In our inquiry, we investigate elements of the foundations of Aristotle’s ontology. We concentrate our attention on aspects of the substance and the universal: we analyse the features which belong to substance qua substance and to universal qua universal, on the one hand, and the features which cannot belong to substance and universal, on the other hand. The mutual incompatibility between substance and universal and between the features which are respectively connected to substance and to universal are the central interest of our investigation. We furthermore inquire into the consequences of a wrong interpretation of the universal. The texts of Aristotle on which we base our study are Metaphysics Zeta 13, Zeta 14, and Zeta 16.
{"title":"ARISTOTLE’S EMENDATION OF ONTOLOGY","authors":"Zdravko Perić, Gianluigi Segalerba","doi":"10.52846/afucv.vi52.55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52846/afucv.vi52.55","url":null,"abstract":"In our inquiry, we investigate elements of the foundations of Aristotle’s ontology. We concentrate our attention on aspects of the substance and the universal: we analyse the features which belong to substance qua substance and to universal qua universal, on the one hand, and the features which cannot belong to substance and universal, on the other hand. The mutual incompatibility between substance and universal and between the features which are respectively connected to substance and to universal are the central interest of our investigation. We furthermore inquire into the consequences of a wrong interpretation of the universal. The texts of Aristotle on which we base our study are Metaphysics Zeta 13, Zeta 14, and Zeta 16.","PeriodicalId":518228,"journal":{"name":"Analele Universităţii din Craiova, seria Filosofie","volume":"80 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140529182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A central theme of Spinoza’s Ethica is the description of the individual’s exposition to the emergence of passions. Passions bring the individual to a condition of mental enslavement. Spinoza tries to find a way out of the passions: through the analysis of the structure of reality and through the inquiry into the structure of the individual’s mind, Spinoza shows that the development of knowledge of reality in the mind is the solution to the process of liberation of the mind. The possibility, for the individual, to reach an authentic power of mind consists in the acquisition of the knowledge of reality. This acquisition needs to be developed through the appropriate education. The knowledge of the whole reality increases the power of the individual’s mind, thus contemporarily diminishing the influence of passions on the individual’s mind. Through the knowledge the individual can emendate his mind: thereby the individual becomes able to eliminate in his mind the already present confused ideas on reality, on the one hand, and to oppose the formation of new confused ideas, on the other hand. The main text of our investigation will be Spinoza’s Ethica; we shall refer also to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and to the Tractatus Politicus.
{"title":"KNOWLEDGE OF GOD, EMPOWERMENT OF THE MIND AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUBJECT IN SPINOZA","authors":"Kathrin Bouvot, Gianluigi Segalerba","doi":"10.52846/afucv.vi51.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52846/afucv.vi51.44","url":null,"abstract":"A central theme of Spinoza’s Ethica is the description of the individual’s exposition to the emergence of passions. Passions bring the individual to a condition of mental enslavement. Spinoza tries to find a way out of the passions: through the analysis of the structure of reality and through the inquiry into the structure of the individual’s mind, Spinoza shows that the development of knowledge of reality in the mind is the solution to the process of liberation of the mind. The possibility, for the individual, to reach an authentic power of mind consists in the acquisition of the knowledge of reality. This acquisition needs to be developed through the appropriate education. The knowledge of the whole reality increases the power of the individual’s mind, thus contemporarily diminishing the influence of passions on the individual’s mind. Through the knowledge the individual can emendate his mind: thereby the individual becomes able to eliminate in his mind the already present confused ideas on reality, on the one hand, and to oppose the formation of new confused ideas, on the other hand. The main text of our investigation will be Spinoza’s Ethica; we shall refer also to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and to the Tractatus Politicus.","PeriodicalId":518228,"journal":{"name":"Analele Universităţii din Craiova, seria Filosofie","volume":"102 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140529497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I aim to phenomenologically analyze the transformation of experience, which can be epitomized both by religious conversion and phenomenological reduction. In so doing, I propose a definite set of concepts such as: self-dislodgement and relodgement (dislocare-relocare), open and closed experience, consolidation of experience, hierarchy of relevance and others. I show the clarifying potential of this terminology by putting it at work in a phenomenological reading of some excerpts from Augustine’s Confessions. Moreover, I argue that this conceptuality is deeply rooted both in the medieval tradition of self-understanding of the believer—such as Hildegard of Bingen—and in the Romanian phenomenological tradition, exemplified by Alexandru Dragomir.
{"title":"CONCEPTE FUNDAMENTALE PENTRU O FENOMENOLOGIE A TRANSFORMĂRII EXPERIENȚEI","authors":"Vasile Visoțchi","doi":"10.52846/afucv.vi51.50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52846/afucv.vi51.50","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I aim to phenomenologically analyze the transformation of experience, which can be epitomized both by religious conversion and phenomenological reduction. In so doing, I propose a definite set of concepts such as: self-dislodgement and relodgement (dislocare-relocare), open and closed experience, consolidation of experience, hierarchy of relevance and others. I show the clarifying potential of this terminology by putting it at work in a phenomenological reading of some excerpts from Augustine’s Confessions. Moreover, I argue that this conceptuality is deeply rooted both in the medieval tradition of self-understanding of the believer—such as Hildegard of Bingen—and in the Romanian phenomenological tradition, exemplified by Alexandru Dragomir.","PeriodicalId":518228,"journal":{"name":"Analele Universităţii din Craiova, seria Filosofie","volume":"146 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140529563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kant aims to achieve a scientific metaphysics; Camil Petrescu rather a metaphysical science. Neither of them will achieve anything of what they set out to do, only that, while the first one has the consciousness of failure, the second one will eventually reach a failure of conscience. But the metaphysics of failure is more than just a failed metaphysics. Here both of them are saved. Kant, the “all-destroyer”, the negator, this “Prussian Hume”, “falls” from science into faith. Camil Petrescu falls as well, but replaces faith with the successive idea of science. He falls from science to science, in the totality of science about the world or in the science of substance. Such a science, whose meaning will be realized, like that of the concrete, along the way, progressively, by addition. Camil detaches himself from the beginning and definitively from what he calls “rationalist philosophy”, by which he understands classical systems (especially Kantian and Hegelian ones). The reproach? It is a fundamental one for the future substantialist philosophy: this type of rationalist philosophy can only be suspected of being in possession of the notion of the concrete and in no way in possession of the reality of this concept. Rationalism has the “other” one in the form of abstraction; substantialism has it in the form of simultaneous reality. What Camil Petrescu wants to demonstrate is the fact that reality lacks logic or, at least, reality escapes from classic logic. Both Kant and Hegel capture reality in a scheme, ossifies it, they give it logic, thereby canceling out precisely what characterizes it essentially: the concrete. Logicism translates into a heretical infidelity to the real. The concrete thus becomes the fact of being for self, not of existing. All this I try to analyze by applying them to the theory of knowledge as it appears in an episode of the Doctrine of Substance, the episode of the discovery of America.
{"title":"UN EXEMPLU SUBSTANȚIALIST: DESCOPERIREA AMERICII","authors":"Anton Adămuț","doi":"10.52846/afucv.vi51.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52846/afucv.vi51.48","url":null,"abstract":"Kant aims to achieve a scientific metaphysics; Camil Petrescu rather a metaphysical science. Neither of them will achieve anything of what they set out to do, only that, while the first one has the consciousness of failure, the second one will eventually reach a failure of conscience. But the metaphysics of failure is more than just a failed metaphysics. Here both of them are saved. Kant, the “all-destroyer”, the negator, this “Prussian Hume”, “falls” from science into faith. Camil Petrescu falls as well, but replaces faith with the successive idea of science. He falls from science to science, in the totality of science about the world or in the science of substance. Such a science, whose meaning will be realized, like that of the concrete, along the way, progressively, by addition. Camil detaches himself from the beginning and definitively from what he calls “rationalist philosophy”, by which he understands classical systems (especially Kantian and Hegelian ones). The reproach? It is a fundamental one for the future substantialist philosophy: this type of rationalist philosophy can only be suspected of being in possession of the notion of the concrete and in no way in possession of the reality of this concept. Rationalism has the “other” one in the form of abstraction; substantialism has it in the form of simultaneous reality. What Camil Petrescu wants to demonstrate is the fact that reality lacks logic or, at least, reality escapes from classic logic. Both Kant and Hegel capture reality in a scheme, ossifies it, they give it logic, thereby canceling out precisely what characterizes it essentially: the concrete. Logicism translates into a heretical infidelity to the real. The concrete thus becomes the fact of being for self, not of existing. All this I try to analyze by applying them to the theory of knowledge as it appears in an episode of the Doctrine of Substance, the episode of the discovery of America.","PeriodicalId":518228,"journal":{"name":"Analele Universităţii din Craiova, seria Filosofie","volume":"149 43","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140529561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper investigates the common and different features of Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophy, thus not the historical and personal aspects of authors are important but the internal articulation of their philosophical methodologies. These features are both the dialectical approach of the knowledge of the world and, somehow deriving from the dialectical method, the understanding of objectivity. The beauty and limits of the dialectical pattern of Hegel is shown in his treatment of the finites. The analysis is rather andialogue between the dialectical idealism and the dialectical materialism. The conclusion is not a synthesis seen dogmatically - as a final state, apotheosis of philosophy - but as an inherent development of thought, therefore even as its division into the never-completed dialectical materialist methodology and the eternally necessary convergence of philosophical interrogations and science.
{"title":"UP TO A POINT, THE DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM IS DIALECTICAL IDEALISM, IN HEGEL’S MEANING; BUT THEN IT IS MORE","authors":"Ana Bazac","doi":"10.52846/afucv.vi51.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52846/afucv.vi51.47","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates the common and different features of Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophy, thus not the historical and personal aspects of authors are important but the internal articulation of their philosophical methodologies. These features are both the dialectical approach of the knowledge of the world and, somehow deriving from the dialectical method, the understanding of objectivity. The beauty and limits of the dialectical pattern of Hegel is shown in his treatment of the finites. The analysis is rather andialogue between the dialectical idealism and the dialectical materialism. The conclusion is not a synthesis seen dogmatically - as a final state, apotheosis of philosophy - but as an inherent development of thought, therefore even as its division into the never-completed dialectical materialist methodology and the eternally necessary convergence of philosophical interrogations and science.","PeriodicalId":518228,"journal":{"name":"Analele Universităţii din Craiova, seria Filosofie","volume":"237 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140529265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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