HEYTHROP JOURNAL最新文献

This essay argues that a renewed focus on the importance of embodied social play for people of all ages, but especially for children and teenagers, is an essential element of forming an interdisciplinary response to the mental health crises facing children and young people today. It examines the role of play from the perspective of the sciences, especially psychology and evolutionary biology, but it also draws insights from philosophy and theology to extend its arguments into the arenas of theological anthropology and aesthetics. In addition to the many psychological, emotional, physical, cognitive, and social benefits of play, there is research to suggest that forms of juvenile play, especially ‘pretend play’, in children contribute to the development of capacities relevant for aesthetic experience and expression such as creativity, symbolic representation, mental flexibility, and imagination. This suggests that attention to play and, more broadly, to childhood and children, is important for developments in theological aesthetics. It suggests, at the same time, that theology has important grounds to insist on the goodness of play ‘for its own sake’, while also celebrating the downstream evolutionary benefits of play.

We argue here that bringing insights from evolution and bioengineering to bear on traditional accounts of divine providence helps to illustrate just how complex providence is and how difficult it is to achieve. While other non-human animals might exhibit greater agency in creation and its evolutionary development than has traditionally been recognised, we contend non-human animals don't meet the threshold for acting providentially. However, the interplay between biological and cultural evolution prior to the arrival of modern human beings gives us a fresh perspective on God's providence through these intermediate forms that are much more interlinked than previously afforded. When considering the human being, the complexity and difficulty of achieving genuine providence is even more acute. Here human beings bear the potential to act providentially by having the capacities for foresight, benevolence, and power, but are still limited in exercising each of these in specific instances—often failing owing to weakness or deliberate intention. Human power to influence or create existing and new creaturely and evolutionary trajectories through substantial cultural production and bioengineering should be met with great humility, sobriety, and prudence, because our foresight and benevolence are profoundly limited.

Some recent philosophical analyses of gene-culture coevolutionary theory propose that morality is a contributing cause in (and not only an outcome of) human evolution. This paper considers implications of this idea for Thomistic moral theory. According to the coevolutionary account, the social practices of early human communities create selection pressures in favour of pro-moral adaptations, making the evolution of morality a ‘biocultural’ process in which culture in some respects drives biology. This position chimes with, and indeed advances, some core themes of Thomistic ethics, including: the abiding significance of moral passions; the centrality of practical reason; the social character of practical reason; moral realism; the naturalness of morality; the link between nature and normativity. Biocultural evolutionary theory can thus offer Thomistic ethicists some new ways to understand their old ideas. If it is true that morality is a cause and not only an effect of human evolution, then Thomists are invited to see morality as an even more natural phenomenon than they previously thought.

The human imagination is studied widely across both the sciences and the humanities, yet there is a lack of conceptual clarity for interdisciplinary engagement. This article surveys a sample of recent scientific research on the imagination, focusing on creativity and storytelling, to demonstrate how an understanding of the biocultural evolutionary context may yield helpful insights for contemporary theological anthropology. Niko Tinbergen's levels of analysis (mechanism, function, phylogeny, and ontogeny) are used as a guiding framework to structure the scientific content. The final section sketches some of the recent trajectories in theological anthropology that are supported by a biocultural evolutionary perspective on the imagination, namely those that emphasise the hybridity of human being and resist human/non-human binaries. This exercise in examining scientific perspectives for theological construction is reflected upon in the context of a broader science-engaged theology methodology.

Desire and its cognates—longing, yearning—do a lot of hard work in modern theology, the work grounded in philosophical precedents going back at least as far as the early German Romantics. These precedents helped to inaugurate the twentieth century explorations of psychoanalysis. And so, desire re-entered theological conversation and some lessons were learnt; most evidently about bringing the body back to the soul and the spirit. Despite the impact of Nygren’s Agape and Eros thesis, the range ‘desire’ covers now in modern theology admits no dualism between caritas and eros, and has actively promoted discussions that move fluidly between philosophy and theology. But a question remains that this essay can only begin to explore: what is desire? The question arises because, as theologians concerned with concepts closely allied to desiring, yearning, and longing—concepts such as grace, participation, friendship, love, and formation, for example—we employ it as if we knew what it is, and the mechanics of its operations are self-evident. But desire, this essay argues, is obscure and multiple, elusive, deceptive, and slippery. And that has theological implications.