{"title":"Erratum: Solutions to four open problems on quorum colorings ofgraphs","authors":"Rafik Sahbi","doi":"10.1051/ro/2021137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2021137","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74495679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The retailers within a supply chain management are the most important player as it has direct contact with the customers. Customers are the source of the money and information for the entire supply chain management. The equilibrium condition of the forward and backward supply chain is tight until it is reliable. But sometimes the retailers hide information from the manufacturer and this unreliability starts to propagate to the entire supply chain management. Blockchain technology is one of the secure decentralized systems to prevent unreliability. This study eliminates the unreliability of the system. A mathematical model is derived where the vendor-managed inventory policy is used by the single manufacturer to deal with multiple unreliable retailers. The entire process of manufacturing emits carbon. The carbon emission is controlled by the cap and trade policy and by paying the carbon tax. The results are found by the classical optimization technique and the numerical studies open up a way to the blockchain to deal with unreliable retailers. The decentralized system is a probable choice to prevent unreliability and thus the blockchain.
{"title":"Economic and environmental assessment of an unreliable supply chain management","authors":"Rekha Guchhait, B. Sarkar","doi":"10.1051/ro/2021128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2021128","url":null,"abstract":"The retailers within a supply chain management are the most important player as it has direct contact with the customers. Customers are the source of the money and information for the entire supply chain management. The equilibrium condition of the forward and backward supply chain is tight until it is reliable. But sometimes the retailers hide information from the manufacturer and this unreliability starts to propagate to the entire supply chain management. Blockchain technology is one of the secure decentralized systems to prevent unreliability. This study eliminates the unreliability of the system. A mathematical model is derived where the vendor-managed inventory policy is used by the single manufacturer to deal with multiple unreliable retailers. The entire process of manufacturing emits carbon. The carbon emission is controlled by the cap and trade policy and by paying the carbon tax. The results are found by the classical optimization technique and the numerical studies open up a way to the blockchain to deal with unreliable retailers. The decentralized system is a probable choice to prevent unreliability and thus the blockchain.","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87610992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consumers’ perceived quality of products reflects their psychological estimations on product quality, which directly affected by the real product quality by manufacturer provided and the appearance of package that conducted by the retailer. This study explores how the consumer quality preference influents the supply chain decisions. Thereafter, two situations where manufacturer and retailer respectively dominates the supply chain are considered to obtain the analytical solutions of optimal product quality, wholesale price, packaging investment and retail price. Finally, the impact of consumer perception coefficient on product quality, packaging investment, and pricing strategy is investigated, and some management enlightenment are obtained.
{"title":"Supply chain partners ’ decisions with heterogeneous marketing efforts considering consumer’s perception of quality","authors":"Xiao Fu, Shuchun Liu, Guanghua Han","doi":"10.1051/ro/2021126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2021126","url":null,"abstract":"Consumers’ perceived quality of products reflects their psychological estimations on product quality, which directly affected by the real product quality by manufacturer provided and the appearance of package that conducted by the retailer. This study explores how the consumer quality preference influents the supply chain decisions. Thereafter, two situations where manufacturer and retailer respectively dominates the supply chain are considered to obtain the analytical solutions of optimal product quality, wholesale price, packaging investment and retail price. Finally, the impact of consumer perception coefficient on product quality, packaging investment, and pricing strategy is investigated, and some management enlightenment are obtained.","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77907303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Let G = (V, E) be a graph of order n and let B(D) be the set of vertices in V D that have a neighbor in the vertex set D. The differential of a vertex set D is defined as ∂(D) = |B(D)| − |D| and the maximum value of ∂(D) for any subset D of V is the differential of G. A set D of vertices of a graph G is said to be a dominating set if every vertex in V D is adjacent to a vertex in D. G is a dominant differential graph if it contains a ∂-set which is also a dominating set. This paper is devoted to the computation of differential of wheel, cycle and path-related graphs as infrastructure networks. Furthermore, dominant differential wheel, cycle and path-related types of networks are recognized.
{"title":"Differential in infrastructure networks","authors":"Akın Kanli, Zeynep Nihan Berberler","doi":"10.1051/ro/2020032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2020032","url":null,"abstract":"Let G = (V, E) be a graph of order n and let B(D) be the set of vertices in V D that have a neighbor in the vertex set D. The differential of a vertex set D is defined as ∂(D) = |B(D)| − |D| and the maximum value of ∂(D) for any subset D of V is the differential of G. A set D of vertices of a graph G is said to be a dominating set if every vertex in V D is adjacent to a vertex in D. G is a dominant differential graph if it contains a ∂-set which is also a dominating set. This paper is devoted to the computation of differential of wheel, cycle and path-related graphs as infrastructure networks. Furthermore, dominant differential wheel, cycle and path-related types of networks are recognized.","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2020-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73412233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is one of the well-known mechanisms for coordination of supply chains. Vertical co-op advertising is a financial agreement in which a member of the chain pays certain percentage (i.e. cooperation rate) of a subsequent member’s advertisement cost. Since increasing the number of echelons and decision variables in supply chain problems increase the modelling and computational complexity, most researchers study vertical co-op advertising in a two-level supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer. This paper investigates the problem by considering price and quality levels as additional decision variables in a three-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one retailer. The ultimate goal is to show supply chain managers the importance of product quality as well the role of local advertisement in positively influencing market demand on top of the traditional approach of speed and efficiency optimization. Using game theory approach, power of the manufacturer is assumed to be higher than or equal to those of others in the chain. Five different relationships between players are considered in five non-cooperative games (named as G1–G5) and equilibrium solutions are extracted for each. The results show that the manufacturer prefers to play Stackelberg with the retailer and the supplier rather than be in conflict with them in Nash game. Such preference can lead manufacturer towards high quality and cost-efficient product/service via efficient advertisement in our complex network of business firms.
{"title":"Modelling pricing, vertical co-op advertising and quality improvement in a non-cooperative three-echelon supply chain using game theory approach","authors":"Razieh Shoeleh, M. Seifbarghy, D. Pishva","doi":"10.1051/RO/2018109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/RO/2018109","url":null,"abstract":"Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is one of the well-known mechanisms for coordination of supply chains. Vertical co-op advertising is a financial agreement in which a member of the chain pays certain percentage (i.e. cooperation rate) of a subsequent member’s advertisement cost. Since increasing the number of echelons and decision variables in supply chain problems increase the modelling and computational complexity, most researchers study vertical co-op advertising in a two-level supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer. This paper investigates the problem by considering price and quality levels as additional decision variables in a three-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one retailer. The ultimate goal is to show supply chain managers the importance of product quality as well the role of local advertisement in positively influencing market demand on top of the traditional approach of speed and efficiency optimization. Using game theory approach, power of the manufacturer is assumed to be higher than or equal to those of others in the chain. Five different relationships between players are considered in five non-cooperative games (named as G1–G5) and equilibrium solutions are extracted for each. The results show that the manufacturer prefers to play Stackelberg with the retailer and the supplier rather than be in conflict with them in Nash game. Such preference can lead manufacturer towards high quality and cost-efficient product/service via efficient advertisement in our complex network of business firms.","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87607973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most important strategic decisions in Research-Development projects is network design. It needs to be optimized for the long-term efficient operation. This paper aims at designing the network of Supply Chain for R&D projects. Accordingly, it proposes a Goal programming model for solving a Project-oriented Supply Chain Management problem. The proposed model is developed to determine the optimal combination of the main contractors, executers, and various alternatives for project implementation. The model optimizes time, cost and reliability in the whole lifecycle for the R&D projects. A case study is presented to validate and illustrate the proposed model. The main reason for the high cost and time in the case study was due to the incorrect choice of the network of suppliers and consultants. The model has been tested by the numerical data, revealing that the model could have a significant contribution to the productivity of project-oriented organization. This model could serve as a guideline for managers and decision makers in R&D projects, enabling them to identify the best networks of the SC in their organizations to resolve and improve problems. It also acts as a useful basis for researchers to continue research concerning SCM in R&D projects.
{"title":"A mathematical formulation of time-cost and reliability optimization for supply chain management in research-development projects","authors":"M. Forozandeh, E. Teimoury, A. Makui","doi":"10.1051/RO/2018068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/RO/2018068","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most important strategic decisions in Research-Development projects is network design. It needs to be optimized for the long-term efficient operation. This paper aims at designing the network of Supply Chain for R&D projects. Accordingly, it proposes a Goal programming model for solving a Project-oriented Supply Chain Management problem. The proposed model is developed to determine the optimal combination of the main contractors, executers, and various alternatives for project implementation. The model optimizes time, cost and reliability in the whole lifecycle for the R&D projects. A case study is presented to validate and illustrate the proposed model. The main reason for the high cost and time in the case study was due to the incorrect choice of the network of suppliers and consultants. The model has been tested by the numerical data, revealing that the model could have a significant contribution to the productivity of project-oriented organization. This model could serve as a guideline for managers and decision makers in R&D projects, enabling them to identify the best networks of the SC in their organizations to resolve and improve problems. It also acts as a useful basis for researchers to continue research concerning SCM in R&D projects.","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80474435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Product quality depends on the quality investment of the manufacturer and quality decisions of the supplier. Therefore, many firms and researchers pay considerable attention to supply quality management. Considering a supply chain that includes two competing suppliers and one manufacturer, this paper investigates the influences of competition and the “brand halo” effect on the quality strategies of channel members, and explores the potential coordinating power of the bilateral participation contract. Utilizing differential game theory, this paper compares and analyzes the quality strategies of all channel members under three different scenarios: (i) decentralized scenario within a subsidy program, (ii) integrated scenario, and (iii) bilateral participation contract. Our results confirm the following results. (1) The manufacturer may not grant a subsidy to the supplier if two final products are highly competitive. (2) Supply chain members are more likely to join the bilateral participation contract if the “brand halo” effect is large. (3) The bilateral participation contract can achieve perfect coordination if the competition is weak or if a transfer payment policy exists.
{"title":"Channel coordination through quality improvement with brand halo effect","authors":"Qingyun Xu, Bing Xu, Yi He","doi":"10.1051/RO/2018039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/RO/2018039","url":null,"abstract":"Product quality depends on the quality investment of the manufacturer and quality decisions of the supplier. Therefore, many firms and researchers pay considerable attention to supply quality management. Considering a supply chain that includes two competing suppliers and one manufacturer, this paper investigates the influences of competition and the “brand halo” effect on the quality strategies of channel members, and explores the potential coordinating power of the bilateral participation contract. Utilizing differential game theory, this paper compares and analyzes the quality strategies of all channel members under three different scenarios: (i) decentralized scenario within a subsidy program, (ii) integrated scenario, and (iii) bilateral participation contract. Our results confirm the following results. (1) The manufacturer may not grant a subsidy to the supplier if two final products are highly competitive. (2) Supply chain members are more likely to join the bilateral participation contract if the “brand halo” effect is large. (3) The bilateral participation contract can achieve perfect coordination if the competition is weak or if a transfer payment policy exists.","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87064331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B. Ganguly, B. Sarkar, M. Sarkar, Sarla Pareek, M. Omair
Recently, carbon emission becomes a major issue during transportation of products from one player to another player. Due to the increasing number of single-setup-multi-delivery (SSMD) policies by several industries, fixed and variable transportation cost and carbon emission cost are considered. The aim of the model is to reduce the total cost of supply chain for controlling the lead time and to diminish setup cost by a discrete investment. A premium cost is introduced and Stackelberg game policy is employed to obtain the analytical solution. Some numerical examples are given to validate the model. Sensitivity analysis and managerial insights are given to show the applicability of the model. Finally, the outcomes show that the model minimizes the optimum cost at the optimal values of the decision variables. It is found that the total cost is minimized when the multi-buyer is leader and vendor is follower.
{"title":"Influence of controllable lead time, premium price, and unequal shipments under environmental effects in a supply chain management","authors":"B. Ganguly, B. Sarkar, M. Sarkar, Sarla Pareek, M. Omair","doi":"10.1051/RO/2018041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/RO/2018041","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, carbon emission becomes a major issue during transportation of products from one player to another player. Due to the increasing number of single-setup-multi-delivery (SSMD) policies by several industries, fixed and variable transportation cost and carbon emission cost are considered. The aim of the model is to reduce the total cost of supply chain for controlling the lead time and to diminish setup cost by a discrete investment. A premium cost is introduced and Stackelberg game policy is employed to obtain the analytical solution. Some numerical examples are given to validate the model. Sensitivity analysis and managerial insights are given to show the applicability of the model. Finally, the outcomes show that the model minimizes the optimum cost at the optimal values of the decision variables. It is found that the total cost is minimized when the multi-buyer is leader and vendor is follower.","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73279039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper deals with an M/G/1 queueing system with random vacation policy, in which the server takes the maximum number of random vacations till it finds minimum one message (customer) waiting in a queue at a vacation completion epoch. If no arrival occurs after completing maximum number of random vacations, the server stays dormant in the system and waits for the upcoming arrival. Here, we obtain steady state queue size distribution at an idle period completion epoch and service completion epoch. We also obtain the steady state system size probabilities and system state probabilities. Some significant measures such as a mean number of customers served during the busy period, Laplace-Stieltjes transform of unfinished work and its corresponding mean value and second moment have been obtained for the system. A cost optimal policy have been developed in terms of the average cost function to determine a locally optimal random vacation policy at a lower cost. Finally, we present various numerical results for the above system performance measures.
{"title":"A single server queue under random vacation policy","authors":"Priyanka Kalita, G. Choudhury","doi":"10.1051/ro/2019083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2019083","url":null,"abstract":"This paper deals with an M/G/1 queueing system with random vacation policy, in which the server takes the maximum number of random vacations till it finds minimum one message (customer) waiting in a queue at a vacation completion epoch. If no arrival occurs after completing maximum number of random vacations, the server stays dormant in the system and waits for the upcoming arrival. Here, we obtain steady state queue size distribution at an idle period completion epoch and service completion epoch. We also obtain the steady state system size probabilities and system state probabilities. Some significant measures such as a mean number of customers served during the busy period, Laplace-Stieltjes transform of unfinished work and its corresponding mean value and second moment have been obtained for the system. A cost optimal policy have been developed in terms of the average cost function to determine a locally optimal random vacation policy at a lower cost. Finally, we present various numerical results for the above system performance measures.","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2019-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72861519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper addresses the problem of redesigning a three-echelon supply chain network under uncertainty. Since one of the most realistic problems that supply chains are dealt with is routing of vehicles, routing constraints with a split delivery condition are considered in our proposed model. Also, the possibility of outsourcing is considered in order to satisfy demands that exceed the production capacity. Furthermore, in order to deal with the presence of uncertainty in the problem, a light robust approach is developed. The performance of the proposed model is illustrated using a simulation procedure. Sensitivity analysis on the proposed model is also presented in the paper. The results show that the proposed method has a better performance than Light Robust approach and can be used as a useful managerial tool in redesign problems.
{"title":"Warehouse redesigning in a three-echelon supply chain network with consideration of routing under uncertainty","authors":"Zahra Azadehranjbar, A. Bozorgi-Amiri, A. Zandi","doi":"10.1051/RO/2019065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1051/RO/2019065","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the problem of redesigning a three-echelon supply chain network under uncertainty. Since one of the most realistic problems that supply chains are dealt with is routing of vehicles, routing constraints with a split delivery condition are considered in our proposed model. Also, the possibility of outsourcing is considered in order to satisfy demands that exceed the production capacity. Furthermore, in order to deal with the presence of uncertainty in the problem, a light robust approach is developed. The performance of the proposed model is illustrated using a simulation procedure. Sensitivity analysis on the proposed model is also presented in the paper. The results show that the proposed method has a better performance than Light Robust approach and can be used as a useful managerial tool in redesign problems.","PeriodicalId":54509,"journal":{"name":"Rairo-Operations Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2019-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76831132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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