Quite some work in the ATL-tradition uses the differences between various types of strategies (positional, uniform, perfect recall) to give alternative semantics to the same logical language. This paper contributes to another perspective on strategy types, one where we characterise the differences between them on the syntactic (object language) level. This is important for a more traditional knowledge representation view on strategic content. Leaving differences between strategy types implicit in the semantics is a sensible idea if the goal is to use the strategic formalism for model checking. But, for traditional knowledge representation in terms of object language level formulas, we need to extent the language. This paper introduces a strategic STIT syntax with explicit operators for knowledge that allows us to charaterise strategy types. This more expressive strategic language is interpreted on standard ATL-type concurrent epistemic game structures. We introduce rule-based strategies in our language and fruitfully apply them to the representation and characterisation of positional and uniform strategies. Our representations highlight crucial conditions to be met for strategy types. We demonstrate the usefulness of our work by showing that it leads to a critical reexamination of coalitional uniform strategies.
{"title":"Representing Strategies","authors":"H. Duijf, J. Broersen","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.218.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.218.2","url":null,"abstract":"Quite some work in the ATL-tradition uses the differences between various types of strategies (positional, uniform, perfect recall) to give alternative semantics to the same logical language. This paper contributes to another perspective on strategy types, one where we characterise the differences between them on the syntactic (object language) level. This is important for a more traditional knowledge representation view on strategic content. Leaving differences between strategy types implicit in the semantics is a sensible idea if the goal is to use the strategic formalism for model checking. But, for traditional knowledge representation in terms of object language level formulas, we need to extent the language. This paper introduces a strategic STIT syntax with explicit operators for knowledge that allows us to charaterise strategy types. This more expressive strategic language is interpreted on standard ATL-type concurrent epistemic game structures. We introduce rule-based strategies in our language and fruitfully apply them to the representation and characterisation of positional and uniform strategies. Our representations highlight crucial conditions to be met for strategy types. We demonstrate the usefulness of our work by showing that it leads to a critical reexamination of coalitional uniform strategies.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"79 1","pages":"15-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89225471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benjamin Aminof, Vadim Malvone, A. Murano, S. Rubin
Strategy Logic (SL) is a logical formalism for strategic reasoning in multi-agent systems. Its main feature is that it has variables for strategies that are associated to specific agents with a binding operator. We introduce Graded Strategy Logic (GRADEDSL), an extension of SL by graded quantifiers over tuples of strategy variables, i.e., “there exist at least g different tuples (x1;:::; xn) of strategies” where g is a cardinal from the set N[f?0;?1; 2 ?0g. We prove that the model-checking problem of GRADEDSL is decidable. We then turn to the complexity of fragments of GRADEDSL. When the g’s are restricted to finite cardinals, written GRADEDNSL, the complexity of model-checking is no harder than for SL, i.e., it is non-elementary in the quantifier rank. We illustrate our formalism by showing how to count the number of different strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria (NE), or subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE). By analyzing the structure of the specific formulas involved, we conclude that the important problems of checking for the existence of a unique NE or SPE can both be solved in 2EXPTIME, which is not harder than merely checking for the existence of such equilibria.
{"title":"Extended Graded Modalities in Strategy Logic","authors":"Benjamin Aminof, Vadim Malvone, A. Murano, S. Rubin","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.218.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.218.1","url":null,"abstract":"Strategy Logic (SL) is a logical formalism for strategic reasoning in multi-agent systems. Its main feature is that it has variables for strategies that are associated to specific agents with a binding operator. We introduce Graded Strategy Logic (GRADEDSL), an extension of SL by graded quantifiers over tuples of strategy variables, i.e., “there exist at least g different tuples (x1;:::; xn) of strategies” where g is a cardinal from the set N[f?0;?1; 2 ?0g. We prove that the model-checking problem of GRADEDSL is decidable. We then turn to the complexity of fragments of GRADEDSL. When the g’s are restricted to finite cardinals, written GRADEDNSL, the complexity of model-checking is no harder than for SL, i.e., it is non-elementary in the quantifier rank. We illustrate our formalism by showing how to count the number of different strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria (NE), or subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE). By analyzing the structure of the specific formulas involved, we conclude that the important problems of checking for the existence of a unique NE or SPE can both be solved in 2EXPTIME, which is not harder than merely checking for the existence of such equilibria.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"13 1","pages":"1-14"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81969995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Electric boolean games are compact representations of games where the players have qualitative objectives described by LTL formulae and have limited resources. We study the complexity of several decision problems related to the analysis of rationality in electric boolean games with LTL objectives. In particular, we report that the problem of deciding whether a profile is a Nash equilibrium in an iterated electric boolean game is no harder than in iterated boolean games without resource bounds. We show that it is a PSPACE-complete problem. As a corollary, we obtain that both rational elimination and rational construction of Nash equilibria by a supervising authority are PSPACE-complete problems.
{"title":"Rational verification in Iterated Electric Boolean Games","authors":"Y. Oualhadj, N. Troquard","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.218.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.218.4","url":null,"abstract":"Electric boolean games are compact representations of games where the players have qualitative objectives described by LTL formulae and have limited resources. We study the complexity of several decision problems related to the analysis of rationality in electric boolean games with LTL objectives. In particular, we report that the problem of deciding whether a profile is a Nash equilibrium in an iterated electric boolean game is no harder than in iterated boolean games without resource bounds. We show that it is a PSPACE-complete problem. As a corollary, we obtain that both rational elimination and rational construction of Nash equilibria by a supervising authority are PSPACE-complete problems.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"15 1","pages":"41-51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86728989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding class of multi-player multi-outcome games. This generalizes a previous result by Brihaye, De Pril and Schewe. For most of our conditions we provide counterexamples showing that they cannot be dispensed with. Our proofs are generally constructive, that is, provide upper bounds for the memory required, as well as algorithms to compute the relevant winning strategies.
我们证明了在某些一般条件下，一类在有限图上进行的双人输赢博弈的有限记忆确定性意味着存在一个由有限记忆策略构建的纳什均衡，用于相应的一类多人多结果博弈。这概括了Brihaye, De Pril和Schewe之前的结果。对于我们的大多数条件，我们提供了反例，表明它们是不可缺少的。我们的证明通常是建设性的，也就是说，提供了所需内存的上限，以及计算相关获胜策略的算法。
{"title":"Extending Finite Memory Determinacy to Multiplayer Games","authors":"Stéphane Le Roux, A. Pauly","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.218.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.218.3","url":null,"abstract":"We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding class of multi-player multi-outcome games. This generalizes a previous result by Brihaye, De Pril and Schewe. For most of our conditions we provide counterexamples showing that they cannot be dispensed with. \u0000Our proofs are generally constructive, that is, provide upper bounds for the memory required, as well as algorithms to compute the relevant winning strategies.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"5 1","pages":"27-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78501934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
V. Bruyère, E. Filiot, Mickael Randour, Jean-François Raskin
When reasoning about the strategic capabilities of an agent, it is important to consider the nature of its adversaries. In the particular context of controller synthesis for quantitative specifications, the usual problem is to devise a strategy for a reactive system which yields some desired performance, taking into account the possible impact of the environment of the system. There are at least two ways to look at this environment. In the classical analysis of two-player quantitative games, the environment is purely antagonistic and the problem is to provide strict performance guarantees. In Markov decision processes, the environment is seen as purely stochastic: the aim is then to optimize the expected payoff, with no guarantee on individual outcomes. In this expository work, we report on recent results [10, 9] introducing the beyond worst-case synthesis problem, which is to construct strategies that guarantee some quantitative requirement in the worst-case while providing an higher expected value against a particular stochastic model of the environment given as input. This problem is relevant to produce system controllers that provide nice expected performance in the everyday situation while ensuring a strict (but relaxed) performance threshold even in the event of very bad (while unlikely) circumstances. It has been studied for both the mean-payoff and the shortest path quantitative measures.
{"title":"Expectations or Guarantees? I Want It All! A crossroad between games and MDPs","authors":"V. Bruyère, E. Filiot, Mickael Randour, Jean-François Raskin","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.146.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.1","url":null,"abstract":"When reasoning about the strategic capabilities of an agent, it is important to consider the nature of its adversaries. In the particular context of controller synthesis for quantitative specifications, the usual problem is to devise a strategy for a reactive system which yields some desired performance, taking into account the possible impact of the environment of the system. There are at least two ways to look at this environment. In the classical analysis of two-player quantitative games, the environment is purely antagonistic and the problem is to provide strict performance guarantees. In Markov decision processes, the environment is seen as purely stochastic: the aim is then to optimize the expected payoff, with no guarantee on individual outcomes. In this expository work, we report on recent results [10, 9] introducing the beyond worst-case synthesis problem, which is to construct strategies that guarantee some quantitative requirement in the worst-case while providing an higher expected value against a particular stochastic model of the environment given as input. This problem is relevant to produce system controllers that provide nice expected performance in the everyday situation while ensuring a strict (but relaxed) performance threshold even in the event of very bad (while unlikely) circumstances. It has been studied for both the mean-payoff and the shortest path quantitative measures.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76936185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.
{"title":"Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation","authors":"P. Bouyer, N. Markey, Steen Vester","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.146.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.7","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"109 1","pages":"49-55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80686374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this work we aim at applying automata techniques to problems studied in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, such as epistemic planning. To do so, we first remark that repeatedly executing ad infinitum a propositional event model from an initial epistemic model yields a relational structure that can be finitely represented with automata. This correspondence, together with recent results on uniform strategies, allows us to give an alternative decidability proof of the epistemic planning problem for propositional events, with as by-products accurate upper-bounds on its time complexity, and the possibility to synthesize a finite word automaton that describes the set of all solution plans. In fact, using automata techniques enables us to solve a much more general problem, that we introduce and call epistemic protocol synthesis.
{"title":"Automata Techniques for Epistemic Protocol Synthesis","authors":"Guillaume Aucher, Bastien Maubert, S. Pinchinat","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.146.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.13","url":null,"abstract":"In this work we aim at applying automata techniques to problems studied in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, such as epistemic planning. To do so, we first remark that repeatedly executing ad infinitum a propositional event model from an initial epistemic model yields a relational structure that can be finitely represented with automata. This correspondence, together with recent results on uniform strategies, allows us to give an alternative decidability proof of the epistemic planning problem for propositional events, with as by-products accurate upper-bounds on its time complexity, and the possibility to synthesize a finite word automaton that describes the set of all solution plans. In fact, using automata techniques enables us to solve a much more general problem, that we introduce and call epistemic protocol synthesis.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"116 1","pages":"97-103"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82360483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this work we generalize standard Decision Theory by assuming that two outcomes can also be incomparable. Two motivating scenarios show how incomparability may be helpful to represent those situations where, due to lack of information, the decision maker would like to maintain different options alive and defer the final decision. In particular, a new axiomatization is given which turns out to be a weakening of the classical set of axioms used in Decision Theory. Preliminary results show how preferences involving complex distributions are related to judgments on single alternatives.
{"title":"Partial Preferences for Mediated Bargaining","authors":"P. Bonatti, M. Faella, L. Sauro","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.146.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.14","url":null,"abstract":"In this work we generalize standard Decision Theory by assuming that two outcomes can also be incomparable. Two motivating scenarios show how incomparability may be helpful to represent those situations where, due to lack of information, the decision maker would like to maintain different options alive and defer the final decision. In particular, a new axiomatization is given which turns out to be a weakening of the classical set of axioms used in Decision Theory. Preliminary results show how preferences involving complex distributions are related to judgments on single alternatives.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"100 1","pages":"105-111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77443334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over strategies. The language also provides a natural way to represent what agents would know were they to be aware of the strategies being used by other agents. Some examples are presented to motivate the framework, and relationships to several variants of alternating temporal epistemic logic are discussed. The computational complexity of model checking the logic is also characterized.
{"title":"An Epistemic Strategy Logic (Extended Abstract)","authors":"Xiaowei Huang, R. V. D. Meyden","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.146.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.5","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over strategies. The language also provides a natural way to represent what agents would know were they to be aware of the strategies being used by other agents. Some examples are presented to motivate the framework, and relationships to several variants of alternating temporal epistemic logic are discussed. The computational complexity of model checking the logic is also characterized.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"16 3 1","pages":"35-41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89382824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we introduce Epistemic Strategy Logic (ESL), an extension of Strategy Logic with modal operators for individual knowledge. This enhanced framework allows us to represent explicitly and to reason about the knowledge agents have of their own and other agents' strategies. We provide a semantics to ESL in terms of epistemic concurrent game models, and consider the corresponding model checking problem. We show that the complexity of model checking ESL is not worse than (non-epistemic) Strategy Logic
{"title":"Reasoning about Knowledge and Strategies: Epistemic Strategy Logic","authors":"F. Belardinelli","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.146.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.4","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we introduce Epistemic Strategy Logic (ESL), an extension of Strategy Logic with modal operators for individual knowledge. This enhanced framework allows us to represent explicitly and to reason about the knowledge agents have of their own and other agents' strategies. We provide a semantics to ESL in terms of epistemic concurrent game models, and consider the corresponding model checking problem. We show that the complexity of model checking ESL is not worse than (non-epistemic) Strategy Logic","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"16 1","pages":"27-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77135213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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