We propose a logical framework combining a game-theoretic study of abilities of agents to achieve quantitative objectives in multi-player games by optimizing payoffs or preferences on outcomes with a logical analysis of the abilities of players for achieving qualitative objectives of players, i.e., reaching or maintaining game states with desired properties. We enrich concurrent game models with payoffs for the normal form games associated with the states of the model and propose a quantitative extension of the logic ATL* enabling the combination of quantitative and qualitative reasoning.
{"title":"How to Be Both Rich and Happy: Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Strategic Reasoning about Multi-Player Games (Extended Abstract)","authors":"N. Bulling, V. Goranko","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.112.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.112.8","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a logical framework combining a game-theoretic study of abilities of agents to achieve quantitative objectives in multi-player games by optimizing payoffs or preferences on outcomes with a logical analysis of the abilities of players for achieving qualitative objectives of players, i.e., reaching or maintaining game states with desired properties. We enrich concurrent game models with payoffs for the normal form games associated with the states of the model and propose a quantitative extension of the logic ATL* enabling the combination of quantitative and qualitative reasoning.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"117 1","pages":"33-41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77142434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Simon Busard, C. Pecheur, Hongyang Qu, F. Raimondi
A number of extensions exist for Alternating-time Temporal Logic; some of these mix strategies and partial observability but, to the best of our knowledge, no work provides a unified framework for strategies, partial observability and fairness constraints. In this paper we propose ATLK^F_po, a logic mixing strategies under partial observability and epistemic properties of agents in a system with fairness constraints on states, and we provide a model checking algorithm for it.
{"title":"Reasoning about Strategies under Partial Observability and Fairness Constraints","authors":"Simon Busard, C. Pecheur, Hongyang Qu, F. Raimondi","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.112.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.112.12","url":null,"abstract":"A number of extensions exist for Alternating-time Temporal Logic; some of these mix strategies and partial observability but, to the best of our knowledge, no work provides a unified framework for strategies, partial observability and fairness constraints. In this paper we propose ATLK^F_po, a logic mixing strategies under partial observability and epistemic properties of agents in a system with fairness constraints on states, and we provide a model checking algorithm for it.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"46 1","pages":"71-79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89959688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a strategic analysis of a trust model that has recently been proposed for promoting cooperative behaviour in user-centric networks. The mechanism for cooperation is based on a combination of reputation and virtual currency schemes in which service providers reward paying customers and punish non-paying ones by adjusting their reputation, and hence the price they pay for services. We model and analyse this system using PRISM-games, a tool that performs automated verification and strategy synthesis for stochastic multi-player games using the probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with rewards (rPATL). We construct optimal strategies for both service users and providers, which expose potential risks of the cooperation mechanism and which we use to devise improvements that counteract these risks.
{"title":"Strategic Analysis of Trust Models for User-Centric Networks","authors":"M. Kwiatkowska, D. Parker, A. Simaitis","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.112.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.112.10","url":null,"abstract":"We present a strategic analysis of a trust model that has recently been proposed for promoting cooperative behaviour in user-centric networks. The mechanism for cooperation is based on a combination of reputation and virtual currency schemes in which service providers reward paying customers and punish non-paying ones by adjusting their reputation, and hence the price they pay for services. We model and analyse this system using PRISM-games, a tool that performs automated verification and strategy synthesis for stochastic multi-player games using the probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with rewards (rPATL). We construct optimal strategies for both service users and providers, which expose potential risks of the cooperation mechanism and which we use to devise improvements that counteract these risks.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"24 1","pages":"53-59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74093568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is an expository contribution reporting on published work. It focusses on an approach followed in the rewriting community to formalize the concept of strategy. Based on rewriting concepts, several definitions of strategy are reviewed and connected: in order to catch the higher-order nature of strategies, a strategy is defined as a proof term expressed in the rewriting logic or in the rewriting calculus; to address in a coherent way deduction and computation, a strategy is seen as a subset of derivations; and to recover the definition of strategy in sequential path-building games or in functional programs, a strategy is considered as a partial function that associates to a reduction-in-progress, the possible next steps in the reduction sequence.
{"title":"A rewriting point of view on strategies","authors":"H. Kirchner","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.112.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.112.15","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is an expository contribution reporting on published work. It focusses on an approach followed in the rewriting community to formalize the concept of strategy. Based on rewriting concepts, several definitions of strategy are reviewed and connected: in order to catch the higher-order nature of strategies, a strategy is defined as a proof term expressed in the rewriting logic or in the rewriting calculus; to address in a coherent way deduction and computation, a strategy is seen as a subset of derivations; and to recover the definition of strategy in sequential path-building games or in functional programs, a strategy is considered as a partial function that associates to a reduction-in-progress, the possible next steps in the reduction sequence.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"358 1","pages":"99-105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76921418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a validity preserving translation from a subset of epistemic Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) to epistemic Computation Tree Logic (CTL). The considered subset of epistemic ATL is known to have the finite model property and decidable model-checking. This entails the decidability of validity but the implied algorithm is unfeasible. Reducing the validity problem to that in a corresponding system of CTL makes the techniques for automated deduction for that logic available for the handling of the apparently more complex system of ATL.
{"title":"Reducing Validity in Epistemic ATL to Validity in Epistemic CTL","authors":"Dimitar P. Guelev","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.112.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.112.13","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a validity preserving translation from a subset of epistemic Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) to epistemic Computation Tree Logic (CTL). The considered subset of epistemic ATL is known to have the finite model property and decidable model-checking. This entails the decidability of validity but the implied algorithm is unfeasible. Reducing the validity problem to that in a corresponding system of CTL makes the techniques for automated deduction for that logic available for the handling of the apparently more complex system of ATL.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"27 1","pages":"81-89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83396918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Umberto Grandi, Andrea Loreggia, F. Rossi, K. Venable, T. Walsh
In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative behavior to be avoided, or at least to be made computationally difficult for the agents to perform. However, there are scenarios in which a restricted form of manipulation can instead be beneficial. In this paper we consider the iterative version of several voting rules, where at each step one agent is allowed to manipulate by modifying his ballot according to a set of restricted manipulation moves which are computationally easy and require little information to be performed. We prove convergence of iterative voting rules when restricted manipulation is allowed, and we present experiments showing that most iterative voting rules have a higher Condorcet efficiency than their non-iterative version.
{"title":"Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Convergence and Condorcet Efficiency","authors":"Umberto Grandi, Andrea Loreggia, F. Rossi, K. Venable, T. Walsh","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.112.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.112.6","url":null,"abstract":"In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative behavior to be avoided, or at least to be made computationally difficult for the agents to perform. However, there are scenarios in which a restricted form of manipulation can instead be beneficial. In this paper we consider the iterative version of several voting rules, where at each step one agent is allowed to manipulate by modifying his ballot according to a set of restricted manipulation moves which are computationally easy and require little information to be performed. We prove convergence of iterative voting rules when restricted manipulation is allowed, and we present experiments showing that most iterative voting rules have a higher Condorcet efficiency than their non-iterative version.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"22 1","pages":"17-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74918341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we investigate lossy channel games under incomplete information, where two players operate on a finite set of unbounded FIFO channels and one player, representing a system component under consideration operates under incomplete information, while the other player, representing the component's environment is allowed to lose messages from the channels. We argue that these games are a suitable model for synthesis of communication protocols where processes communicate over unreliable channels. We show that in the case of finite message alphabets, games with safety and reachability winning conditions are decidable and finite-state observation-based strategies for the component can be effectively computed. Undecidability for (weak) parity objectives follows from the undecidability of (weak) parity perfect information games where only one player can lose messages.
{"title":"Lossy Channel Games under Incomplete Information","authors":"Rayna Dimitrova, B. Finkbeiner","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.112.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.112.9","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we investigate lossy channel games under incomplete information, where two players operate on a finite set of unbounded FIFO channels and one player, representing a system component under consideration operates under incomplete information, while the other player, representing the component's environment is allowed to lose messages from the channels. We argue that these games are a suitable model for synthesis of communication protocols where processes communicate over unreliable channels. We show that in the case of finite message alphabets, games with safety and reachability winning conditions are decidable and finite-state observation-based strategies for the component can be effectively computed. Undecidability for (weak) parity objectives follows from the undecidability of (weak) parity perfect information games where only one player can lose messages.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"110 1","pages":"43-51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90385340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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