Pub Date : 2023-07-18DOI: 10.1017/S0034670522000924
Jonathan Ashbach
Abstract Scholars have long contested James Madison's position on religious liberty. Madison believed in governmental noncognizance of religion. The dominant view, voiced by Vincent Muñoz, interprets that to mean that government should take no notice of religion either to target it or to allow religious objectors exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws. While there is much to commend Muñoz's view, it fails to accurately convey Madison's position. Noncognizance, for Madison, meant not that government should not notice religion, but that it should assume no authority over it. Consequently, Madison believed government should not interfere with religious duties unless to achieve important ends via carefully tailored policies.
{"title":"Reasonable Accommodation: James Madison and Governmental Noncognizance of Religion","authors":"Jonathan Ashbach","doi":"10.1017/S0034670522000924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670522000924","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scholars have long contested James Madison's position on religious liberty. Madison believed in governmental noncognizance of religion. The dominant view, voiced by Vincent Muñoz, interprets that to mean that government should take no notice of religion either to target it or to allow religious objectors exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws. While there is much to commend Muñoz's view, it fails to accurately convey Madison's position. Noncognizance, for Madison, meant not that government should not notice religion, but that it should assume no authority over it. Consequently, Madison believed government should not interfere with religious duties unless to achieve important ends via carefully tailored policies.","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"327 - 348"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46553914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-18DOI: 10.1017/S0034670523000025
Jonathan Ashbach
I am grateful to Vincent Muñoz for his analysis and critique of my argument. It seems to me, however, that the two criticisms offered here fail to connect with the position I advance. Begin with the second and more fundamental point. Muñoz claims my argument is predicated upon redefining the term “jurisdiction” such that “the state’s absence of jurisdiction over subject matter X means the state cannot pass laws that adversely impact X” (351). I am not sure where this definition is coming from, but it is certainly not coming from me. Undoubtedly, governments may pass all manner of laws that negatively impact religion, on Madison’s terms. Madison’s own advocacy of secular state universities, for example, might well have some negative impact on religion by diverting promising candidates from religious institutions. Neither here nor anywhere else in his corpus, to my knowledge, does Madison make adverse impact a test of jurisdiction. What I did say was that government may not rule religious areas of life, either intentionally or unintentionally: “Something stronger than a duty merely to abstain from targeting religion flows naturally from Madison’s claims. Because reserved rights have not been granted to government, for Madison, the more natural implication is not that government may only infringe upon them if it does so unintentionally, but that government may not infringe upon them at all” (339). Government may not require individuals to take or abstain from actions in violation of their right of religious conscience merely out of oversight or because everyone else is required to do the same thing. Yet the legitimacy of such governmental requirements is the acknowledged upshot of Muñoz’s understanding of noncognizance and the Smith decision it supports. Instead, I present evidence that Madison believed government must actively respect the inalienable rights of conscience to the extent feasible. In short, the difference betweenMuñoz and myself is not that I am unfamiliar with his treatment of inalienable rights, as he suggests. As indicated in the passage just quoted, I agree with it and use it to advance my own case. Nor is the issue that we disagree on the meaning of jurisdiction. Muñoz characterizes the true definition well enough: it means that the state “lacks authority
{"title":"Reply to Muñoz","authors":"Jonathan Ashbach","doi":"10.1017/S0034670523000025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670523000025","url":null,"abstract":"I am grateful to Vincent Muñoz for his analysis and critique of my argument. It seems to me, however, that the two criticisms offered here fail to connect with the position I advance. Begin with the second and more fundamental point. Muñoz claims my argument is predicated upon redefining the term “jurisdiction” such that “the state’s absence of jurisdiction over subject matter X means the state cannot pass laws that adversely impact X” (351). I am not sure where this definition is coming from, but it is certainly not coming from me. Undoubtedly, governments may pass all manner of laws that negatively impact religion, on Madison’s terms. Madison’s own advocacy of secular state universities, for example, might well have some negative impact on religion by diverting promising candidates from religious institutions. Neither here nor anywhere else in his corpus, to my knowledge, does Madison make adverse impact a test of jurisdiction. What I did say was that government may not rule religious areas of life, either intentionally or unintentionally: “Something stronger than a duty merely to abstain from targeting religion flows naturally from Madison’s claims. Because reserved rights have not been granted to government, for Madison, the more natural implication is not that government may only infringe upon them if it does so unintentionally, but that government may not infringe upon them at all” (339). Government may not require individuals to take or abstain from actions in violation of their right of religious conscience merely out of oversight or because everyone else is required to do the same thing. Yet the legitimacy of such governmental requirements is the acknowledged upshot of Muñoz’s understanding of noncognizance and the Smith decision it supports. Instead, I present evidence that Madison believed government must actively respect the inalienable rights of conscience to the extent feasible. In short, the difference betweenMuñoz and myself is not that I am unfamiliar with his treatment of inalienable rights, as he suggests. As indicated in the passage just quoted, I agree with it and use it to advance my own case. Nor is the issue that we disagree on the meaning of jurisdiction. Muñoz characterizes the true definition well enough: it means that the state “lacks authority","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"352 - 353"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49529552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-18DOI: 10.1017/S0034670523000086
B. Storey, Jenna Silber Storey
We are grateful to the contributors for exemplifying the kind of conversation we hoped Why We Are Restless would inspire. Each embraces the spirit of the book, taking seriously our effort to clarify the Tocquevillean paradox: that citizens of modern liberal democracies are freer and more prosperous than almost anyone in human history, yet are restlessly discontent in ways that unsettle both our individual lives and our capacity for free and orderly politics. We seek to understand the origin and nature of this discontent through the work of Montaigne, Pascal, Rousseau, and Tocqueville—who are likewise concerned with inquietude. Zuckert, Halikias, Yarbrough, and Callanan assess our scholarly work by the high standard of their own penetrating readings of those authors. Their lucid summaries of and objections to our arguments helped clarify our own thoughts. In particular, they prompted further thought about two important questions: first, what it means to write in public about the questions our authors raise; and second, what contribution liberal education can make to ameliorating the problems we describe. Zuckert seeks to offer a more Montaignean reading of Montaigne than our own. We welcome this approach and appreciate her attention to the detail of Montaigne’s text, consideration of his intentions, and defense of his distinctiveness as a thinker. Her central criticism concerns our contention that the search for “unmediated approbation” is a central theme of Montaigne’s thought. We use this term to describe the core of Montaigne’s distinctive understanding of friendship, patterned on his experience with Étienne de La Boétie. We believe that thinking about friendship so understood can be useful for assessing some distinctive social aspirations of modern people. Although Zuckert acknowledges that friendship was important to Montaigne, she writes that after La Boétie’s death “there is no evidence in the Essays or his biography that he actively sought another such friend” (379). Instead, she claims that Montaigne retired to the solitude of his estate and that it is “such a solitary life that he recommends to his readers” (379). She is further concerned that our characterization of the aim of Montaignean
我们非常感谢这些贡献者，他们为我们所希望的“为什么我们不安分”的对话提供了例证。每个人都拥抱了本书的精神，认真对待我们为澄清托克维尔悖论所做的努力:现代自由民主国家的公民比人类历史上几乎任何一个国家的公民都更自由、更繁荣，但他们的不满情绪却在某种程度上扰乱了我们的个人生活，也扰乱了我们自由有序政治的能力。我们试图通过蒙田、帕斯卡、卢梭和托克维尔的作品来理解这种不满的根源和本质，他们也同样关注不安。扎克特、哈利基亚斯、亚伯勒和卡拉南通过他们自己对这些作者的深入阅读的高标准来评估我们的学术工作。他们对我们论点的清晰总结和反驳有助于理清我们自己的思路。特别是，它们促使人们进一步思考两个重要的问题:第一，在公开场合写下作者提出的问题意味着什么;第二，通识教育对改善我们所描述的问题有何贡献。扎克特试图提供一种比我们自己的蒙田更蒙田式的解读。我们欢迎这种方法，并感谢她对蒙田文本细节的关注，对他的意图的思考，以及对他作为思想家的独特性的辩护。她的核心批评与我们的论点有关，即寻求“未经调解的认可”是蒙田思想的中心主题。我们用这个词来描述蒙田对友谊的独特理解的核心，这是他在Étienne de La bosamtie的经历的模式。我们相信，这样理解友谊对于评估现代人的一些独特的社会愿望是有用的。尽管扎克特承认友谊对蒙田来说很重要，但她写道，在La bosamtie死后，“在《随笔》或他的传记中没有证据表明他积极寻找另一个这样的朋友”(379)。相反，她声称蒙田隐居在他的庄园里，“他向他的读者推荐的是这样一种孤独的生活”(379)。她进一步关注我们对蒙台安的目标的刻画
{"title":"Authors’ Response: Liberal Education and the Restless Soul","authors":"B. Storey, Jenna Silber Storey","doi":"10.1017/S0034670523000086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670523000086","url":null,"abstract":"We are grateful to the contributors for exemplifying the kind of conversation we hoped Why We Are Restless would inspire. Each embraces the spirit of the book, taking seriously our effort to clarify the Tocquevillean paradox: that citizens of modern liberal democracies are freer and more prosperous than almost anyone in human history, yet are restlessly discontent in ways that unsettle both our individual lives and our capacity for free and orderly politics. We seek to understand the origin and nature of this discontent through the work of Montaigne, Pascal, Rousseau, and Tocqueville—who are likewise concerned with inquietude. Zuckert, Halikias, Yarbrough, and Callanan assess our scholarly work by the high standard of their own penetrating readings of those authors. Their lucid summaries of and objections to our arguments helped clarify our own thoughts. In particular, they prompted further thought about two important questions: first, what it means to write in public about the questions our authors raise; and second, what contribution liberal education can make to ameliorating the problems we describe. Zuckert seeks to offer a more Montaignean reading of Montaigne than our own. We welcome this approach and appreciate her attention to the detail of Montaigne’s text, consideration of his intentions, and defense of his distinctiveness as a thinker. Her central criticism concerns our contention that the search for “unmediated approbation” is a central theme of Montaigne’s thought. We use this term to describe the core of Montaigne’s distinctive understanding of friendship, patterned on his experience with Étienne de La Boétie. We believe that thinking about friendship so understood can be useful for assessing some distinctive social aspirations of modern people. Although Zuckert acknowledges that friendship was important to Montaigne, she writes that after La Boétie’s death “there is no evidence in the Essays or his biography that he actively sought another such friend” (379). Instead, she claims that Montaigne retired to the solitude of his estate and that it is “such a solitary life that he recommends to his readers” (379). She is further concerned that our characterization of the aim of Montaignean","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"394 - 403"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44318343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-18DOI: 10.1017/S0034670523000013
V. P. Muñoz
It is satisfying to have one’s work taken seriously by the next generation of scholars. I was pleased to learn in Jonathan Ashbach’s article that I advance “both the most persuasive and the dominant articulation of Madison’s beliefs about religious free exercise in the literature” (329). I was less pleased to read that my interpretation is “mistaken,” “in need of revision,” and “fail[s] to appreciate the implications of social contract theory” (330). Upon review, however, I think my work survives his criticism. I believe that Ashbach makes two errors, which leads him to both misinterpret my scholarship and misunderstand Madison. The issue between us is the proper understanding of Madison’s principle of religious freedom. We focus on the same evidence—primarily, Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance”—and read Madison in the same way, as a natural rights, social compact political thinker. We disagree, however, about what Madison’s fundamental principle is. Starting with a 2003 article, further developed in my first book and a subsequent article, I have advanced a “noncognizance” interpretation, contending that Madison held that the state must remain “blind” to religion and thus cannot classify individuals on account of their religious affiliation for purposes of privilege or penalty. Ashbach finds this mistaken because, he
{"title":"Response to Jonathan Ashbach","authors":"V. P. Muñoz","doi":"10.1017/S0034670523000013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670523000013","url":null,"abstract":"It is satisfying to have one’s work taken seriously by the next generation of scholars. I was pleased to learn in Jonathan Ashbach’s article that I advance “both the most persuasive and the dominant articulation of Madison’s beliefs about religious free exercise in the literature” (329). I was less pleased to read that my interpretation is “mistaken,” “in need of revision,” and “fail[s] to appreciate the implications of social contract theory” (330). Upon review, however, I think my work survives his criticism. I believe that Ashbach makes two errors, which leads him to both misinterpret my scholarship and misunderstand Madison. The issue between us is the proper understanding of Madison’s principle of religious freedom. We focus on the same evidence—primarily, Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance”—and read Madison in the same way, as a natural rights, social compact political thinker. We disagree, however, about what Madison’s fundamental principle is. Starting with a 2003 article, further developed in my first book and a subsequent article, I have advanced a “noncognizance” interpretation, contending that Madison held that the state must remain “blind” to religion and thus cannot classify individuals on account of their religious affiliation for purposes of privilege or penalty. Ashbach finds this mistaken because, he","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"349 - 351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46536520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-29DOI: 10.1017/s003467052300013x
Peter Westmoreland
{"title":"Gary M. Kelly: The Human Condition in Rousseau's “Essay on the Origin of Languages.” (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2021. Pp. xviii, 242.)","authors":"Peter Westmoreland","doi":"10.1017/s003467052300013x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s003467052300013x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"439 - 441"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43806690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-14DOI: 10.1017/S0034670523000116
Robert Goodman
{"title":"Richard Shorten: The Ideology of Political Reactionaries. (New York: Routledge, 2022. Pp. xiii, 270.)","authors":"Robert Goodman","doi":"10.1017/S0034670523000116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670523000116","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"429 - 431"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47761632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1017/s0034670523000219
M. Rovira
{"title":"David Dyzenhaus: The Long Arc of Legality: Hobbes, Kelsen, Hart. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. xiv, 443.)","authors":"M. Rovira","doi":"10.1017/s0034670523000219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034670523000219","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"426 - 429"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44219552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1017/S0034670523000098
A. Cimino
Abstract The first book of Agamben's Homo Sacer series contains very few references to Heidegger. Even so, the pages that Agamben devotes to Heidegger in the third part of the book are far from a digression. They touch on a number of crucial topics that are vital to both Heidegger and Agamben, such as the relationship between philosophy and politics, the specific philosophical motivations behind Heidegger's political commitment, and life as a central philosophical theme. This article evaluates Agamben's interpretation of Heidegger in those pages by concentrating on two interrelated questions: (1) whether and to what extent Agamben's biopolitical reading of Heidegger is plausible and persuasive, and (2) how to judge the relationship between their respective accounts of life, which center around the two seminal concepts of “bare life” and “facticity.”
{"title":"Bare Life, Facticity, and Biopolitics in Agamben and the Early Heidegger","authors":"A. Cimino","doi":"10.1017/S0034670523000098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670523000098","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The first book of Agamben's Homo Sacer series contains very few references to Heidegger. Even so, the pages that Agamben devotes to Heidegger in the third part of the book are far from a digression. They touch on a number of crucial topics that are vital to both Heidegger and Agamben, such as the relationship between philosophy and politics, the specific philosophical motivations behind Heidegger's political commitment, and life as a central philosophical theme. This article evaluates Agamben's interpretation of Heidegger in those pages by concentrating on two interrelated questions: (1) whether and to what extent Agamben's biopolitical reading of Heidegger is plausible and persuasive, and (2) how to judge the relationship between their respective accounts of life, which center around the two seminal concepts of “bare life” and “facticity.”","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"354 - 374"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45735887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-06DOI: 10.1017/S0034670523000128
P. Digeser
{"title":"Areti Giannopoulou: Political Friendship and Degrowth: An Ethical Grounding of an Economy of Human Flourishing. (London: Routledge, 2022. Pp. xi, 168.)","authors":"P. Digeser","doi":"10.1017/S0034670523000128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670523000128","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"421 - 423"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44453576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-05DOI: 10.1017/S0034670523000141
Philip D. Bunn
{"title":"Paul Sagar: Adam Smith Reconsidered: History, Liberty, and the Foundations of Modern Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021. Pp. xii, 229.)","authors":"Philip D. Bunn","doi":"10.1017/S0034670523000141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670523000141","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52549,"journal":{"name":"Review of Politics","volume":"85 1","pages":"419 - 421"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46094511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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