Pub Date : 2022-10-10DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2129771
Victoriia Noskova
ABSTRACT In July 2022 the European Council gave final approval to new regulation of digital markets. This specifically addresses the main concerns raised by the business behaviour of operators of core services in their gatekeeping positions. The list of core services was extended during revisions. In this article, I address the question of whether the inclusion of virtual assistants into the list of core services was the right decision. Overall, this paper argues that (i) virtual assistants as gatekeepers for consumption should be listed among core services, (ii) some of the Digital Markets Act’s obligations need to be adopted to fit the specifics of virtual assistants, (iii) there are two relevant dimensions of power which should be considered in competition policy and regulation analysis: market power on virtual assistants’ market and the ecosystem of related markets (cross-market integration criterion), (iv) the growth of new gatekeepers should be prevented, among other means by stricter merger control.
{"title":"Virtual assistants as gatekeepers for consumption? – how information intermediaries shape competition","authors":"Victoriia Noskova","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2129771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2129771","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In July 2022 the European Council gave final approval to new regulation of digital markets. This specifically addresses the main concerns raised by the business behaviour of operators of core services in their gatekeeping positions. The list of core services was extended during revisions. In this article, I address the question of whether the inclusion of virtual assistants into the list of core services was the right decision. Overall, this paper argues that (i) virtual assistants as gatekeepers for consumption should be listed among core services, (ii) some of the Digital Markets Act’s obligations need to be adopted to fit the specifics of virtual assistants, (iii) there are two relevant dimensions of power which should be considered in competition policy and regulation analysis: market power on virtual assistants’ market and the ecosystem of related markets (cross-market integration criterion), (iv) the growth of new gatekeepers should be prevented, among other means by stricter merger control.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48401509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2136852
Philip Marsden
ABSTRACT Overseeing digital gatekeepers through ex post competition law is too slow and too complicated to prevent serious exclusionary and exploitative harm. To provide greater contestability and fairness in digital markets, new European laws introduce complementary ex ante pro-competitive regulation. Differing forms of intellectual property innovation are crucial for the increasing digitization of markets, particularly involving the Internet of Things. When intellectual property “gatekeepers” thwart willing implementers’ access to standards by seeking injunctions, ex post competition law enforcement is too slow and complicated to prevent serious exclusionary and exploitative harm. Ex ante regulation could ensure re-instatement of the pro-competitive promise of FRAND access that ensures fair, contestable and innovative markets.
{"title":"Restoring the promise of competition: ex ante pro-competitive regulation of FRAND access to SEPs","authors":"Philip Marsden","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2136852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2136852","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Overseeing digital gatekeepers through ex post competition law is too slow and too complicated to prevent serious exclusionary and exploitative harm. To provide greater contestability and fairness in digital markets, new European laws introduce complementary ex ante pro-competitive regulation. Differing forms of intellectual property innovation are crucial for the increasing digitization of markets, particularly involving the Internet of Things. When intellectual property “gatekeepers” thwart willing implementers’ access to standards by seeking injunctions, ex post competition law enforcement is too slow and complicated to prevent serious exclusionary and exploitative harm. Ex ante regulation could ensure re-instatement of the pro-competitive promise of FRAND access that ensures fair, contestable and innovative markets.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45877724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2128551
Tuvana Aras
ABSTRACT The present article analyses the competition issues that arise from the legal gaps of the Slot Regulation (95/93/EC). Although the Slot Regulation targets a just allocation system, allowing market access for all airlines, the augmenting number of congested airports in the European Union makes it hard to attribute slots to newcomers. The gaps of the Slot Regulation have led to problematic conducts such as 'slot hoarding' as incumbent carriers are aware of the financial and operational importance of these slots, and of their scarcity. The gaps have also allowed dominant airlines to engage in secondary slot trading under secretive and potentially anti-competitive terms, which may have an impact on the competitiveness of the market. The article examines the applicability of Article 102 TFEU to airlines that may abuse their dominance created by the number of slots they have under the essential facilities doctrine and the margin squeeze theory.
{"title":"Article 102 TFEU to the rescue: filling the legal gaps of the airport slot regulation","authors":"Tuvana Aras","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2128551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2128551","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The present article analyses the competition issues that arise from the legal gaps of the Slot Regulation (95/93/EC). Although the Slot Regulation targets a just allocation system, allowing market access for all airlines, the augmenting number of congested airports in the European Union makes it hard to attribute slots to newcomers. The gaps of the Slot Regulation have led to problematic conducts such as 'slot hoarding' as incumbent carriers are aware of the financial and operational importance of these slots, and of their scarcity. The gaps have also allowed dominant airlines to engage in secondary slot trading under secretive and potentially anti-competitive terms, which may have an impact on the competitiveness of the market. The article examines the applicability of Article 102 TFEU to airlines that may abuse their dominance created by the number of slots they have under the essential facilities doctrine and the margin squeeze theory.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43307869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2131238
B. Zelger
ABSTRACT The Austrian legislator, together with the adaptions to be made in order to implement the ECN+ Directive, decided to include into national law, i.e. § 2(1) Austrian Cartel Act serving as corresponding rule to Article 101(3) TFEU, a sustainability exemption from the prohibition on cartels as stipulated in § 1 Austrian Cartel Act being the Austrian counterpart to Article 101(1) TFEU. Hence, in light of Regulation 1/2003 it arguably made a bold decision as the adoption of such exemption into national law is anything but uncontroversial. Moreover, also its compatibility with Article 101(3) TFEU is not clear-cut, as the inclusion of aspects other than economic ones, i.e. environmental and sustainability considerations, in the assessment of exemptions at the European level has been subject to debate ever since. This article shall shed light on the issues emanating from this new sustainability exemption and its relationship with the given EU legal framework.
{"title":"The new sustainability exemption according to § 2(1) Austrian Cartel Act and its relationship with Article 101 TFEU – European spearhead or born to fail?","authors":"B. Zelger","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2131238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2131238","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Austrian legislator, together with the adaptions to be made in order to implement the ECN+ Directive, decided to include into national law, i.e. § 2(1) Austrian Cartel Act serving as corresponding rule to Article 101(3) TFEU, a sustainability exemption from the prohibition on cartels as stipulated in § 1 Austrian Cartel Act being the Austrian counterpart to Article 101(1) TFEU. Hence, in light of Regulation 1/2003 it arguably made a bold decision as the adoption of such exemption into national law is anything but uncontroversial. Moreover, also its compatibility with Article 101(3) TFEU is not clear-cut, as the inclusion of aspects other than economic ones, i.e. environmental and sustainability considerations, in the assessment of exemptions at the European level has been subject to debate ever since. This article shall shed light on the issues emanating from this new sustainability exemption and its relationship with the given EU legal framework.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60256008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2115871
B. Balasingham
ABSTRACT Exclusionary innovation poses a bigger threat to competition in digital platform markets than in other innovation markets given the relevance of data-driven network effects as well as the strong incentive and ability of digital platforms to pursue an envelopment strategy. This paper advocates a theory of harm called “platform-wide exclusionary innovation” which applies to conduct that plausibly creates short-term consumer benefit but is more likely to foreclose rivals and therefore reduce technological progress in the long run. This theory of harm can help to explain Google’s conduct that the European Commission condemned in its three decisions against Google between 2017 and 2019. Due to interconnections between Google’s practices in the three cases this article assesses whether they may be considered jointly for the purpose of finding of an infringement of Article 102 TFEU or under the proposed Digital Markets Act.
{"title":"Exclusionary innovation in the European Commission’s decisions against Google","authors":"B. Balasingham","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2115871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2115871","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Exclusionary innovation poses a bigger threat to competition in digital platform markets than in other innovation markets given the relevance of data-driven network effects as well as the strong incentive and ability of digital platforms to pursue an envelopment strategy. This paper advocates a theory of harm called “platform-wide exclusionary innovation” which applies to conduct that plausibly creates short-term consumer benefit but is more likely to foreclose rivals and therefore reduce technological progress in the long run. This theory of harm can help to explain Google’s conduct that the European Commission condemned in its three decisions against Google between 2017 and 2019. Due to interconnections between Google’s practices in the three cases this article assesses whether they may be considered jointly for the purpose of finding of an infringement of Article 102 TFEU or under the proposed Digital Markets Act.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48912580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-29DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2059962
Alessia Sophia D’Amico, B. Balasingham
ABSTRACT In the Google Shopping judgment, the General Court refers to Google’s super-dominance and with it its stronger obligation not to allow its behaviour to impair effective competition. The concept of super-dominance suggests that certain conduct could breach Article 102 TFEU only when adopted by super-dominant undertakings, but it remains uncertain how exactly it contributes to finding an abuse. The aim of this paper is to analyze the Google Shopping judgment in relation to the concept of super-dominance. We explore how the concept has evolved in the case-law and what role it has played when establishing an abuse of dominance and analyze whether reliance on super-dominance in the case law is consistent with the effects-based approach. Finally, we examine how Google Shopping fits with the evolution of super-dominance in the case law and the effects-based approach and what it means for the regulation of digital gatekeepers going forward.
{"title":"Super-dominant and super-problematic? The degree of dominance in the Google Shopping judgement","authors":"Alessia Sophia D’Amico, B. Balasingham","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2059962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2059962","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the Google Shopping judgment, the General Court refers to Google’s super-dominance and with it its stronger obligation not to allow its behaviour to impair effective competition. The concept of super-dominance suggests that certain conduct could breach Article 102 TFEU only when adopted by super-dominant undertakings, but it remains uncertain how exactly it contributes to finding an abuse. The aim of this paper is to analyze the Google Shopping judgment in relation to the concept of super-dominance. We explore how the concept has evolved in the case-law and what role it has played when establishing an abuse of dominance and analyze whether reliance on super-dominance in the case law is consistent with the effects-based approach. Finally, we examine how Google Shopping fits with the evolution of super-dominance in the case law and the effects-based approach and what it means for the regulation of digital gatekeepers going forward.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41852102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-13DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2056345
Florian Deuflhard, R. Lauer
ABSTRACT Damage quantification in antitrust cases typically revolves around overcharge and pass-on estimation. In vertical industry structures, both measures crucially depend on contract structure, with linear and two-part tariffs being the most common contract types. While most of the damages literature focuses on linear contracts, two-part tariffs are mostly neglected. We discuss implications of tariff structure for damage quantification, highlight common pitfalls and propose practical solutions in damage assessment when two-part tariffs are present.
{"title":"The role of contract structure for damage quantification: pitfalls and solutions","authors":"Florian Deuflhard, R. Lauer","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2056345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2056345","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Damage quantification in antitrust cases typically revolves around overcharge and pass-on estimation. In vertical industry structures, both measures crucially depend on contract structure, with linear and two-part tariffs being the most common contract types. While most of the damages literature focuses on linear contracts, two-part tariffs are mostly neglected. We discuss implications of tariff structure for damage quantification, highlight common pitfalls and propose practical solutions in damage assessment when two-part tariffs are present.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46235841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2056347
A. Pera
ABSTRACT This paper examines the role and meaning of the concept of “fairness” in the application of European competition law, and in particular of Art, 102 of TFEU, It argues that, with its emphasis on firms competing on the bases of their superior performance, the paradigm of competition on the merits may well be considered a reference for the definition of whether a conduct by a dominant undertaking may be considered “fair”. The paper finds support for this in the case law of the European Courts and the Commission, as well as in the legal constructions characterizing EU jurisprudence, such as the “special responsibility” of a dominant firm and the “essential facility” doctrine. This view of fairness is also at the bases of the application of art. 102 through the different issues posed by the development of data based digital economy; the paper also argues that such a view helps clarifying the criteria to be used when applying the principles set by the European Courts with respect to the application of art. 102 to excessive prices.
{"title":"Fairness, competition on the merits and article 102","authors":"A. Pera","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2056347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2056347","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines the role and meaning of the concept of “fairness” in the application of European competition law, and in particular of Art, 102 of TFEU, It argues that, with its emphasis on firms competing on the bases of their superior performance, the paradigm of competition on the merits may well be considered a reference for the definition of whether a conduct by a dominant undertaking may be considered “fair”. The paper finds support for this in the case law of the European Courts and the Commission, as well as in the legal constructions characterizing EU jurisprudence, such as the “special responsibility” of a dominant firm and the “essential facility” doctrine. This view of fairness is also at the bases of the application of art. 102 through the different issues posed by the development of data based digital economy; the paper also argues that such a view helps clarifying the criteria to be used when applying the principles set by the European Courts with respect to the application of art. 102 to excessive prices.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42823786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2056346
C. Veljanovski
ABSTRACT The case for a greener antitrust is weak and flawed. It is largely abstract, hypothetical, legalistic, somewhat emotive and lacks supporting evidence. Its proponents claim that the European Commission’s enforcement of Article 101 TFEU blocks efficient industry-initiated cooperation to improve sustainability. But as is shown, this more permissive approach will lead to increased market power, supra-competitive prices and greater industry profits, and is unlikely to achieve greater investment in and the faster adoption of green technologies than competition.
{"title":"The case against green antitrust","authors":"C. Veljanovski","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2056346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2056346","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The case for a greener antitrust is weak and flawed. It is largely abstract, hypothetical, legalistic, somewhat emotive and lacks supporting evidence. Its proponents claim that the European Commission’s enforcement of Article 101 TFEU blocks efficient industry-initiated cooperation to improve sustainability. But as is shown, this more permissive approach will lead to increased market power, supra-competitive prices and greater industry profits, and is unlikely to achieve greater investment in and the faster adoption of green technologies than competition.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42873480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2034330
Suryaprakash Mishra
ABSTRACT This paper, concerning cost structures and innovation in monopoly and the resulting welfare, has counter-intuitive results. We consider linear demand and two cases of cost structures namely constant marginal cost (henceforth CMC) and increasing marginal cost (henceforth IMC) in monopoly, and show that innovation is rewarding in both situations. From the regulator’s perspective, in absence of any innovation or in case of equal innovation in both cases, a monopolist with an IMC may be preferred as against the one with a CMC.
{"title":"Cost structures, innovation and welfare in monopoly","authors":"Suryaprakash Mishra","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2034330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2034330","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper, concerning cost structures and innovation in monopoly and the resulting welfare, has counter-intuitive results. We consider linear demand and two cases of cost structures namely constant marginal cost (henceforth CMC) and increasing marginal cost (henceforth IMC) in monopoly, and show that innovation is rewarding in both situations. From the regulator’s perspective, in absence of any innovation or in case of equal innovation in both cases, a monopolist with an IMC may be preferred as against the one with a CMC.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47599450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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