Journal of Applied Logic最新文献

SRAM-based FPGAs are increasingly popular in the aerospace industry due to their field programmability and low cost. However, they suffer from cosmic radiation induced Single Event Upsets (SEUs). In safety-critical applications, the dependability of the design is a prime concern since failures may have catastrophic consequences. An early analysis of the relationship between dependability metrics, performability-area trade-off, and different mitigation techniques for such applications can reduce the design effort while increasing the design confidence. This paper introduces a novel methodology based on probabilistic model checking, for the analysis of the reliability, availability, safety and performance-area tradeoffs of safety-critical systems for early design decisions. Starting from the high-level description of a system, a Markov reward model is constructed from the Control Data Flow Graph (CDFG) and a component characterization library targeting FPGAs. The proposed model and exhaustive analysis capture all the failure states (based on the fault detection coverage) and repairs possible in the system. We present quantitative results based on an FIR filter circuit to illustrate the applicability of the proposed approach and to demonstrate that a wide range of useful dependability and performability properties can be analyzed using the proposed methodology. The modeling results show the relationship between different mitigation techniques and fault detection coverage, exposing their direct impact on the design for early decisions.

We present a multiple-assumption multiple-conclusion system for bi-intuitionistic logic. Derivations in the systems are graphs whose edges are labelled by formulas and whose nodes are labelled by rules. We show how to embed both the standard intuitionistic and dual-intuitionistic natural deduction systems into the proposed system. Soundness and completeness are established using translations with more traditional sequent calculi for bi-intuitionistic logic.

This paper is devoted to three main aims: (I) to present the conceptual relations between recursion, on the one hand, and inductive definitions and mathematical induction, on the other; as well as among recursion and self-involvement. In order to receive the original and primary use of recursion in cognitive science, it is important to bear in mind the conceptual relations and distinctions between them. (II) To analyze the interpretation of recursion from two different approaches. The first one, mainly represented by Chomsky, emphasizes the origin of recursion in the formal sciences, and applies it to characterize the mechanical procedure which underlies the language faculty. On this view, recursion is a property of the mind/brain. The second one disregards this conception of recursion and redefines it in terms of either the processing of self-embedded structures (e.g. [20]) or the ability to represent multiple hierarchical levels using the same rule (e.g. [45]); or as follows: recursion refers to the ability to embed structures within structures of the same kind (e.g. [48]). (III) To discuss whether or not this change in the meaning of recursion is more suitable than the original one for empirical research.

In this paper it is suggested to generalize our understanding of general (structural) proof theory and to consider it as a general theory of two kinds of derivations, namely proofs and dual proofs. The proposal is substantiated by (i) considerations on assertion, denial, and bi-lateralism, (ii) remarks on compositionality in proof-theoretic semantics, and (iii) comments on falsification and co-implication. The main formal result of the paper is a normal form theorem for the natural deduction proof system N2Int of the bi-intuitionistic logic 2Int. The proof makes use of the faithful embedding of 2Int into intuitionistic logic with respect to validity and shows that conversions of dual proofs can be sidestepped.

This paper presents two major aspects of Frege's and Peirce's views on assertion and denial: first, their arguments for the notational choices concerning the representation of assertion and denial in Begriffsschrift (BS) and Existential Graphs (EGs), respectively; and second, those properties of BS and EGs which reflect their inventors' views on assertion and denial. We show that while Frege's notation has an ad hoc sign of assertion and an ad hoc sign of negation, Peirce has a sign of assertion which is also a sign of logical conjunction, and a sign of scope which is also a sign of negation.

In this short paper I note that a key metatheorem does not hold for the bilateralist inferential framework: harmony does not entail consistency. I conclude that the requirement of harmony will not suffice for a bilateralist to maintain a proof theoretic account of classical logic. I conclude that a proof theoretic account of meaning based on the bilateralist framework has no natural way of distinguishing legitimate definitional inference rules from illegitimate ones (such as those for tonk). Finally, as an appendix to the main argument, I propose an alternative non-bilateral formal solution to the problem of providing a proof-theoretic account of classical logic.

Input/output logic is a formalism in deontic logic and normative reasoning. Unlike deontic logical frameworks based on possible-world semantics, input/output logic adopts norm-based semantics in the sense of [13], specifically operational semantics. It is well-known in theoretical computer science that complexity is an indispensable component of every logic. So far, previous literature in input/output systems focuses on proof theory and semantics, while neglects complexity. This paper adds the missing component by giving the complexity results of main decision problems in input/output logic. Our results show that input/output logic is coNP hard and in the 2nd level of the polynomial hierarchy.

In this paper it is suggested to generalize our understanding of general (structural) proof theory and to consider it as a general theory of two kinds of derivations, namely proofs and dual proofs. The proposal is substantiated by (i) considerations on assertion, denial, and bi-lateralism, (ii) remarks on compositionality in proof-theoretic semantics, and (iii) comments on falsification and co-implication. The main formal result of the paper is a normal form theorem for the natural deduction proof system N2Int of the bi-intuitionistic logic 2Int. The proof makes use of the faithful embedding of 2Int into intuitionistic logic with respect to validity and shows that conversions of dual proofs can be sidestepped.

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence.