Series-Journal of the Spanish Economic Association最新文献

This paper updates the available evidence on the public-private wage gap in Spain, which dates back to 2012. Through microdata drawn from the last three waves of the Wage Structure Survey (2010, 2014 and 2018), we study how this gap and its distribution by gender and education have evolved during and after the Great Recession. Conventional Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are used to divide the raw wage gap into a component explained by differences in characteristics and another one capturing differences in returns and endogenous selection. The main findings are: (i) a strong wage compression by skills, and (ii) a wage premium for less-skilled women in the public sector. Both empirical results can be rationalised by a monopoly union wage-setting model with monopsonistic features and the presence of female statistical discrimination.

This paper uncovers an inverted U-shaped relationship between firm exit and total factor productivity (TFP) growth using Spanish data. At low levels of firm exit, Schumpeterian cleansing effects dominate and the effect of firm destruction on TFP is positive, but when exit rates are very high, this effect turns negative. In order to rationalize this finding, we build on Asturias et al. (Firm entry and exit and aggregate growth, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017) and develop a model of firm dynamics with exit spillovers calibrated to match the nonlinearity found in the data. This reduced-form spillover captures amplification effects from very high destruction rates that might force viable firms to exit, for example, due to disruptions in the production network and a generalized contraction in credit supply. Armed with the calibrated model, we perform counterfactual scenarios depending on the severity of the shock to firm's outcomes. We find that when the shock is mild and firm destruction rates at impact are similar to those observed during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), TFP growth increases, and the recovery is faster. However, when the shock is severe and firm exit is well above that of the GFC, TFP growth decreases, since high-efficiency firms are forced out of the market, which makes the recovery much slower.

This paper estimates the aggregate effects of government income transfers shocks for a sample of EU countries. I construct a new measure of transfers shocks based on a dataset by public finance experts of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The identification strategy consists of a narrative analysis of policy actions in old age pensions reported in the ESCB dataset. I find that increases in old age pensions have a positive impact on aggregate expenditure components and employment consistent with a multiplier effect between 0 and 1.

I assess the macroeconomic and redistributive effects of tax reforms aimed at increasing tax revenue in Spain. To this end, I develop a theory of entrepreneurship that mimics key facts on the wealth and income distribution in Spain. I find two reforms that raise fiscal pressure in Spain to the average value among countries in the Euro area. The first reform involves doubling the average effective tax rate on labor and business income for all individuals whose income is above a threshold level. I find that this reform reduces the inequality in after-tax income, wealth, and consumption. However, it implies a substantial GDP reduction. The second reform increases the flat tax rate on consumption by fifteen percentage points. While this reform does not reduce long-run output, it does not decrease household inequality. All in all, the desirability of the two reforms depends on the government's preferences for reducing inequality at the expense of aggregate output losses.

Empirical evidence in Dauth et al. (J Eur Econ Assoc, 2021) suggests that industrial robot adoption in Germany has led to a sectoral reallocation of employment from manufacturing to services, leaving total employment unaffected. We rationalize this evidence through the lens of a general equilibrium model with two sectors, matching frictions and endogenous participation. Automation induces firms to create fewer vacancies and job seekers to search less in the automatable sector (manufacturing). The service sector expands due to the sectoral complementarity in the production of the final good and a positive wealth effect for the household. Analysis across steady states shows that the reduction in manufacturing employment can be offset by the increase in service employment. The model can also replicate the magnitude of the decline in the ratio of manufacturing employment to service employment in Germany between 1994 and 2014.

Supplementary information: The online version supplementary material available at 10.1007/s13209-021-00240-w.

We investigate the behavior of aggregate hours supplied by workers in permanent (open-ended) contracts and temporary contracts, distinguishing changes in employment (extensive margin) and hours per worker (intensive margin). We focus on the differences between the Great Recession and the start of the COVID-19 Recession. In the Great Recession, the loss in aggregate hours is largely accounted for by employment losses (hours per worker did not adjust) and initially mainly by workers in temporary contracts. In contrast, in the early stages of the COVID-19 Recession, approximately sixty percent of the drop in aggregate hours is accounted for by permanent workers that do not only adjust hours per worker (beyond average) but also face employment losses-accounting for one-third of the total employment losses in the economy. We argue that our comparison across recessions allows for a more general discussion on the impact of adjustment frictions in the dual labor market and the effects policy, in particular the short-time work policy (ERTE) in Spain.

Young workers in Spain face the unprecedented impact of the Great Recession and the COVID-19 crisis in short sequence. Moreover, they have also experienced a deterioration in their employment and earnings over the last three decades. In this paper, we document this evolution and adopt a longitudinal approach to show that employment and earnings losses suffered by young workers during recessions are not made up in the subsequent expansions. We also estimate the size of the scarring effects of entering the job market in a recession for college-educated workers during their first decade in the labor market. Our empirical estimates indicate that while there is some evidence of scarring effects, the driving force is a trend worsening of youth labor market outcomes.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s13209-021-00244-6.

Over the past decades, Spain has seen a striking convergence between women's and men's participation in the labour market. However, this convergence has stalled since the early 2010s. We show that women still fare worse in several important labour market dimensions. Gender inequalities are further aggravated among people with children. Women with children under 16 are much more likely to be unemployed, work part-time or on temporary contracts than men with children of the same age. We show that it is unlikely that preferences alone can account for these gaps. A review of the evidence shows that family policies, such as paternity leave expansions, financial incentives in the form of tax credits for working mothers and subsidised or free childcare for very young children, could help reduce the motherhood penalty. However, such policies are likely to be more effective if combined with advances in breaking up traditional gender roles.

Dynamic factor models (DFMs), which assume the existence of a small number of unobserved underlying factors common to a large number of variables, are very popular among empirical macroeconomists. Factors can be extracted using either nonparametric principal components or parametric Kalman filter and smoothing procedures, with the former being computationally simpler and robust against misspecification and the latter coping in a natural way with missing and mixed-frequency data, time-varying parameters, nonlinearities and non-stationarity, among many other stylized facts often observed in real systems of economic variables. This paper analyses the empirical consequences on factor estimation, in-sample predictions and out-of-sample forecasting of using alternative estimators of the DFM under various sources of potential misspecification. In particular, we consider factor extraction when assuming different number of factors and different factor dynamics. The factors are extracted from a popular data base of US macroeconomic variables, widely analyzed in the literature without consensus about the most appropriate model specification. We show that this lack of consensus is only marginally crucial when it comes to factor extraction, but it matters when the objective is out-of-sample forecasting.

Using two novel online surveys collected in May and November 2020, we study the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on Spanish households. We document a large and negative effect on household income. By May 2020, the average individual lived in a household that had lost 16% of their pre-pandemic monthly income. Furthermore, this drop was highly unequal: while households in the richest quintile lost 6.8% of their income, those in the poorest quintile lost 27%. We also document that the pandemic deepened the gender-income gap: on average, women experienced a three-percentage point larger income loss than men. While this is consistent with previous findings in the literature, in this paper we document that this effect is driven by women from middle-income households with kids. Finally, we provide evidence that Spanish individuals experienced moderate declines in their levels of psychological well-being. This effect is not different for individuals living in rich or poor households, but the reasons behind well-being losses do differ: richer individuals are more concerned about loss of contact with dear ones, while low-income individuals are more likely to mention loss of income and employment as a key source of emotional distress.