Pub Date : 2022-02-15DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2034332
C. Hutchinson, D. Treščáková
ABSTRACT “Self-preferencing” refers to a conduct of a large provider of core platform services which consists in favouring one’s own products and services over those offered by competitors on the same platform. Drawing on the experience acquired through its various antitrust investigations into the conducts of Big Tech, the European Commission, in its its “proposal for the Digital Market Act”, has put forward the concept of “gatekeeper”. If adopted, this regulatory instrument which aims at ensuring fairness and transparency in the EU digital markets, would enable the Commission to qualify as such any large core platform service on the basis of narrowly defined objectives criteria and submit it to a set of prohibitions and obligations. By opting for such an approach, the Commission would be able to switch from an ex-post assessment of a gatekeepers’ self-preferencing practices to an ex-ante one.
{"title":"Tackling gatekeepers’ self-preferencing practices","authors":"C. Hutchinson, D. Treščáková","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2034332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2034332","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT “Self-preferencing” refers to a conduct of a large provider of core platform services which consists in favouring one’s own products and services over those offered by competitors on the same platform. Drawing on the experience acquired through its various antitrust investigations into the conducts of Big Tech, the European Commission, in its its “proposal for the Digital Market Act”, has put forward the concept of “gatekeeper”. If adopted, this regulatory instrument which aims at ensuring fairness and transparency in the EU digital markets, would enable the Commission to qualify as such any large core platform service on the basis of narrowly defined objectives criteria and submit it to a set of prohibitions and obligations. By opting for such an approach, the Commission would be able to switch from an ex-post assessment of a gatekeepers’ self-preferencing practices to an ex-ante one.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43095332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-02DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2022.2034331
Thomas Tombal
ABSTRACT In a society where individuals increasingly spend time on the internet, large online platforms have become, for many, unavoidable actors. As it is increasingly argued that competition policy alone cannot address all the systemic problems that they create in digital markets where quick reactions are indispensable, there seems to be a consensus across the globe that legislative action must be taken against a specific sub-set of these large online platforms in order to foster contestability and fairness. This contribution aims to analyse how the EU, UK and US legislators intend to do so through regulation. First, the scope of the digital platforms that would be subject to these regulatory initiatives, and the potential discrepancies in this regard, will be clarified. Then, the general approach and options taken in each of these jurisdictions to address this dependence issue will be outlined. Finally, the main discrepancies between these different approaches will be summarized.
{"title":"Ensuring contestability and fairness in digital markets through regulation: a comparative analysis of the EU, UK and US approaches","authors":"Thomas Tombal","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2022.2034331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2022.2034331","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In a society where individuals increasingly spend time on the internet, large online platforms have become, for many, unavoidable actors. As it is increasingly argued that competition policy alone cannot address all the systemic problems that they create in digital markets where quick reactions are indispensable, there seems to be a consensus across the globe that legislative action must be taken against a specific sub-set of these large online platforms in order to foster contestability and fairness. This contribution aims to analyse how the EU, UK and US legislators intend to do so through regulation. First, the scope of the digital platforms that would be subject to these regulatory initiatives, and the potential discrepancies in this regard, will be clarified. Then, the general approach and options taken in each of these jurisdictions to address this dependence issue will be outlined. Finally, the main discrepancies between these different approaches will be summarized.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48369953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-17DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.2002588
Oliver Latham, Chara Tzanetaki
ABSTRACT We draw parallels between the pandemic and foreclosure in network industries by applying “Susceptible, Infected, Recovered” (SIR) modelling to an antitrust setting. We consider a digital service seeking to grow into an addressable market occupied by an incumbent platform. The entrant can grow organically, but amassing more users allows it to spread faster as users invite friends or generate content increasing its attractiveness. We consider the impact of the incumbent taking steps (e.g. reducing interoperability) to make the entrant “less infectious” with three main implications for antitrust policy: conduct may have large effects even if the targeted service continues to grow; conduct is most effective when applied against nascent services before they can harness netwrok effects; and conduct can have non-linear effects, with the most “viral” services continuing to grow while others are eliminated. Each result has parallels with the experience of the pandemic and implications for innovation incentives.
{"title":"R you being foreclosed?","authors":"Oliver Latham, Chara Tzanetaki","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.2002588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.2002588","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We draw parallels between the pandemic and foreclosure in network industries by applying “Susceptible, Infected, Recovered” (SIR) modelling to an antitrust setting. We consider a digital service seeking to grow into an addressable market occupied by an incumbent platform. The entrant can grow organically, but amassing more users allows it to spread faster as users invite friends or generate content increasing its attractiveness. We consider the impact of the incumbent taking steps (e.g. reducing interoperability) to make the entrant “less infectious” with three main implications for antitrust policy: conduct may have large effects even if the targeted service continues to grow; conduct is most effective when applied against nascent services before they can harness netwrok effects; and conduct can have non-linear effects, with the most “viral” services continuing to grow while others are eliminated. Each result has parallels with the experience of the pandemic and implications for innovation incentives.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46969950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-22DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.2003998
Idris Abdelkhalek
ABSTRACT Sustainable development is today a guiding objective of the EU. This article therefore analyses if and how it can be integrated in competition law and more specifically in the antitrust rules of art. 101 TFEU. This paper first explains the legal background of sustainable development, its economic, social and environmental dimensions on the international scene and highlights its enshrinement in the EU treaties. It then focuses on its environmental dimension and identifies three routes to integration in EU competition law: (i) the agreements not restricting competition while protecting the environment; (ii) the objective necessity route whereby agreements whose restrictions on competition are objectively justified and proportionate make them fall outside of the scope of art. 101 TFEU; (iii) and the exemption route of art. 101 (3) TFEU. This article analyses each of these routes and puts forward the legal points requiring clarifications or modifications in this regard.
{"title":"Sustainable development in the EU – which state of play in competition law?","authors":"Idris Abdelkhalek","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.2003998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.2003998","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Sustainable development is today a guiding objective of the EU. This article therefore analyses if and how it can be integrated in competition law and more specifically in the antitrust rules of art. 101 TFEU. This paper first explains the legal background of sustainable development, its economic, social and environmental dimensions on the international scene and highlights its enshrinement in the EU treaties. It then focuses on its environmental dimension and identifies three routes to integration in EU competition law: (i) the agreements not restricting competition while protecting the environment; (ii) the objective necessity route whereby agreements whose restrictions on competition are objectively justified and proportionate make them fall outside of the scope of art. 101 TFEU; (iii) and the exemption route of art. 101 (3) TFEU. This article analyses each of these routes and puts forward the legal points requiring clarifications or modifications in this regard.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47892917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-16DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.2003999
Cezary Banasiński, Marcin Rojszczak
ABSTRACT For more than 30 years, EU institutions and Member States have been engaged in a dialogue on what measures might be considered appropriate to protect media pluralism. With the increasing globalization of digital services, national legislatures have increasingly recognized the need to actively shape the media market by controlling mergers taking place within it. The aim of this article is to discuss the PKN Orlen/Polska Press case and to explain the role of EU competition authorities in protecting media pluralism. The analysis also seeks to determine whether – and based on which competencies – the EU should counter systemic threats to media independence in Member States. The Polish experience may also be helpful in view of work currently underway on the new Media Freedom Act – EU legislation intended to counteract the growing monopolization of media and ensure its protection as a central pillar of democracy.
{"title":"The role of competition authorities in protecting freedom of speech: the PKN Orlen/Polska Press case","authors":"Cezary Banasiński, Marcin Rojszczak","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.2003999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.2003999","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For more than 30 years, EU institutions and Member States have been engaged in a dialogue on what measures might be considered appropriate to protect media pluralism. With the increasing globalization of digital services, national legislatures have increasingly recognized the need to actively shape the media market by controlling mergers taking place within it. The aim of this article is to discuss the PKN Orlen/Polska Press case and to explain the role of EU competition authorities in protecting media pluralism. The analysis also seeks to determine whether – and based on which competencies – the EU should counter systemic threats to media independence in Member States. The Polish experience may also be helpful in view of work currently underway on the new Media Freedom Act – EU legislation intended to counteract the growing monopolization of media and ensure its protection as a central pillar of democracy.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44685904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-28DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1995206
C. Hutchinson
ABSTRACT The use of IoT products is increasingly becoming part of the everyday life of citizens in the EU. With the consumer IoT sector braced for rapid growth, the European Commission is concerned that it will be concentrated in a small number of companies. The Commission is particularly wary that Big Tech may leverage their large shares on the voice assistants market to harm developing competitors and consumers. The preliminary report of its inquiry into the consumer IoT sector published in June 2021 shows that many respondents share the Commission’s competition concerns. If, after analyzing the results of the inquiry, the Commission turns up evidence of anti-competitive practices by tech giants, it could initiate investigations against those companies to ensure compliance with EU rules on abuse of dominant position. Nevertheless, some experts doubt whether a crackdown on Big Tech would lead to a more competitive and innovative IoT market.
{"title":"Curbing Big Tech's IoT dominance","authors":"C. Hutchinson","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1995206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1995206","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The use of IoT products is increasingly becoming part of the everyday life of citizens in the EU. With the consumer IoT sector braced for rapid growth, the European Commission is concerned that it will be concentrated in a small number of companies. The Commission is particularly wary that Big Tech may leverage their large shares on the voice assistants market to harm developing competitors and consumers. The preliminary report of its inquiry into the consumer IoT sector published in June 2021 shows that many respondents share the Commission’s competition concerns. If, after analyzing the results of the inquiry, the Commission turns up evidence of anti-competitive practices by tech giants, it could initiate investigations against those companies to ensure compliance with EU rules on abuse of dominant position. Nevertheless, some experts doubt whether a crackdown on Big Tech would lead to a more competitive and innovative IoT market.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44810562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-28DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1995227
P. Jansen, S. Beeston, L. Van Acker
ABSTRACT In October 2020, the European Commission (EC) published a call for contributions on how competition rules could support the Green Deal. With this initiative, the EC followed in the footsteps of several national competition authorities which had already issued guidance on competition policy and sustainability initiatives. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) is, to date, the only authority to publish draft Sustainability Guidelines with progressive, practical guidance. In this paper, we explore the extent to which ACM’s Sustainability Guidelines could serve as a source of inspiration for a modern EU approach to sustainability and competition policy. We will conclude that while these Guidelines constitute a clear compromise, ACM has created an intelligent modus operandi to allow for more cooperative sustainability initiatives under the third paragraph of Articles 6 Dutch Competition Act and 101 TFEU without itself having to take decisions about public policy. Sustainability – Green Deal - fair share - polluter pays – ACM - Netherlands - Article 101 TFEU.
{"title":"The sustainability guidelines of the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets: an impetus for a modern EU approach to sustainability and competition policy reflecting the principle that the polluter pays?","authors":"P. Jansen, S. Beeston, L. Van Acker","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1995227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1995227","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In October 2020, the European Commission (EC) published a call for contributions on how competition rules could support the Green Deal. With this initiative, the EC followed in the footsteps of several national competition authorities which had already issued guidance on competition policy and sustainability initiatives. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) is, to date, the only authority to publish draft Sustainability Guidelines with progressive, practical guidance. In this paper, we explore the extent to which ACM’s Sustainability Guidelines could serve as a source of inspiration for a modern EU approach to sustainability and competition policy. We will conclude that while these Guidelines constitute a clear compromise, ACM has created an intelligent modus operandi to allow for more cooperative sustainability initiatives under the third paragraph of Articles 6 Dutch Competition Act and 101 TFEU without itself having to take decisions about public policy. Sustainability – Green Deal - fair share - polluter pays – ACM - Netherlands - Article 101 TFEU.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48032458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-18DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.2002589
D. Geradin, Dimitrios Katsifis
ABSTRACT While the initiatives in various jurisdictions to impose ex ante regulation on “digital gatekeepers” – large online platforms that are necessary intermediaries between business users and their customers – have attracted considerable attention, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the equally important need to strengthen effective antitrust enforcement in digital markets. The focus is on possible adjustments to the current competition law framework on unilateral conduct. The paper examines four proposals. First, it argues in favour of revisiting the error-cost framework and considering the introduction of presumptions of anticompetitiveness in limited circumstances. Second, it makes the case that competition authorities should make greater use of restorative remedies to reinject lost competition in the market. Third, it discusses the need for greater focus on harms to quality and innovation. Fourth, it argues that when competition has been irreparably harmed, EU competition authorities should consider exploitative cases.
{"title":"Strengthening effective antitrust enforcement in digital platform markets","authors":"D. Geradin, Dimitrios Katsifis","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.2002589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.2002589","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 While the initiatives in various jurisdictions to impose ex ante regulation on “digital gatekeepers” – large online platforms that are necessary intermediaries between business users and their customers – have attracted considerable attention, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the equally important need to strengthen effective antitrust enforcement in digital markets. The focus is on possible adjustments to the current competition law framework on unilateral conduct. The paper examines four proposals. First, it argues in favour of revisiting the error-cost framework and considering the introduction of presumptions of anticompetitiveness in limited circumstances. Second, it makes the case that competition authorities should make greater use of restorative remedies to reinject lost competition in the market. Third, it discusses the need for greater focus on harms to quality and innovation. Fourth, it argues that when competition has been irreparably harmed, EU competition authorities should consider exploitative cases.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41588918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-10DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1979776
Amanda Cliffe
ABSTRACT Fintechs are crucial to ensuring Europe’s transition to a digital economy. In its Digital Finance Strategy, the Commission endorses the need to ensure a level playing field in the provision of digital financial services. However, the dominant position that banks hold in the European economy has enabled them to engage in abusive practices, such as the refusal to grant access to data to fintechs. Such a practice could also occur among bigtechs, which are soon to become dominant players in the payment services sphere. The first part of this article pertains to the Payment Services Directive II and to what extent it has contributed towards levelling the playing field between banks and fintechs. The second part of this paper analyses the extent to which provisions of the proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) could help contribute towards levelling the playing field between bigtechs and fintechs.
{"title":"To what extent does European law ensure a level playing field for fintechs in the payment services sector?","authors":"Amanda Cliffe","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1979776","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1979776","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Fintechs are crucial to ensuring Europe’s transition to a digital economy. In its Digital Finance Strategy, the Commission endorses the need to ensure a level playing field in the provision of digital financial services. However, the dominant position that banks hold in the European economy has enabled them to engage in abusive practices, such as the refusal to grant access to data to fintechs. Such a practice could also occur among bigtechs, which are soon to become dominant players in the payment services sphere. The first part of this article pertains to the Payment Services Directive II and to what extent it has contributed towards levelling the playing field between banks and fintechs. The second part of this paper analyses the extent to which provisions of the proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) could help contribute towards levelling the playing field between bigtechs and fintechs.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41706323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-26DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1979777
Peter van Wijck, Franziska Weber
ABSTRACT This paper is focussed on the implementation of the presumption of harm for cartels, as formulated in art. 17.2 of Directive 2014/104/EU. In most Member States the overcharge is presumed to be 0% unless proven otherwise. In two Member States this is 10% and in one it is 20%. These can be considered as three defaults. Damages litigation may lead to under- or overcompensation. Achieving full compensation is rather a coincidence. If harm is de facto substantially lower (higher) than the default, the infringer (victim) has an incentive to prove the actual level of harm. Different choices regarding the presumptions of harm imply a difference in the weighing of under- and overcompensation. A 0% default suggests that preventing overcompensation is the dominant goal. A 10% default will be more effective than a 0% default in serving the compensatory function.
{"title":"The abstract presumption of harm in the Damages Directive: overconcern of overcompensation","authors":"Peter van Wijck, Franziska Weber","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1979777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1979777","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper is focussed on the implementation of the presumption of harm for cartels, as formulated in art. 17.2 of Directive 2014/104/EU. In most Member States the overcharge is presumed to be 0% unless proven otherwise. In two Member States this is 10% and in one it is 20%. These can be considered as three defaults. Damages litigation may lead to under- or overcompensation. Achieving full compensation is rather a coincidence. If harm is de facto substantially lower (higher) than the default, the infringer (victim) has an incentive to prove the actual level of harm. Different choices regarding the presumptions of harm imply a difference in the weighing of under- and overcompensation. A 0% default suggests that preventing overcompensation is the dominant goal. A 10% default will be more effective than a 0% default in serving the compensatory function.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42289184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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