Abstract In what follows, we will reply to the critical comments one by one in the order that seemed most natural to us, given the topics covered. Apart from the references section towards the end, our replies are conceived as pieces each of which can be read independently from any of the others (but not, of course, independently from the comments it responds to). We hope to have done justice to the critical points made by our commentators and to have come up with viable answers to the various challenges they raise.
{"title":"Replies to Critics","authors":"F. Correia, Sven Rosenkranz","doi":"10.1111/phpr.12818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12818","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In what follows, we will reply to the critical comments one by one in the order that seemed most natural to us, given the topics covered. Apart from the references section towards the end, our replies are conceived as pieces each of which can be read independently from any of the others (but not, of course, independently from the comments it responds to). We hope to have done justice to the critical points made by our commentators and to have come up with viable answers to the various challenges they raise.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"102 1","pages":"445 - 494"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75748348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While Kant's claim has been discredited — namely that logic had, by his time, neither progressed nor regressed ever since Aristotle — both the exact reason while he was wrong and the partial core of truth his assertion contained ought to be elucidated. Aristotle's was a logic of terms that ignored the calculus of statements, cultivated instead by the Stoic logicians and later Scholastics. However a unified — yet unsuccessful — logical account of terms and propositions was attempted by Leibniz. It was an anticipation of modern combinatory logic. Leibniz's successors took over his reduction of logic to a certain mathematical calculus. Boole asserted that all logical truths were algebraic equations. Nevertheless, existential statements showed themselves unamenable to his approach. It was Frege who really made a giant step forward by resorting to variables and inventing the quantifier, thanks to his theory of objects and functions. Thus, Aristotle's logic was at last somehaw overcome. Not quite, though, since both Aristotle's and Frege's accounts share common assumptions, which have been put to rest by nonclassical logics such as combinatory and many-valued logics.
{"title":"El papel de Frege en la historia de la lógica","authors":"Lorenzo Peña","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.5168811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.5168811","url":null,"abstract":"While Kant's claim has been discredited — namely that logic had, by his time, neither progressed nor regressed ever since Aristotle — both the exact reason while he was wrong and the partial core of truth his assertion contained ought to be elucidated. Aristotle's was a logic of terms that ignored the calculus of statements, cultivated instead by the Stoic logicians and later Scholastics. However a unified — yet unsuccessful — logical account of terms and propositions was attempted by Leibniz. It was an anticipation of modern combinatory logic. Leibniz's successors took over his reduction of logic to a certain mathematical calculus. Boole asserted that all logical truths were algebraic equations. Nevertheless, existential statements showed themselves unamenable to his approach. It was Frege who really made a giant step forward by resorting to variables and inventing the quantifier, thanks to his theory of objects and functions. Thus, Aristotle's logic was at last somehaw overcome. Not quite, though, since both Aristotle's and Frege's accounts share common assumptions, which have been put to rest by nonclassical logics such as combinatory and many-valued logics.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"48 1","pages":"207-230"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76933035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be.
{"title":"Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns","authors":"H. Noonan","doi":"10.2478/disp-2021-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"14 1","pages":"51 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73927895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.
{"title":"Practical Identity and Duties of Love","authors":"Berit Brogaard","doi":"10.2478/disp-2021-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"76 1","pages":"27 - 50"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80546018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract People respond to moral criticism of their speech by claiming that they were joking. In this paper, I develop a speech act analysis of the humor excuse consisting of a negative stage, in which the speaker denies he or she was making an assertion, and a positive stage, in which the speaker claims she or he was engaged in non-serious/humorous speech instead. This analysis, however, runs afoul of the group identity objection, according to which there is a moral distinction between jokes targeting members of vulnerable groups made by members of those groups and similar jokes made by non-members. In order to avoid this objection, I offer a revision to the speech act analysis that draws upon Perry’s distinction between beliefs and belief-states.
{"title":"Just Kidding: Stand-Up, Speech Acts and Slurs","authors":"P. Alward","doi":"10.2478/disp-2021-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People respond to moral criticism of their speech by claiming that they were joking. In this paper, I develop a speech act analysis of the humor excuse consisting of a negative stage, in which the speaker denies he or she was making an assertion, and a positive stage, in which the speaker claims she or he was engaged in non-serious/humorous speech instead. This analysis, however, runs afoul of the group identity objection, according to which there is a moral distinction between jokes targeting members of vulnerable groups made by members of those groups and similar jokes made by non-members. In order to avoid this objection, I offer a revision to the speech act analysis that draws upon Perry’s distinction between beliefs and belief-states.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"24 1","pages":"1 - 25"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87217638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case that rational agents ought to reason logically. If the converse holds, and the exponent of logical normativity believes either (a) that it is false that rational agents ought to reason logically or (b) that the claim that rational agents ought to reason logically is not truth–functional, then any attempt to formulate sound arguments in support of their position will be either question–begging or self–contradictory. To argue in favour of the normative status of logic involves the assumption that the issue is substantive. I draw a distinction between deontic and axiological normativity as applied to logical theory and demonstrate that because deontic sentences are not truth–functional, logic cannot be normative in the deontic sense. I conclude that the only sense in which logical theory may be thought of as normative is axiologically.
{"title":"Logic Oughtn't be Normative","authors":"C. Searle","doi":"10.32701/DP.22.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32701/DP.22.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case that rational agents ought to reason logically. If the converse holds, and the exponent of logical normativity believes either (a) that it is false that rational agents ought to reason logically or (b) that the claim that rational agents ought to reason logically is not truth–functional, then any attempt to formulate sound arguments in support of their position will be either question–begging or self–contradictory. To argue in favour of the normative status of logic involves the assumption that the issue is substantive. I draw a distinction between deontic and axiological normativity as applied to logical theory and demonstrate that because deontic sentences are not truth–functional, logic cannot be normative in the deontic sense. I conclude that the only sense in which logical theory may be thought of as normative is axiologically.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"25 1","pages":"3-10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85921544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122378
Raphaèle Preisinger
{"title":"Introduction: A Return to Medieval Visuality after the Material Turn","authors":"Raphaèle Preisinger","doi":"10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122378","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"518 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77163710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122381
Jens Rüffer
{"title":"De spiritu et anima: The Cistercians, the Image, and Imagination","authors":"Jens Rüffer","doi":"10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122381","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89284582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122383
Silke Tammen
{"title":"Radiance and Image on the Breast: Seeing Medieval Jewellery","authors":"Silke Tammen","doi":"10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122383","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74718338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122379
Berthold Hub, Raphaèle Preisinger
{"title":"‘Visual Piety’ and Visual Theory: Was There a Paradigm Shift?","authors":"Berthold Hub, Raphaèle Preisinger","doi":"10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122379","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80741187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：