Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122380
W. Shaw
{"title":"Fortress of Form, Robber of Consciousness: Theorizing Visuality in Islam","authors":"W. Shaw","doi":"10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122380","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86359352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122384
C. Hahn
{"title":"Reliquaries and the Boundaries of Vision: Relics, Crystals, Mirrors, and the ‘Vision Effect’","authors":"C. Hahn","doi":"10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122384","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86884285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122385
Tina Bawden
{"title":"Channelling the Gaze: Squints in Late Medieval Screens","authors":"Tina Bawden","doi":"10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122385","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80966200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122382
B. Pentcheva
{"title":"The Liveliness of the Methexic Image","authors":"B. Pentcheva","doi":"10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.122382","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73741864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
espanolA menudo leemos textos del Antiguo Testamento donde parece ponerse de manifiesto la idea de la tierra entendida como centro de la creacion con el sol moviendose a su entorno. Es lo comunmente conocido como geocentrismo (γeωκeντρισμός), formulacion perfectamente compatible con la filosofia contemporanea de fuerte matriz aristotelica. Nos encontramos, por lo tanto, en un periodo —que duraria varios siglos— donde el pensamiento teologico y el pensamiento filosofico cohabitan perfectamente. En el presente articulo se presentan algunos de estos textos veterotestamentarios, que literalmente coinciden con el generalizado geocentrismo de la epoca. Para ello, se han tomado ejemplos de distintos Libros correspondientes a etapas de redaccion diversas. EnglishWe often read excerpts from the Old Testament that appear to evince an understanding of the Earth as the centre of creation, with the Sun revolving around it. That conception is commonly known as Geocentrism (γeωκeντρισμός), a formulation perfectly consistent with the philosophy of that age, which was strongly rooted in Aristotelianism. Therefore, we are talking about a period which lasted for several centuries in which theological and philosophical thought coexisted faultlessly. This essay contains some such Old Testament texts, which prove to concur literally with the Geocentrism prevalent at the time. To that end, examples have been extracted from a number of Books pertaining to different writing stages.
我们经常读旧约的文本，在那里，地球被理解为创造的中心，太阳移动到它的周围。这就是众所周知的地心主义(γeωκeντρισμός)，这个公式与强烈的亚里士多德矩阵的当代哲学完全一致。因此，我们发现自己处于一个持续几个世纪的时期，在这个时期，神学思想和哲学思想完美地共存。在这篇文章中，我们介绍了一些旧约文本，它们字面上符合当时广泛的地理中心主义。为了做到这一点，我们从不同的书籍中选取了不同写作阶段的例子。我们经常读旧约的节选，它似乎表明地球是创造的中心，太阳围绕着它旋转。这一概念通常被称为地理中心主义(γeωκeντρισμός)，与那个时代的哲学完全一致，它强烈地起源于亚里士多德主义。因此，我们谈论的是一个持续了几个世纪的时期，在这个时期，神学和哲学思想是不可避免的。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，这个县的面积为。而To that end,范例或from a number Books关于不同writing To stages。
{"title":"Do Old Testament texts substantiate Geocentrism","authors":"Pons Poblet, Josep María","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.4625605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.4625605","url":null,"abstract":"espanolA menudo leemos textos del Antiguo Testamento donde parece ponerse de manifiesto la idea de la tierra entendida como centro de la creacion con el sol moviendose a su entorno. Es lo comunmente conocido como geocentrismo (γeωκeντρισμός), formulacion perfectamente compatible con la filosofia contemporanea de fuerte matriz aristotelica. Nos encontramos, por lo tanto, en un periodo —que duraria varios siglos— donde el pensamiento teologico y el pensamiento filosofico cohabitan perfectamente. En el presente articulo se presentan algunos de estos textos veterotestamentarios, que literalmente coinciden con el generalizado geocentrismo de la epoca. Para ello, se han tomado ejemplos de distintos Libros correspondientes a etapas de redaccion diversas. EnglishWe often read excerpts from the Old Testament that appear to evince an understanding of the Earth as the centre of creation, with the Sun revolving around it. That conception is commonly known as Geocentrism (γeωκeντρισμός), a formulation perfectly consistent with the philosophy of that age, which was strongly rooted in Aristotelianism. Therefore, we are talking about a period which lasted for several centuries in which theological and philosophical thought coexisted faultlessly. This essay contains some such Old Testament texts, which prove to concur literally with the Geocentrism prevalent at the time. To that end, examples have been extracted from a number of Books pertaining to different writing stages.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"5 1","pages":"147-165"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87323948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper I provide five separate responses, one for each of the contributed papers, in order to clarify some crucial aspects of the view defended in my book.
在本文中，为了澄清我书中捍卫的观点的一些关键方面，我提供了五个单独的回应，每个回应一个贡献的论文。
{"title":"Replies","authors":"Andrea Iacona","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I provide five separate responses, one for each of the contributed papers, in order to clarify some crucial aspects of the view defended in my book.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"16 1","pages":"309 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87490667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The paper reviews some conceptions of logical form in the light of Andrea Iacona’s book Logical Form. I distinguish the following: logical form as schematization of natural language, provided by, for example, Aristotle’s syllogistic; the relevance to logical form of formal languages like those used by Frege and Russell to express and prove mathematical theorems; Russell’s mid-period conception of logical form as the structural cement binding propositions; the conceptions of logical form discussed by Iacona; and logical form regarded as an empirical hypothesis about the psychology of language processing, as in the Discourse Representation Theory tradition. Whereas neither schematization, nor the use of special languages for mathematics, raise general methodological or empirical difficulties, other conceptions of logical form raise at least apparent problems.
{"title":"Varieties of Logical Form","authors":"M. Sainsbury","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper reviews some conceptions of logical form in the light of Andrea Iacona’s book Logical Form. I distinguish the following: logical form as schematization of natural language, provided by, for example, Aristotle’s syllogistic; the relevance to logical form of formal languages like those used by Frege and Russell to express and prove mathematical theorems; Russell’s mid-period conception of logical form as the structural cement binding propositions; the conceptions of logical form discussed by Iacona; and logical form regarded as an empirical hypothesis about the psychology of language processing, as in the Discourse Representation Theory tradition. Whereas neither schematization, nor the use of special languages for mathematics, raise general methodological or empirical difficulties, other conceptions of logical form raise at least apparent problems.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"69 1","pages":"223 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83716871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The consensus is that repeatable artworks cannot be identified with particular material individuals. A perennial temptation is to identify them with types, broadly construed. Such identification, however, faces the so-called “Creation Problem.” This problem stems from the fact that, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept the claims that (1) repeatable artworks are types, (2) types cannot be created, and (3) repeatable artworks are created, but, on the other hand, these claims are mutually inconsistent. A possible solution to the Creation Problem is to argue that claim (2) can be rejected because (a) the only motivation for it is that a type, being abstract, cannot stand in causal relations, but (b) this motivation is ungrounded, since types can, in fact, stand in such relations. Clearly, in order for this solution to be successful, it is necessary to substantiate the possibility of types to be causally efficacious. In this essay, I examine an attempt to do this with the help of Yablo’s principle of proportionality, which has been undertaken by Walters (2013) and, more recently, Juvshik (2018). Although the argument they advance may seem to provide strong support for the causal efficacy of types, I think it actually fails to do this. To explain why this is so, I first show that this argument commits us to the existence of widespread causal overdetermination involving types and then argue that this commitment is both epistemically and ontologically problematic.
{"title":"The Proportionality Argument and the Problem of Widespread Causal Overdetermination","authors":"A. Aliyev","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The consensus is that repeatable artworks cannot be identified with particular material individuals. A perennial temptation is to identify them with types, broadly construed. Such identification, however, faces the so-called “Creation Problem.” This problem stems from the fact that, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept the claims that (1) repeatable artworks are types, (2) types cannot be created, and (3) repeatable artworks are created, but, on the other hand, these claims are mutually inconsistent. A possible solution to the Creation Problem is to argue that claim (2) can be rejected because (a) the only motivation for it is that a type, being abstract, cannot stand in causal relations, but (b) this motivation is ungrounded, since types can, in fact, stand in such relations. Clearly, in order for this solution to be successful, it is necessary to substantiate the possibility of types to be causally efficacious. In this essay, I examine an attempt to do this with the help of Yablo’s principle of proportionality, which has been undertaken by Walters (2013) and, more recently, Juvshik (2018). Although the argument they advance may seem to provide strong support for the causal efficacy of types, I think it actually fails to do this. To explain why this is so, I first show that this argument commits us to the existence of widespread causal overdetermination involving types and then argue that this commitment is both epistemically and ontologically problematic.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"27 1","pages":"331 - 355"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73165847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In a recent book, Logical Form: between Logic and Natural Language, Andrea Iacona argues that semantic form and logical form are distinct. The semantic form of a sentence is something that (together with the meanings of its parts) determines what it means; the logical from of a sentence is something that (all by itself) determines whether it is a logical truth. Semantic form does not depend on context but logical form does: for example, whether ‘This is this’ is a logical truth depends on whether the two occurrences of ‘this’ are used to demonstrate the same individual. I respond by claiming that logical form is indifferent to reference and is sensitive only to obligatory co-reference. When the speaker intends both occurrences of ‘this’ to be interpreted the same way the logical from of ‘This is this’ is a=a, while in a context where the speaker has no such intention it is a=b. This proposal allows a much more conservative revision of the traditional picture than the one suggested by Iacona. Instead of identifying the logical form of a natural language sentence by seeking a formalization in an artificial language, we obtain it through abstraction from its syntactic analysis: replacing the non-logical expressions by schematic letters, making sure that we use identical ones if and only if the speaker intended co-reference.
Andrea Iacona在他的新书《逻辑形式:在逻辑和自然语言之间》中提出语义形式和逻辑形式是不同的。句子的语义形式(连同句子各部分的意义)决定了它的意思;一个句子的逻辑来源(其本身)决定了它是否为逻辑真理。语义形式不依赖于语境，但逻辑形式依赖于语境:例如，“This is This”是否为逻辑真理取决于“This”的两次出现是否被用来证明同一个人。我的回应是，逻辑形式对参照是漠不关心的，只对强制性的共同参照敏感。当说话者有意以同样的方式解释“this is this”的出现时，“this is this”的逻辑表达式是a=a，而在说话者没有这种意图的上下文中，它是a=b。与Iacona的建议相比，这一建议允许对传统图景进行更为保守的修正。我们不是通过在人工语言中寻找形式化来识别自然语言句子的逻辑形式，而是通过对其句法分析的抽象来获得逻辑形式:用图式字母代替非逻辑表达式，确保当且仅当说话者有意共指时我们使用相同的表达式。
{"title":"Logical Form through Abstraction","authors":"Z. Szabó","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a recent book, Logical Form: between Logic and Natural Language, Andrea Iacona argues that semantic form and logical form are distinct. The semantic form of a sentence is something that (together with the meanings of its parts) determines what it means; the logical from of a sentence is something that (all by itself) determines whether it is a logical truth. Semantic form does not depend on context but logical form does: for example, whether ‘This is this’ is a logical truth depends on whether the two occurrences of ‘this’ are used to demonstrate the same individual. I respond by claiming that logical form is indifferent to reference and is sensitive only to obligatory co-reference. When the speaker intends both occurrences of ‘this’ to be interpreted the same way the logical from of ‘This is this’ is a=a, while in a context where the speaker has no such intention it is a=b. This proposal allows a much more conservative revision of the traditional picture than the one suggested by Iacona. Instead of identifying the logical form of a natural language sentence by seeking a formalization in an artificial language, we obtain it through abstraction from its syntactic analysis: replacing the non-logical expressions by schematic letters, making sure that we use identical ones if and only if the speaker intended co-reference.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"15 1","pages":"251 - 263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76607326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.
{"title":"Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization","authors":"Mario Gómez-Torrente","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"43 1","pages":"209 - 222"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90275428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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