Hastings Center Report最新文献

The number of older adults incarcerated in prisons is growing significantly, and there is a great need for legal authority, processes, and resources to mitigate individual and social burdens of elder neglect and abuse within these settings. Older adults in prison may be particularly vulnerable to abuse, neglect, or exploitation. They are dependent on the carceral system for basic resources, are at risk for retaliatory actions for reporting mistreatment, and bear disproportionately high health burdens. This essay first considers standards and resources for mitigating elder mistreatment in the community and residential-care settings in contrast to the available resources in prisons. Arguing that a conceptual model of elder abuse tailored to the prison population is needed, the essay proposes a research agenda through which such a model could be developed. The model could then be used in the creation of policy for detecting and mitigating elder mistreatment of incarcerated people. The essay concludes with a call to action to address the rift in legal protections and processes that leave older adults in prison at increased risk of abuse and neglect without a clear pathway for recourse.

Global health has long been characterized by injustice, with certain populations marginalized and made vulnerable by social, economic, and health disparities within and among countries. The pandemic only amplified inequalities. In response to it, the World Health Organization and the United Nations have embarked on transformative normative and financial reforms that could reimagine pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (PPPR). These reforms include a new strategy to sustainably finance the WHO, a UN political declaration on PPPR, a fundamental revision to the International Health Regulations, and negotiation of a new, legally binding pandemic agreement (popularly called the “Pandemic Treaty”). We revisit the cavernous shortcomings of the global Covid-19 response, explain potentially transformative legal reforms and the ethical values that underpin them, and propose actionable solutions to advance both health and justice.

Mass incarceration is an ethical crisis. Yet it is not only the magnitude of the system that is troubling. Mass incarceration has been created and sustained by racism, classism, and ableism, and the problems of the criminal legal system will not be solved without meaningfully intervening upon these forms of oppression. Beyond that, incarceration itself—whether of one person or 2 million—represents a moral failing. To punish and control, rather than invest in community and healing, is antithetical to the values of the field of bioethics. This commentary, which responds to the article “Fifty Years of U.S. Mass Incarceration and What It Means for Bioethics,” by Sean Valles, considers abolition as a crucial form of justice that must be centered in the work of bioethics. Abolition is both an antiracist intervention and a means of considering the ways health care broadly and bioethics specifically have allowed for the perpetuation of carcerality in the United States.

Moral distress names a widely discussed and concerning clinician experience. Yet the precise nature of the distress and the appropriate practical response to it remain unclear. Clinicians speak of their moral distress in terms of guilt, regret, anger, or other distressing emotions, and they often invoke them interchangeably. But these emotions are distinct, and they are not all equally fitting in the same circumstances. This indicates a problematic ambiguity in the moral distress concept that obscures its distinctiveness, its relevant circumstances, and how individual clinicians and the medical community should practically respond to it. We argue that, in a range of situations that are said to be morally distressing, the characteristic emotion can be well-understood in terms of what Bernard Williams calls “agent-regret.” We show what can thereby be gained in terms of a less ambiguous concept and a more adequate ethical response to this distinctive and complex clinician experience.

The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Bioethics, edited by Wendy A. Rogers et al., presents a thorough, contemporary understanding of feminist bioethics, linking feminist efforts to other critical approaches in the field of bioethics. A more demanding standard for feminist scholarship is set by engaging gender at its intersections with race, class, sexuality, and ability––intersections that require bioethicists to attend to issues like incarceration and transmisogynistic violence that are less frequently tackled in the field. Editors and contributors alike in this volume show that long-standing feminist conceptual interventions, especially those regarding the significance of relationality and epistemic marginalization, provide key tools for a coalition of critical approaches to bioethics.

This essay explores what the future may hold for bioethics if it continues its evolution toward a field that embraces systemic, collective-level challenges; has a global scale and focus; emphasizes human flourishing; and seeks to have increased societal impact. As The Hastings Center considers strategic priorities for its research, public engagement, and impact, this essay reflects on where we have been and where we are going. It offers an expansive and inclusive vision for the future of bioethics, in order to invite an open and wide-ranging conversation about the future of our field and the role that The Hastings Center can and should play within it.

This essay summarizes key insights across the essays in the Hastings Center Report's special report “Time to Rebuild: Essays on Trust in Health Care and Science.” These insights concern trust and trustworthiness as distinct concepts, competence as a necessary but not sufficient input to trust, trust as a reciprocal good, trust as an interpersonal as well as structural phenomena, the ethical impermissibility of seeking to win trust without being trustworthy, building and borrowing trust as distinct strategies, and challenges to trustworthiness posed by the contingent nature of science. Together, these insights stand to advance an area of research that we believe has been historically stymied by conceptual confusion and a long-standing insistence on treating trust as a purely instrumental good.