Abstract I address the question of human agency from the perspective of critical social theory, starting from the premise that, today, such theories must focus on the global ecological disaster. I assume, furthermore, that radical societal change is necessary in order to arrest our current disastrous ecological trajectory. Radical societal change calls for a fundamental re-orientation in values globally, on both an individual and collective level. This entails a thorough-going change in perceptions of what it means to lead an ethically good life, including revision of deepseated conceptions of ethical agency, in particular, the idea of individual freedom. Wearing the hat of an engaged theorist, I propose a re-imagining and rearticulation of freedom as ecologically attuned, self-directing, self-transforming political agency. Taking social institutions as an example, I discuss non-authoritarian authority as a force for forming and transforming ethical perceptions and attribute a similar non-authoritarian potential to critical social theories, in this case a disclosive one. While a change in ethical perceptions will not be sufficient for the required societal transformation, I claim that it is an integral component of it.
{"title":"Freiheit neu vorstellen: menschliches Handlungsvermögen in Zeiten der ökologischen Katastrophe","authors":"M. Cooke","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2023-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I address the question of human agency from the perspective of critical social theory, starting from the premise that, today, such theories must focus on the global ecological disaster. I assume, furthermore, that radical societal change is necessary in order to arrest our current disastrous ecological trajectory. Radical societal change calls for a fundamental re-orientation in values globally, on both an individual and collective level. This entails a thorough-going change in perceptions of what it means to lead an ethically good life, including revision of deepseated conceptions of ethical agency, in particular, the idea of individual freedom. Wearing the hat of an engaged theorist, I propose a re-imagining and rearticulation of freedom as ecologically attuned, self-directing, self-transforming political agency. Taking social institutions as an example, I discuss non-authoritarian authority as a force for forming and transforming ethical perceptions and attribute a similar non-authoritarian potential to critical social theories, in this case a disclosive one. While a change in ethical perceptions will not be sufficient for the required societal transformation, I claim that it is an integral component of it.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"71 1","pages":"178 - 193"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42562197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
1. Mit Die Natur des Menschen will Daniel Martin Feige die Umrisse einer dialektischen Anthropologie hervortreten lassen. Das tut das Buch in vier Schritten. In einem ersten Schritt kritisiert Feige reduktiv-naturalistische sowie historistische Auffassungen des Menschen. Während den naturalistischen Positionen (in Gestalt von Soziobiologie und evolutionärer Psychologie) vorgeworfen wird, die Vernunft des Menschen „wegzuerklären“ (19) und so zugleich den eigenen Wahrheitsanspruch als wissenschaftlicher Theorie nicht mehr verständlich machen zu können, hat die historistische Auffassung nach Feige einen Relativismus zur Folge, der auch die Geltung der eigenen Theorie untergräbt. Beide Unternehmungen sollen also an einem performativen Selbstwiderspruch kranken. Der zweite Teil geht auf dieser Grundlage davon aus, dass wir den Menschen im Gegenteil als wesentlich vernünftiges Wesen verstehen müssen, statt zu versuchen diese Vernunft naturalistisch oder historistisch zu reduzieren. Er diskutiert zwei Weisen, diese Vernunft als unsere Natur zu verstehen, die die Grundintuitionen des Naturalismus und des Historismus unter veränderten Vorzeichen wieder aufnehmen: Auf der einen Seite wird Michael Thompsons neoaristotelische Auffassung diskutiert, dass die Vernunft die Form der ersten Natur des Menschen sei; auf der anderen Seite wird McDowells kantianisch genannte Auffassung untersucht, dass die Vernunft die zweite Natur des Menschen ausmache. Beide Positionen werden so verstanden, dass sie den Anspruch haben, eine transformative Theorie der Vernunft zu formulieren, dergestalt die Vernunft nicht einfach zu unserer tierischen Natur additiv hinzutritt, sondern diese Natur vielmehr insgesamt transformiert und die allgemeine Form und Weise angibt, in der wir lebendig sind. Der Mensch ist also ein wesentlich vernünftiges Wesen, weshalb jeder Versuch, die Vernunft ‚wegzuerklären‘, seinen Gegenstand verfehlt. Selbst Beschreibungen unserer vermeintlich niederen Fähigkeiten, die von der übergreifenden vernünftigen Form
1.丹尼尔·马丁·费格（Daniel Martin Feige）在《人的本质》（The Nature of Man）一书中希望出现辩证人类学的轮廓。这本书分四步完成。费格首先批判了还原自然主义和历史主义的人观。而自然主义立场（以社会生物学和进化心理学的形式）被指责“解释”男人的理由（19）因此，同时，根据费格的说法，历史主义概念无法使一个人对真理作为一种科学理论的主张变得可理解，从而导致相对主义，这也破坏了一个人自己理论的有效性。因此，这两项事业都应该受到表演性自相矛盾的影响。第二部分在此基础上假设，相反，我们必须将人理解为一个实质上理性的存在，而不是试图从自然主义或历史上减少这种理性。他讨论了将这种理性理解为我们的本性的两种方式，这两种方式在变化的迹象下恢复了自然主义和历史主义的基本直觉：一方面，讨论了迈克尔·汤普森的新亚里士多德观点，即理性是人的第一本性的形式；另一方面，考察了麦克道尔的康德观点，即理性构成人的第二性。这两种立场都被理解为主张形成一种变革性的理性理论，因此理性并不是简单地增加我们的动物本性，而是将这种本性作为一个整体来改变，并表明我们生活的一般形式和方式。因此，人本质上是一个理性的存在，这就是为什么每一次试图“解释”理性的尝试都会错过它的目标。甚至对我们所谓的较低能力的描述，都源于总体理性形式
{"title":"Dialektische Anthropologie – oder romantischer Idealismus?","authors":"Thomas Khurana","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2023-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0026","url":null,"abstract":"1. Mit Die Natur des Menschen will Daniel Martin Feige die Umrisse einer dialektischen Anthropologie hervortreten lassen. Das tut das Buch in vier Schritten. In einem ersten Schritt kritisiert Feige reduktiv-naturalistische sowie historistische Auffassungen des Menschen. Während den naturalistischen Positionen (in Gestalt von Soziobiologie und evolutionärer Psychologie) vorgeworfen wird, die Vernunft des Menschen „wegzuerklären“ (19) und so zugleich den eigenen Wahrheitsanspruch als wissenschaftlicher Theorie nicht mehr verständlich machen zu können, hat die historistische Auffassung nach Feige einen Relativismus zur Folge, der auch die Geltung der eigenen Theorie untergräbt. Beide Unternehmungen sollen also an einem performativen Selbstwiderspruch kranken. Der zweite Teil geht auf dieser Grundlage davon aus, dass wir den Menschen im Gegenteil als wesentlich vernünftiges Wesen verstehen müssen, statt zu versuchen diese Vernunft naturalistisch oder historistisch zu reduzieren. Er diskutiert zwei Weisen, diese Vernunft als unsere Natur zu verstehen, die die Grundintuitionen des Naturalismus und des Historismus unter veränderten Vorzeichen wieder aufnehmen: Auf der einen Seite wird Michael Thompsons neoaristotelische Auffassung diskutiert, dass die Vernunft die Form der ersten Natur des Menschen sei; auf der anderen Seite wird McDowells kantianisch genannte Auffassung untersucht, dass die Vernunft die zweite Natur des Menschen ausmache. Beide Positionen werden so verstanden, dass sie den Anspruch haben, eine transformative Theorie der Vernunft zu formulieren, dergestalt die Vernunft nicht einfach zu unserer tierischen Natur additiv hinzutritt, sondern diese Natur vielmehr insgesamt transformiert und die allgemeine Form und Weise angibt, in der wir lebendig sind. Der Mensch ist also ein wesentlich vernünftiges Wesen, weshalb jeder Versuch, die Vernunft ‚wegzuerklären‘, seinen Gegenstand verfehlt. Selbst Beschreibungen unserer vermeintlich niederen Fähigkeiten, die von der übergreifenden vernünftigen Form","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"71 1","pages":"304 - 311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47687214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article is dedicated to a topic that has been largely neglected in the historiography of philosophy to date: the position of philosophers towards the institution of slavery. Especially in survey works on the history of philosophy, positions on slavery and colonial conquest are not addressed, but have so far only been discussed in a few individual studies. From the beginning of European expansion, however, philosophical and political theories no longer emerged independently of these developments, as the expansion forced reflection on how to deal with the conquered regions and peoples, and thus on the problematic sides of the ‘voyages of discovery’: land grabbing, subjugation and slavery. Such entanglements are briefly explained using John Locke as an example. In view of the “colonial ensnarement of the Enlightenment” (Elberfeld) and the need for a critical examination of it, I propose as a methodological approach to include texts by thinkers of African origin, who had first-hand experiences of the institution of slavery and critically reflected on their own social position, the social and political conditions of their time as well as moral questions. Using three selected Black thinkers, the poet Phillis Wheatley (1753–1784), the abolitionist Olaudah Equiano (1745–1797) and the theologian Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein (ca. 1717–1747), I discuss the relevance of texts by former slaves for the historiography of philosophy.
本文致力于一个迄今为止在哲学史编纂中基本上被忽视的话题:哲学家对奴隶制制度的立场。特别是在哲学史的调查工作中，对奴隶制和殖民征服的立场没有涉及，但迄今为止只在少数个别研究中进行了讨论。然而，从欧洲扩张开始，哲学和政治理论就不再独立于这些发展而出现，因为扩张迫使人们反思如何处理被征服的地区和民族，从而反思“发现之旅”的问题方面:土地掠夺、征服和奴隶制。以约翰·洛克为例，简要地解释了这种纠缠。鉴于“启蒙运动的殖民陷阱”(Elberfeld)以及对其进行批判性检查的需要，我建议作为一种方法论方法，包括非洲裔思想家的文本，他们有奴隶制制度的第一手经验，并批判性地反思他们自己的社会地位，他们那个时代的社会和政治条件以及道德问题。我选取了三位黑人思想家，诗人菲利斯·惠特利(Phillis Wheatley, 1753-1784)、废奴主义者奥劳达·伊奎亚诺(Olaudah Equiano, 1745-1797)和神学家雅各布·埃莉萨·约翰内斯·卡皮因(Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein，约1717-1747)，讨论了前奴隶的文本与哲学史的相关性。
{"title":"Sklaverei und Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung","authors":"Anke Graness","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2023-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article is dedicated to a topic that has been largely neglected in the historiography of philosophy to date: the position of philosophers towards the institution of slavery. Especially in survey works on the history of philosophy, positions on slavery and colonial conquest are not addressed, but have so far only been discussed in a few individual studies. From the beginning of European expansion, however, philosophical and political theories no longer emerged independently of these developments, as the expansion forced reflection on how to deal with the conquered regions and peoples, and thus on the problematic sides of the ‘voyages of discovery’: land grabbing, subjugation and slavery. Such entanglements are briefly explained using John Locke as an example. In view of the “colonial ensnarement of the Enlightenment” (Elberfeld) and the need for a critical examination of it, I propose as a methodological approach to include texts by thinkers of African origin, who had first-hand experiences of the institution of slavery and critically reflected on their own social position, the social and political conditions of their time as well as moral questions. Using three selected Black thinkers, the poet Phillis Wheatley (1753–1784), the abolitionist Olaudah Equiano (1745–1797) and the theologian Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein (ca. 1717–1747), I discuss the relevance of texts by former slaves for the historiography of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"71 1","pages":"226 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48790515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract How is philosophical knowledge related to the world in which it is produced – and how should it be related? In the article, “world” refers to the whole of historically established, politically contested and materially constituted practices. Three ideal-type relationships are distinguished: affirmatively in the world, negatively against the world, and with the world. The article argues for the latter because it combines the two decisive insights of the first two relationships: the insight into philosophy’s facticity, i. e., it being bound to the world, and the insight into philosophy’s freedom, i. e., that it can, nevertheless, turn against that world. Political epistemology is needed to explicate any philosophy with the world because it holds together, in a productive tension, minimal materialism as the core of the insight into philosophy’s facticity and the irreducibility of thought as the core of the insight into philosophy’s freedom.
{"title":"Der Weisheit Freund und aller Welt Feind?","authors":"Frieder Vogelmann","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2023-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How is philosophical knowledge related to the world in which it is produced – and how should it be related? In the article, “world” refers to the whole of historically established, politically contested and materially constituted practices. Three ideal-type relationships are distinguished: affirmatively in the world, negatively against the world, and with the world. The article argues for the latter because it combines the two decisive insights of the first two relationships: the insight into philosophy’s facticity, i. e., it being bound to the world, and the insight into philosophy’s freedom, i. e., that it can, nevertheless, turn against that world. Political epistemology is needed to explicate any philosophy with the world because it holds together, in a productive tension, minimal materialism as the core of the insight into philosophy’s facticity and the irreducibility of thought as the core of the insight into philosophy’s freedom.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"71 1","pages":"157 - 177"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45258435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Schwerpunkt: Verlegenheit als Phänomen und als philosophische Denkfigur","authors":"Viet Anh Nguyen Duc, Moritz von Kalckreuth","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2023-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"71 1","pages":"81 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48863530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, I explore how bio-hybrid forms can be created and combined starting from organic forms. The thesis put forward is epistemological: the combinatorial practice of bionics, biomimetics, biorobotics, and all design strategies inspired by nature is not based on a kind of biomimetic inspiration, i. e., on a kind of imitation of nature, but on a practice of translation. To develop this thesis, I focus on the practices of contemporary biorobotics, first examining the practice of translating natural forms into technical artefacts as developed by Raoul Heinrich Francé at the beginning of the 20th century, secondly, analysing the production of robots capable of replicating complex locomotion systems and, finally, investigating the interaction between robots and living organisms (fish). In the last part of the paper, I reflect on the philosophical payoff and broader conditions of possibility for this translational practice. I discuss when and to what extent a translation of biological forms into biotechnical ones is acceptable and point out the notion of form that underlies this practice. Moreover, I draw attention to the need to philosophically investigate what happens between different domains of knowledge – and especially between science and technology. This article is thus an invitation to philosophers to develop a philosophy in the interstices of knowledge production.
{"title":"Philosophie der Bionik: Das Komponieren von bio-robotischen Formen","authors":"M. Tamborini","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2023-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I explore how bio-hybrid forms can be created and combined starting from organic forms. The thesis put forward is epistemological: the combinatorial practice of bionics, biomimetics, biorobotics, and all design strategies inspired by nature is not based on a kind of biomimetic inspiration, i. e., on a kind of imitation of nature, but on a practice of translation. To develop this thesis, I focus on the practices of contemporary biorobotics, first examining the practice of translating natural forms into technical artefacts as developed by Raoul Heinrich Francé at the beginning of the 20th century, secondly, analysing the production of robots capable of replicating complex locomotion systems and, finally, investigating the interaction between robots and living organisms (fish). In the last part of the paper, I reflect on the philosophical payoff and broader conditions of possibility for this translational practice. I discuss when and to what extent a translation of biological forms into biotechnical ones is acceptable and point out the notion of form that underlies this practice. Moreover, I draw attention to the need to philosophically investigate what happens between different domains of knowledge – and especially between science and technology. This article is thus an invitation to philosophers to develop a philosophy in the interstices of knowledge production.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"71 1","pages":"30 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48713889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The paper examines the significance of embarrassment for a concept of political publicity. It is critical of how the common interpretation of this apparently social phenomenon as a “milder form of shame” leads to a functionalist interpretation. According to this interpretation, embarrassment regulates given normative structures by initiating or even motivating self-criticism. In contrast, the article shows, first, that embarrassment cannot occur at all in a public sphere that is thought of exclusively in normative terms, and second, that the phenomenon is primordially not reflexive. In embarrassment, one is not immediately “thrown back on oneself” but tries to find a relation to one’s public figure. A philosophical reflection on this pursuit reveals the constitution of normative structures. In this light, embarrassment presents itself as a genuinely political phenomenon.
{"title":"Zur Bedeutung von Verlegenheit für einen Begriff politischer Öffentlichkeit","authors":"K. Felgenhauer, R. Lehmann","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2023-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper examines the significance of embarrassment for a concept of political publicity. It is critical of how the common interpretation of this apparently social phenomenon as a “milder form of shame” leads to a functionalist interpretation. According to this interpretation, embarrassment regulates given normative structures by initiating or even motivating self-criticism. In contrast, the article shows, first, that embarrassment cannot occur at all in a public sphere that is thought of exclusively in normative terms, and second, that the phenomenon is primordially not reflexive. In embarrassment, one is not immediately “thrown back on oneself” but tries to find a relation to one’s public figure. A philosophical reflection on this pursuit reveals the constitution of normative structures. In this light, embarrassment presents itself as a genuinely political phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"71 1","pages":"95 - 106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47019451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article aims at conceptualising the notion of embarrassment as a negativistic figure of thought that takes the experience of one’s own non-sovereignty as a starting point and emphasises an engagement with situations of not-knowing. This consideration is clarified in discussion with the figure of Socrates or with the philosophical attitude of Socrates. Because the negativistic thrust of the conceptualisation undertaken is reminiscent of irony, the paper then addresses the question of what distinguishes embarrassment understood as a figure of thought from irony. For this purpose, Kierkegaard’s reading of Socratic irony is drawn upon. It is shown that irony is inherently a negativism, which in the last consequence aims at a retention of rights; but this is exactly what embarrassment avoids, because, as the article shows, it is not a negativism of strength, but of weakness.
{"title":"Sokrates’ Verlegenheit(en)","authors":"V. Duc","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2023-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article aims at conceptualising the notion of embarrassment as a negativistic figure of thought that takes the experience of one’s own non-sovereignty as a starting point and emphasises an engagement with situations of not-knowing. This consideration is clarified in discussion with the figure of Socrates or with the philosophical attitude of Socrates. Because the negativistic thrust of the conceptualisation undertaken is reminiscent of irony, the paper then addresses the question of what distinguishes embarrassment understood as a figure of thought from irony. For this purpose, Kierkegaard’s reading of Socratic irony is drawn upon. It is shown that irony is inherently a negativism, which in the last consequence aims at a retention of rights; but this is exactly what embarrassment avoids, because, as the article shows, it is not a negativism of strength, but of weakness.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"71 1","pages":"107 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42079422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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