Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2280324
Jussi Koivusalo
The duration of infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU has significant implications on the enforcement of those rules and those subject to enforcement. This article examines the European Court of Justice’s case law on the assessment of the duration of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU after the conduct constituting the infringement has ended. While earlier case law focused on continuing market conduct corresponding to the original infringing conduct, more recent case law appears to bring forth an approach centred on the restriction of competition resulting from the conduct. The judgment in Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto suggests that a complete assessment of an infringement’s duration should consider the scrutinized conduct’s restrictive effects on the competition that it distorts. That judgment also suggests that any price effects or other damages suffered by the infringers’ customers do not affect the infringement period’s length.
违反《国际贸易条约》第101条和第102条的期限对这些规则的执行和被执行者的执行具有重大影响。本文考察了欧洲法院的判例法中关于在构成侵权行为结束后对第101条的侵权持续时间的评估。虽然早期的判例法侧重于与原始侵权行为相对应的持续市场行为，但最近的判例法似乎提出了一种以限制由侵权行为引起的竞争为中心的方法。Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto一案的判决表明，对侵权持续时间的全面评估应该考虑被审查的行为对其扭曲的竞争的限制性影响。该判决还表明，侵权人的客户所遭受的任何价格影响或其他损害都不会影响侵权期的长度。
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Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2280333
Giuseppe Colangelo
ABSTRACTAs part of the recent proposal for a regulation that would overhaul the entire standard essential patents licensing system (SEP Proposal), the European Commission has envisaged a pre-trial mandatory FRAND determination by a conciliator. The paper investigates the relationship between the FRAND determination process under such a proposal and the test developed by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE, which represents the current guiding framework for SEP licensing negotiations in the EU. The paper aims at demonstrating that even, if the SEP Proposal were not to displace Huawei, it endorses an anti-injunction approach which is inconsistent with the CJEU’s stance and is essentially triggered by the German case law.KEYWORDS: Standard essential patentsFRAND determinationcompetition lawinjunctionswilling licensee testconciliation Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Standard Essential Patents and Amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, COM(2023)232.2 ibid Recital 2.3 See Group of Experts on Licensing and Valuation of Standard Essential Patents, ‘Contribution to the Debate on SEPs’ [2021] (all websites last visited on 4 November 2023); European Commission, ‘Making the most of the EU’s innovative potential. An intellectual property action plan to support the EU’s recovery and resilience’, COM(2020) 760 final; European Commission, ‘Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents’, COM(2017) 712 final; European Commission, ‘ICT Standardisation Priorities for the Digital Single Market’, COM(2016) 176 final.4 European Commission, ‘Intellectual property – new framework for standard-essential patents’ [2022] Call for evidence for an impact assessment, .5 ibid.6 See, e.g. Centre for a Digital Society of the European University Institute, ‘Feedback to EU Commission’s public consultation’ [2023] ; Christine A Varney and others, ‘Comments on European Commission’s Draft “Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for Transparent Licensing of Standard Essential Patents”’ [2023] ; Robin Jacob and Igor Nikolic, ‘ICLE Feedback to EU Commission’s public consultation’ [2023] .7 European Commission, ‘Imp
{"title":"FRAND determination under the European SEP Regulation Proposal: discarding the <i>Huawei</i> framework?","authors":"Giuseppe Colangelo","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2280333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2280333","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAs part of the recent proposal for a regulation that would overhaul the entire standard essential patents licensing system (SEP Proposal), the European Commission has envisaged a pre-trial mandatory FRAND determination by a conciliator. The paper investigates the relationship between the FRAND determination process under such a proposal and the test developed by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE, which represents the current guiding framework for SEP licensing negotiations in the EU. The paper aims at demonstrating that even, if the SEP Proposal were not to displace Huawei, it endorses an anti-injunction approach which is inconsistent with the CJEU’s stance and is essentially triggered by the German case law.KEYWORDS: Standard essential patentsFRAND determinationcompetition lawinjunctionswilling licensee testconciliation Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Standard Essential Patents and Amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, COM(2023)232.2 ibid Recital 2.3 See Group of Experts on Licensing and Valuation of Standard Essential Patents, ‘Contribution to the Debate on SEPs’ [2021] <https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/45217> (all websites last visited on 4 November 2023); European Commission, ‘Making the most of the EU’s innovative potential. An intellectual property action plan to support the EU’s recovery and resilience’, COM(2020) 760 final; European Commission, ‘Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents’, COM(2017) 712 final; European Commission, ‘ICT Standardisation Priorities for the Digital Single Market’, COM(2016) 176 final.4 European Commission, ‘Intellectual property – new framework for standard-essential patents’ [2022] Call for evidence for an impact assessment, <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13109-Intellectual-property-new-framework-for-standard-essential-patents_en>.5 ibid.6 See, e.g. Centre for a Digital Society of the European University Institute, ‘Feedback to EU Commission’s public consultation’ [2023] <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13109-Intellectual-property-new-framework-for-standard-essential-patents/F3432699_en>; Christine A Varney and others, ‘Comments on European Commission’s Draft “Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for Transparent Licensing of Standard Essential Patents”’ [2023] <https://ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Comments-on-European-Commission-Draft-SEP-Regulation-by-Former-US-Officials-1.pdf>; Robin Jacob and Igor Nikolic, ‘ICLE Feedback to EU Commission’s public consultation’ [2023] <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13109-Intellectual-property-new-framework-for-standard-essential-patents/F3433917_en>.7 European Commission, ‘Imp","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2280331
Franziska Weber, Peter van Wijck
According to the Damages Directive victims of infringements of competition law are entitled to full compensation. To achieve this goal overcharges, passing-on, and volume effects should play a role in the calculation of damages (for any purchaser who is not yet the final consumer). Whereas the Damages Directive promotes the passing-on defence for the defendants, it does not regulate volume effects in depth. The computation of these effects requires information on counterfactual prices and quantities. Since this information cannot be observed, the size of the volume effect tends to be uncertain. This paper discusses policy-options that aspire to bring compensation closer to full compensation, given uncertainty about the size of the volume effect. Based on the maximin-principle, a principle for decision-making under uncertainty, not allowing a passing-on defence appears to be an attractive option since this may lead to the minimization of the maximum gap between actual and full compensation.
{"title":"Full compensation and the volume effect: assessing different policy options","authors":"Franziska Weber, Peter van Wijck","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2280331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2280331","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Damages Directive victims of infringements of competition law are entitled to full compensation. To achieve this goal overcharges, passing-on, and volume effects should play a role in the calculation of damages (for any purchaser who is not yet the final consumer). Whereas the Damages Directive promotes the passing-on defence for the defendants, it does not regulate volume effects in depth. The computation of these effects requires information on counterfactual prices and quantities. Since this information cannot be observed, the size of the volume effect tends to be uncertain. This paper discusses policy-options that aspire to bring compensation closer to full compensation, given uncertainty about the size of the volume effect. Based on the maximin-principle, a principle for decision-making under uncertainty, not allowing a passing-on defence appears to be an attractive option since this may lead to the minimization of the maximum gap between actual and full compensation.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2280323
Francesca Niola
ABSTRACTThe document examines challenges and innovations in telecommunications law, focusing on the European context. It highlights the importance of asymmetric regulation and ex ante identification of enterprises with substantial market power. The 2018 European Electronic Communications Code introduces pivotal changes, including co-investment agreements (Art. 76), aiming to foster cost and risk sharing among operators, benefiting smaller enterprises. Such agreements respond to the need for sustainable competition. Art. 72 introduces a new obligation: access to civil engineering infrastructures. This obligation can extend beyond the traditional market if necessary and proportionate to achieve competition and unhindered access objectives. The document emphasizes the regulations' efforts to balance the interests of economic operators and consumers, promoting competition and innovation in the telecommunications sector.KEYWORDS: Electronic communicationdigital single marketcompetition lawnet neutralitynew remedies Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 O. Pollicino, Codes of conduct between self-regulation and hard law: is there really a third way for digital regulation? The case of the European strategy against online disinformation in Riv. Trim. dir. pubb., no. 4/2022.2 This procedure was originally provided for in Article 15(1) of Directive No. 2002/21/EC (the so-called Framework Directive), under which the Commission is required to periodically review the list of these markets with a view to updating its Recommendation on the subject. To date, there are three Recommendations: the first, No. 2003/311/EC, identified eighteen markets as susceptible to ex ante regulation divided into two macro-areas (retail services and wholesale services); subsequently, Recommendation 2007/879/EC reduced the number of relevant markets to only seven, maintaining the typological division of the previous identification. Specifically, the retail services included the markets for access services on fixed networks (both local networks and new generation networks); the wholesale services included the markets for interconnection services on fixed networks and mobile networks: call origination, termination and local transit services; termination services on mobile networks and services for the provision of terminating segments of leased lines On 8 January 2013, the Commission concluded a new process of revision of the list, which led to the issue of Recommendation no. 2014/710/EU, the third and final one, which further decreased the number of regulated markets, while redefining some markets to take into account industry and technological developments. In doing so, it identified only four relevant markets: ‘Market 1: Wholesale provision of the call termination service on individual public telephone networks at a fixed location; Market 2: Wholesale provision of the voice call termination service on individual mobile networks;
摘要该文件考察了电信法的挑战和创新，重点关注欧洲背景。它强调了不对称监管和事先识别具有重大市场力量的企业的重要性。2018年欧洲电子通信法规引入了关键变化，包括共同投资协议(第76条)，旨在促进运营商之间的成本和风险分担，使小型企业受益。这样的协议回应了可持续竞争的需要。第72条引入了一项新的义务:使用土木工程基础设施。如果有必要，这种义务可以扩展到传统市场之外，以实现竞争和不受阻碍的进入目标。该文件强调，条例努力平衡经济运营商和消费者的利益，促进电信行业的竞争和创新。关键词:电子通信数字单一市场竞争法网络中立性新的补救措施披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 O. Pollicino:自我监管与硬性法律之间的行为准则:数字监管真的有第三种方式吗?Riv的欧洲反网络虚假信息战略案例。修剪。dir。pubb。,没有。该程序最初由第2002/21/EC号指令(所谓的框架指令)第15(1)条规定，根据该指令，欧盟委员会需要定期审查这些市场清单，以更新其关于该主题的建议。迄今为止，有三个建议:第一个，2003/311/EC号，确定了18个易受事前监管的市场，分为两个宏观领域(零售服务和批发服务);随后，第2007/879/EC号建议将相关市场的数量减少到只有7个，保持了之前确定的类型划分。具体而言，零售服务包括固定网络(本地网络和新一代网络)接达服务市场;批发服务包括固定网络和流动网络互连服务市场:呼叫发起、终止和本地过境服务;移动网络终端服务和提供租用线路终端段的服务2013年1月8日，委员会结束了对清单的新修订进程，并因此发布了第5号建议。2014/710/EU，第三个也是最后一个，它进一步减少了受监管市场的数量，同时重新定义了一些市场，以考虑到工业和技术的发展。在此过程中，它只确定了四个相关市场:“市场一:在固定地点为个别公共电话网络批发提供电话终止服务;市场二:批发提供个人移动网络语音通话终止服务;市场3:(a)在固定地点进行当地批发;(b)消费品在固定地点的中央批发通道;市场4:高品质的定点批发通道。据媒体报道，欧盟内部市场专员蒂埃里·布雷顿(Thierry Breton)宣布，将在2023年初进行一项新的、范围广泛的磋商，其中也应涵盖电信公司(其中许多是国内市场的前现任者)在所谓的“现任者”建设的网络上的宽带使用和消费。顶部:参见P. Licata，电信公司的大型科技宽带网络。布列塔尼:《2023年的磋商》，《通讯通讯》。它，2002年12月9日，在https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/digital-economy/reti-a-banda-larga-telco-big-tech-breton-consultazione-nel-2023/;和Il Fatto Quotidiano的编辑，汽车，欧盟委员会开始就未来的机动性进行磋商，在ilfattoquotidiano。在2019年的分析中，在列出使用的指标后，a.g..com。确定了四个地理上确定的相关市场:(I) 3a -米兰;(II) 3a -意大利其他地区;(III) 3b -米兰;(IV) 3b -意大利其他地区”，a.g..com，第348/19/CONS号决定，5，其中(3a)表示在固定地点批发本地接入服务市场，(3b)表示在固定地点批发消费产品的中央接入服务市场M. Orofino:《2002框架二十年后电子通信的多层次“治理”》，《联邦制》。,没有。如第一章所述，可与特定电信领域的决策职能相媲美A. de Streel，欧盟的反垄断和部门特定监管:以电子通信为例，载于R. Dewenter和J. Haucap主编。 电信行业竞争的替代模式:意大利的方法，《商业杂志》。浓缩的。reg。, fasc。Orofino, Op. Cit, 703.44 . A. Manganelli，《共同投资、仅批发和“单一网络”:对Riv电信行业新监管和市场模式的分析》，对《欧洲电子通信法》中包含的监管趋势，特别是电信部门的投资政策进行了深入研究。regol。芝加哥商业交易所。, fasc。这是TIM于2021年1月29日提出的联合投资要约的情况，随后在2021年3月25日和4月8日向管理局发送的说明中进行了修改和补充，并于2022年10月7日最终合并。事实上，同年10月20日，a.g.。com。根据董事会的多数决议，拒绝了合并要约，因为它不符合《守则》第87条第1款第(c)项(第76条CCEE)，“因为2021年加入的经济条件也必须适用于自要约公布之日起6个月内签署协议的共同投资者”。在TIM作出回应并修改了要约条款后，a.g..com才宣布收购。第385/22/ con .46号决议，“关于通过引入价格指数化机制修改TIM根据CCEE第76条和第79条提交的承诺提案”，发起了公众咨询这一例外的作用将是对共同投资协定的特别干预，因为它将在必要时以附属而非补充的方式影响后者。正如权威主义所主张的那样，全国管制局施加补充义务的权力采取的形式是对一般承诺制度的例外，在起始阶段- -因为在目前的情况下，对承诺的修改不是管理局和经营者之间事先辩证法的结果- -和在最后阶段，因为补充义务不是取代，而是补充共同投资承诺，尽管形式相同。进一步的讨论见M. Bourreau, S. hoerning和W. Maxwell，《Cerre report, 2020, 41.47》。恰当的表达是Manganelli, op . city。15048根据BEREC的说法，竞争性合作将使所有共同投资者和运营商在推销其报价的能力和按比例分担投资风险方面拥有重大权力。这也将满足在每个共同投资者参与的价值和时间方面的灵活性要求，以及在共同投资的基础设施建成后，共同投资者之间授予互惠权利的要求。BEREC，促进一致应用评估新的超大容量网络要素共同投资的条件和标准的指南，EECC第76(1)条和附件IV, 2020, BoR, 20。通过这种方式，立法者确保信息不对称被相应的合同前信息义务所抵消，这种信息义务是透明的，受到客观、非歧视和可预测标准的启发网络的寿命只能参照商业共同投资计划的预期寿命来理解，在此期间，网络完全运行，而不是任何网络组件的技术运行寿命(可能比商业寿命更长)”，因此BEREC, Op. citp .12.50该理论长期以来提出了监管和承诺的时间有效性问题;特别是，电信等行业的战略性质要求它们自然地受到政治周期和平衡(并非总是固定的)的影响，因此，所谓的长期监管承诺被认为是一种有用的工具，可以最大限度地降低监管不稳定的风险，相反，可以最大限度地提高监管的可预测性。谢普斯尔:《自由裁量权、制度与政府承诺问题》，载于《变革社会的社会理论》，伦敦，1991;李建平，《监管承诺的制度基础:电信监管的比较分析》，《法律经济学》。器官。,没有。10/1994, 201 - 246;波罗先生。DOĞAN，电信行业的监管和创新，Tel. pol。,没有。[j] .中国科学院学报(自然科学版);达勒·诺加雷，同上，第162页。
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Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2280330
Lilian Klein
ABSTRACTThe advent of digital companies has brought benefits to society. Nevertheless, the digital era poses significant risks to consumers’ privacy. The combination, through mergers, of enormous datasets could raise further privacy concerns. It has been much discussed whether and how consumer privacy concerns should be introduced within merger assessment. This paper approaches this issue from another perspective and reflects upon the circumstances under which the EU Merger Control Regulation (EUMR) has a role to address privacy issues. Accordingly, this paper clarifies the conditions that must be satisfied in order for privacy issues to fall within the EUMR’s ambit. First, privacy should be a parameter of competition on the market and second, there must be a causal link between the merger and privacy deterioration. Following this, the paper turns to critically analyse the Commission’s treatment of privacy issues in objectively selected mergers involving some of the most powerful digital companies.KEYWORDS: EU merger controlprivacydata protectioncausal linkdigital marketsGAMAM AcknowledgementsI would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Michael Harker and Dr Elias Deutscher for their invaluable and insightful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 [12].2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ 364/3 of 18 December 2000, Articles 7&8.3 Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECHR’ [2013] International Data Privacy Law 222, 223.4 Autorité de la Concurrence & Bundeskartellamt, ‘Competition Law and Data’ [2016]. at page 5.5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1 (GDPR).6 Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law (3rd edn, OUP 2016) 5–11 & 51–54.7 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University Press 2010) 19.8 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ Report on the CMA’s call for information CMA38 June 2015. at page 5; Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 55.9 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ (n 8) para 3.56; OECD, ‘Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-being: Interim Synthesis Report’ [2014].
28 Microsoft/LinkedIn (Case COMP/M.8124)欧盟委员会决定C(2016) 8404 final, GDPR第1(1)条第350.29段2002年7月12日欧洲议会和理事会指令2002/58/EC，关于电子通信领域的个人数据处理和隐私保护(隐私和电子通信指令)[2002]L 201/37(电子隐私指令)电子隐私指令，第1(1)条电子隐私指令，第5(3)条GDPR第4(1)条GDPR第5.35条GDPR第51(1)-(2).36条根据《经营者间集中控制理事会条例》评估非横向合并的指南[2008]OJ C 265/6第10段;根据经营者之间集中控制的理事会条例评估横向合并的指南[2004]OJ C 31/5第8.38段ec:EU:C:2005:87第42-43.39段Google/Fitbit (n 11)第411-412.40段同上。41 Google/Fitbit (n 11)第411.42段Meta(原Facebook)/Kustomer (Case M.10262)委员会决定C(2022) 409 final，Apple/Shazam (Case COMP/M.8788)委员会决定C(2018) 5748 final，第200.47段同上第225段和226.48段同上第231.49段同上第238.50段案例C-252/21元平台和其他(社交网络的一般使用条款[2023]ECLI:EU:C: 20123:537.51同上，第48.52段同上，第49.53段微软/LinkedIn (n 28)第350.54段参见，例如欧洲数据保护监管机构，“大数据时代的隐私和竞争力”(n 15) 26.55参见，例如，Stucke和Grunes，大数据和竞争政策(n 13) 260.56 Cooper (n 22) 1188, 1192.57同上1193.58 CMA，并购评估指南[2021]CMA129，第2.5.59段横向并购评估指南(n 37)第8段;非横向并购评估指南(n 37)第10.60段，同上。61 OECD，“竞争分析中质量的作用和衡量”[2013]政策圆桌会议DAF/COMP(2013)17。在79.62页微软雅虎!/搜索业务(案件COMP/M.5727)委员会决定C(2010)1077，第101段;Microsoft/Skype (Case Comp/M.6281) Commission Decision C(2011)7279, para 8163 Patricia A Norberg, Daniel R Horne和David A Horne，“隐私悖论:个人信息披露意图与行为”[2007]，《消费者事务杂志》100,100 - 101.64 See, e.g. Alessandro Acquisti和Jens grosskags，“个人决策中的隐私和合理性”[2005]IEEE安全和隐私24,26&28.65 See, e.g. Pinar Akman，“悖论网络”:J.ON TELECOMM & HIGH TECH L . 251,259.68 CMA，“消费者数据的商业使用”(n 8) para 4.41.69 ibid para 4.142.70 Akman (n 65) 268.71 OECD，“网络平台与数字广告”(n 14)第117.67页。“考虑并购控制中的非价格影响——秘书处的背景说明”[2018]DAF/COMP(2018)见第31.72页OECD，“并购的非价格效应——Orla Lynskey注释”(第17页)。8.73欧盟委员会，“并购控制程序概况”[2013]。见第2.74页，同上。75微软/LinkedIn (n 28)，脚注330至第350.76段，同上。77同上。第350.78段，同上。79同上。80一般参见OECD，“新兴隐私增强技术”(OECD出版社，巴黎，2023)。第15.81页案例C-68/94和C-30/95法国和其他公司诉欧盟委员会:C:1998:148第109-124.82段横向合并评估指南(第37段)第21段;委员会诉利乐拉瓦尔(第38段)第43.84段案例C-413/06 P贝塔斯曼和美国索尼公司诉Impala (Impala II)， ECLI:EU:C:2008:392段第46&48&51.85段案例T-79/12思科系统和Messagenet诉委员会ECLI:EU:C: 2013: 561第88.87段同上第87.88段同上第76.89段法国和其他诉委员会(第81段)第109-124.90段横向合并评估指南(第37段)脚注110.91同上第9.92段同上93 Damien Geradin和Ianis Girgenson，《欧盟合并控制中的反事实分析(2013)》，2023年7月15日，第2页;横向合并评估指南(第37页)第9.95段Geradin和Girgenson(第93页)6.96横向合并评估指南(第37页)第9.97段同上。98同上第89段;法国和其他公司诉委员会(n 81)第115.101段巴斯夫/潘托奇姆/Eurodiol (Comp/M.2314)委员会2001年11月7日决定，第142和143段。 102横向合并评估指引(n 37)第90.103段微软/雅虎!搜索业务(n 62)第131-159.104段微软雅虎!/查册业务(n 62)第101段;微软/Skype (n 62)第81.105段欧洲数据保护主管，“EDPS关于大数据时代基本权利连贯执行的意见”(第8/2016号意见)。第6.106页欧洲数据保护主管，“大数据时代的隐私和竞争力”(n 15) 10.107 JD Sports Fashion plc收购Footasylum plc完成合并:最终报告(2020年5月6日). .108同上第8.95,8.98,8.108 - 8.115和8.200 - 8.204.109同上。110 JD Sports Fashion plc诉竞争和市场管理局[2020]CAT 24.111同上[77]和[89]。112同上[99]。113同上，114 Facebook/WhatsApp(同上，第25段)，第87.115段，同上，第87.116段，同上，第102段和第106.118段，同上，第132.119 Stucke和Grunes，大数据和竞争政策(同上，第13段)，75和133.120微软/LinkedIn(同上，第28段)，第301.121段，同上，第338段和第343.122段，同上，第346.123段，同上，第350.124段，同上，125谷歌/Fitbit(同上，第11段)，第452.126段，同上，127谷歌/Fitbit(同上，第11段)，第452.128段，脚注300，参见，例如Stucke和Grunes，大数据和竞争政策(n 13) 61.129法国和其他国家诉欧盟委员会(n 81)第109-124段。
{"title":"When should EU merger assessment address privacy? The conditions for addressing privacy issues under the EU merger control regulation","authors":"Lilian Klein","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2280330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2280330","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe advent of digital companies has brought benefits to society. Nevertheless, the digital era poses significant risks to consumers’ privacy. The combination, through mergers, of enormous datasets could raise further privacy concerns. It has been much discussed whether and how consumer privacy concerns should be introduced within merger assessment. This paper approaches this issue from another perspective and reflects upon the circumstances under which the EU Merger Control Regulation (EUMR) has a role to address privacy issues. Accordingly, this paper clarifies the conditions that must be satisfied in order for privacy issues to fall within the EUMR’s ambit. First, privacy should be a parameter of competition on the market and second, there must be a causal link between the merger and privacy deterioration. Following this, the paper turns to critically analyse the Commission’s treatment of privacy issues in objectively selected mergers involving some of the most powerful digital companies.KEYWORDS: EU merger controlprivacydata protectioncausal linkdigital marketsGAMAM AcknowledgementsI would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Michael Harker and Dr Elias Deutscher for their invaluable and insightful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 [12].2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ 364/3 of 18 December 2000, Articles 7&8.3 Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECHR’ [2013] International Data Privacy Law 222, 223.4 Autorité de la Concurrence & Bundeskartellamt, ‘Competition Law and Data’ [2016]. <http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf> at page 5.5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1 (GDPR).6 Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law (3rd edn, OUP 2016) 5–11 & 51–54.7 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University Press 2010) 19.8 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ Report on the CMA’s call for information CMA38 June 2015. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf> at page 5; Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 55.9 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ (n 8) para 3.56; OECD, ‘Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-being: Interim Synthesis Report’ [2014]. <https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/data-driven-innovation-interim-synt","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2270744
Alessia Sophia D’Amico
Platform power poses a number of challenges for competition authorities. One concern is that big tech companies may harm competition through the acquisition of emerging companies with a high competitive potential. Such acquisitions may escape ex ante merger control if they do not reach the turnover threshold for mandatory notification. The Commission sought to bridge this enforcement gap with its Article 22 guidance and the Digital Markets Act. This paper evaluates the steps taken by the Commission to increase scrutiny of such mergers. Building on this discussion, the paper examines the AG opinion in Towercast and analyses the residual gap-closing function of Article 102 TFEU. The aim of this paper is to bring the new developments surrounding digital merger control together and assess whether they represent an adequate response to the challenges posed by the digital economy.
{"title":"Closing the tech acquisitions enforcement gap: from article 22 to article 102","authors":"Alessia Sophia D’Amico","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2270744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2270744","url":null,"abstract":"Platform power poses a number of challenges for competition authorities. One concern is that big tech companies may harm competition through the acquisition of emerging companies with a high competitive potential. Such acquisitions may escape ex ante merger control if they do not reach the turnover threshold for mandatory notification. The Commission sought to bridge this enforcement gap with its Article 22 guidance and the Digital Markets Act. This paper evaluates the steps taken by the Commission to increase scrutiny of such mergers. Building on this discussion, the paper examines the AG opinion in Towercast and analyses the residual gap-closing function of Article 102 TFEU. The aim of this paper is to bring the new developments surrounding digital merger control together and assess whether they represent an adequate response to the challenges posed by the digital economy.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135883191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2263262
Patrick Actis Perinetto, Giacomo Grechi
ABSTRACTWho should be liable for competition law infringements? While the answer should be, in theory, a simple application of the personal liability principle – the infringer pays – the corporate changes that an infringer may undergo in the years necessary to come to an imputation of the infringement make the matter, in practice, significantly more complex. In this article, we first investigate the core of the antitrust liability theories, all to be traced back to the fundamental concept of undertaking, which constitutes their indispensable theoretical background. Then, we will try to provide an answer to the question, by analyzing, on the basis of the case-law, the multifaceted and colourful applications of antitrust liability theories to M&A transactions involving antitrust infringers. Lastly, we lay out practical suggestions which may be useful for companies to minimize the risks of being left with antitrust liability as a result of corporate transactions.KEYWORDS: Antitrust liabilityundertakingSumalSkanskaeconomic continuity Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 P Whelan, ‘Private Enforcement and the Imputation of Antitrust Liability’ in B Rodger, F Marcos and M Sousa Ferro (eds), Research Handbook on Competition Law Private Enforcement in the EU (Elgar Publishing) 159–80, available at SSRN: 159 and 175. See also C Reichow, ‘The Court of Justice’s Sumal Judgment: Civil Liability of a Subsidiary for its Parent’s Infringement of EU Competition Law’ (2021) 6(3) European Papers 1327.2 Judgment of the Court of First instance of 30 September 2009, case T-161/05, Hoechst v. Commission, EU:T:2009:366, §58.3 Opinion of A.G. Kokott of 29 November 2012, case C-440/11 P, Commission v. Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje, EU:C:2012:76, §32.4 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 October 2021, case C-882/19, Sumal v. Mercedes Benz Trucks España (Sumal), EU:C:2021:800, §43.5 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2017, case C-625/13P, Villeroy & Boch AG v. Commission, EU:C:2017:52, §154.6 Sumal, cit., §39 and judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 March 2019, case C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy and others (Skanska), EU:C:2019:204, §32.7 Sumal, cit., §42.8 Opinion of A.G. Wahl of 6 February 2019, Skanska, EU:C:2019:100, §66.9 Sumal, cit., §38.10 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU refer to undertakings as subjects which can infringe competition law, Articles 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003 and 2(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU mention the undertaking as the subject on which fines should be imposed and damages should be claimed in connection with a competition law infringement.11 Whelan, cit., 160.12 S Thomas, ‘Guilty of a Fault that one has not Committed. The Limits of the Group-Based Sanction Policy Carried out by the Commission and the European Courts in EU-Antitrust Law’ (2012) 3(1) JECLAP 33.13 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 April 20
{"title":"Antitrust liability, corporate groups and M&A transactions: a tale of undertakings, economic continuity and effectiveness of EU competition law","authors":"Patrick Actis Perinetto, Giacomo Grechi","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2263262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2263262","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTWho should be liable for competition law infringements? While the answer should be, in theory, a simple application of the personal liability principle – the infringer pays – the corporate changes that an infringer may undergo in the years necessary to come to an imputation of the infringement make the matter, in practice, significantly more complex. In this article, we first investigate the core of the antitrust liability theories, all to be traced back to the fundamental concept of undertaking, which constitutes their indispensable theoretical background. Then, we will try to provide an answer to the question, by analyzing, on the basis of the case-law, the multifaceted and colourful applications of antitrust liability theories to M&A transactions involving antitrust infringers. Lastly, we lay out practical suggestions which may be useful for companies to minimize the risks of being left with antitrust liability as a result of corporate transactions.KEYWORDS: Antitrust liabilityundertakingSumalSkanskaeconomic continuity Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 P Whelan, ‘Private Enforcement and the Imputation of Antitrust Liability’ in B Rodger, F Marcos and M Sousa Ferro (eds), Research Handbook on Competition Law Private Enforcement in the EU (Elgar Publishing) 159–80, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4080911> 159 and 175. See also C Reichow, ‘The Court of Justice’s Sumal Judgment: Civil Liability of a Subsidiary for its Parent’s Infringement of EU Competition Law’ (2021) 6(3) European Papers 1327.2 Judgment of the Court of First instance of 30 September 2009, case T-161/05, Hoechst v. Commission, EU:T:2009:366, §58.3 Opinion of A.G. Kokott of 29 November 2012, case C-440/11 P, Commission v. Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje, EU:C:2012:76, §32.4 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 October 2021, case C-882/19, Sumal v. Mercedes Benz Trucks España (Sumal), EU:C:2021:800, §43.5 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2017, case C-625/13P, Villeroy & Boch AG v. Commission, EU:C:2017:52, §154.6 Sumal, cit., §39 and judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 March 2019, case C-724/17, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy and others (Skanska), EU:C:2019:204, §32.7 Sumal, cit., §42.8 Opinion of A.G. Wahl of 6 February 2019, Skanska, EU:C:2019:100, §66.9 Sumal, cit., §38.10 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU refer to undertakings as subjects which can infringe competition law, Articles 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003 and 2(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU mention the undertaking as the subject on which fines should be imposed and damages should be claimed in connection with a competition law infringement.11 Whelan, cit., 160.12 S Thomas, ‘Guilty of a Fault that one has not Committed. The Limits of the Group-Based Sanction Policy Carried out by the Commission and the European Courts in EU-Antitrust Law’ (2012) 3(1) JECLAP 33.13 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 April 20","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135424964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2262870
Manuel Wörsdörfer
ABSTRACTThis paper builds on Khan’s work on Amazon by transferring her normative framework to Apple. It explores the company’s anti-competitive business practices, main antitrust concerns, and the currently proposed reform measures from an innovative business ethics and law (i.e., ordoliberal) perspective. The paper argues that one of the key issues with Apple is the company’s closed ecosystem combined with its role as an internet gatekeeper. The E.U.’s Digital Markets Act, which aims to open Apple’s ecosystem – via data portability, interoperability, and multi-homing requirements – is a necessary step in the right direction. Yet, it is insufficient to prevent the lock-in effects of a ‘walled product garden’ and ensure complete device and platform neutrality. That is, additional steps must be taken to overcome Apple’s dual role as a platform operator and service provider and inhibit the company from engaging in anti-competitive business conduct.KEYWORDS: Apple Incantitrustcompetition law and policyDigital Markets Actordoliberalism Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See L. Khan, ‘Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox’ (2017) 126 Yale Law Journal 710.2 See L. Khan (n 1): “In addition to being a retailer, Amazon is a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of [TV] and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading provider of cloud server space and computing power” (p. 754).3 See for more information on Apple’s App Store as an essential facility: B. Kotapati, S. Mutungi, M. Newham, J. Schroeder, S. Shao, & M. Wang, ‘The Antitrust Case Against Apple’ (2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606073 (accessed: July 11, 2023).4 See B. Baer, J. Baker, M. Kades, F. Scott Morton, N. Rose, C. Shapiro, & T. Wu, ‘Restoring Competition in the United States’ (2020) https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/ (accessed: July 11, 2023), J. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm (Harvard University Press 2019), R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (Free Press 1978/1993), R. Bork & W. Bowman, ‘The Crisis in Antitrust’ (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 363, H. Hovenkamp, ‘Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?’ (2019) 94 Notre Dame Law Review 583, H. Hovenkamp, ‘The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics’ (2021) 101 Boston University Law Review 489, H. Hovenkamp, ‘Antitrust and Platform Monopoly’ (2021) 130 Yale Law Journal 1901, H. Hovenkamp & F. Scott Morton, ‘Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ (2020) 168 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1843, A. Klobuchar, Antitrust (Knopf 2021), C. Shapiro, ‘Antitrust. What Went Wrong and How to Fix It’ (2021) http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/fixingantitrust.pdf (accessed: July 11, 2023), M. Wörsdörfer, ‘Big Tech and Antitrust: An Ordoliberal Analysis’ (2022) 35 Philosophy & Technology Ar
{"title":"Apple’s antitrust paradox","authors":"Manuel Wörsdörfer","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2262870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2262870","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper builds on Khan’s work on Amazon by transferring her normative framework to Apple. It explores the company’s anti-competitive business practices, main antitrust concerns, and the currently proposed reform measures from an innovative business ethics and law (i.e., ordoliberal) perspective. The paper argues that one of the key issues with Apple is the company’s closed ecosystem combined with its role as an internet gatekeeper. The E.U.’s Digital Markets Act, which aims to open Apple’s ecosystem – via data portability, interoperability, and multi-homing requirements – is a necessary step in the right direction. Yet, it is insufficient to prevent the lock-in effects of a ‘walled product garden’ and ensure complete device and platform neutrality. That is, additional steps must be taken to overcome Apple’s dual role as a platform operator and service provider and inhibit the company from engaging in anti-competitive business conduct.KEYWORDS: Apple Incantitrustcompetition law and policyDigital Markets Actordoliberalism Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See L. Khan, ‘Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox’ (2017) 126 Yale Law Journal 710.2 See L. Khan (n 1): “In addition to being a retailer, Amazon is a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of [TV] and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading provider of cloud server space and computing power” (p. 754).3 See for more information on Apple’s App Store as an essential facility: B. Kotapati, S. Mutungi, M. Newham, J. Schroeder, S. Shao, & M. Wang, ‘The Antitrust Case Against Apple’ (2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3606073 (accessed: July 11, 2023).4 See B. Baer, J. Baker, M. Kades, F. Scott Morton, N. Rose, C. Shapiro, & T. Wu, ‘Restoring Competition in the United States’ (2020) https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/restoring-competition-in-the-united-states/ (accessed: July 11, 2023), J. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm (Harvard University Press 2019), R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (Free Press 1978/1993), R. Bork & W. Bowman, ‘The Crisis in Antitrust’ (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 363, H. Hovenkamp, ‘Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?’ (2019) 94 Notre Dame Law Review 583, H. Hovenkamp, ‘The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics’ (2021) 101 Boston University Law Review 489, H. Hovenkamp, ‘Antitrust and Platform Monopoly’ (2021) 130 Yale Law Journal 1901, H. Hovenkamp & F. Scott Morton, ‘Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ (2020) 168 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1843, A. Klobuchar, Antitrust (Knopf 2021), C. Shapiro, ‘Antitrust. What Went Wrong and How to Fix It’ (2021) http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/fixingantitrust.pdf (accessed: July 11, 2023), M. Wörsdörfer, ‘Big Tech and Antitrust: An Ordoliberal Analysis’ (2022) 35 Philosophy & Technology Ar","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135425789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-01DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2242698
Robert Lauer
ABSTRACTThe General Court’s annulment of the European Commission’s finding that Intel’s conditional rebate scheme was abusive underscores the Court’s readiness to scrutinize in detail the economic analysis, including the as-efficient competitor (AEC) test. This paper critically reviews some of the key errors that the Commission, according to the Court, made in relation to the implementation of that test, focusing on some of its main ingredients, namely the contestable share of the market, the conditional portion of the rebates, and the relevant cost benchmark. We conclude that the Court’s assessment provides useful lessons for how to perform thorough and robust economic analysis not only within the context of an AEC test but in competition cases more generally. At the same time, considering the test’s intrinsic limitations, we find that, aside from the test’s implementation, its informative value should also be explored, based on economic theory and the facts of the case.KEYWORDS: Abuse of dominant positionas-efficient competitor testexclusivity rebatesforeclosure strategymicroprocessors marketJEL: D43K21L12L42 AcknowledgmentsFor helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Nicola Tosini, David Matthew, C.-Philipp Heller, and an anonymous referee. The opinions and views stated in this text do not necessarily reflect those of my employer. All remaining errors are my own.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See Decision of the European Commission of 13 May 2009 – Intel (COMP/37.990).2 See Judgment of the General Court of 26 January 2022 – Intel v Commission (T-286/09 RENV, EU:T:2022:19).3 See Judgment, Article 1.4 See GC 2014: Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2014 – Intel v Commission (T-286/09, EU:T:2014:547).5 See CJEU 2017: Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 September 2017 – Intel v Commission (C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632).6 Judgment, para. 482.7 Judgment, para. 524.8 Judgment, para. 526.9 See James Killick, Assimakis Komninos, and Peter Citron, ‘EU General Court demands a vigorous effects-based analysis for rebates cases and annuls the European Commission’s Intel decision and the €1.06 billion fine’ (2022) White & Case .10 See Judgment, para. 529 and Article 1.11 See Official Journal of the European Union from 7 June 2022, Appeal brought on 5 April 2022 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 26 January 2022 in Case T-286/09 RENV, Intel Corporation v Commission (case C-240/22 P).12 See Judgment, section III. B. (pp. 25–76), out of a total of 88 pages. By contrast, the GC’s assessment of the criteria set out by the CJEU receives considerably less attention; see Judgment, section III. C. (pp. 76–82).13 See Decision, para. 5.14 See Decision, Article 1 a) – d).15 See Decision, Ar
66参见约书亚·赖特的《简单但错误还是复杂但更准确?》“基于排他性交易方法评估忠诚折扣的案例”(2013)在贝茨怀特第十届年度反垄断会议上的演讲，华盛顿特区。67 Wright (n 66) (p. 18).68参见kaiu - uwe k<e:1> hn和Miroslava Marinova，“作为有效竞争者”测试在CJEU判决英特尔后的作用”(2018)4(2)竞争法与政策辩论64-72.69关于这场辩论的摘要，参见Miroslava Marinova，竞争法中的忠诚回扣-“作为有效竞争者”测试的应用(Wolters Kluwer 2018)(特别是第6章)，以及Miroslava Marinova，从美国最近的判例法中，我们可以学到什么关于作为有效竞争者测试在保真退款案件中的应用?(2018) 41(4)世界大赛523-48.70见《决定》，第4段。1202 - 213。见《审判》，第6段。171-73.71这是基于以下两个理由。首先，平均售价在100-200美元左右(见《判决》，第18段)。305，即平均售价165美元(惠普);一般来说，cpu的售价范围很广;见《决定》，第2段。796)，而委员会使用的费用基准，即平均可避免费用(AAC)似乎约占ASP的35%(见决定，第7段)。1043;但请注意，具体的成本分担比例仍未公布;见《决定》，第2段。1145 - 153)。在图3中，通过将ASP设置为100美元，将成本设置为35美元来反映这一点。其次，委员会计算出英特尔通过AEC测试所需的可竞争份额为7.9%(见判决书第2段)。176，参照2005年Q1的AEC测试计算;要求的份额当然高于委员会采纳的实际可竞争份额，即7.1%，因为否则英特尔将通过委员会的AEC测试)。因此，在图3中，如果可竞争份额仅略高于委员会的7.1%，则折扣设置为AEC测试确实可以通过(参见第60条)72在这个例子中，当排他性折扣高于5%时，一个假设的有效竞争对手所要求的折扣很快就会超过100%——也就是说，一个有效价格是负的见《审判》，第6段。176. 委员会计算的所需份额指的是2005年第一季度。207-11.76见《判决》，第7段。269.77见《判决》，第2段。177,277.78判决，第1段。217.79判决，第2段234.80见判决书，第2段。233.81判决，第2段256.82见《判决》，第2段。260.83见《判决》，第2段。265-66.84见《判决》，第2段。判决，第268-69.85段。271.86见《判决》，第2段。282.87判决，第2段287.88见《决定》，第7段。1261. 见《审判》，第6段。280.89当然，当委员会发布其决定时，它是基于这样一种假设:英特尔的有条件回扣就其本质而言是反竞争的除了这种更定量的练习之外，了解下游市场的竞争强度也与首先评估排除动机有关。例如，参见第3.2.91节讨论的经济文献，尽管与委员会的AEC测试没有直接关系，但委员会注意到英特尔的营业利润率(31%)明显高于AMD的(4%)。见《决定》，第2段。878.92见(n 71).93见《审判》，第6段。126. 另一个问题是，不允许投资回报的AEC框架是否给予了主导企业定价行为不应有的自由裁量权。也就是说，如果一个假想的竞争对手(或假想的投资者)在现实世界中能够预期赚取的利润率(超过平均可避免成本)约为0%或略高，那么它是否真的会寻求扩大其客户群见决定，第1 (c).95条AEC测试仅限于一个季度，该测试的结果被外推到其余的侵权期。见《决定》，第2段。1408 - 411。然而，总检察长裁定，选委会在推断其调查结果时犯了一个评估错误，因为选委会没有证明选委会在该季度的数字对该期间的其余时间具有代表性。见《审判》，第6段。390 - 411。96 .这种外推构成了与回扣的有条件部分分开的错误，本文将不作进一步讨论见《审判》，第6段。347.97见《判决》，第7段。342.98判决，第2段354.99判决，第2段380.100判决，第2段372.101判决，第2段389.102见判决书，第2段。339-40，再现英特尔的位置。从定量的角度来看，从公开信息中很难推断出这是否通过了AEC测试。 752, 798-99，指的是“由委员会进行的AEC测试”。在欧盟委员会对谷歌Android的决定中，AEC分析在13.4.1.2节中进行(“竞争的通用搜索服务不可能匹配谷歌向oem和移动运营商支付的基于投资组合的收入分成”)。在那里，委员会发现竞争性的通用搜索服务要匹配谷歌的报价，它必须提供超过100%的收入分成，这是另一种说法，价格低于成本Google Android, para。644.142参见GC Google Android，第2段。735-52.143见GC Google Android，第2段。758-74.144见GC Google Android，第2段。789-97.145 GC Google Android, para。799. GC对欧盟委员会在谷歌Android上的AEC测试的评估也吸引了一些批评的政策言论。参见Cristina Caffarra，“欧盟普通法院确认Android通过捆绑滥用支配地位，案件的真正遗产远远超出(Google Android)”(2022)并发(预览)。146见GC Google Android，第6段。964-1005.147参见Christian Burholt和Katrin Kurz的《作为有效竞争者的Das Ende des》——测试?- Die jngste Entscheidung des EuG im Fall Intel ' (2022) 4 Wirtschaft and Wettbewerb 182-84.148 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13796-EU-competition-law-guidelines-on-exclusionary-abuses-by-dominant-undertakings_en
{"title":"The <i>Intel</i> saga: what went wrong with the Commission’s AEC test (in the General Court’s view)?","authors":"Robert Lauer","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2242698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2242698","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe General Court’s annulment of the European Commission’s finding that Intel’s conditional rebate scheme was abusive underscores the Court’s readiness to scrutinize in detail the economic analysis, including the as-efficient competitor (AEC) test. This paper critically reviews some of the key errors that the Commission, according to the Court, made in relation to the implementation of that test, focusing on some of its main ingredients, namely the contestable share of the market, the conditional portion of the rebates, and the relevant cost benchmark. We conclude that the Court’s assessment provides useful lessons for how to perform thorough and robust economic analysis not only within the context of an AEC test but in competition cases more generally. At the same time, considering the test’s intrinsic limitations, we find that, aside from the test’s implementation, its informative value should also be explored, based on economic theory and the facts of the case.KEYWORDS: Abuse of dominant positionas-efficient competitor testexclusivity rebatesforeclosure strategymicroprocessors marketJEL: D43K21L12L42 AcknowledgmentsFor helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Nicola Tosini, David Matthew, C.-Philipp Heller, and an anonymous referee. The opinions and views stated in this text do not necessarily reflect those of my employer. All remaining errors are my own.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See Decision of the European Commission of 13 May 2009 – Intel (COMP/37.990).2 See Judgment of the General Court of 26 January 2022 – Intel v Commission (T-286/09 RENV, EU:T:2022:19).3 See Judgment, Article 1.4 See GC 2014: Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2014 – Intel v Commission (T-286/09, EU:T:2014:547).5 See CJEU 2017: Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 September 2017 – Intel v Commission (C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632).6 Judgment, para. 482.7 Judgment, para. 524.8 Judgment, para. 526.9 See James Killick, Assimakis Komninos, and Peter Citron, ‘EU General Court demands a vigorous effects-based analysis for rebates cases and annuls the European Commission’s Intel decision and the €1.06 billion fine’ (2022) White & Case <https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/eu-general-court-demands-vigorous-effects-based-analysis-rebates-cases-and-annuls>.10 See Judgment, para. 529 and Article 1.11 See Official Journal of the European Union from 7 June 2022, Appeal brought on 5 April 2022 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 26 January 2022 in Case T-286/09 RENV, Intel Corporation v Commission (case C-240/22 P).12 See Judgment, section III. B. (pp. 25–76), out of a total of 88 pages. By contrast, the GC’s assessment of the criteria set out by the CJEU receives considerably less attention; see Judgment, section III. C. (pp. 76–82).13 See Decision, para. 5.14 See Decision, Article 1 a) – d).15 See Decision, Ar","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136020867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2023.2234233
Jesper Fredborg Huric-Larsen
{"title":"Cartel formation and the business cycle","authors":"Jesper Fredborg Huric-Larsen","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2234233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2234233","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42537054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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