Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5789
Archie Zariski
This article argues that access to judges is an essential element of access to justice. Traditional civil litigation procedure aimed at preparation for trial that is complex, time-consuming and costly obstructs such access, especially for litigants without lawyers. To remedy this, the author proposes a summary judicial dispute resolution procedure comprising two stages: early judicial intervention followed by judicial dispute resolution that is determinative if necessary. At both points litigants would be given the opportunity to settle their dispute consensually, thus combining principles of self-determination with final disposition according to law. The proposal draws on and extends contemporary innovations in Canadian courts concerning summary proceedings and binding judicial dispute resolution. The new procedure should improve access to judges and thus access to justice.
{"title":"Judicial Dispute Resolution in Canada: Towards Accessible Dispute Resolution","authors":"Archie Zariski","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5789","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that access to judges is an essential element of access to justice. Traditional civil litigation procedure aimed at preparation for trial that is complex, time-consuming and costly obstructs such access, especially for litigants without lawyers. To remedy this, the author proposes a summary judicial dispute resolution procedure comprising two stages: early judicial intervention followed by judicial dispute resolution that is determinative if necessary. At both points litigants would be given the opportunity to settle their dispute consensually, thus combining principles of self-determination with final disposition according to law. The proposal draws on and extends contemporary innovations in Canadian courts concerning summary proceedings and binding judicial dispute resolution. The new procedure should improve access to judges and thus access to justice.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49578336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5691
G. Kennedy
This article analyzes the first three years of the operation of Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rule”), which allows a court to very summarily dismiss litigation that is “on its face” frivolous, vexatious, and/or abusive. The author explores the history of and rationale for the Rule, in the context of the access to justice crisis in Ontario, and in light of the perceived inadequacy of alternative mechanisms for addressing the dangers raised by vexatious litigants. He then reviews all 190 Rule 2.1 decisions decided between July 1, 2014 and June 30, 2017, with the goal to provide guidance for future lawyers and judges considering using the Rule. This is followed by an analysis of the effects on access to justice of the Rule, in terms of providing speedy and cost-efficient resolution of actions on their merits. The author concludes by considering how the Rule should be used in the future – doctrinally, institutionally, and ethically. His conclusions are hopeful. The Rule is powerful, and its use should prompt some pause in judges and lawyers. By and large, however, the Rule has been very well employed. It has resulted in immense savings of time and financial expense and many cases model fairness to vulnerable parties. In rare instances where the Rule’s (attempted) use has been inappropriate, costs in terms of delay and financial expense are usually minimal. The Rule is ultimately an inspiring example of how civil procedure can be amended to facilitate access to justice.
{"title":"Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure: Responding to Vexatious Litigation While Advancing Access to Justice?","authors":"G. Kennedy","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5691","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the first three years of the operation of Rule 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rule”), which allows a court to very summarily dismiss litigation that is “on its face” frivolous, vexatious, and/or abusive. The author explores the history of and rationale for the Rule, in the context of the access to justice crisis in Ontario, and in light of the perceived inadequacy of alternative mechanisms for addressing the dangers raised by vexatious litigants. He then reviews all 190 Rule 2.1 decisions decided between July 1, 2014 and June 30, 2017, with the goal to provide guidance for future lawyers and judges considering using the Rule. This is followed by an analysis of the effects on access to justice of the Rule, in terms of providing speedy and cost-efficient resolution of actions on their merits. The author concludes by considering how the Rule should be used in the future – doctrinally, institutionally, and ethically. His conclusions are hopeful. The Rule is powerful, and its use should prompt some pause in judges and lawyers. By and large, however, the Rule has been very well employed. It has resulted in immense savings of time and financial expense and many cases model fairness to vulnerable parties. In rare instances where the Rule’s (attempted) use has been inappropriate, costs in terms of delay and financial expense are usually minimal. The Rule is ultimately an inspiring example of how civil procedure can be amended to facilitate access to justice.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48321278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5692
Yasir Naqvi
The Hon. Yasir Naqvi, Attorney General of Ontario, delivered the George M. Duck Lecture at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law on February 28, 2018.
2018年2月28日,安大略省总检察长亚西尔·纳克维在温莎大学法学院举行“乔治·达克讲座”。
{"title":"George M. Duck Lecture","authors":"Yasir Naqvi","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5692","url":null,"abstract":"The Hon. Yasir Naqvi, Attorney General of Ontario, delivered the George M. Duck Lecture at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law on February 28, 2018.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45403740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5790
Andrew E. Costa
Throughout the 18thcentury, the eastern Wabanakipeoples and the British Crown negotiated several Peace and Friendship Treaties, as well as Compacts, to properly situate the Crown among the WabankiConfederacy (Mi’kmaq, Penobscot, Wulstukwiuk, Passamaqoddy). One treaty was the Wabanaki Compactof 1725-26. The agreements that comprised the Wabanaki Compactwere negotiated in the years succeeding the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Indigenous - Crown skirmishes and raids that culminated in Dummer’s War (1722 – 25). This paper asserts the Wabanaki Compact(specifically Mascarene’s Treaty) maintains legal import by showing that many components of the agreement actually contained Crown obligation to preserve customary religious observance and generational hunting, fishing and trapping rights. The Compact also builds up interdependent relations between the Crown and the Wabanakithat were premised on a strong responsibility to preserve and assist the well being of adjoined communities or nations.These assertions will be analyzed through the lens of Wabanaki legal teaching related to interrelatedness, generational obligation, linguistic protocols and gift giving ceremonies. Legal judgments like R v. Sappier & Polchiesand R v. Sappier; R v. Greyshow that the Crown is tied to these relations by recognizing their role in affirming their fidelity to the treaty order well into the future. Analyzing the Compactwith these principles in mind implies that partners individually hold normative autonomy while also collectively holding obligation to preserve living treaty partnerships throughout future generations.It is argued that theWabanaki Compactalsoretains legal relevance by tying the Crown and the Wabanaki(specifically the Mi’kmaqand Wulstukwiuk) in intergenerational obligation through respecting and preserving the autonomy which brought them to the Compactin the first place.
{"title":"Interrelated Treaty Orders Across the Generations: Autonomy, Obligation and Confederacy in the Wabanaki Compact (1725-26)","authors":"Andrew E. Costa","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5790","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout the 18thcentury, the eastern Wabanakipeoples and the British Crown negotiated several Peace and Friendship Treaties, as well as Compacts, to properly situate the Crown among the WabankiConfederacy (Mi’kmaq, Penobscot, Wulstukwiuk, Passamaqoddy). One treaty was the Wabanaki Compactof 1725-26. The agreements that comprised the Wabanaki Compactwere negotiated in the years succeeding the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Indigenous - Crown skirmishes and raids that culminated in Dummer’s War (1722 – 25). This paper asserts the Wabanaki Compact(specifically Mascarene’s Treaty) maintains legal import by showing that many components of the agreement actually contained Crown obligation to preserve customary religious observance and generational hunting, fishing and trapping rights. The Compact also builds up interdependent relations between the Crown and the Wabanakithat were premised on a strong responsibility to preserve and assist the well being of adjoined communities or nations.These assertions will be analyzed through the lens of Wabanaki legal teaching related to interrelatedness, generational obligation, linguistic protocols and gift giving ceremonies. Legal judgments like R v. Sappier & Polchiesand R v. Sappier; R v. Greyshow that the Crown is tied to these relations by recognizing their role in affirming their fidelity to the treaty order well into the future. Analyzing the Compactwith these principles in mind implies that partners individually hold normative autonomy while also collectively holding obligation to preserve living treaty partnerships throughout future generations.It is argued that theWabanaki Compactalsoretains legal relevance by tying the Crown and the Wabanaki(specifically the Mi’kmaqand Wulstukwiuk) in intergenerational obligation through respecting and preserving the autonomy which brought them to the Compactin the first place.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42845340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5784
Alexandra Bahary-Dionne
Au Québec et au Canada, l’accès à la justice est une préoccupation croissante pour les milieux juridique, politique et universitaire. L’inaccessibilité financière des services juridiques engendre plusieurs problèmes pour un nombre important de justiciables, tout comme l’inaccessibilité cognitive de l’univers juridique. C’est dans ce contexte que les technologies de l’information et de la communication [TIC] occupent une place importante dans les discussions sur les manières de rendre la justice plus accessible. Elles auraient notamment le potentiel de fournir des ressources plus intelligibles et accessibles aux justiciables. Les médias sociaux en particulier pourraient démocratiser l’information juridique dans la mesure où ils sont faciles d’utilisation, rassemblent une diversité de contenus et sont de plus en plus ancrés dans les activités quotidiennes. Malgré l’intérêt que suscitent ces plateformes sur le plan de l’accès à la justice, leurs usages relatifs à l’information juridique restent à explorer pour la recherche en droit. Le présent article s’intéresse à ces plateformes, et en particulier au média social Facebook, qui a pour particularité de mettre en scène des internautes qui sont à la fois créateurs, récepteurs et relayeurs de contenus d’information juridique. Nous proposons finalement une typologie utile à la recherche sur le thème du droit et des médias sociaux.
{"title":"L’accès à la justice en contexte numérique : l’information juridique par et pour les justiciables sur les médias sociaux","authors":"Alexandra Bahary-Dionne","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5784","url":null,"abstract":"Au Québec et au Canada, l’accès à la justice est une préoccupation croissante pour les milieux juridique, politique et universitaire. L’inaccessibilité financière des services juridiques engendre plusieurs problèmes pour un nombre important de justiciables, tout comme l’inaccessibilité cognitive de l’univers juridique. C’est dans ce contexte que les technologies de l’information et de la communication [TIC] occupent une place importante dans les discussions sur les manières de rendre la justice plus accessible. Elles auraient notamment le potentiel de fournir des ressources plus intelligibles et accessibles aux justiciables. Les médias sociaux en particulier pourraient démocratiser l’information juridique dans la mesure où ils sont faciles d’utilisation, rassemblent une diversité de contenus et sont de plus en plus ancrés dans les activités quotidiennes. Malgré l’intérêt que suscitent ces plateformes sur le plan de l’accès à la justice, leurs usages relatifs à l’information juridique restent à explorer pour la recherche en droit. Le présent article s’intéresse à ces plateformes, et en particulier au média social Facebook, qui a pour particularité de mettre en scène des internautes qui sont à la fois créateurs, récepteurs et relayeurs de contenus d’information juridique. Nous proposons finalement une typologie utile à la recherche sur le thème du droit et des médias sociaux.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48834692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5109
S. Al-Sharieh
The Copyright Act includes a set of copyright infringement exceptions that permit the unauthorized use of copyrighted works in order to serve public interest objectives. The Supreme Court of Canada liberally interpreted these exceptions as “users’ rights” by relying on the purpose of the Act, understood as a balance between the authors’ right to be rewarded for their works and the public interest in the dissemination and use of works. The utility of copyright balance to safeguard users’ rights is uncertain. The Act does not explicitly adopt “balance” as a purpose. National and international copyright law traditionally recognize the users’ side in the copyright law balance in copyright exceptions and limitations. And, in copyright law discourse, different stakeholders propose and defend conflicting forms of balance. Therefore, the paper argues that a human rights-based approach to copyright exceptions is more persuasive in justifying their interpretation as users’ rights. Copyright users’ rights mirror the content of the human rights to participate in culture, education, and freedom of expression, which Canada is obliged to implement as a State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The proposed approach would align the discourse with key elements of Canadian jurisprudence: (1) human rights as reinforcers of the rule of law; (2) international human rights law as an interpretive tool for Canadian courts; and (3) the need to interpret Canadian legislation in a manner that does not breach international obligations.
{"title":"Securing the Future of Copyright Users’ Rights in Canada","authors":"S. Al-Sharieh","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5109","url":null,"abstract":"The Copyright Act includes a set of copyright infringement exceptions that permit the unauthorized use of copyrighted works in order to serve public interest objectives. The Supreme Court of Canada liberally interpreted these exceptions as “users’ rights” by relying on the purpose of the Act, understood as a balance between the authors’ right to be rewarded for their works and the public interest in the dissemination and use of works. The utility of copyright balance to safeguard users’ rights is uncertain. The Act does not explicitly adopt “balance” as a purpose. National and international copyright law traditionally recognize the users’ side in the copyright law balance in copyright exceptions and limitations. And, in copyright law discourse, different stakeholders propose and defend conflicting forms of balance. Therefore, the paper argues that a human rights-based approach to copyright exceptions is more persuasive in justifying their interpretation as users’ rights. Copyright users’ rights mirror the content of the human rights to participate in culture, education, and freedom of expression, which Canada is obliged to implement as a State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The proposed approach would align the discourse with key elements of Canadian jurisprudence: (1) human rights as reinforcers of the rule of law; (2) international human rights law as an interpretive tool for Canadian courts; and (3) the need to interpret Canadian legislation in a manner that does not breach international obligations.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48231111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5783
Thomas McMorrow
In this paper, I aim to advance understanding of the constitutional principle of the honour of the Crown, by evaluating legal and political dimensions of the concept. I seek to demonstrate how the honour of the Crown may obscure but also illuminate legal issues and political challenges that meaningful pursuit of reconciliation involves. I argue that once one starts to ask “Who is to uphold the honour of the Crown?” one observes opaque royal symbolism obscuring, but also framing, contested questions of governance shot through with collective coordination problems. I argue that appreciating the normative potential of the “honour of the Crown” means acknowledging that the concept figures as but one of many communicative forms that may serve to foster a more just arrangement for and among peoples.
{"title":"Upholding the Honour of the Crown","authors":"Thomas McMorrow","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5783","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I aim to advance understanding of the constitutional principle of the honour of the Crown, by evaluating legal and political dimensions of the concept. I seek to demonstrate how the honour of the Crown may obscure but also illuminate legal issues and political challenges that meaningful pursuit of reconciliation involves. I argue that once one starts to ask “Who is to uphold the honour of the Crown?” one observes opaque royal symbolism obscuring, but also framing, contested questions of governance shot through with collective coordination problems. I argue that appreciating the normative potential of the “honour of the Crown” means acknowledging that the concept figures as but one of many communicative forms that may serve to foster a more just arrangement for and among peoples.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43738466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5788
Deanne Sowter
Family law is evolving towards non-adversarial dispute resolution processes. As a result, some family lawyers are representing clients who are trying to reach settlements that recognize their interests, instead of just pursuing their legal rights. By responding to the full spectrum of client needs, lawyers are required to behave differently than they do when they are representing a client in a traditional civil litigation file. They consider the emotional and financial consequences of relationship breakdown – things that are not typically within the purview of the family law lawyer. They objectively reality check with their clients, and they approach interest-based negotiations in a client-centric way. These lawyers view their role as that of a non-adversarial advocate, and their clients as whole people with interests that are not just legal. This paper draws on an empirical study involving focus groups with family law lawyers, to argue that the Federation of Law Societies of Canada’sModel Code of Professional Conductneeds to be updated to incorporate non-adversarial advocacy. The lawyers in the study viewed non-adversarial advocacy as being responsive to client needs, and in the interest of clients’ children. This paper draws from the study to establish what constitutes non-adversarial advocacy and then it presents a proposal for revising Rule 5 (Advocacy) of the Model Code.
{"title":"Advocacy in Non-Adversarial Family Law: A Recommendation for Revision to the Model Code","authors":"Deanne Sowter","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5788","url":null,"abstract":"Family law is evolving towards non-adversarial dispute resolution processes. As a result, some family lawyers are representing clients who are trying to reach settlements that recognize their interests, instead of just pursuing their legal rights. By responding to the full spectrum of client needs, lawyers are required to behave differently than they do when they are representing a client in a traditional civil litigation file. They consider the emotional and financial consequences of relationship breakdown – things that are not typically within the purview of the family law lawyer. They objectively reality check with their clients, and they approach interest-based negotiations in a client-centric way. These lawyers view their role as that of a non-adversarial advocate, and their clients as whole people with interests that are not just legal. This paper draws on an empirical study involving focus groups with family law lawyers, to argue that the Federation of Law Societies of Canada’sModel Code of Professional Conductneeds to be updated to incorporate non-adversarial advocacy. The lawyers in the study viewed non-adversarial advocacy as being responsive to client needs, and in the interest of clients’ children. This paper draws from the study to establish what constitutes non-adversarial advocacy and then it presents a proposal for revising Rule 5 (Advocacy) of the Model Code.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48228902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5271
D. Phillips
This article examines the role of social science in feminist intervener advocacy, focusing on the 2015 case ofIshaq v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration). InIshaq, a Muslim woman challenged a Canadian government policy requiring her to remove her niqab while reciting the citizenship oath. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed several motions for intervention by feminist and other equality-seeking organizations, emphasizing their improper reliance on unproven social facts and social science research. I argue that this decision departs from the generous approach to public interest interventions sanctioned by the federal and other Canadian courts. More importantly, the Court’s characterization of the intervener submissions as relying on “social science facts” that must be established through the evidentiary record diminishes the capacity of feminist interveners to effectively support equality and access to justice for marginalized groups in practice.
{"title":"Ishaq v Canada: “Social Science Facts” in Feminist Interventions","authors":"D. Phillips","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5271","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the role of social science in feminist intervener advocacy, focusing on the 2015 case ofIshaq v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration). InIshaq, a Muslim woman challenged a Canadian government policy requiring her to remove her niqab while reciting the citizenship oath. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed several motions for intervention by feminist and other equality-seeking organizations, emphasizing their improper reliance on unproven social facts and social science research. I argue that this decision departs from the generous approach to public interest interventions sanctioned by the federal and other Canadian courts. More importantly, the Court’s characterization of the intervener submissions as relying on “social science facts” that must be established through the evidentiary record diminishes the capacity of feminist interveners to effectively support equality and access to justice for marginalized groups in practice.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45753816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5108
P. Chapdelaine
{"title":"Copyright User Rights and Access to Justice (Introduction)","authors":"P. Chapdelaine","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V35I0.5108","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43881352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}