{"title":"Schwerpunkt: Angstverfassungen. Über die affektiven Untergründe des Rechts","authors":"I. Augsberg, B. Zabel","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0025","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"425 - 429"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42896181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In recent times, Kant’s theory of the moral feeling of respect has increasingly come to the centre of Kant research. His diverse and seemingly contradictory characterisations of this feeling in particular have led to continued controversial discussion. While a number of scholars try to understand the special role of respect in Kant by isolating this feeling from its conceptual context or solely referring to its role as moral motivation, I will concentrate on the systemic position of respect within the framework of Kant’s theory of the autonomy of reason. Furthermore, I will try to elucidate the different characterisations of respect given by Kant, referring not only to his ethics, but also to his general theory of transcendental idealism. Examining the special place of respect within Kant’s transcendental idealism, I will plead for a compatibilist reading of respect, according to which the “intellectualist” as well as the “affectivist” view both hold true. This is motivated by interpreting respect as a volitional structure featuring rational as well as emotional dimensions.
{"title":"Jenseits von Affektivismus und Intellektualismus","authors":"Jörg U. Noller","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent times, Kant’s theory of the moral feeling of respect has increasingly come to the centre of Kant research. His diverse and seemingly contradictory characterisations of this feeling in particular have led to continued controversial discussion. While a number of scholars try to understand the special role of respect in Kant by isolating this feeling from its conceptual context or solely referring to its role as moral motivation, I will concentrate on the systemic position of respect within the framework of Kant’s theory of the autonomy of reason. Furthermore, I will try to elucidate the different characterisations of respect given by Kant, referring not only to his ethics, but also to his general theory of transcendental idealism. Examining the special place of respect within Kant’s transcendental idealism, I will plead for a compatibilist reading of respect, according to which the “intellectualist” as well as the “affectivist” view both hold true. This is motivated by interpreting respect as a volitional structure featuring rational as well as emotional dimensions.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"400 - 424"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45997337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The Special Focus on invitation policy at universities contains a target article by Romy Jaster and Geert Keil, five commentaries, and a response. The question under discussion is what disqualifies a person from being invited to speak at a university. On liberal, Millian approaches, the epistemic benefits of free speech preclude no-platforming policies. More restrictive approaches demand the exclusion of speakers who are considered racist or otherwise hostile against marginalized groups. Jaster and Keil take a virtue-based approach to invitation policy: A person is ineligible as a speaker if she exhibits specific intellectual vices that are detrimental to the pursuit of truth, the university’s raison d’être. The five critics raise various concerns. Birgit Recki deems the virtue-based approach too restrictive: It is prone to exclude some speakers who make intellectually stimulating contributions. Eva von Redecker and Daniel Loick deem the criterion too permissive: It allows for contributions that should have no place on campus. Dieter Schönecker and Maria-Sibylla Lotter object that the approach is silent on all recent actual cases of ‘cancelling’ at universities. In their response, Jaster and Keil address these concerns and clarify their position.
摘要《对大学邀请政策的特别关注》包含Romy Jaster和Geert Keil的一篇目标文章、五篇评论和一篇回应。正在讨论的问题是，是什么使一个人失去了在大学演讲的资格。在自由主义、米利安主义的方法中，言论自由的认识利益排除了无平台化政策。更具限制性的做法要求将被视为种族主义者或对边缘化群体怀有敌意的发言者排除在外。Jaster和Keil对邀请政策采取了基于美德的方法：如果一个人表现出不利于追求真理的特定智力缺陷，即大学存在的理由，那么她就没有资格成为演讲者。五位评论家提出了各种各样的担忧。Birgit Recki认为基于美德的方法限制性太强：它倾向于排除一些在智力上做出激励贡献的演讲者。Eva von Redecker和Daniel Loick认为这一标准过于宽松：它允许在校园里没有立足之地的捐款。Dieter Schönecker和Maria Sibylla Lotter反对这种做法对最近所有大学“取消”的实际案例保持沉默。Jaster和Keil在答复中谈到了这些关切并阐明了他们的立场。
{"title":"Wer muss draußen bleiben?","authors":"R. Jaster, G. Keil","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Special Focus on invitation policy at universities contains a target article by Romy Jaster and Geert Keil, five commentaries, and a response. The question under discussion is what disqualifies a person from being invited to speak at a university. On liberal, Millian approaches, the epistemic benefits of free speech preclude no-platforming policies. More restrictive approaches demand the exclusion of speakers who are considered racist or otherwise hostile against marginalized groups. Jaster and Keil take a virtue-based approach to invitation policy: A person is ineligible as a speaker if she exhibits specific intellectual vices that are detrimental to the pursuit of truth, the university’s raison d’être. The five critics raise various concerns. Birgit Recki deems the virtue-based approach too restrictive: It is prone to exclude some speakers who make intellectually stimulating contributions. Eva von Redecker and Daniel Loick deem the criterion too permissive: It allows for contributions that should have no place on campus. Dieter Schönecker and Maria-Sibylla Lotter object that the approach is silent on all recent actual cases of ‘cancelling’ at universities. In their response, Jaster and Keil address these concerns and clarify their position.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"474 - 491"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43911530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The connection between fear, law and the state is a topic that is given particular attention in times of social insecurity. Some approximations are explored here under the notion of fear constitutions. We are equal in fear of one another, which is why fear can be understood as a condition of modern constitutions. However, the social contract does not lead to freedom from fear, but rather fear shifts; the legal subjects remain subjects of fear, in relation to one another, but in particular towards that multiple artificial person which the state comes to embody as it takes on a life of its own. The degree of fear varies with the degree of unpredictability and indeterminacy of executive action. State measures against terrorism or against the pandemic are often an unpredictable response to an unknown danger and are therefore at the same time both an expression of fear and its trigger. It would be helpful if there was a clear distinction between sensible and unreasonable, functional and dysfunctional forms of fear. Freud tried to provide criteria with his concept of neurotic fear, a concept that has been taken up in political and legal philosophy. However, the concept is obscure and cannot be used without normative specifications.
{"title":"Angstverfassungen","authors":"J. Bung","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The connection between fear, law and the state is a topic that is given particular attention in times of social insecurity. Some approximations are explored here under the notion of fear constitutions. We are equal in fear of one another, which is why fear can be understood as a condition of modern constitutions. However, the social contract does not lead to freedom from fear, but rather fear shifts; the legal subjects remain subjects of fear, in relation to one another, but in particular towards that multiple artificial person which the state comes to embody as it takes on a life of its own. The degree of fear varies with the degree of unpredictability and indeterminacy of executive action. State measures against terrorism or against the pandemic are often an unpredictable response to an unknown danger and are therefore at the same time both an expression of fear and its trigger. It would be helpful if there was a clear distinction between sensible and unreasonable, functional and dysfunctional forms of fear. Freud tried to provide criteria with his concept of neurotic fear, a concept that has been taken up in political and legal philosophy. However, the concept is obscure and cannot be used without normative specifications.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"430 - 444"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44756539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：