This paper argues that the core phi-features behind grammatical person, number, and gender are widely used in animal cognition and are in no way limited to humans or to communication. Based on this, it is hypothesized (i) that the semantics behind phi-features were fixed long before primates evolved, (ii) that most go back as far as far as vertebrates, and (iii) that some are shared with insects and plants.
{"title":"Phi-Features in Animal Cognition","authors":"Chris Golston","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9131","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that the core phi-features behind grammatical person, number, and gender are widely used in animal cognition and are in no way limited to humans or to communication. Based on this, it is hypothesized (i) that the semantics behind phi-features were fixed long before primates evolved, (ii) that most go back as far as far as vertebrates, and (iii) that some are shared with insects and plants.","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49052125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
[I]t is of recent evolutionary vintage. A common assumption is that language arose in humans in roughly the last 50,000–100,000 years. This is very rapid in evolutionary terms. I suggest the following picture: FL is the product of (at most) one (or two) evolutionary innovations which, when combined with cognitive resources available before the changes that led to language, delivers FL. (Hornstein 2009: 4)
{"title":"Merge and Labeling as Descent with Modification of Categorization: A Neo-Lennebergian Approach","authors":"Koji Hoshi","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9135","url":null,"abstract":"[I]t is of recent evolutionary vintage. A common assumption is that language arose in humans in roughly the last 50,000–100,000 years. This is very rapid in evolutionary terms. I suggest the following picture: FL is the product of (at most) one (or two) evolutionary innovations which, when combined with cognitive resources available before the changes that led to language, delivers FL. (Hornstein 2009: 4)","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49306085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose that the interface between phonology and phonetics is mediated by a transduction process that converts elementary units of phonological computation, features, into temporally coordinated neuromuscular patterns, called ‘True Phonetic Representations’, which are directly interpretable by the motor system of speech production. Our view of the interface is constrained by substance-free generative phonological assumptions and by insights gained from psycholinguistic and phonetic models of speech production. To distinguish transduction of abstract phonological units into planned neuromuscular patterns from the biomechanics of speech production usually associated with physiological phonetics, we have termed this interface theory ‘Cognitive Phonetics’ (CP). The inner workings of CP are described in terms of Marr’s (1982/2010) tri-level approach, which we used to construct a linking hypothesis relating formal phonology to neurobiological activity. Potential neurobiological correlates supporting various parts of CP are presented. We also argue that CP augments the study of certain phonetic phenomena, most notably coarticulation, and suggest that some phenomena usually considered phonological (e.g., naturalness and gradience) receive better explanations within CP.
{"title":"Cognitive Phonetics: The Transduction of Distinctive Features at the Phonology-Phonetics Interface","authors":"Veno Volenec, C. Reiss","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9089","url":null,"abstract":"We propose that the interface between phonology and phonetics is mediated by a transduction process that converts elementary units of phonological computation, features, into temporally coordinated neuromuscular patterns, called ‘True Phonetic Representations’, which are directly interpretable by the motor system of speech production. Our view of the interface is constrained by substance-free generative phonological assumptions and by insights gained from psycholinguistic and phonetic models of speech production. To distinguish transduction of abstract phonological units into planned neuromuscular patterns from the biomechanics of speech production usually associated with physiological phonetics, we have termed this interface theory ‘Cognitive Phonetics’ (CP). The inner workings of CP are described in terms of Marr’s (1982/2010) tri-level approach, which we used to construct a linking hypothesis relating formal phonology to neurobiological activity. Potential neurobiological correlates supporting various parts of CP are presented. We also argue that CP augments the study of certain phonetic phenomena, most notably coarticulation, and suggest that some phenomena usually considered phonological (e.g., naturalness and gradience) receive better explanations within CP.","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44956139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Circa 1930, Wittgenstein began to develop a theory of semantics in terms of distinct representational systems (calculi) each constructed from measure-ment scales. Impressed by the heterogeneity of measurement scaling, he eventually abandoned the effort. However, such a project can be continued in the light of later developments in measurement theory. Any remaining heterogeneity can be accounted for, plausibly enough, in terms of the facultative nature of the mind/brain. Developing such a theory is potentially a contribution to biolinguistics. The symmetries and asymmetries of the measurement scales suggest self-organization in brain activity, further suggesting a connection between such a neo-Wittgensteinian approach to the thought systems and minimalist approaches to syntax.
{"title":"Wittgenstein and Biolinguistics: Building upon the Second Picture Theory","authors":"John Bolender","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9129","url":null,"abstract":"Circa 1930, Wittgenstein began to develop a theory of semantics in terms of distinct representational systems (calculi) each constructed from measure-ment scales. Impressed by the heterogeneity of measurement scaling, he eventually abandoned the effort. However, such a project can be continued in the light of later developments in measurement theory. Any remaining heterogeneity can be accounted for, plausibly enough, in terms of the facultative nature of the mind/brain. Developing such a theory is potentially a contribution to biolinguistics. The symmetries and asymmetries of the measurement scales suggest self-organization in brain activity, further suggesting a connection between such a neo-Wittgensteinian approach to the thought systems and minimalist approaches to syntax.","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46236495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Chapter 6 of Biological Foundations of Language, Lenneberg argues against continuity theories of language evolution, which claim that language evolved from simpler communication systems. Although Lenneberg was pessimistic about even discontinuity theories explaining how language evolved, discontinuity has become significant in the Minimalist program, which posits that our species’ acquisition of Merge was the key discontinuity that made language possible. On the basis of a unified description of natural communication systems, I show that language is indeed based upon a cognitive discontinuity, which is moreover specific to linguistic ability. However, I argue that even Minimalist theories must recognise this discontinuity as the sensorimotor interface with syntax, rather than syntax itself. This ultimately supports the view that syntactic structures are structures of thought, but taking this claim seriously means reimagining how syntax relates to semantics and morphology, as the traditional ‘lexical item’ is no longer a tenable primitive of generative theory.
{"title":"Justifications for a Discontinuity Theory of Language Evolution","authors":"C. Hackett","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9085","url":null,"abstract":"In Chapter 6 of Biological Foundations of Language, Lenneberg argues against continuity theories of language evolution, which claim that language evolved from simpler communication systems. Although Lenneberg was pessimistic about even discontinuity theories explaining how language evolved, discontinuity has become significant in the Minimalist program, which posits that our species’ acquisition of Merge was the key discontinuity that made language possible. On the basis of a unified description of natural communication systems, I show that language is indeed based upon a cognitive discontinuity, which is moreover specific to linguistic ability. However, I argue that even Minimalist theories must recognise this discontinuity as the sensorimotor interface with syntax, rather than syntax itself. This ultimately supports the view that syntactic structures are structures of thought, but taking this claim seriously means reimagining how syntax relates to semantics and morphology, as the traditional ‘lexical item’ is no longer a tenable primitive of generative theory.","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42929179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B. Lust, Suzanne Flynn, J. Sherman, Charles R. Henderson, J. Gair, Marc Harrison, Leah M Shabo
In this paper, experimental results on the study of language loss in pro- dromal Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in the elderly are linked to experimen- tal results from the study of language acquisition in the child, via a tran- sitional stage of Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI). Recent brain imag- ing results from a pilot study comparing prodromal AD and normal ag- ing are reported. Both, behavioral results and their underlying neural underpinnings, identify the source of language deficits in MCI as break- down in syntax–semantics integration. These results are linked to inde- pendent discoveries regarding the ontogeny of language in the child and their neural foundations. It is suggested that these convergent results ad- vance our understanding of the true nature of maturational processes in language, allowing us to reconsider a “regression hypothesis” (e.g., Ribot 1881), wherein later acquisition predicts earliest dissolution.
{"title":"On the Biological Foundations of Language: Recent Advances in Language Acquisition, Deterioration, and Neuroscience Begin to Converge","authors":"B. Lust, Suzanne Flynn, J. Sherman, Charles R. Henderson, J. Gair, Marc Harrison, Leah M Shabo","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9081","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, experimental results on the study of language loss in pro- dromal Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in the elderly are linked to experimen- tal results from the study of language acquisition in the child, via a tran- sitional stage of Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI). Recent brain imag- ing results from a pilot study comparing prodromal AD and normal ag- ing are reported. Both, behavioral results and their underlying neural underpinnings, identify the source of language deficits in MCI as break- down in syntax–semantics integration. These results are linked to inde- pendent discoveries regarding the ontogeny of language in the child and their neural foundations. It is suggested that these convergent results ad- vance our understanding of the true nature of maturational processes in language, allowing us to reconsider a “regression hypothesis” (e.g., Ribot 1881), wherein later acquisition predicts earliest dissolution.","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42199399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2003, Jerry Fodor published Hume Variations (HV), a book sitting astride The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (Fodor 2000) and LOT 2 (Fodor 2008). Sadly, we now know that the latter would end up being Fodor’s last solo effort to defend the Representational/Computational Theory of Mind (RCTM) in book format. Thereafter two collaborative endeavors ensued, the widely vituperated What Darwin Got Wrong (Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini 2010) and the sketchy Minds Without Meanings (Fodor & Pylyshyn 2015). The former could easily be connected with Fodor (2000) as striking the, in our opinion, definitive blow on evolutionary psychology, while the latter elaborated on Fodor’s (2008) referentialist account of the content of intentional states, hinting, also in our opinion, at the basis of what might eventually constitute a solution for this hard problem—we held our breaths awaiting the next season, only to recently know that it would not be shot. This apparently leaves HV in a kind of no man’s land and seemingly makes of it a relatively minor work not worth the attention of the casual follower of the happenings in the philosophy of mind—a text for wholehearted fans only.1 However, when read as part of a trilogy that opens with Fodor (2000) and culminates with LOT 2, HV acquires a full sense of its own as the necessary link between the computational model of the former and the theory of ideas developed in the latter. Especially, we believe, when Fodor’s Hume is reassessed under the reading we propose here. In HV, Fodor got it right when he asserted that the etiology of complex ideas is the crux of Hume’s psychology; but he didn’t get it completely right, for Hume’s etiological suggestions are more complex and nuanced than they surface in Fodor’s portrait. The first section of this note is aimed at explaining why we believe so. Thereafter, we move to the question of what, according to Fodor, Hume got inexcusably wrong. Again, while we would like to suggest that Fodor got this partially right, we nonetheless believe that Hume’s contentions are not as inexcusably wrong as Fodor argued them to be, even from the point of view of a
{"title":"Complex Ideas: Fodor's Hume Revisited","authors":"S. Balari, G. Lorenzo","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9133","url":null,"abstract":"In 2003, Jerry Fodor published Hume Variations (HV), a book sitting astride The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (Fodor 2000) and LOT 2 (Fodor 2008). Sadly, we now know that the latter would end up being Fodor’s last solo effort to defend the Representational/Computational Theory of Mind (RCTM) in book format. Thereafter two collaborative endeavors ensued, the widely vituperated What Darwin Got Wrong (Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini 2010) and the sketchy Minds Without Meanings (Fodor & Pylyshyn 2015). The former could easily be connected with Fodor (2000) as striking the, in our opinion, definitive blow on evolutionary psychology, while the latter elaborated on Fodor’s (2008) referentialist account of the content of intentional states, hinting, also in our opinion, at the basis of what might eventually constitute a solution for this hard problem—we held our breaths awaiting the next season, only to recently know that it would not be shot. This apparently leaves HV in a kind of no man’s land and seemingly makes of it a relatively minor work not worth the attention of the casual follower of the happenings in the philosophy of mind—a text for wholehearted fans only.1 However, when read as part of a trilogy that opens with Fodor (2000) and culminates with LOT 2, HV acquires a full sense of its own as the necessary link between the computational model of the former and the theory of ideas developed in the latter. Especially, we believe, when Fodor’s Hume is reassessed under the reading we propose here. In HV, Fodor got it right when he asserted that the etiology of complex ideas is the crux of Hume’s psychology; but he didn’t get it completely right, for Hume’s etiological suggestions are more complex and nuanced than they surface in Fodor’s portrait. The first section of this note is aimed at explaining why we believe so. Thereafter, we move to the question of what, according to Fodor, Hume got inexcusably wrong. Again, while we would like to suggest that Fodor got this partially right, we nonetheless believe that Hume’s contentions are not as inexcusably wrong as Fodor argued them to be, even from the point of view of a","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44169450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Biological Foundations of Language already included a discussion of the role of temporal structural regularities and rhythm as organizing principle in language (see chapter 3 in Lenneberg 1967). In this article, we rely on Lenneberg’s biological notion of language and related ideas like rhythmicity and temporal structural regularities in order to show that individuals with developmental dyslexia (DD) are less efficient than control individuals in using structural regularities during handwriting and some language activities. Consequently, they cannot fully exploit (temporal) structural representations to process oral language, to execute handwriting movement and to read, although they have developed compensatory mechanisms to understand language, perform motor activities, and read. This proposal is based on findings collected in a varieties of studies conducted in our lab. First, we show that children with DD, who do not fail standardized language tests, but do not process oral language in the same ways as age-matched peers, as evident through ERP measures. They are also less efficient than control peers in morphologically manipulating non-words. Second, we show that children with DD are impaired in complying with two rhythmic principles governing handwriting considered in its motor dimension (not spelling), although they do not meet the criteria for disgraphia. Thus, children with DD have subtle oral language problems and motor disorders, beyond clear reading difficulties. Although we are aware of the great genetic and phenotypic heterogeneity of dyslexia and language disorders, we would like to conjecture that there might be a common source to language, motor and reading difficulties. This lies in the efficient use of the temporal structural regularities underlying these three behaviors. The possibility of a common source does not preclude the existence of different phenotypic manifestations, as the way to compensate for the difficulties may vary across individuals.
{"title":"Language, Reading, and Motor Control: Get Rhythm!","authors":"M. Guasti, E. Pagliarini, N. Stucchi","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9103","url":null,"abstract":"Biological Foundations of Language already included a discussion of the role of temporal structural regularities and rhythm as organizing principle in language (see chapter 3 in Lenneberg 1967). In this article, we rely on Lenneberg’s biological notion of language and related ideas like rhythmicity and temporal structural regularities in order to show that individuals with developmental dyslexia (DD) are less efficient than control individuals in using structural regularities during handwriting and some language activities. Consequently, they cannot fully exploit (temporal) structural representations to process oral language, to execute handwriting movement and to read, although they have developed compensatory mechanisms to understand language, perform motor activities, and read. This proposal is based on findings collected in a varieties of studies conducted in our lab. First, we show that children with DD, who do not fail standardized language tests, but do not process oral language in the same ways as age-matched peers, as evident through ERP measures. They are also less efficient than control peers in morphologically manipulating non-words. Second, we show that children with DD are impaired in complying with two rhythmic principles governing handwriting considered in its motor dimension (not spelling), although they do not meet the criteria for disgraphia. Thus, children with DD have subtle oral language problems and motor disorders, beyond clear reading difficulties. Although we are aware of the great genetic and phenotypic heterogeneity of dyslexia and language disorders, we would like to conjecture that there might be a common source to language, motor and reading difficulties. This lies in the efficient use of the temporal structural regularities underlying these three behaviors. The possibility of a common source does not preclude the existence of different phenotypic manifestations, as the way to compensate for the difficulties may vary across individuals.","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44978127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the central questions that Eric Lenneberg raised in his seminal book, Biological Foundations of Language is: What is the relationship between language comprehension and language production? This paper reviews Lenneberg’s case study of a child with congenital anarthria and then presents the results of two studies that investigate the relationship between phoneme perception and production. The first study investigates the phoneme identification skills of a child with developmental apraxia who, like the anarthric child studied by Lenneberg, had essentially no speech yet had no difficulty understanding speech. The second study investigates the extent to which 28 typically-developing children’s ability to identify phonemes is related to their ability to produce phonemes. The results of both studies support Lenneberg’s conclusion that children’s ability to perceive speech is not dependent on their ability to produce speech. Thus, Lenneberg’s original case study and the two studies presented in this paper argue against gestural theories of speech perception such as the Motor Theory.
Eric Lenneberg在他的开创性著作《语言的生物学基础》中提出的一个核心问题是:语言理解和语言生产之间的关系是什么?本文回顾了Lenneberg对先天性无构音儿童的个案研究，然后介绍了两项研究音素感知与产生之间关系的结果。第一项研究调查了一个患有发展性失用症的儿童的音素识别技能，就像Lenneberg研究的那个患有失用症的儿童一样，他基本上不会说话，但理解语言没有困难。第二项研究调查了28名发育正常的儿童识别音素的能力与他们产生音素的能力之间的关系。两项研究的结果都支持Lenneberg的结论，即儿童感知语言的能力并不取决于他们说话的能力。因此，Lenneberg最初的案例研究和本文中提出的两项研究反对言语感知的手势理论，如运动理论。
{"title":"The Relationship between Phoneme Production and Perception in Speech-Impaired and Typically-Developing Children","authors":"K. Stromswold, A. Lichtenstein","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9075","url":null,"abstract":"One of the central questions that Eric Lenneberg raised in his seminal book, Biological Foundations of Language is: What is the relationship between language comprehension and language production? This paper reviews Lenneberg’s case study of a child with congenital anarthria and then presents the results of two studies that investigate the relationship between phoneme perception and production. The first study investigates the phoneme identification skills of a child with developmental apraxia who, like the anarthric child studied by Lenneberg, had essentially no speech yet had no difficulty understanding speech. The second study investigates the extent to which 28 typically-developing children’s ability to identify phonemes is related to their ability to produce phonemes. The results of both studies support Lenneberg’s conclusion that children’s ability to perceive speech is not dependent on their ability to produce speech. Thus, Lenneberg’s original case study and the two studies presented in this paper argue against gestural theories of speech perception such as the Motor Theory.","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2018-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45196252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims to re-evaluate the legacy of Eric Lenneberg’s monumental Biological Foundations of Language, with special reference to his biolinguistic framework and view on (child) aphasiology. The argument draws from the following concepts from Lenneberg’s work: (i) language (latent struc- ture vs. realized structure) as independent of externalization; (ii) resonance theory; (iii) brain rhythmicity; and (iv) aphasia as temporal dysfunction. Specifically, it will be demonstrated that Lenneberg’s original version of the critical period hypothesis and his child aphasiology lend themselves to elucidating a child aphasia of epileptic origin called Landau-Kleffner syndrome (LKS), thereby opening a possible hope for recovery from the disease. Moreover, it will be claimed that, to the extent that the language disorder in LKS can be couched in these terms, it can serve as strong “liv- ing” evidence in support of Lenneberg’s critical period hypothesis and his view on child aphasiology.
{"title":"Lenneberg’s Contributions to the Biology of Language and Child Aphasiology: Resonation and Brain Rhythmicity as Key Mechanisms","authors":"Koji Hoshi","doi":"10.5964/bioling.9079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.9079","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to re-evaluate the legacy of Eric Lenneberg’s monumental Biological Foundations of Language, with special reference to his biolinguistic framework and view on (child) aphasiology. The argument draws from the following concepts from Lenneberg’s work: (i) language (latent struc- ture vs. realized structure) as independent of externalization; (ii) resonance theory; (iii) brain rhythmicity; and (iv) aphasia as temporal dysfunction. Specifically, it will be demonstrated that Lenneberg’s original version of the critical period hypothesis and his child aphasiology lend themselves to elucidating a child aphasia of epileptic origin called Landau-Kleffner syndrome (LKS), thereby opening a possible hope for recovery from the disease. Moreover, it will be claimed that, to the extent that the language disorder in LKS can be couched in these terms, it can serve as strong “liv- ing” evidence in support of Lenneberg’s critical period hypothesis and his view on child aphasiology.","PeriodicalId":54041,"journal":{"name":"Biolinguistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48338996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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