Abstract There is an unusual link between the two most prominent themes in Proust’s In Search of Time Past: the psychological dimensions of love and the experience of lived temporality. Each experience is shadowed by, and intensified by, even seems to require, absence. The absence of the beloved is the source of jealousy, and that experience is treated as inseparable, and sometimes as indistinguishable, from love itself. And the absence of reliable access to the past, or the vanishing of the past into a realm of fantasy and projection, undermines any confidence in our mutual interpretability. At the extreme, jealousy is depicted as sustaining a love all by itself, something captured in Swann’s famous, puzzling closing statement at the end of the “Swann in Love” section of the first novel: “To think that I have wasted years of my life, that I’ve longed to die, that I have experienced my greatest love, for a woman who didn’t appeal to me, who wasn’t even my type.” The aim of this paper is to understand the dynamic of presence and absence, its role in the link between these two themes, and thereby to understand such a claim as much more than a singular character’s expression of a neurotic obsession.
{"title":"Der Schatten der Liebe","authors":"Robert B. Pippin","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is an unusual link between the two most prominent themes in Proust’s In Search of Time Past: the psychological dimensions of love and the experience of lived temporality. Each experience is shadowed by, and intensified by, even seems to require, absence. The absence of the beloved is the source of jealousy, and that experience is treated as inseparable, and sometimes as indistinguishable, from love itself. And the absence of reliable access to the past, or the vanishing of the past into a realm of fantasy and projection, undermines any confidence in our mutual interpretability. At the extreme, jealousy is depicted as sustaining a love all by itself, something captured in Swann’s famous, puzzling closing statement at the end of the “Swann in Love” section of the first novel: “To think that I have wasted years of my life, that I’ve longed to die, that I have experienced my greatest love, for a woman who didn’t appeal to me, who wasn’t even my type.” The aim of this paper is to understand the dynamic of presence and absence, its role in the link between these two themes, and thereby to understand such a claim as much more than a singular character’s expression of a neurotic obsession.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"280 - 306"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48823240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Conspiracy theories are currently all the rage in philosophy and broader intellectual culture. One of the most common background assumptions in the discourse on conspiracy theories is that conspiracy theorists exhibit certain epistemic vices in the sense of cognitive misconduct. This epistemic vice is mostly seen as a form of irrationality; the corresponding “remedy”, as suggested by some commentators, is a return to the ideals of the Enlightenment. This article argues that this idea is wrongheaded. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that conspiracy theorists are actually motivated by the rational Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking in the first place. In contrast to the standard discourse, the article posits that conspiracism is based on a certain form of social scepticism, according to which conspiracy theorists radically mistrust a certain form of expert testimony, namely “official” statements. This form of social scepticism in turn facilitates a naive appropriation of the Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking. The article closes by drawing connections to the ethical and epistemological debate on trust and offers the pessimistic assessment that there are no easy solutions based on individual epistemic virtues.
{"title":"Verschwörungstheorien und das Erbe der Aufklärung: Auf den Schultern von Scheinriesen","authors":"T. Spiegel","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Conspiracy theories are currently all the rage in philosophy and broader intellectual culture. One of the most common background assumptions in the discourse on conspiracy theories is that conspiracy theorists exhibit certain epistemic vices in the sense of cognitive misconduct. This epistemic vice is mostly seen as a form of irrationality; the corresponding “remedy”, as suggested by some commentators, is a return to the ideals of the Enlightenment. This article argues that this idea is wrongheaded. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that conspiracy theorists are actually motivated by the rational Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking in the first place. In contrast to the standard discourse, the article posits that conspiracism is based on a certain form of social scepticism, according to which conspiracy theorists radically mistrust a certain form of expert testimony, namely “official” statements. This form of social scepticism in turn facilitates a naive appropriation of the Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking. The article closes by drawing connections to the ethical and epistemological debate on trust and offers the pessimistic assessment that there are no easy solutions based on individual epistemic virtues.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"253 - 273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45184564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In 2020, M. Summa developed a promising approach to understanding the concept of illness. This approach combines a theory of organisms with Responsive Phenomenology to gain a concept of illness. Following on from this, the present article shows that the normative presuppositions can be further explicated and justified by drawing on the theoretical resources of Aristotelian naturalism as propounded by Michael Thompson. Aristotelian naturalism does provide a theoretical option to grasp the normative foundations of human life. However, this article argues that Aristotelian naturalism requires another criterion besides human nature to make the concept of illness intelligible. Following John McDowell’s critique of Aristotelian naturalism, it will be shown that this criterion consists in the capacity for autonomy. From this a concept of (mental) illness is developed which describes an impairment of the self-regulated and autonomous realisation of the human form of life.
{"title":"Autonomie und menschliche Lebensform","authors":"G. Melichar","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In 2020, M. Summa developed a promising approach to understanding the concept of illness. This approach combines a theory of organisms with Responsive Phenomenology to gain a concept of illness. Following on from this, the present article shows that the normative presuppositions can be further explicated and justified by drawing on the theoretical resources of Aristotelian naturalism as propounded by Michael Thompson. Aristotelian naturalism does provide a theoretical option to grasp the normative foundations of human life. However, this article argues that Aristotelian naturalism requires another criterion besides human nature to make the concept of illness intelligible. Following John McDowell’s critique of Aristotelian naturalism, it will be shown that this criterion consists in the capacity for autonomy. From this a concept of (mental) illness is developed which describes an impairment of the self-regulated and autonomous realisation of the human form of life.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"226 - 252"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44696551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The philosophical reading of Proust’s Recherche presented here suggests Proust’s aesthetic method as a model for philosophy (as an aesthetic practice). The term “aesthetic” refers to the constitutive role of sensation, perception, and sensuality for the practice of philosophising. In Proust’s peculiar descriptions a specific form of “sentient thinking” (empfindendes Denken) takes shape. This thinking is characterised by the entanglement of the particular as detailed description and the general as theoretical reflection. With reference to Proust, the philosophical practice of describing is developed into a central element of philosophy as aesthetic practice.
{"title":"Proust – Philosophie als ästhetische Praxis","authors":"Katrin Wille","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The philosophical reading of Proust’s Recherche presented here suggests Proust’s aesthetic method as a model for philosophy (as an aesthetic practice). The term “aesthetic” refers to the constitutive role of sensation, perception, and sensuality for the practice of philosophising. In Proust’s peculiar descriptions a specific form of “sentient thinking” (empfindendes Denken) takes shape. This thinking is characterised by the entanglement of the particular as detailed description and the general as theoretical reflection. With reference to Proust, the philosophical practice of describing is developed into a central element of philosophy as aesthetic practice.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"328 - 349"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41619475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The entire corpus of Proust’s Recherche is permeated by philosophical digressions, reflections, aphorisms, dialogues and monologues. These are presented by a number of different and often divergent voices – that of the narrator who is the fictive author of the novel, that of the young Marcel on his long way to become this writer, those of many other figures, with whom Marcel interacts, that of the real author, who has permanently rewritten the text and finally the authority of the text as a whole. The interplay of these perspectives is an essential part of the drama the novel displays. Their contrast cannot, must not and should not be overcome in favour of an integrated and justified point of view of the kind professional philosophy is aiming at. Following this observation, the essay highlights a number of intertwined strands of philosophical motives in the Recherche in order to explore a basic relationship as well as tension between philosophy and literature. Proust’s novel – like other instances of literature and the arts – is not primarily made for a veridical but primarily for a processual thinking. It invites its readers to get involved and to linger in open ended mind games. Philosophising in and with the Recherche means doing philosophy without heading at a philosophy.
{"title":"Schreibarten, Lesarten, Denkarten","authors":"M. Seel","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The entire corpus of Proust’s Recherche is permeated by philosophical digressions, reflections, aphorisms, dialogues and monologues. These are presented by a number of different and often divergent voices – that of the narrator who is the fictive author of the novel, that of the young Marcel on his long way to become this writer, those of many other figures, with whom Marcel interacts, that of the real author, who has permanently rewritten the text and finally the authority of the text as a whole. The interplay of these perspectives is an essential part of the drama the novel displays. Their contrast cannot, must not and should not be overcome in favour of an integrated and justified point of view of the kind professional philosophy is aiming at. Following this observation, the essay highlights a number of intertwined strands of philosophical motives in the Recherche in order to explore a basic relationship as well as tension between philosophy and literature. Proust’s novel – like other instances of literature and the arts – is not primarily made for a veridical but primarily for a processual thinking. It invites its readers to get involved and to linger in open ended mind games. Philosophising in and with the Recherche means doing philosophy without heading at a philosophy.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"307 - 327"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45187768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Iatrogenic immunodeficiency-associated lymphoproliferative disorders (IA-LPD) may arise in patients treated with immunosuppressive drugs for autoimmune disease or other conditions. Polymorphic EBV-positive B-lymphoproliferations often have features mimicking Hodgkin lymphoma and typically a self-limited, indolent course. We present an unusual case with isolated, intracerebral manifestation of polymorphic B-LPD with features of classic Hodgkin-lymphoma in an immunosuppressed patient treated with methotrexate and infliximab, including clinical-radiological features and a detailed description of morphological findings, together with a literature review on reported cases of primary CNS manifestation of cHL and IA-LPD with Hodgkin-like morphology. The patient achieved complete remission following neurosurgery with gross total tumor resection and drug withdrawal without any additional treatment. Post-operative staging revealed no evidence for focal relapse or systemic disease during the 18 months follow-up period. Among the previously reported 24 cases of primary, isolated Hodgkin lymphoma in the central nervous system, three similar cases of iatrogenic, IA-LPDs were identified and are discussed here. Polymorphic B-LPD are destructive lesions with a range of morphologic features and disease manifestations. It is clinically important to recognize the spectrum of proliferations with features of classic Hodgkin lymphoma in immunodeficiency, iatrogenic settings, because they are likely to impact the choice of treatment strategies.
{"title":"Intracerebral manifestation of iatrogenic, immunodeficiency-associated polymorphic B-LPD with morphology mimicking Hodgkin lymphoma: a case report and literature review.","authors":"Leonie Saft, Marina Perdiki-Grigoriadi, Georgios Rassidakis","doi":"10.1007/s12308-021-00478-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12308-021-00478-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Iatrogenic immunodeficiency-associated lymphoproliferative disorders (IA-LPD) may arise in patients treated with immunosuppressive drugs for autoimmune disease or other conditions. Polymorphic EBV-positive B-lymphoproliferations often have features mimicking Hodgkin lymphoma and typically a self-limited, indolent course. We present an unusual case with isolated, intracerebral manifestation of polymorphic B-LPD with features of classic Hodgkin-lymphoma in an immunosuppressed patient treated with methotrexate and infliximab, including clinical-radiological features and a detailed description of morphological findings, together with a literature review on reported cases of primary CNS manifestation of cHL and IA-LPD with Hodgkin-like morphology. The patient achieved complete remission following neurosurgery with gross total tumor resection and drug withdrawal without any additional treatment. Post-operative staging revealed no evidence for focal relapse or systemic disease during the 18 months follow-up period. Among the previously reported 24 cases of primary, isolated Hodgkin lymphoma in the central nervous system, three similar cases of iatrogenic, IA-LPDs were identified and are discussed here. Polymorphic B-LPD are destructive lesions with a range of morphologic features and disease manifestations. It is clinically important to recognize the spectrum of proliferations with features of classic Hodgkin lymphoma in immunodeficiency, iatrogenic settings, because they are likely to impact the choice of treatment strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"28 1","pages":"13-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89581892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Against the backdrop of contemporary debates about care ethics and care, this article undertakes a re-reading of Foucault’s analyses of the ancient care of the self. While the care of the self has so far been interpreted primarily in terms of an ethics and aesthetics of the self, it argues that the care of the self is constituted by the presence of the Other. This becomes clear as soon as one links the care of the self to parrhesia, which signifies an act of truth-telling through which the individual constitutes herself as the subject of a discourse of truth by confronting the Other with the truth. It is through this connection that the care of the self and parrhesia unfold their critical potential, as can be seen in the examples of Sophocles’ Antigone or the whistleblower Edward Snowden. This makes it possible not only to detach the concept of care from its close entanglement with the private sphere and to reframe it in political terms but also to envisage a critical attitude that is based both on the care of the self and others and on a concern for truth.
{"title":"Die Sorge um sich und die anderen","authors":"Gerald Posselt","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Against the backdrop of contemporary debates about care ethics and care, this article undertakes a re-reading of Foucault’s analyses of the ancient care of the self. While the care of the self has so far been interpreted primarily in terms of an ethics and aesthetics of the self, it argues that the care of the self is constituted by the presence of the Other. This becomes clear as soon as one links the care of the self to parrhesia, which signifies an act of truth-telling through which the individual constitutes herself as the subject of a discourse of truth by confronting the Other with the truth. It is through this connection that the care of the self and parrhesia unfold their critical potential, as can be seen in the examples of Sophocles’ Antigone or the whistleblower Edward Snowden. This makes it possible not only to detach the concept of care from its close entanglement with the private sphere and to reframe it in political terms but also to envisage a critical attitude that is based both on the care of the self and others and on a concern for truth.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"116 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42842110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}