{"title":"The effects of national culture and academic discipline on responses to ethical dilemmas: A comparison of students from turkey and the united states","authors":"L. Kidwell, S. Arzova, A. E. Gegez","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ200524325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ200524325","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"24 1","pages":"37-57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71239964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The common sense view of a company is that it is not a person in the sense in which individual humans are people. Yet many are quite ready to blame companies for their acts, to sometimes praise them, and even to prosecute them for manslaughter: as if they are people. Thus there has been an on-going philosophical debate as to whether it is proper to confer 'person hood' on companies, to the extent they can be said to be moral agents, who are responsible in a moral sense for their actions and omissions. There are still some companies which claim that they are just economic agents having no responsibility beyond economic efficiency. Strangely, they may, purely voluntarily, also make substantial charitable donations. Other companies realize that they are powerful actors in today's global society and as such they are indeed moral agents. Some of the latter embrace corporate social responsibility (CSR). The CSR perspective appears to take for granted that companies are persons and indeed as 'corporate citizenship' goes further, considering them also citizens, enjoying rights and duties and certainly capable of moral standing. Behind the challenge and coun ter-challenge of NGO campaigns against companies lies the assumption that
{"title":"Corporations: Amoral Machines or Moral Persons?","authors":"Adrian Henriques","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ200524327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ200524327","url":null,"abstract":"The common sense view of a company is that it is not a person in the sense in which individual humans are people. Yet many are quite ready to blame companies for their acts, to sometimes praise them, and even to prosecute them for manslaughter: as if they are people. Thus there has been an on-going philosophical debate as to whether it is proper to confer 'person hood' on companies, to the extent they can be said to be moral agents, who are responsible in a moral sense for their actions and omissions. There are still some companies which claim that they are just economic agents having no responsibility beyond economic efficiency. Strangely, they may, purely voluntarily, also make substantial charitable donations. Other companies realize that they are powerful actors in today's global society and as such they are indeed moral agents. Some of the latter embrace corporate social responsibility (CSR). The CSR perspective appears to take for granted that companies are persons and indeed as 'corporate citizenship' goes further, considering them also citizens, enjoying rights and duties and certainly capable of moral standing. Behind the challenge and coun ter-challenge of NGO campaigns against companies lies the assumption that","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"24 1","pages":"91-99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71240015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Meaningful work is an unspoken theme of informal discussions and formal scholarship about business ethics. However, playful metaphors and earnest truisms about shower time, corporate social responsibility, and employee values are not often translated into serious scholarship about meaningful work. This paper seeks to demonstrate the need for a theory of meaningful work in hopes of motivating more work on meaningful work by outlining connections between meaningful work theory and work motivation theory, corporate social responsibility, and other, more established areas of business ethics and management inquiry. One conventionally pessimistic line of argument it examines is that preoccupation with work might erode our capacity to experience other good things in life. More optimistically, the paper seeks to erode the barriers between meaningful work and meaningful life because work can be integral to meaningful life and human flourishing.
{"title":"‘I Want Your Shower Time!’: Drowning in Work and the Erosion of Life","authors":"Christopher Michaelson","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ200524417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ200524417","url":null,"abstract":"Meaningful work is an unspoken theme of informal discussions and formal scholarship about business ethics. However, playful metaphors and earnest truisms about shower time, corporate social responsibility, and employee values are not often translated into serious scholarship about meaningful work. This paper seeks to demonstrate the need for a theory of meaningful work in hopes of motivating more work on meaningful work by outlining connections between meaningful work theory and work motivation theory, corporate social responsibility, and other, more established areas of business ethics and management inquiry. One conventionally pessimistic line of argument it examines is that preoccupation with work might erode our capacity to experience other good things in life. More optimistically, the paper seeks to erode the barriers between meaningful work and meaningful life because work can be integral to meaningful life and human flourishing.","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"24 1","pages":"7-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71240039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ism, probability assignments are crucial in certain kinds of moral decisions. Utilitarianism also encourages quantification of whatever values are to be promoted, such as human happiness or, on a hedonistic version, pleasure and the reduction of pain. Given its emphasis on quantification, utilitarian ism is sometimes taken to be quantitative rather than qualitative. But the position is not unqualifiedly quantitative, nor is it the only ethical theory that gives probability a major role and attempts, in some way, to quantify value. The view can also be qualitative, as in the case of Mill's version, which distinguishes between pleasures in a way that permits considering some of them intrinsically better than others (Mill, 1957, p. 12). My aim here is to explicate some of the ethical uses of a form of cost benefit analysis, to explore the extent to which it may be employed by moral theories other than utilitarianism, and consider both some points about the nature of intrinsic value and the possibility of treating it quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The results are intended to be of use in moral reflec tion of many kinds and to facilitate reflection in business and professional ethics as well as on matters of ethical theory.
{"title":"The Ethical Significance of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Business and The Professions","authors":"R. Audi","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ200524323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ200524323","url":null,"abstract":"ism, probability assignments are crucial in certain kinds of moral decisions. Utilitarianism also encourages quantification of whatever values are to be promoted, such as human happiness or, on a hedonistic version, pleasure and the reduction of pain. Given its emphasis on quantification, utilitarian ism is sometimes taken to be quantitative rather than qualitative. But the position is not unqualifiedly quantitative, nor is it the only ethical theory that gives probability a major role and attempts, in some way, to quantify value. The view can also be qualitative, as in the case of Mill's version, which distinguishes between pleasures in a way that permits considering some of them intrinsically better than others (Mill, 1957, p. 12). My aim here is to explicate some of the ethical uses of a form of cost benefit analysis, to explore the extent to which it may be employed by moral theories other than utilitarianism, and consider both some points about the nature of intrinsic value and the possibility of treating it quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The results are intended to be of use in moral reflec tion of many kinds and to facilitate reflection in business and professional ethics as well as on matters of ethical theory.","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"24 1","pages":"3-21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71239884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
At the ministerial conference held in Doha in 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) pointed out that public health problems resulting from tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics are afflicting many developing and least developed countries (LDCs).2 It reiterated the organization's commitment to Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), but affirmed that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. While the WTO's plea was directed at various member nation states, in recent years some have argued that for-profit pharm aceutical corporations also have a moral duty to help promote access to essential medicines in the LDCs. This essay will focus on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in LDCs and examine whether or not multinational pharmaceutical corporations that pro duce AIDS medication have a moral duty to help ease the disproportionate disease burden. While there are many third-world infectious diseases that are affecting LDCs, this article will only focus on HIV/AIDS, which is unique partly because it is not solely a third-world disease. Unlike many infectious diseases such as TB and malaria, which are concentrated in LDCs with limited ability to pay for health care and thus have long been neglected
{"title":"Pharmaceutical Corporations and the Duty to Aid in HIV/AIDS Epidemic","authors":"A. Ho","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ200524419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ200524419","url":null,"abstract":"At the ministerial conference held in Doha in 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) pointed out that public health problems resulting from tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics are afflicting many developing and least developed countries (LDCs).2 It reiterated the organization's commitment to Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), but affirmed that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. While the WTO's plea was directed at various member nation states, in recent years some have argued that for-profit pharm aceutical corporations also have a moral duty to help promote access to essential medicines in the LDCs. This essay will focus on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in LDCs and examine whether or not multinational pharmaceutical corporations that pro duce AIDS medication have a moral duty to help ease the disproportionate disease burden. While there are many third-world infectious diseases that are affecting LDCs, this article will only focus on HIV/AIDS, which is unique partly because it is not solely a third-world disease. Unlike many infectious diseases such as TB and malaria, which are concentrated in LDCs with limited ability to pay for health care and thus have long been neglected","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"24 1","pages":"51-81"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71240085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Governance reform, introduced after the corporate scandals of the 1980s and 1990s, failed to significantly improve corporate conduct and accountability. That much is evidenced by the accounting and other scandals that have held us captive since the first word on Enron hit the street. With what confidence should we then embrace the post-Enron reforms introduced by the same reformers, such as the SEC, Congress, the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB), The Conference Board, the NYSE and NASDAQ, and the courts in Delaware? In a short history of what they call the "revolutionary idea of the company," Micklethwait and Wooldridge describe the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), as "arguably the toughest piece of corporate legislation since the 1930s" (2003:151).1 Their assertion about the far-reaching effect of SOX should pique our interest about whether recent reform initiatives will have the same staying power as did the 1930s initiatives; such staying power likely based on the ability of SOX to produce the corporate conduct intended by reformers. Have reformers finally managed to settle the disconnect between structural reform and substantive conduct, or does the "recurrent crisis in corporate governance" (Mac A voy and Millstein, 2003) remain unresolved?2
在上世纪80年代和90年代的公司丑闻之后引入的治理改革未能显著改善公司行为和问责制。自从安然的第一个消息传出以来，会计和其他丑闻就一直束缚着我们，这证明了这一点。那么，我们应该带着怎样的信心去接受由SEC、国会、美国联邦会计准则委员会(FASB)、世界大型企业联合会(Conference Board)、纽约证券交易所(NYSE)和纳斯达克(NASDAQ)以及特拉华州法院等改革者推出的后安然改革呢?在被他们称为“革命性的公司理念”的短暂历史中，米克尔思韦特和伍尔德里奇将2002年的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(SOX)描述为“可以说是自20世纪30年代以来最严厉的公司立法”(2003:151)他们对SOX法案深远影响的断言，应该会激起我们的兴趣:最近的改革举措是否会像上世纪30年代的举措那样具有同样的持久力;这种持久力很可能是基于SOX法案产生改革者所期望的企业行为的能力。改革者是否最终解决了结构性改革与实质性行为之间的脱节，或者“公司治理中反复出现的危机”(Mac A voy和Millstein, 2003)是否仍然没有得到解决?2
{"title":"The Recurring Governance Crisis: Director Independence and the Disconnect Between Structural Reform and Conduct","authors":"C. Plessis","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ200524420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ200524420","url":null,"abstract":"Governance reform, introduced after the corporate scandals of the 1980s and 1990s, failed to significantly improve corporate conduct and accountability. That much is evidenced by the accounting and other scandals that have held us captive since the first word on Enron hit the street. With what confidence should we then embrace the post-Enron reforms introduced by the same reformers, such as the SEC, Congress, the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB), The Conference Board, the NYSE and NASDAQ, and the courts in Delaware? In a short history of what they call the \"revolutionary idea of the company,\" Micklethwait and Wooldridge describe the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), as \"arguably the toughest piece of corporate legislation since the 1930s\" (2003:151).1 Their assertion about the far-reaching effect of SOX should pique our interest about whether recent reform initiatives will have the same staying power as did the 1930s initiatives; such staying power likely based on the ability of SOX to produce the corporate conduct intended by reformers. Have reformers finally managed to settle the disconnect between structural reform and substantive conduct, or does the \"recurrent crisis in corporate governance\" (Mac A voy and Millstein, 2003) remain unresolved?2","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"24 1","pages":"83-111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71240091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 1997, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) restated its position on direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical products, for the first time allowing the broad marketing of prescription drugs through media such as television. In 2003, pharmaceutical companies spent an estimated $3.2 billion on advertising campaigns targeting American con sumers.1 In just six short years, the pharmaceutical advertising industry shifted from being virtually nonexistent to become the tenth largest adver tising category in the United States.2 For the companies footing the bill for these advertisements, however, this money needs to be recouped through higher and higher sales revenues. Add to this the average $800 million it costs to bring a new drug to market, and pharmaceutical companies find themselves under intense pressure to produce the latest and greatest "blockbuster" drug simply to cover their enormous R&D and marketing costs.3 The pharmaceutical industry and other proponents of direct-to consumer advertising claim that the FDA's loosening of its restrictions in 1997 has produced a more informed public and saved countless lives through early disease detection and prevention, even though some industry analysts point to less altruistic motives, such as immense pressure from drug makers who could see the money to be made with television advertising.4
{"title":"Pharmaceutical Advertising to Consumers: Corporate Profits vs. Public Safety","authors":"P. Lansing, Michael Fricke","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ200524324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ200524324","url":null,"abstract":"In 1997, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) restated its position on direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical products, for the first time allowing the broad marketing of prescription drugs through media such as television. In 2003, pharmaceutical companies spent an estimated $3.2 billion on advertising campaigns targeting American con sumers.1 In just six short years, the pharmaceutical advertising industry shifted from being virtually nonexistent to become the tenth largest adver tising category in the United States.2 For the companies footing the bill for these advertisements, however, this money needs to be recouped through higher and higher sales revenues. Add to this the average $800 million it costs to bring a new drug to market, and pharmaceutical companies find themselves under intense pressure to produce the latest and greatest \"blockbuster\" drug simply to cover their enormous R&D and marketing costs.3 The pharmaceutical industry and other proponents of direct-to consumer advertising claim that the FDA's loosening of its restrictions in 1997 has produced a more informed public and saved countless lives through early disease detection and prevention, even though some industry analysts point to less altruistic motives, such as immense pressure from drug makers who could see the money to be made with television advertising.4","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"24 1","pages":"23-36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71239893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
rationally argue infants and small children should be allowed to roam freely about cars when the latter are in use. Moreover, adult seatbelts are inade quate substitutes for car seats: seatbelts cannot prevent injuries to children they way they can for adults. Since the state has an obligation to protect those who cannot protect themselves, it has a moral duty to pass and enforce laws requiring children's guardians to use car seats. Of a somewhat more controversial nature is a legal requirement for adult seatbelt use. Even though seatbelts save lives in general, there are those who argue against states' intervention in their citizens' right to self determination. If a person autonomously chooses not to wear a seatbelt, and no one is unduly harmed by the act, then the person may omit wearing a seat belt. Acting in such a way is imprudent, but the right to self-determination is not limited to the prudent (Gorovitz, 186). In this particular argument, autonomy trumps governments' obligation to protect the populace's health. Others argue for the contrary position.
{"title":"Hospitality Industry Smoking Bans and Child Endangerment","authors":"D. Cooley","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ200524326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ200524326","url":null,"abstract":"rationally argue infants and small children should be allowed to roam freely about cars when the latter are in use. Moreover, adult seatbelts are inade quate substitutes for car seats: seatbelts cannot prevent injuries to children they way they can for adults. Since the state has an obligation to protect those who cannot protect themselves, it has a moral duty to pass and enforce laws requiring children's guardians to use car seats. Of a somewhat more controversial nature is a legal requirement for adult seatbelt use. Even though seatbelts save lives in general, there are those who argue against states' intervention in their citizens' right to self determination. If a person autonomously chooses not to wear a seatbelt, and no one is unduly harmed by the act, then the person may omit wearing a seat belt. Acting in such a way is imprudent, but the right to self-determination is not limited to the prudent (Gorovitz, 186). In this particular argument, autonomy trumps governments' obligation to protect the populace's health. Others argue for the contrary position.","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"24 1","pages":"59-90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71239973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Kaufmann, T. West, S. Ravenscroft, Charles B. Shrader
Recent work on moral reasoning has focused on the psychological relationship between the actor, the action and the outcome. The argument is that a tighter connection between these categories leads to more moral behavior. Using data from students who cheated on an exam, we extend this literature by delineating how people can rationalize non-moral behavior by loosening the above relationships. In particular, we found that students tried to distance themselves from the wrongfulness of cheating using four types of rationalization: separating themselves from the action, blaming a third-party for influencing the decision, re-defining the action as something good, and defining alternate outcomes from the behavior. Supporting these rationales are nine basic arguments based on confusion, character, professor clarity, attractive nuisance, culture, intent, acceptance, comparisons and outcome. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for our understanding of moral reasoning and provide some practical approaches for minimizing this behavior.
{"title":"Ethical Distancing: Rationalizing Violations of Organizational Norms","authors":"J. Kaufmann, T. West, S. Ravenscroft, Charles B. Shrader","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ200524328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ200524328","url":null,"abstract":"Recent work on moral reasoning has focused on the psychological relationship between the actor, the action and the outcome. The argument is that a tighter connection between these categories leads to more moral behavior. Using data from students who cheated on an exam, we extend this literature by delineating how people can rationalize non-moral behavior by loosening the above relationships. In particular, we found that students tried to distance themselves from the wrongfulness of cheating using four types of rationalization: separating themselves from the action, blaming a third-party for influencing the decision, re-defining the action as something good, and defining alternate outcomes from the behavior. Supporting these rationales are nine basic arguments based on confusion, character, professor clarity, attractive nuisance, culture, intent, acceptance, comparisons and outcome. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for our understanding of moral reasoning and provide some practical approaches for minimizing this behavior.","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"24 1","pages":"101-134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71240026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Introduced by a cover story promising "a skeptical look at corporate social responsibility," The Economist recently published four articles under the title "The Good Company: A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility" (January 22-28, 2005). The second of these, "The World According to CSR," is uncompromisingly critical of sustainable development and its triple bottom line. Although The Economist does not offer definitions of sustainable development (or, for that matter, of corporate social responsibility), they are not difficult to locate elsewhere. The United Nations World Commis sion on Environment and Development, for example, defines sustainability with respect to the present and the future: "Sustainable development meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gener ations to meet their own needs" (Smart Communities Network). The envi ronmental architect Muscoe Martin cites the etymological origin of the word, and describes its scope to include "physical, cultural, and . . . spiri tual characteristics":
{"title":"Are We Ready for God?: Value and Profit in Sustainable Development and Market Capitalism","authors":"P. Primeaux","doi":"10.5840/BPEJ2005241/24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BPEJ2005241/24","url":null,"abstract":"Introduced by a cover story promising \"a skeptical look at corporate social responsibility,\" The Economist recently published four articles under the title \"The Good Company: A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility\" (January 22-28, 2005). The second of these, \"The World According to CSR,\" is uncompromisingly critical of sustainable development and its triple bottom line. Although The Economist does not offer definitions of sustainable development (or, for that matter, of corporate social responsibility), they are not difficult to locate elsewhere. The United Nations World Commis sion on Environment and Development, for example, defines sustainability with respect to the present and the future: \"Sustainable development meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gener ations to meet their own needs\" (Smart Communities Network). The envi ronmental architect Muscoe Martin cites the etymological origin of the word, and describes its scope to include \"physical, cultural, and . . . spiri tual characteristics\":","PeriodicalId":53983,"journal":{"name":"BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL","volume":"56 1","pages":"61-78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2005-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71240228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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