Pub Date : 2008-12-01DOI: 10.1080/03071840802670080
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
{"title":"NATO and the Challenge of Energy Security","authors":"Jaap de Hoop Scheffer","doi":"10.1080/03071840802670080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840802670080","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":"153 1","pages":"56 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03071840802670080","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59516355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-06-11DOI: 10.1080/03071848308523488
General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley Gbe Kcb Dso Mc, General Sir Harry Tuzo Gcb Obe Mc Ma
{"title":"Dynamic defence: The Northern Flank","authors":"General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley Gbe Kcb Dso Mc, General Sir Harry Tuzo Gcb Obe Mc Ma","doi":"10.1080/03071848308523488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071848308523488","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03071848308523488","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59689043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-06-10DOI: 10.1080/03071848408522222
Air Commodore F. W. Thompson Raf Cbe
{"title":"Morale, motivation and leadership in the Soviet armed forces","authors":"Air Commodore F. W. Thompson Raf Cbe","doi":"10.1080/03071848408522222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071848408522222","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":"161 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03071848408522222","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59691664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-06-10DOI: 10.1080/03071848608522732
Right Honourable Dr David Owen Mp, Field Marshal Sir John Stanier Gcb Mbe Dl Frgs
{"title":"Defence: A sense of balance","authors":"Right Honourable Dr David Owen Mp, Field Marshal Sir John Stanier Gcb Mbe Dl Frgs","doi":"10.1080/03071848608522732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071848608522732","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03071848608522732","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59703448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-06-10DOI: 10.1080/03071848408523126
Malcolm Mackintosh Cmg, Sir Clive Rose Gcmg
{"title":"Power in the Kremlin: Politics and the military","authors":"Malcolm Mackintosh Cmg, Sir Clive Rose Gcmg","doi":"10.1080/03071848408523126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071848408523126","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03071848408523126","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59693284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-03-20DOI: 10.1080/03071849308445676
Sir Michael Howard Cbe Dlitt Fba Frhs
In this lecture of 1961, Michael Howard assesses the uses and abuses of the study of military history from the perspectives of both the academic historian and the practising soldier. While acknowledging past tendencies to mythogise national achievements out of often misguided notions of patriotism, as well as difficulties involving evidence, he argues that the benefits to soldier and civilian alike of ‘finding out what really happened’ outweigh these doubts. Using the criteria of width, depth and context, he concludes that the study of military history enables an under’ standing of the nature of war and its impact on society and directly improves the soldier's ability to understand and fulfil his function.
{"title":"The use and abuse of military history","authors":"Sir Michael Howard Cbe Dlitt Fba Frhs","doi":"10.1080/03071849308445676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849308445676","url":null,"abstract":"In this lecture of 1961, Michael Howard assesses the uses and abuses of the study of military history from the perspectives of both the academic historian and the practising soldier. While acknowledging past tendencies to mythogise national achievements out of often misguided notions of patriotism, as well as difficulties involving evidence, he argues that the benefits to soldier and civilian alike of ‘finding out what really happened’ outweigh these doubts. Using the criteria of width, depth and context, he concludes that the study of military history enables an under’ standing of the nature of war and its impact on society and directly improves the soldier's ability to understand and fulfil his function.","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":"138 1","pages":"26-30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03071849308445676","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59731746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-03-20DOI: 10.1080/03071849208445636
Commander N D Latham MSc CEng MIMechE Rn
The winner of the Trench‐Gascoigne Essay Competition, Commander Latham defines the term ‘security’ as an individual, national and international requirement, the achievement of which is dependent upon the political, economic and social trends dominant in the world. With the end of the Cold War and the new international realignments that have subsequently occurred, he argues that the security of Britain and her allies in particular, will focus increasingly on the non‐military aspects of security, with smaller, mobile military units as defence, rather than on the current superstructure of weapons and armed forces.
{"title":"How valuable are the armed forces in contributing to the security of Britain","authors":"Commander N D Latham MSc CEng MIMechE Rn","doi":"10.1080/03071849208445636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849208445636","url":null,"abstract":"The winner of the Trench‐Gascoigne Essay Competition, Commander Latham defines the term ‘security’ as an individual, national and international requirement, the achievement of which is dependent upon the political, economic and social trends dominant in the world. With the end of the Cold War and the new international realignments that have subsequently occurred, he argues that the security of Britain and her allies in particular, will focus increasingly on the non‐military aspects of security, with smaller, mobile military units as defence, rather than on the current superstructure of weapons and armed forces.","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":"137 1","pages":"27-33"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03071849208445636","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59728491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-02-01DOI: 10.1080/03071840801984615
Anna Maria Brudenell
DOI: 10.1080/03071840801984615 Introduction In the spring and summer of 1999, NATO undertook its second major military operation: Operation Allied Force, air operations in reaction to the Serbian ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians. Russia took no direct part in Operation Allied Force, but by late 1999, Russian forces were a component of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), stationed throughout Kosovo. Prior to that, Russian involvement in the conflict can be seen to have had two aspects: its seizure of Slatina airport at Pristina, and its influence on Milosevic. This topic is of interest because it may have relevance to Russian motives and actions in the current situation in the Balkans. This article considers the above two aspects of Russian involvement, and draws conclusions.
{"title":"Russia's Role in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999","authors":"Anna Maria Brudenell","doi":"10.1080/03071840801984615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840801984615","url":null,"abstract":"DOI: 10.1080/03071840801984615 Introduction In the spring and summer of 1999, NATO undertook its second major military operation: Operation Allied Force, air operations in reaction to the Serbian ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians. Russia took no direct part in Operation Allied Force, but by late 1999, Russian forces were a component of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), stationed throughout Kosovo. Prior to that, Russian involvement in the conflict can be seen to have had two aspects: its seizure of Slatina airport at Pristina, and its influence on Milosevic. This topic is of interest because it may have relevance to Russian motives and actions in the current situation in the Balkans. This article considers the above two aspects of Russian involvement, and draws conclusions.","PeriodicalId":51795,"journal":{"name":"RUSI Journal","volume":"153 1","pages":"30 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03071840801984615","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59516659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-12-01DOI: 10.1080/03071840701863117
Charles Chao Rong Phua
DOI: 10.1080/03071840701863117 It is claimed that Sun Tzu’s precepts were applied in US strategy for both the First Gulf War and the ongoing Global War on Terror. General Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the US and coalition forces in the Gulf War, was a student of Sun Tzu and employed tactics from The Art ofWar to secure victory. In the latest war in Iraq and Afghanistan, former CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks, was reported to be a devotee of Sun Tzu and often found quoting him. However, the results differ. The Gulf War was a short and victorious war while the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is long and hitherto inconclusive. This essay does not seek to judge the success of the GWOT, but rather understand why the results of the US application of Sun Tzu are so different, given McNeilly’s claim that Sun Tzu’s influence is growing in the US military amongst the higher-ranking officers, to the extent that an essay competition in Sun Tzu’s name has been inaugurated at the National Defense University. A simple answer would be that the Gulf War was a conventional war and fighting it using Sun Tzu’s indirect approach was sufficient to deliver an overwhelming victory, which Schwarzkopf did. However, the GWOT is an unconventional war against unseen enemies (terrorists) and hence the entire force needs to fully understand Sun Tzu in order to fight against the terrorists who are arguably also using the indirect approach. Therefore, it becomes a battle of hearts and minds and the side which is faster and more ‘indirect’ will emerge victorious. Even if Franks had internalized Sun Tzu, his subordinates might not have, and this could have been the weak link. However, this answer is simplistic. Based on wide reading of secondary literature and textual analysis of Sun Tzu-related articles in Military Review (MR), Naval Proceedings (NP) and Parameters (PA) between 1997 to June 2006, the author found the following insights to better understand the phenomenon. By analyzing the manner and the frequency of usage of Sun Tzu in each article, there is evidence that he was usually name-dropped and quoted to substantiate certain points and some misuse of quotes was observed. Sun Tzu is incorrectly engaged in other articles: for example, the maxim ‘know your enemy and yourself’ is often used to legitimize the Information Technology (IT) Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) where knowledge leads to victory. But Sun Tzu meant ‘foreknowledge’, or human intelligence of intentions, rather than merely technical information. Other articles misuse Sun Tzu’s phrase ‘to subdue without fighting’ to justify the IT RMA, overwhelming and precise firepower. Sun Tzu actually stated a preference for non-violence, skillful strategizing and psychological operations. In their correct engagements, there is evidence pointing towards articles inNaval Proceedings demonstrating a firmer grasp of Sun Tzu’s concepts though Parameters and Military Review also featured writers who truly understood Sun
据说，在第一次海湾战争和正在进行的全球反恐战争中，美国的战略都应用了孙子的戒律。在海湾战争中领导美国和联军的诺曼·施瓦茨科普夫将军就是孙子的学生，他运用了《孙子兵法》中的战术来确保胜利。在最近的伊拉克和阿富汗战争中，据报道，前中央司令部司令汤米·弗兰克斯将军是孙子的忠实信徒，经常引用他的话。然而，结果却有所不同。海湾战争是一场短暂而胜利的战争，而全球反恐战争(GWOT)是一场旷日持久且迄今尚无定论的战争。这篇文章并不是要评判GWOT的成功，而是要理解为什么美国应用孙子的结果如此不同，考虑到麦克尼利声称孙子的影响在美国军队的高级军官中越来越大，以至于在国防大学举行了一场以孙子的名字命名的征文比赛。一个简单的答案是，海湾战争是一场常规战争，使用孙子的间接方法足以取得压倒性的胜利，施瓦茨科普夫做到了。然而，GWOT是一场针对看不见的敌人(恐怖分子)的非常规战争，因此整个部队需要充分理解《孙子兵法》，以便与可能也使用间接方法的恐怖分子作战。因此，它变成了一场心灵和思想的战斗，更快、更“间接”的一方将取得胜利。即使弗兰克斯内化了孙子，他的下属也可能没有，这可能是薄弱环节。然而，这个答案过于简单化了。通过对1997年至2006年6月期间《军事评论》(MR)、《海军学报》(NP)和《参数》(PA)上与孙子有关的文章的广泛阅读和文本分析，笔者发现了以下几点见解，以更好地理解这一现象。通过分析每篇文章中使用孙子的方式和频率，有证据表明，他经常被引用并引用以证实某些观点，并且观察到一些误用引用。《孙子兵法》在其他文章中也有错误的表述:例如，“知己知彼”这句格言经常被用来为军事信息技术革命(Information Technology Revolution in Military Affairs，简称RMA)正名，在这场革命中，知识导致胜利。但孙子的意思是“预知”，或人类对意图的智慧，而不仅仅是技术信息。其他文章滥用孙子的“不战而屈”来为IT军事革命辩护，即压倒性和精确的火力。事实上，孙子更倾向于非暴力，巧妙的战略和心理操作。在他们正确的接触中，有证据表明，《海军学报》上的文章对孙子的概念有更坚定的把握，尽管《参数》和《军事评论》也有真正理解孙子的作家。通过对美国军队及其战略思想的各种影响的进一步阅读，本文得出结论，自海湾战争以来，由于结构(战略文化)和代理因素之间的平衡变化，孙子兵法逐渐被扭曲。华朝荣拥有伦敦政治经济学院的国际关系学位，并因其卓越的学术和领导力荣获2004年高盛全球领袖奖。他目前是新加坡武装部队的上尉。本文仅代表作者个人观点，不代表新加坡武装部队的观点。从海湾战争到全球反恐战争——美国战略思想中扭曲的孙子?
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Pub Date : 2007-08-01DOI: 10.1080/03071840701574755
Richard Ned Lebow
Twenty-five years after the event, the Falklands War is presented as a hard-fought victory won by doughty British forces and their plucky prime minister. The recent celebrations have tended to obsc...
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