Diversity concerns come up in many important decision making settings including two-sided matching, in particular centralized student admission matching. We overview papers on the topic of two-sided matching with diversity concerns.
{"title":"Two-sided matching with diversity concerns","authors":"H. Aziz","doi":"10.1145/3476436.3476440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3476436.3476440","url":null,"abstract":"Diversity concerns come up in many important decision making settings including two-sided matching, in particular centralized student admission matching. We overview papers on the topic of two-sided matching with diversity concerns.","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":"19 1","pages":"15 - 17"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3476436.3476440","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41970820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a report on the inaugural SIGecom Winter Meeting which was held online on February 25, 2021. We highlight the goals of the workshop and summarize the format and content.
{"title":"SIGecom winter meeting report","authors":"Piotr Dworczak, Brendan Lucier","doi":"10.1145/3476436.3476437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3476436.3476437","url":null,"abstract":"We present a report on the inaugural SIGecom Winter Meeting which was held online on February 25, 2021. We highlight the goals of the workshop and summarize the format and content.","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":"19 1","pages":"2 - 9"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3476436.3476437","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46214387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The inaugural ACM conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO'21) invites participation from the SIGecom community. The conferrence aims to highlight work where techniques from algorithms, optimization, and mechanism design, along with insights from other disciplines, can help improve equity and access to opportunity for historically disadvantaged and underserved communities. The conference is organized by the Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG) initiative, and builds on the MD4SG technical workshop series and tutorials at conferences including ACM EC, ACM COMPASS, and WINE. The conference will have both an archival publication track as well as a non-archival track that welcomes papers under submission or published in the previous year. Papers submitted to EC 2021 or that will be submitted to EC 2022 are welcome in the non-archival track.
{"title":"Invitation to participate in the ACM conference on equity and access in algorithms, mechanisms, and optimization (EAAMO'21)","authors":"Rediet Abebe, Irene Lo, Ana-Andreea Stoica","doi":"10.1145/3476436.3476438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3476436.3476438","url":null,"abstract":"The inaugural ACM conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO'21) invites participation from the SIGecom community. The conferrence aims to highlight work where techniques from algorithms, optimization, and mechanism design, along with insights from other disciplines, can help improve equity and access to opportunity for historically disadvantaged and underserved communities. The conference is organized by the Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG) initiative, and builds on the MD4SG technical workshop series and tutorials at conferences including ACM EC, ACM COMPASS, and WINE. The conference will have both an archival publication track as well as a non-archival track that welcomes papers under submission or published in the previous year. Papers submitted to EC 2021 or that will be submitted to EC 2022 are welcome in the non-archival track.","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":"19 1","pages":"10 - 11"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3476436.3476438","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46274448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Nisarg Shah, Alexandros A. Voudouris
The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in efficiency---typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the participating agents---due to having access only to limited information about the preferences of the agents. Here, we provide a comprehensive reading list on the related literature.
{"title":"Distortion in social choice problems","authors":"Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Nisarg Shah, Alexandros A. Voudouris","doi":"10.1145/3476436.3476439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3476436.3476439","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in efficiency---typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the participating agents---due to having access only to limited information about the preferences of the agents. Here, we provide a comprehensive reading list on the related literature.","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":"19 1","pages":"12 - 14"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3476436.3476439","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44474390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled changes to the Ethereum blockchain's transaction fee mechanism, including the introduction of variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. These changes are slated for deployment in Ethereum's "London fork," scheduled for late summer 2021, at which point it will be the biggest economic change made to a major blockchain to date. This short note provides an overview of recent work by the author that formally investigates and compares the incentive guarantees offered by Ethereum's current transaction fee mechanism and the new mechanism proposed in EIP-1559.
{"title":"Transaction fee mechanism design","authors":"T. Roughgarden","doi":"10.1145/3476436.3476445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3476436.3476445","url":null,"abstract":"Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include \"on-chain\" from the pool of all pending transactions. EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled changes to the Ethereum blockchain's transaction fee mechanism, including the introduction of variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. These changes are slated for deployment in Ethereum's \"London fork,\" scheduled for late summer 2021, at which point it will be the biggest economic change made to a major blockchain to date. This short note provides an overview of recent work by the author that formally investigates and compares the incentive guarantees offered by Ethereum's current transaction fee mechanism and the new mechanism proposed in EIP-1559.","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":"19 1","pages":"52 - 55"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3476436.3476445","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41865142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is the sixth annual collection of profiles of the junior faculty job market candidates of the SIGecom community. The twenty four candidates for 2021 are listed alphabetically and indexed by research areas that define the interests of the community. The candidates can be contacted individually or via the moderated mailing list ecom-candidates2021@acm.org.
{"title":"SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2021","authors":"Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline","doi":"10.1145/3440968.3440971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3440968.3440971","url":null,"abstract":"This is the sixth annual collection of profiles of the junior faculty job market candidates of the SIGecom community. The twenty four candidates for 2021 are listed alphabetically and indexed by research areas that define the interests of the community. The candidates can be contacted individually or via the moderated mailing list ecom-candidates2021@acm.org.","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":"18 1","pages":"4 - 31"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3440968.3440971","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48571533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"Introduction to multi-armed bandits" is a broad and accessible textbook which emphasizes connections to economics and operations research.
《多武装强盗入门》是一本内容广泛、通俗易懂的教科书，强调与经济学和运筹学的联系。
{"title":"Book announcement: Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits","authors":"Aleksandrs Slivkins","doi":"10.1145/3440959.3440965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3440959.3440965","url":null,"abstract":"\"Introduction to multi-armed bandits\" is a broad and accessible textbook which emphasizes connections to economics and operations research.","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":"18 1","pages":"28 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3440959.3440965","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43743717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SIGecom embraces diversity, fosters mutual understanding and respect, and recognizes the inherent dignity of every person and group [sig 2020]. Over the years, the SIG has taken many measures towards these objectives, including establishing SafeEC, creating a virtual conference format designed to ease participation across time zones, and launching a Global Outreach program to increase participation of low- and middle-income countries [Immorlica et al. 2019].
{"title":"Diversity, equity, and inclusion in economics and computation","authors":"Rediet Abebe","doi":"10.1145/3440959.3440961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3440959.3440961","url":null,"abstract":"SIGecom embraces diversity, fosters mutual understanding and respect, and recognizes the inherent dignity of every person and group [sig 2020]. Over the years, the SIG has taken many measures towards these objectives, including establishing SafeEC, creating a virtual conference format designed to ease participation across time zones, and launching a Global Outreach program to increase participation of low- and middle-income countries [Immorlica et al. 2019].","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":"18 1","pages":"2 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3440959.3440961","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43654764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex, offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or deterministic and simple mechanisms are huge even for additive valuations. Furthermore, the optimal revenue displays strange properties such as non-continuity: changing valuations by tiny multiplicative amounts can change the optimal revenue by an arbitrarily large multiplicative factor. Our work shows that these strange properties do not apply to most natural situations as they require that the mechanism overcharges the buyer for a bundle while selling individual items at much lower prices. In such cases, the buyer would prefer to break his order into smaller pieces paying a much lower price overall. We advocate studying a new revenue benchmark, namely the optimal revenue achievable by "buy-many" mechanisms, that is much better behaved. In a buy-many mechanism, the buyer is allowed to interact with the mechanism multiple times instead of just once. We show that the optimal buy-many revenue for any n item setting is at most O(log n) times the revenue achievable by item pricing. Furthermore, a mechanism of finite menu-size (n/ε)2O(n) suffices to achieve (1 + ε)-approximation to the optimal buy-many revenue. Both these results are tight in a very strong sense, as any family of mechanisms with description complexity sub-doubly-exponential in n cannot achieve better than logarithmic approximation in revenue. In contrast, for buy-one mechanisms, no simple mechanism of finite menu-size can get a finite-approximation in revenue. Moreover, the revenue of buy-one mechanisms can be extremely sensitive to multiplicative changes in values, while as we show optimal buy-many mechanisms satisfy revenue continuity.
{"title":"Buy-many mechanisms","authors":"Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos","doi":"10.1145/3440959.3440963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3440959.3440963","url":null,"abstract":"Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex, offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or deterministic and simple mechanisms are huge even for additive valuations. Furthermore, the optimal revenue displays strange properties such as non-continuity: changing valuations by tiny multiplicative amounts can change the optimal revenue by an arbitrarily large multiplicative factor. Our work shows that these strange properties do not apply to most natural situations as they require that the mechanism overcharges the buyer for a bundle while selling individual items at much lower prices. In such cases, the buyer would prefer to break his order into smaller pieces paying a much lower price overall. We advocate studying a new revenue benchmark, namely the optimal revenue achievable by \"buy-many\" mechanisms, that is much better behaved. In a buy-many mechanism, the buyer is allowed to interact with the mechanism multiple times instead of just once. We show that the optimal buy-many revenue for any n item setting is at most O(log n) times the revenue achievable by item pricing. Furthermore, a mechanism of finite menu-size (n/ε)2O(n) suffices to achieve (1 + ε)-approximation to the optimal buy-many revenue. Both these results are tight in a very strong sense, as any family of mechanisms with description complexity sub-doubly-exponential in n cannot achieve better than logarithmic approximation in revenue. In contrast, for buy-one mechanisms, no simple mechanism of finite menu-size can get a finite-approximation in revenue. Moreover, the revenue of buy-one mechanisms can be extremely sensitive to multiplicative changes in values, while as we show optimal buy-many mechanisms satisfy revenue continuity.","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":"18 1","pages":"12 - 18"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3440959.3440963","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47167149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dear SIGecom community, This has been quite a year. But with 2020's challenges have come opportunities to both reinforce our strengths and evolve as a community. We are incredibly proud of how everyone in the SIG has risen to the occasion.
{"title":"Letter from SIGecom executive committee","authors":"Nicole Immorlica, S. Kominers, Katrina Ligett","doi":"10.1145/3440968.3440970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3440968.3440970","url":null,"abstract":"Dear SIGecom community, This has been quite a year. But with 2020's challenges have come opportunities to both reinforce our strengths and evolve as a community. We are incredibly proud of how everyone in the SIG has risen to the occasion.","PeriodicalId":56237,"journal":{"name":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","volume":" ","pages":"2 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1145/3440968.3440970","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45744647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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