Citation1976) and Lautens (Citation1976).2. Moreover, one may wonder whether philosophy by itself can make sound contributions to policymaking (Wolff Citation2019).3. We acknowledge that Loland’s account of competitive fairness, especially his distinction between stable and dynamic conditions, clashes with some of the policy recommendations reviewed below. However, it is possible to draw on Loland’s fair play opportunity principle without also accepting (some of) his further refinements and applications of the notion. See Camporesi (Citation2020); Camporesi and Hämäläinen (Citation2021); Hämäläinen (Citation2012).4. Also see Berg (Citation2015), (Citation2018).5. One year after the publication of English’s work, Iris Marion Young (Citation1979), another feminist philosopher who formulated a justice-based argument for sex segregation in sport, expanded on this argument. By drawing on Simone de Beauvoir, she argued that sport engagement allows individuals to flourish. Thus, a lack of participation in sport prevents them from developing capacities crucial to leading fully human lives. For an analysis of feminist approaches to sport, see Burke Citation2015.6. This concept also plays a key role in the works of Young (Citation1979). For a detailed analysis of this concept, see Falbo (Citation2008).7. As Schultz et al. (Citation2022) expound, data from communities with transgender inclusive policies indicate that ‘the inclusion of trans athletes at the high school level has had no negative impact on sport participation or athletic achievements fo
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Pub Date : 2023-09-21DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2260567
Tom Brock
This article identifies the benefits of adopting a critical realist ontology to researching esports in the social sciences. The article outlines some of the challenges in researching esports, paying particular attention to the emerging specialisms and sub-disciplines. The article suggests that different schools of thought have different ontological and epistemological commitments, resulting in a complex and somewhat fragmented or contested set of definitions and research directives. The article considers how the philosophy of science can enable researchers to gain a more complete understanding and appreciation of esports. More specifically, the article outlines some of the central philosophical commitments of critical realism and considers their benefits for researching the multi-layered and multifaceted nature of esports. What results is a stratified ontology of esports, in which various biological, psychological and sociological factors interact to produce emergent outcomes at micro, meso and macro levels of causality. Such an interdisciplinary approach resists previous attempts to reduce esports research to singular (and competing) epistemological claims. Instead, this article invites sports researchers to investigate the complex ways natural and social factors interact to generate and change esports structures, institutions and agential behaviours.
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Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2259620
Neslihan Filiz
ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to analyze the possibility of ‘authenticity’, in other words, ‘authentic being’ in sports, based on the ideas in Heidegger’s Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). In order to do that, I firstly explain Dasein and its existentialia (which are significant for this paper: being-in-the-world, thrownness, understanding, attunement, and possibilities), the concept of ‘care’, and Heideggerian understanding of authenticity. Then, I examine the possibilities of authenticity in sports participation, and I look at some related studies analyzing the Heideggerian take on authenticity in sports. Finally, considering human existence (i.e. Dasein) within the sportsworld, I describe some possibilities for an authentic being to reveal itself, even for a short moment, such as ‘the realization of our finitude’ (by confronting death, especially in extreme sports); ‘coping with failure or loss (by facing with the call of conscience)’; ‘anxiety of losing the familiarity to the world’ (non-skillful coping in sports) and anxiety accompanying the realization of being-in-the-sportsworld’ (They-self vs. One-Self as an athlete) etc.KEYWORDS: Heideggersportsauthenticityauthentic being AcknowledgmentsI really appreciate Assoc. Prof. Dr. Irena Parry Martínková and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. This article was partially submitted as a presentation at the 11th Czech Philosophy of Sport Conference.2. Heidegger uses the term ‘Dasein’ to address the being of human beings (or i.e. human existence). It is the central concept used in B&T which is wisely-chosen by Heidegger to denote that only human beings have the the possibility of an existential understanding of ‘what it means to exist’ by way of self-relation and its relation to other beings. Moreover, Dasein is the entity which makes its very Being an issue (and the meaning of Being) and so, cares.3. ‘existentialia’ i.e. the existential structures of Dasein. HEIDEGGER (Citation2001, §9, 71) states that “Existentialia andcategories are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively: any entity is either a ‘who’ (existence) or a ‘what’ (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense)”. Therefore, we need existentialia to interpret the Being of Dasein, its existence.4. Here, it is significant to distinguish what ontological (i.e. ontologico-existential) and ontical (ontico-existentiell) inquiries mean. In the footnote of their translation of B&T, Macquarrie & Robinson define the terms as follows: the ontical one is “concerned with the entities and the facts about them and the ontological one is ‘concerned primarily with Being’5. As the translators of B&T, Macquarrie and Robinson, clarified in a footnote that the German Stimmung is ‘the usual word for one’s mood or humour’ and they prefer to translat
摘要本文旨在从海德格尔的《存在与时间》(Sein und Zeit)的观点出发，分析体育运动中“本真”即“本真存在”的可能性。为了做到这一点，我首先解释此在及其存在性(这对本文来说很重要:在世界中存在、抛掷、理解、调和和可能性)、“关心”的概念，以及海德格尔对真实性的理解。然后，我考察了真实性在体育参与中的可能性，我看了一些相关的研究，分析海德格尔对体育真实性的看法。最后，考虑到体育世界中的人类存在(即此在)，我描述了一些真实存在揭示自身的可能性，即使是短暂的时刻，例如“实现我们的有限性”(通过面对死亡，特别是在极限运动中);“面对失败或损失(通过面对良心的召唤)”;“对世界失去熟悉感的焦虑”(运动中的非熟练应对)和“在运动世界中存在的焦虑”(作为运动员的自我vs.自我)等。关键词:海德格尔体育真实性真实性认同我很欣赏协会Irena Parry博士教授Martínková和两位匿名评论者的宝贵意见。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。这篇文章的一部分是作为第11届捷克体育哲学会议的报告提交的。海德格尔使用“此在”一词来表述人的存在(即人的存在)。这是海德格尔明智地选择在《理性与批判》中使用的中心概念，以表示只有人类才有可能通过自我关系及其与其他存在的关系来理解“存在的意义”。而且，此在是一个实体，它使它的存在本身成为一个问题(和存在的意义)。存在主义，即此在的存在结构。海德格尔(Citation2001，§9,71)指出:“存在性和范畴是存在的两种基本可能性。与它们相对应的实体分别需要不同类型的初级讯问:任何实体要么是‘谁’(存在)，要么是‘什么’(最广义上的在场)”。因此，我们需要存在主义来解释此在的存在，即它的存在。在这里，区分本体论(即本体论-存在主义)和本体论(即本体论-存在主义)调查的含义是很重要的。在翻译《B&T》的脚注中，麦考瑞和罗宾逊对这两个术语的定义如下:本体论“关注实体和关于实体的事实”，而本体论“主要关注存在”。正如《B&T》的译者麦考瑞和罗宾逊在脚注中澄清的那样，德语Stimmung是“一个人的情绪或幽默的常用词汇”，他们更愿意把它翻译成“情绪”。同样，他们将Gestimmtsein翻译为“与北京和谐”，将Befindlichkeit翻译为“精神状态”。然而，他们警告我们，“of-mind”属于英语成语，在德语单词“of-mind”的结构中没有对应的字面意思。有些作家在谈论“协调”的存在主义时使用Stimmung，有些使用Befindlichkeit，这就是为什么我把两个德语单词都放在括号里。在拉丁语中，它的意思是“独自一人”或“独自一人”。关于规则的进一步讨论，可以看《The Grasshopper of Suits》，第6章:Ivan和abdul。另一方面，埃德加(Citation2013)声称，当运动员和观众的全部注意力集中在创造表演的动作和材料上时，体育有可能使人类及其世界摆脱器质性的干扰。1. 目标很明确。2. 反馈是即时的。3.技能匹配挑战。4. 专注是深度的。5. 问题被遗忘了。6. 控制是可能的。7. 自我意识消失。时间的感觉被改变了。9. 这种体验会自动消失。德雷福斯在他的技能模型中试图表明，最高水平的技能如何表现出越来越无意识和自动的行为形式。专家只是采取行动。他们不需要进行反思性和主题性的思考。身体最清楚。大脑中的平行网络完成了这项工作”(Breivik Citation2007 p.132)。事实上，Breivik在他进一步的文章《危险的元素游戏:走向冒险运动的现象学》中也对其他一些冒险运动做了这样的分析。GORICHANAZ (Citation2019)解释说，在某个时候决定不继续跑步和停止跑步不仅是一种DNF，而且还会出现急性症状，经历精神衰竭，速度太慢。在某些情况下，官员们也会做出这样的决定，为特定的超级马拉松运动员结束比赛。 本研究由土耳其科学技术研究委员会在TUBITAK-2219土耳其公民国际博士后研究奖学金项目下支持。
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Pub Date : 2023-09-14DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2256985
Jacob Kornbeck
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1. The planners hadn’t yet reached today’s belief in banning cars from city centres, but rather took the functional separation of Le Corbusier to the next stage, by sending cars underground and reserving the open spaces for pedestrians, just like they were two a decade later in Louvain-la-Neuve, the Belgian university city planned and build to host the francophone half of the old Catholic University of Leuven who had been expelled thence following the events of 1968 (where 1968 didn’t mean the same as in the rest of the global West). My pictures from that warm summer evening—during a summer regularly featuring the highest temperatures recorded to date—seem to have captured what I felt during that evening walk.2. There is a curious reticence in Germany to use the army for domestic security purposes, usually backed up by woolly references to ‘German history’. Such explanations are flawed, as Hitler did not take power through a military coup, while the big street fights of the Weimar Republic were carried out by heavily armoured and motorised police forces, not the army, yet the taboo persists, although mass-scale repression through troops has not happened since 1848.
{"title":"Anschlag auf Olympia. Was 1972 in München wirklich geschah","authors":"Jacob Kornbeck","doi":"10.1080/17511321.2023.2256985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2023.2256985","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1. The planners hadn’t yet reached today’s belief in banning cars from city centres, but rather took the functional separation of Le Corbusier to the next stage, by sending cars underground and reserving the open spaces for pedestrians, just like they were two a decade later in Louvain-la-Neuve, the Belgian university city planned and build to host the francophone half of the old Catholic University of Leuven who had been expelled thence following the events of 1968 (where 1968 didn’t mean the same as in the rest of the global West). My pictures from that warm summer evening—during a summer regularly featuring the highest temperatures recorded to date—seem to have captured what I felt during that evening walk.2. There is a curious reticence in Germany to use the army for domestic security purposes, usually backed up by woolly references to ‘German history’. Such explanations are flawed, as Hitler did not take power through a military coup, while the big street fights of the Weimar Republic were carried out by heavily armoured and motorised police forces, not the army, yet the taboo persists, although mass-scale repression through troops has not happened since 1848.","PeriodicalId":51786,"journal":{"name":"Sport Ethics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134913030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2256988
Andy Harvey
The article takes up diverse strands of psychoanalytic thinking to investigate how desire is manifested in male team sporting environments. In particular, it is posited that sporting desire shares a remarkable structural similarity to the joking relationship in that they both work through the overcoming of obstacles. In doing so unconscious desires are long-circuited and only emerge in radically altered form, upending traditional gender and sexual subjectivities in the process. The paper explores the concept of desire from perspectives that are either straightforwardly psychoanalytic or heavily influenced by psychoanalytic thought. Initially, I examine desire from a Freudian viewpoint before looking at how Jacques Lacan extended Freudian analysis through a linguistic lens. I then explore desire in terms developed by Gilles Deleuze before turning, in the second part of the paper, to an examination of the work of George Bataille to consider the desire of sport through the mechanism of the joke to trace the complex routing that it often takes.
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Pub Date : 2023-09-07DOI: 10.1080/17511321.2023.2254941
Sinclair A. MacRae
{"title":"Why the rules do not prohibit cheating in sports","authors":"Sinclair A. MacRae","doi":"10.1080/17511321.2023.2254941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2023.2254941","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51786,"journal":{"name":"Sport Ethics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80820502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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