Using a large panel of US BHC over the 2001:Q1-2015:Q4, we investigate the risk-taking behaviors of banks within a comparison perspective – between public and private banks - where there exists substantial differences of asymmetry information and agency problems. We document evidence of greater stability of public banks versus their private peers. However, public banks become riskier than private banks during the last crisis. These findings suggest a mixed evidence of risk-taking mitigating role of listing status. Regulatory pressure is effective in limiting risk taking by undercapitalized public banks before, but not during the crisis, casting doubt the effectiveness of regulators during the turmoil times. Public banks with high franchise value expose to risk less than others during the crisis. Debtholders discipline is ineffective in curbing the risk-taking behavior of banks. Our study is of interest for regulators, policymakers who are in search of improving bank risk-taking behavior.
{"title":"Ownership Structure and Bank Risk: The Effects of Crisis, Market Discipline and Regulatory Pressure","authors":"D. Tran, M. Hassan, R. Houston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3150353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3150353","url":null,"abstract":"Using a large panel of US BHC over the 2001:Q1-2015:Q4, we investigate the risk-taking behaviors of banks within a comparison perspective – between public and private banks - where there exists substantial differences of asymmetry information and agency problems. We document evidence of greater stability of public banks versus their private peers. However, public banks become riskier than private banks during the last crisis. These findings suggest a mixed evidence of risk-taking mitigating role of listing status. Regulatory pressure is effective in limiting risk taking by undercapitalized public banks before, but not during the crisis, casting doubt the effectiveness of regulators during the turmoil times. Public banks with high franchise value expose to risk less than others during the crisis. Debtholders discipline is ineffective in curbing the risk-taking behavior of banks. Our study is of interest for regulators, policymakers who are in search of improving bank risk-taking behavior.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82186123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Claim is the largest expenses of an insurance company. Therefore, claims management is seen as an essential tool of image boosting in insurance industry. Excellence in claims handling gives an insurance company a competitive edge over its competitors. For an insurance company, claims processing is one of its core activities. It could be said to be the main reason why insurance companies are established. Managing it more effectively and efficiently, aligning it with corporate business objectives, and achieving real-time operational awareness are high priorities of an insurance company. This is because claims processing touches all part of the organization, affecting competitive positioning, customer service, fraud management, risk exposure, cost control and Information Technology infrastructure. The objective of this research therefore, is to empirically investigate the impact of claims management on the profitability of non-life insurance companies in the Nigeria insurance industry. Hypotheses were tested to find out whether claims management is significantly related to profitability of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. The study adopts longitudinal design which follow the same sample over time and make repeated observations; hypotheses were tested using correlation analysis. The study revealed that there is a significant relationship between claims management and the operating cost of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. However, the study revealed that there is no significant relationship between claims management and profitability of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. It is recommended that the claims management department should be properly structured with highly technical, trained and experience staff so as to manage the claims of insurance companies properly as a well managed claim lead to profitability through repeated purchase.
{"title":"Impact of Claims Management on the Profitability of Nigerian Insurance Company: An Empirical Study of the Non-Life Insurance Sector","authors":"M. Ogunnubi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3126220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3126220","url":null,"abstract":"Claim is the largest expenses of an insurance company. Therefore, claims management is seen as an essential tool of image boosting in insurance industry. Excellence in claims handling gives an insurance company a competitive edge over its competitors. For an insurance company, claims processing is one of its core activities. It could be said to be the main reason why insurance companies are established. Managing it more effectively and efficiently, aligning it with corporate business objectives, and achieving real-time operational awareness are high priorities of an insurance company. This is because claims processing touches all part of the organization, affecting competitive positioning, customer service, fraud management, risk exposure, cost control and Information Technology infrastructure. The objective of this research therefore, is to empirically investigate the impact of claims management on the profitability of non-life insurance companies in the Nigeria insurance industry. Hypotheses were tested to find out whether claims management is significantly related to profitability of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. The study adopts longitudinal design which follow the same sample over time and make repeated observations; hypotheses were tested using correlation analysis. The study revealed that there is a significant relationship between claims management and the operating cost of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. However, the study revealed that there is no significant relationship between claims management and profitability of non-life insurance companies in Nigeria. It is recommended that the claims management department should be properly structured with highly technical, trained and experience staff so as to manage the claims of insurance companies properly as a well managed claim lead to profitability through repeated purchase.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89566722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The newly revised Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2015) by the OECD are fast emerging as a new regulatory paradigm for the administration of State-owned enterprises and the organization of the State ownership function. This article analyses the Guidelines’ policy prescriptions, governance strategies, and integration into global governance. Noting that the instrument operates by governing the shareholder’s internal make-up, decision-making and objective setting, the article argues that the Guidelines amount to a robust model for an ideal State shareholder – the Good State Shareholder. Efficient, engaged, and accountable, the Good State Shareholder emerges as a critical actor in the contemporary global economy, where States continue to amass and command immense shareholder power. However, when juxtaposed with the recent attempts by the UN to adopt State ownership as an instrument of human rights governance, the fault lines of the Good State Shareholder model, as well as the emerging techniques of shareholder governance, are exposed.
{"title":"Governing the Good State Shareholder: The Case of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises","authors":"Mikko Rajavuori","doi":"10.54648/eulr2018005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eulr2018005","url":null,"abstract":"The newly revised Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2015) by the OECD are fast emerging as a new regulatory paradigm for the administration of State-owned enterprises and the organization of the State ownership function. This article analyses the Guidelines’ policy prescriptions, governance strategies, and integration into global governance. Noting that the instrument operates by governing the shareholder’s internal make-up, decision-making and objective setting, the article argues that the Guidelines amount to a robust model for an ideal State shareholder – the Good State Shareholder. Efficient, engaged, and accountable, the Good State Shareholder emerges as a critical actor in the contemporary global economy, where States continue to amass and command immense shareholder power. However, when juxtaposed with the recent attempts by the UN to adopt State ownership as an instrument of human rights governance, the fault lines of the Good State Shareholder model, as well as the emerging techniques of shareholder governance, are exposed.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83764446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dual-class voting systems have been widely employed in recent initial public offerings by large tech companies, but have been roundly condemned by institutional investors and the S&P 500. As an alternative, commentators have proposed adoption of tenure voting systems, where investor voting rights increase with the length of time that they hold shares. In furtherance of this proposal, some Silicon Valley investors have requested that the SEC permit the creation of a new stock exchange where all of the companies will be required to use tenure voting systems. Is tenure voting a better choice than dual-class stock for both corporate management and shareholders? In this paper, we review the arguments for and against tenure voting that have been made in the literature. In order to shed light on these claims veracity, we generate the first data base that documents institutional investor portfolio turnover rates for stock. We use this data to inform our mathematical voting model of tenure voting to show how its adoption would affect control rights within the corporation. We make two main findings that shed light on this question. First, we show that when corporate management holds a large block of company stock prior to the implementation of tenure voting, and retains at least 20-30% of the total number of company shares on a long term basis, then tenure voting will insure that corporate managers maintain control of the company even in the face of an attempted change of control transaction by a highly motivated dissident shareholder. Our second important finding is that if corporate management chooses to sell off its large initial block of the company’s stock over time, so that inside ownership levels drop eventually down to a low percentage level with the majority of ownership held by institutional shareholders with different investment horizons, then the use of tenure voting systems does little to protect management control in a proxy contest for corporate control. We conclude that tenure voting does indeed represent an intermediate form of voting control from a managers’ perspective: it does not guarantee management control, as dual-class share structures do, but does give control to management who maintain large equity stakes in the firm. Institutional investors are likely to see it as an improvement over dual-class stock structures in terms of giving them corporate governance rights, although less advantageous to these shareholders’ rights than a one share, one vote voting system.
{"title":"Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers Lifetime Tenure?","authors":"Paul H. Edelman, Wei Jiang, Randall S. Thomas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3107225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3107225","url":null,"abstract":"Dual-class voting systems have been widely employed in recent initial public offerings by large tech companies, but have been roundly condemned by institutional investors and the S&P 500. As an alternative, commentators have proposed adoption of tenure voting systems, where investor voting rights increase with the length of time that they hold shares. In furtherance of this proposal, some Silicon Valley investors have requested that the SEC permit the creation of a new stock exchange where all of the companies will be required to use tenure voting systems. \u0000Is tenure voting a better choice than dual-class stock for both corporate management and shareholders? In this paper, we review the arguments for and against tenure voting that have been made in the literature. In order to shed light on these claims veracity, we generate the first data base that documents institutional investor portfolio turnover rates for stock. We use this data to inform our mathematical voting model of tenure voting to show how its adoption would affect control rights within the corporation. \u0000We make two main findings that shed light on this question. First, we show that when corporate management holds a large block of company stock prior to the implementation of tenure voting, and retains at least 20-30% of the total number of company shares on a long term basis, then tenure voting will insure that corporate managers maintain control of the company even in the face of an attempted change of control transaction by a highly motivated dissident shareholder. Our second important finding is that if corporate management chooses to sell off its large initial block of the company’s stock over time, so that inside ownership levels drop eventually down to a low percentage level with the majority of ownership held by institutional shareholders with different investment horizons, then the use of tenure voting systems does little to protect management control in a proxy contest for corporate control. \u0000We conclude that tenure voting does indeed represent an intermediate form of voting control from a managers’ perspective: it does not guarantee management control, as dual-class share structures do, but does give control to management who maintain large equity stakes in the firm. Institutional investors are likely to see it as an improvement over dual-class stock structures in terms of giving them corporate governance rights, although less advantageous to these shareholders’ rights than a one share, one vote voting system.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86098595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite predictions of their demise in the aftermath of the collapse of socialist economies in Eastern Europe, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are very much alive in the global economy. The relevance of listed SOEs — firms still subject to government ownership, a portion of whose shares are traded on public stock markets — has persisted and even increased around the world, as policymakers have encouraged the partial floating of SOE shares either as a first step toward, or as an alternative to, privatization. In this article, we evaluate the governance challenges associated with mixed ownership of enterprise, and examine a variety of national approaches to the governance of listed SOEs, with a view to framing a robust policy discussion in the many countries where SOE reform is a topic of major significance. We describe the evolution and current status of the institutional framework applicable to listed SOEs in eight different jurisdictions, reflecting a variety of economic, legal, and political environments: France, the United States, Norway, Colombia, Brazil, Japan, Singapore, and China. We leverage the lessons from this comparative analysis to critique the policy prescriptions of international agencies such as the OECD, and to frame policy suggestions of our own.
{"title":"Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform","authors":"C. Milhaupt, M. Pargendler","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/zrxmn","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/zrxmn","url":null,"abstract":"Despite predictions of their demise in the aftermath of the collapse of socialist economies in Eastern Europe, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are very much alive in the global economy. The relevance of listed SOEs — firms still subject to government ownership, a portion of whose shares are traded on public stock markets — has persisted and even increased around the world, as policymakers have encouraged the partial floating of SOE shares either as a first step toward, or as an alternative to, privatization. In this article, we evaluate the governance challenges associated with mixed ownership of enterprise, and examine a variety of national approaches to the governance of listed SOEs, with a view to framing a robust policy discussion in the many countries where SOE reform is a topic of major significance. We describe the evolution and current status of the institutional framework applicable to listed SOEs in eight different jurisdictions, reflecting a variety of economic, legal, and political environments: France, the United States, Norway, Colombia, Brazil, Japan, Singapore, and China. We leverage the lessons from this comparative analysis to critique the policy prescriptions of international agencies such as the OECD, and to frame policy suggestions of our own.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84049720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This study explores whether corporate governance at dual class firms differs from that of their single class counterparts and whether firm value at dual class firms is associated with governance. Employing a sample of 1309 U.S. dual class firm-year observations for the period 1996–2006, we show evidence that dual class firms are more likely to employ more shareholder rights provisions while exhibiting lower board and board committee independence than single class firms. The results also show that shareholder rights increase while board provisions decrease in wedge at dual class firms. Further findings underscore that firm value at dual class firms decreases in wedge, and increases in shareholder rights and in board-related provisions, particularly in director independence. While strong board-related governance at dual class firms is significantly positively related to firm value in a multivariate setting, shareholder rights are significantly associated with firm value only in instances of the weakest board provisions. Following unification, firms employ more antitakeover provisions while strengthening their board and board committee independence.
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Firm Value at Dual Class Firms","authors":"Ting Li, N. Zaiats","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2968564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2968564","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study explores whether corporate governance at dual class firms differs from that of their single class counterparts and whether firm value at dual class firms is associated with governance. Employing a sample of 1309 U.S. dual class firm-year observations for the period 1996–2006, we show evidence that dual class firms are more likely to employ more shareholder rights provisions while exhibiting lower board and board committee independence than single class firms. The results also show that shareholder rights increase while board provisions decrease in wedge at dual class firms. Further findings underscore that firm value at dual class firms decreases in wedge, and increases in shareholder rights and in board-related provisions, particularly in director independence. While strong board-related governance at dual class firms is significantly positively related to firm value in a multivariate setting, shareholder rights are significantly associated with firm value only in instances of the weakest board provisions. Following unification, firms employ more antitakeover provisions while strengthening their board and board committee independence.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85103468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A limited liability partnership (LLP) is first a general partnership that makes a special election for LLP status, thereby achieving limited liability for the partners. Many states, including New Jersey and Kentucky, require that, in order for a law firm to elect LLP status, it must have in place malpractice insurance or similar protections for clients. The rules as to the maintenance of malpractice insurance are, however, generally silent as to the consequences when that requirement is not satisfied.
{"title":"LLPs and Professional Malpractice Insurance: Grading the Mortgage Grader Decision","authors":"T. Rutledge","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2873675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2873675","url":null,"abstract":"A limited liability partnership (LLP) is first a general partnership that makes a special election for LLP status, thereby achieving limited liability for the partners. Many states, including New Jersey and Kentucky, require that, in order for a law firm to elect LLP status, it must have in place malpractice insurance or similar protections for clients. The rules as to the maintenance of malpractice insurance are, however, generally silent as to the consequences when that requirement is not satisfied.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85942336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the problem of finding a dynamically updating trading schedule for a portfolio with stochastically evolving forecasts, absolute value based execution costs and a decaying market impact as well as size constraints. This is achieved by deriving a continuous time stochastic state evolution model as well as a Hamiltonian with a corresponding HJB equation which is then approximately solved to third order accuracy which provides a Value function and the optimal controls.
{"title":"Portfolio Execution with Multi-Period Stochastic Forecasts and Size Constraints","authors":"Dmitriy Nuriyev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2814597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2814597","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the problem of finding a dynamically updating trading schedule for a portfolio with stochastically evolving forecasts, absolute value based execution costs and a decaying market impact as well as size constraints. This is achieved by deriving a continuous time stochastic state evolution model as well as a Hamiltonian with a corresponding HJB equation which is then approximately solved to third order accuracy which provides a Value function and the optimal controls.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74110291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we investigate the insurance choice of a risk-averse and prudent insured by assuming that the insurance premium is calculated by a general mean–variance principle. This general class of premium principles encompasses many widely used premium principles such as expected value, variance related, modified variance and mean value principles. We show that any admissible insurance contract, in which the marginal indemnity above a deductible minimum is decreasing in the loss and has a value greater than zero and less than one, is suboptimal to a dual change-loss insurance policy or a change-loss insurance policy, depending upon the coefficient of variation of the ceded loss. Especially for variance related premium principles, it is shown that the change-loss insurance is optimal. In addition to change-loss insurance, a numerical example illustrates that the dual change-loss insurance may also be an optimal choice when the insurance premium is calculated by mean value principle.
{"title":"Insurance Choice Under Third Degree Stochastic Dominance","authors":"Yichun Chi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2783203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2783203","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate the insurance choice of a risk-averse and prudent insured by assuming that the insurance premium is calculated by a general mean–variance principle. This general class of premium principles encompasses many widely used premium principles such as expected value, variance related, modified variance and mean value principles. We show that any admissible insurance contract, in which the marginal indemnity above a deductible minimum is decreasing in the loss and has a value greater than zero and less than one, is suboptimal to a dual change-loss insurance policy or a change-loss insurance policy, depending upon the coefficient of variation of the ceded loss. Especially for variance related premium principles, it is shown that the change-loss insurance is optimal. In addition to change-loss insurance, a numerical example illustrates that the dual change-loss insurance may also be an optimal choice when the insurance premium is calculated by mean value principle.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84661983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bitcoin is a relatively new technology with much promise. As the world’s first successful cryptocurrency, it seems likely to lower the costs of transacting. Nonetheless, many regulators hold a strong presumption that something must be done. I considered the popular justifications for regulating bitcoin with the idea of efficient regulation in mind. I also offer some simple guidelines for regulators to keep in mind while moving forward.
{"title":"Regulating Bitcoin: On What Grounds?","authors":"William J. Luther","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2631307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2631307","url":null,"abstract":"Bitcoin is a relatively new technology with much promise. As the world’s first successful cryptocurrency, it seems likely to lower the costs of transacting. Nonetheless, many regulators hold a strong presumption that something must be done. I considered the popular justifications for regulating bitcoin with the idea of efficient regulation in mind. I also offer some simple guidelines for regulators to keep in mind while moving forward.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77300622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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