Recent literature emphasizes the importance of a director's external network of social connections. I use a sample of closed-end funds to show that internal, within-board connections are also significant determinants of shareholder value. I find that boards with shared education, employment, and family backgrounds exhibit lower market values, higher expense ratios, higher director compensation levels, and an increased likelihood of financial misrepresentation. Director turnover is lower within these boards, and new director appointments are more likely to share connections with incumbent directors. I conclude that internal board networks negatively impact a firm's governance environment and overall monitoring quality.
{"title":"The Effects of Internal Board Networks: Evidence from Closed-End Funds","authors":"Matthew E. Souther","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3163884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163884","url":null,"abstract":"Recent literature emphasizes the importance of a director's external network of social connections. I use a sample of closed-end funds to show that internal, within-board connections are also significant determinants of shareholder value. I find that boards with shared education, employment, and family backgrounds exhibit lower market values, higher expense ratios, higher director compensation levels, and an increased likelihood of financial misrepresentation. Director turnover is lower within these boards, and new director appointments are more likely to share connections with incumbent directors. I conclude that internal board networks negatively impact a firm's governance environment and overall monitoring quality.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88801865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study is a comprehensive analysis of the Australian private rental sector and its institutions. It explores the interplay between regulation; organisations and structures; and social norms and practices of prevailing policies. It also explores the impact of innovation and digital technology.
{"title":"Private Rental in Transition: Institutional Change, Technology and Innovation in Australia","authors":"K. Hulse, Chris Martin, Amity James, W. Stone","doi":"10.18408/AHURI-5112101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18408/AHURI-5112101","url":null,"abstract":"This study is a comprehensive analysis of the Australian private rental sector and its institutions. It explores the interplay between regulation; organisations and structures; and social norms and practices of prevailing policies. It also explores the impact of innovation and digital technology.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75158321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a large panel of US BHC over the 2001:Q1-2015:Q4, we investigate the risk-taking behaviors of banks within a comparison perspective – between public and private banks - where there exists substantial differences of asymmetry information and agency problems. We document evidence of greater stability of public banks versus their private peers. However, public banks become riskier than private banks during the last crisis. These findings suggest a mixed evidence of risk-taking mitigating role of listing status. Regulatory pressure is effective in limiting risk taking by undercapitalized public banks before, but not during the crisis, casting doubt the effectiveness of regulators during the turmoil times. Public banks with high franchise value expose to risk less than others during the crisis. Debtholders discipline is ineffective in curbing the risk-taking behavior of banks. Our study is of interest for regulators, policymakers who are in search of improving bank risk-taking behavior.
{"title":"Ownership Structure and Bank Risk: The Effects of Crisis, Market Discipline and Regulatory Pressure","authors":"D. Tran, M. Hassan, R. Houston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3150353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3150353","url":null,"abstract":"Using a large panel of US BHC over the 2001:Q1-2015:Q4, we investigate the risk-taking behaviors of banks within a comparison perspective – between public and private banks - where there exists substantial differences of asymmetry information and agency problems. We document evidence of greater stability of public banks versus their private peers. However, public banks become riskier than private banks during the last crisis. These findings suggest a mixed evidence of risk-taking mitigating role of listing status. Regulatory pressure is effective in limiting risk taking by undercapitalized public banks before, but not during the crisis, casting doubt the effectiveness of regulators during the turmoil times. Public banks with high franchise value expose to risk less than others during the crisis. Debtholders discipline is ineffective in curbing the risk-taking behavior of banks. Our study is of interest for regulators, policymakers who are in search of improving bank risk-taking behavior.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82186123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The change subsequent to the sub-prime crisis pushed pressure on decreased financial products complexity, going from exotics to vanilla options but increase in pricing efficiency. We introduce in this paper a more efficient methodology for vanilla option pricing using a scenario based particle filter in a hostile data environment. In doing so we capitalise on the risk factor decomposition of the the Implied Volatility surface Parameterization (IVP) recently introduced in order to define our likelihood function and therefore our sampling methodology taking into consideration arbitrage constraints.
{"title":"Machine Learning Techniques for Deciphering Implied Volatility Surface Data in a Hostile Environment: Scenario Based Particle Filter, Risk Factor Decomposition & Arbitrage Constraint Sampling","authors":"Babak Mahdavi-Damghani, S. Roberts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3133862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3133862","url":null,"abstract":"The change subsequent to the sub-prime crisis pushed pressure on decreased financial products complexity, going from exotics to vanilla options but increase in pricing efficiency. We introduce in this paper a more efficient methodology for vanilla option pricing using a scenario based particle filter in a hostile data environment. In doing so we capitalise on the risk factor decomposition of the the Implied Volatility surface Parameterization (IVP) recently introduced in order to define our likelihood function and therefore our sampling methodology taking into consideration arbitrage constraints.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86909568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Claim is the largest expenses of an insurance company. Therefore, claims management is seen as an essential tool of image boosting in insurance industry. Excellence in claims handling gives an insurance company a competitive edge over its competitors. For an insurance company, claims processing is one of its core activities. It could be said to be the main reason why insurance companies are established. Managing it more effectively and efficiently, aligning it with corporate business objectives, and achieving real-time operational awareness are high priorities of an insurance company. This is because claims processing touches all part of the organization, affecting competitive positioning, customer service, fraud management, risk exposure, cost control and Information Technology infrastructure. The objective of this research therefore, is to empirically investigate the impact of claims management on the profitability of non-life insurance companies in the Nigeria insurance industry. Hypotheses were tested to find out whether claims management is significantly related to profitability of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. The study adopts longitudinal design which follow the same sample over time and make repeated observations; hypotheses were tested using correlation analysis. The study revealed that there is a significant relationship between claims management and the operating cost of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. However, the study revealed that there is no significant relationship between claims management and profitability of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. It is recommended that the claims management department should be properly structured with highly technical, trained and experience staff so as to manage the claims of insurance companies properly as a well managed claim lead to profitability through repeated purchase.
{"title":"Impact of Claims Management on the Profitability of Nigerian Insurance Company: An Empirical Study of the Non-Life Insurance Sector","authors":"M. Ogunnubi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3126220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3126220","url":null,"abstract":"Claim is the largest expenses of an insurance company. Therefore, claims management is seen as an essential tool of image boosting in insurance industry. Excellence in claims handling gives an insurance company a competitive edge over its competitors. For an insurance company, claims processing is one of its core activities. It could be said to be the main reason why insurance companies are established. Managing it more effectively and efficiently, aligning it with corporate business objectives, and achieving real-time operational awareness are high priorities of an insurance company. This is because claims processing touches all part of the organization, affecting competitive positioning, customer service, fraud management, risk exposure, cost control and Information Technology infrastructure. The objective of this research therefore, is to empirically investigate the impact of claims management on the profitability of non-life insurance companies in the Nigeria insurance industry. Hypotheses were tested to find out whether claims management is significantly related to profitability of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. The study adopts longitudinal design which follow the same sample over time and make repeated observations; hypotheses were tested using correlation analysis. The study revealed that there is a significant relationship between claims management and the operating cost of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. However, the study revealed that there is no significant relationship between claims management and profitability of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. It is recommended that the claims management department should be properly structured with highly technical, trained and experience staff so as to manage the claims of insurance companies properly as a well managed claim lead to profitability through repeated purchase.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89566722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The newly revised Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2015) by the OECD are fast emerging as a new regulatory paradigm for the administration of State-owned enterprises and the organization of the State ownership function. This article analyses the Guidelines’ policy prescriptions, governance strategies, and integration into global governance. Noting that the instrument operates by governing the shareholder’s internal make-up, decision-making and objective setting, the article argues that the Guidelines amount to a robust model for an ideal State shareholder – the Good State Shareholder. Efficient, engaged, and accountable, the Good State Shareholder emerges as a critical actor in the contemporary global economy, where States continue to amass and command immense shareholder power. However, when juxtaposed with the recent attempts by the UN to adopt State ownership as an instrument of human rights governance, the fault lines of the Good State Shareholder model, as well as the emerging techniques of shareholder governance, are exposed.
{"title":"Governing the Good State Shareholder: The Case of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises","authors":"Mikko Rajavuori","doi":"10.54648/eulr2018005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eulr2018005","url":null,"abstract":"The newly revised Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2015) by the OECD are fast emerging as a new regulatory paradigm for the administration of State-owned enterprises and the organization of the State ownership function. This article analyses the Guidelines’ policy prescriptions, governance strategies, and integration into global governance. Noting that the instrument operates by governing the shareholder’s internal make-up, decision-making and objective setting, the article argues that the Guidelines amount to a robust model for an ideal State shareholder – the Good State Shareholder. Efficient, engaged, and accountable, the Good State Shareholder emerges as a critical actor in the contemporary global economy, where States continue to amass and command immense shareholder power. However, when juxtaposed with the recent attempts by the UN to adopt State ownership as an instrument of human rights governance, the fault lines of the Good State Shareholder model, as well as the emerging techniques of shareholder governance, are exposed.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83764446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dual-class voting systems have been widely employed in recent initial public offerings by large tech companies, but have been roundly condemned by institutional investors and the S&P 500. As an alternative, commentators have proposed adoption of tenure voting systems, where investor voting rights increase with the length of time that they hold shares. In furtherance of this proposal, some Silicon Valley investors have requested that the SEC permit the creation of a new stock exchange where all of the companies will be required to use tenure voting systems. Is tenure voting a better choice than dual-class stock for both corporate management and shareholders? In this paper, we review the arguments for and against tenure voting that have been made in the literature. In order to shed light on these claims veracity, we generate the first data base that documents institutional investor portfolio turnover rates for stock. We use this data to inform our mathematical voting model of tenure voting to show how its adoption would affect control rights within the corporation. We make two main findings that shed light on this question. First, we show that when corporate management holds a large block of company stock prior to the implementation of tenure voting, and retains at least 20-30% of the total number of company shares on a long term basis, then tenure voting will insure that corporate managers maintain control of the company even in the face of an attempted change of control transaction by a highly motivated dissident shareholder. Our second important finding is that if corporate management chooses to sell off its large initial block of the company’s stock over time, so that inside ownership levels drop eventually down to a low percentage level with the majority of ownership held by institutional shareholders with different investment horizons, then the use of tenure voting systems does little to protect management control in a proxy contest for corporate control. We conclude that tenure voting does indeed represent an intermediate form of voting control from a managers’ perspective: it does not guarantee management control, as dual-class share structures do, but does give control to management who maintain large equity stakes in the firm. Institutional investors are likely to see it as an improvement over dual-class stock structures in terms of giving them corporate governance rights, although less advantageous to these shareholders’ rights than a one share, one vote voting system.
{"title":"Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers Lifetime Tenure?","authors":"Paul H. Edelman, Wei Jiang, Randall S. Thomas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3107225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3107225","url":null,"abstract":"Dual-class voting systems have been widely employed in recent initial public offerings by large tech companies, but have been roundly condemned by institutional investors and the S&P 500. As an alternative, commentators have proposed adoption of tenure voting systems, where investor voting rights increase with the length of time that they hold shares. In furtherance of this proposal, some Silicon Valley investors have requested that the SEC permit the creation of a new stock exchange where all of the companies will be required to use tenure voting systems. \u0000Is tenure voting a better choice than dual-class stock for both corporate management and shareholders? In this paper, we review the arguments for and against tenure voting that have been made in the literature. In order to shed light on these claims veracity, we generate the first data base that documents institutional investor portfolio turnover rates for stock. We use this data to inform our mathematical voting model of tenure voting to show how its adoption would affect control rights within the corporation. \u0000We make two main findings that shed light on this question. First, we show that when corporate management holds a large block of company stock prior to the implementation of tenure voting, and retains at least 20-30% of the total number of company shares on a long term basis, then tenure voting will insure that corporate managers maintain control of the company even in the face of an attempted change of control transaction by a highly motivated dissident shareholder. Our second important finding is that if corporate management chooses to sell off its large initial block of the company’s stock over time, so that inside ownership levels drop eventually down to a low percentage level with the majority of ownership held by institutional shareholders with different investment horizons, then the use of tenure voting systems does little to protect management control in a proxy contest for corporate control. \u0000We conclude that tenure voting does indeed represent an intermediate form of voting control from a managers’ perspective: it does not guarantee management control, as dual-class share structures do, but does give control to management who maintain large equity stakes in the firm. Institutional investors are likely to see it as an improvement over dual-class stock structures in terms of giving them corporate governance rights, although less advantageous to these shareholders’ rights than a one share, one vote voting system.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86098595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Insurers sell retail financial products called variable annuities that package mutual funds with minimum return guarantees over long horizons. Variable annuities accounted for $1.5 trillion or 34 percent of U.S. life insurer liabilities in 2015. Sales fell and fees increased after the 2008 financial crisis as the higher valuation of existing liabilities stressed risk-based capital. Insurers also made guarantees less generous or stopped offering guarantees entirely to reduce risk exposure. We develop an equilibrium model of insurance markets in which financial frictions and market power are important determinants of pricing, contract characteristics, and the degree of market incompleteness.
{"title":"The Fragility of Market Risk Insurance","authors":"R. Koijen, Motohiro Yogo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2972295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2972295","url":null,"abstract":"Insurers sell retail financial products called variable annuities that package mutual funds with minimum return guarantees over long horizons. Variable annuities accounted for $1.5 trillion or 34 percent of U.S. life insurer liabilities in 2015. Sales fell and fees increased after the 2008 financial crisis as the higher valuation of existing liabilities stressed risk-based capital. Insurers also made guarantees less generous or stopped offering guarantees entirely to reduce risk exposure. We develop an equilibrium model of insurance markets in which financial frictions and market power are important determinants of pricing, contract characteristics, and the degree of market incompleteness.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90746625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-04-28DOI: 10.21511/IMFI.14(1-1).2017.02
Andreas G. Georgantopoulos, John Filos
This paper is the first research attempt that investigates the impact of a large number of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of Greek banks, employing widely accepted in the literature of corporate governance econometric models. Results indicate that system GMM models are more suitable methodological tools than pooled OLS and fixed effects models to address well-known econometric problems, such as endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity of individual banks. The findings, as derived from the application of GMM models, imply that increasing the board size and the number of independent directors can both have a positive impact on the performance of Greek banks, but only up to a certain point. Thus, bank efficiency will increase as board size and the proportion of independent directors grow up to a point where these relationships hit a maximum from which bank performance decreases. Our multi-model estimations failed to trace any significant contribution of the number of female and foreign directors on the performance of Greek banks. Finally, the dual appointment of a CEO as Chairman appears to affect negatively two out of four proxies of bank performance. Overall, the results provide support for the positive impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of Greek banks. The significance of these findings increases, considering that the period under study (2008-2014) is marked by high market volatility and uncertainty due to the well-known debt crisis that plagues Greece since the beginning of 2008.
{"title":"Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Bank Performance: Evidence from the Greek Banks during Crisis Period","authors":"Andreas G. Georgantopoulos, John Filos","doi":"10.21511/IMFI.14(1-1).2017.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21511/IMFI.14(1-1).2017.02","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is the first research attempt that investigates the impact of a large number of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of Greek banks, employing widely accepted in the literature of corporate governance econometric models. Results indicate that system GMM models are more suitable methodological tools than pooled OLS and fixed effects models to address well-known econometric problems, such as endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity of individual banks. The findings, as derived from the application of GMM models, imply that increasing the board size and the number of independent directors can both have a positive impact on the performance of Greek banks, but only up to a certain point. Thus, bank efficiency will increase as board size and the proportion of independent directors grow up to a point where these relationships hit a maximum from which bank performance decreases. Our multi-model estimations failed to trace any significant contribution of the number of female and foreign directors on the performance of Greek banks. Finally, the dual appointment of a CEO as Chairman appears to affect negatively two out of four proxies of bank performance. Overall, the results provide support for the positive impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of Greek banks. The significance of these findings increases, considering that the period under study (2008-2014) is marked by high market volatility and uncertainty due to the well-known debt crisis that plagues Greece since the beginning of 2008.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89534574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite predictions of their demise in the aftermath of the collapse of socialist economies in Eastern Europe, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are very much alive in the global economy. The relevance of listed SOEs — firms still subject to government ownership, a portion of whose shares are traded on public stock markets — has persisted and even increased around the world, as policymakers have encouraged the partial floating of SOE shares either as a first step toward, or as an alternative to, privatization. In this article, we evaluate the governance challenges associated with mixed ownership of enterprise, and examine a variety of national approaches to the governance of listed SOEs, with a view to framing a robust policy discussion in the many countries where SOE reform is a topic of major significance. We describe the evolution and current status of the institutional framework applicable to listed SOEs in eight different jurisdictions, reflecting a variety of economic, legal, and political environments: France, the United States, Norway, Colombia, Brazil, Japan, Singapore, and China. We leverage the lessons from this comparative analysis to critique the policy prescriptions of international agencies such as the OECD, and to frame policy suggestions of our own.
{"title":"Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform","authors":"C. Milhaupt, M. Pargendler","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/zrxmn","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/zrxmn","url":null,"abstract":"Despite predictions of their demise in the aftermath of the collapse of socialist economies in Eastern Europe, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are very much alive in the global economy. The relevance of listed SOEs — firms still subject to government ownership, a portion of whose shares are traded on public stock markets — has persisted and even increased around the world, as policymakers have encouraged the partial floating of SOE shares either as a first step toward, or as an alternative to, privatization. In this article, we evaluate the governance challenges associated with mixed ownership of enterprise, and examine a variety of national approaches to the governance of listed SOEs, with a view to framing a robust policy discussion in the many countries where SOE reform is a topic of major significance. We describe the evolution and current status of the institutional framework applicable to listed SOEs in eight different jurisdictions, reflecting a variety of economic, legal, and political environments: France, the United States, Norway, Colombia, Brazil, Japan, Singapore, and China. We leverage the lessons from this comparative analysis to critique the policy prescriptions of international agencies such as the OECD, and to frame policy suggestions of our own.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84049720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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